

SOURCE BOOK OF
ANCIENT INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

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Prof. B. KUPPUSWAMY



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Introduction

While it is true that the ancient Indians were greatly interested in metaphysical speculation and developed profound systems of philosophy all the way from the materialism of Carvakas to monistic idealism of Gaudapada and Sankara, it is also true that the philosophical literature in India is rich in psychological thought. Since the beginning of nineteenth century, European and American scholars and thinkers were greatly impressed by the psychological insights and the psychological and physiological disciplines developed in the Upanishads, the Yoga-Sutras, the Bhagavad Gita and the schools of Buddhism and Jainism. Later they were astonished at the psychosomatic views held by the great medical authorities of India, Charaka and Sushruta. It has been one of the wonders in intellectual history that though there was no independent branch of study like Psychology in ancient India, the ancient Indian thinkers had developed highly systematic views regarding mind and its operations, particularly with reference to mental health and well-being.

Long ago Mrs. Rhys Davids published her monumental books on "The Psychology of the Buddhists". In 1933, Jadunath Sinha published his book on "Indian Psychology" dealing with perception. In 1934 Geraldine Coster published her valuable study *Yoga and Western Psychology*. She tried to compare the yoga system of self-analysis and mental training with Psycho-analytical theory and treatment of mental disorders. Jadunath Sinha later published his monumental work in two volumes *Cognition* in 1958 and *Emotion and Will* in 1961. In 1961, Kalghatgi published his book *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*. In 1962, Ramachandra Rao published his book *Development of Psychological Thought in India*. In 1968, Lois B. and Gardner Murphy published their book *Asian Psychology* which contains my essays "Psychological Aspects of Upanisads" (pp. 51-59) and "Psychological Aspects of Bhagavad Gita" (pp. 77-84).

My interest in the Psychological thought of Ancient India goes back to my undergraduate days when I took courses in Experimental Psychology as well as Indian Philosophy. My first article on Indian Psychology was "Naturalistic theory of mind in Indian thought" paper read at the Indian Philosophical Conference in Trivandrum in 1944 and later published in "Hiriyanna Commemoration Volume" Mysore 1952. Since then I have written a few papers for the Indian Philosophical Conference dealing with various psychological problems of Ancient Indian

thought.

When Prof. Gardner Murphy asked me to help him in his project "Asian Psychology" in 1960, I reluctantly agreed to do so, since he informed me that others, more qualified and better equipped than me, were not able to help him. Since then it has been my aim to compile a "Source Book of Ancient Indian Psychology". So in Mysore and later when I was working in New Delhi, I was selecting passages of Psychological interest and getting them typed. I am now happy that the task is completed.

In Part II of the book I have given extracts from the Philosophical Sources right up to fourth century A.D. In Part III I have given extracts from social, medical and aesthetic treatises. With the exception of Anandavardhana's Dhvani theory which belongs to ninth century A.D., the texts used are earlier than fourth century A.D. In order to give the reader a suitable background I have given a short introduction of three to four pages for each extract indicating the historical details of the work and the main ideas dealt with.

In Part I, I have given a description of the main themes of psychological interest in Ancient Indian thought.

My hope is that this book will help the modern scholars to understand the contributions of ancient Indians to the analysis of psychological problems not only in such fields as perception, memory, learning etc., but also in the fields of social behaviour, art experience, psycholinguistics and the theory of meaning. I would not by any means claim that this book gives comprehensive extracts from ancient Indian thought. I would only hope that it gives a representative picture of the problems raised by the ancient Indian thinkers.

I would like to point out that I have now given extracts only from the Sutras and the Commentaries which have been translated into English. There are many texts which are yet to be translated and published.

My hope is that this work will stimulate the interest of Indian Psychologists today to understand critically the contributions of ancient thinkers. It is also my hope that in this and the coming decade a few young men interested in this field will offer to write their Ph.D theses based on ancient Indian thought. I hope further that this book will be of interest to the psychologists, philosophers and other scholars in Europe, America, Russia, Japan and China and in West Asia and South-east Asia. It is my hope that further research by scholars in India and abroad will enable us to get a more detailed and a more integrated picture of Ancient Indian contribution to psychological thought and discipline.

B.KUPPUSWAMY

Preface

Source Book of Ancient Indian Psychology is the outcome of patient study of various ancient Indian texts by late Prof. B.Kuppuswamy. He gathered material for years and was able to bring together in this book contributions of some ancient Indian thinkers to the analysis of psychological problems not only in such fields as perception, memory, learning, etc., but also in the fields of social behaviour, art experience, psycho-linguistics and the theory of meaning. I hope this book will be useful to scholars of Ancient Indian Thought, to understand critically the contributions of ancient Indian thinkers.

I am grateful to Messrs Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. for publishing this book in record time. I am particularly grateful to Mr. V.C. Jain the Editorial Director, who took keen interest in bringing out this book.

I would fail in my duty if I do not acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to my husband Mr. B.V.Kumar who helped me to take up and complete the unfinished task of Prof. B.Kuppuswamy.

KAMALA KUMAR

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Some Main Themes in Ancient Indian Psychology

In ancient Indian thought Psychology was not an independent discipline. But each school of philosophy, medicine, aesthetics etc., developed its own theory of mind. The ancient Indian thinkers were greatly interested in psychological problems, Psychological issues were discussed in the course of their discussions of metaphysical, ethical, logical, aesthetic and other problems.

The philosophic attempt to determine the nature of reality may start either with reflection and analysis of reality of the thinking self or of the objects of thought. In India the philosophic analysis started with reflection on the self of man in the Upanishads. This interest is summed up in the expression "Atmanam Viddhi", "know the self". It is this interest in the analysis of self and the nature of experience, that led them on to a detailed study of perception and illusion on the one hand and of desires, feelings and emotions on the other. Right from the Upanishadic time there has been an interest in the problem of relation between body and mind; and the states of consciousness. Further, the ancient Indian thinkers realised the value of concentration as a means for the perception of truth. As a result, training of the mind and control of the will became the major preoccupations.

The mind of man was looked upon as having three aspects: the subconscious, the conscious and the superconscious. The psychic experiences such as telepathy and clairvoyance were considered to be neither abnormal nor miraculous. They were considered to be the powers of the mind which could be developed with effort. But it was also realised that one should not waste his energies in acquiring and exercising these powers. The ultimate goal of all mental training was the attainment of

moksha or nirvana. So the preoccupation with the "siddhis" like telepathy, and clairvoyance was looked upon as an obstacle to the development of one's personality. The 'abnormal' psychic phenomena like ecstasy, trance etc., were looked upon as the working of the "superconscious" mind. The Yoga system in particular, and some of the other systems of thought in general, refer to these superconscious states of mind and how they can be deliberately induced and the pitfalls to be avoided in the process.

Another noteworthy feature of the ancient Indian approach to the psychological problems is the division of mental states into four categories; the waking, the dreaming, the dreamless sleeping and what is called the "turiya", the fourth state, the supernormal mental state or the superconscious state. Thus the analysis of the mental states took into account all the various aspects and not merely the waking state. The ancient Indian thinker did not dismiss the dream state as something irrational or unworthy of study. If the waking consciousness alone is taken into account, one's philosophic outlook will become realistic; if the dream consciousness is studied exclusively, it leads to subjectivism; if only the state of dreamless sleep and the "fourth" state are taken into account one tends to become mystical in outlook (Radhakrishnan, I.p. 28). This is why the Indian analysis of experience right from the Upanishadic times, that is from about 1000 B.C., has taken into account all these four states of consciousness. This is another reason why psychological analysis plays an important role in ancient Indian thought. The facts of consciousness were studied by them with as much care as the modern scientists study facts of behaviour. They studied the facts obtained by observation and introspection carefully and tested them by logical reflection in order to find out whether the facts observed by one are merely subjectivist in character or are really universalistic in scope.

Yet another unique feature of ancient Indian thinking is the importance attached to mental discipline. As the Gita puts it, mind is volatile and restless; it is characterised by "chanchaltva"; its control is difficult (VI. 33). The great obstacle to attain evenness of mind, equanimity, is the essential character of restlessness of mind. Arjuna says that the control of mind is as difficult as the control of wind. While accepting that mind is difficult to curb, Krishna asserts that it can be controlled by constant practice (abhyasa) and by non-attachment (vairagya). In other words, what appears difficult in the beginning can ultimately be achieved by practice, by doing it over and over again; and by absence of

‘raga’ (attachment).

The emphasis on mental discipline is also the characteristic feature of the Yoga system, Buddhism etc. According to Patanjali, the definition of yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind (*chitta vritti nirodha*). It is further stated that the fluctuations of the mind can be restricted by means of practice and non-attachment or passionlessness (I. 12). It is through constant effort and through repetition that the fluctuations of mind can be controlled. Another requirement is *Vairagya*, getting rid of the thirst for objects like food, drink, sex, wealth, power etc. One can gain mastery over one’s mind through non-attachment, by getting rid of the desire for all kinds of objects and experiences which are not relevant to the purpose on hand, namely, achievement of mental development and equanimity.

Thus, according to the ancient Indian thinkers, mental discipline can be attained by constant practice and persistent effort and by overcoming the desires, and cravings which keep on disturbing one. By these two methods of constant practice and non-attachment, one can gain not only mastery over one’s self but also gain mastery over any branch of knowledge or any branch of skilled activity.

Finally, the goal of all effort is to attain mental health and mental stability (*chittasthairyā*). All the various schools of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism emphasised the necessity to attain mental stability as it was looked upon as a precondition to attain liberation.

It is true that the primary interest of the ancient Indian thinkers was religious development of individuals. But they fully realised that unless the mind is wholly unified and integrated there is no possibility of spiritual liberation. They looked upon mental health, mental stability and integration of the various levels of the mind as a prerequisite for liberation. So long as the mind is disturbed by conflicting emotions and is subject to various kinds of desires and aversions, there cannot be peace of mind. As the Gita puts it for the uncontrolled, there is no intelligence; nor for the uncontrolled is there the power of concentration and for him without concentration, there is no peace and for the unpeaceful, how can there be happiness? (II. 66). There cannot be any realisation of ultimate truth so long as the mind is restless, unsteady and unstable. The ancient Indian thinkers were convinced that mental development as well as mental health are both necessary to realise the ultimate values of religion. The technique of mental training developed by the various schools of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism is of great importance for the integration of mind and for the attainment of mental

health.

Liberation is freedom from various automatisms that render a person a slave to his impulses and emotions. A man can become psychologically free if he can succeed in disentangling himself entirely from desires and aversions so that his actions are never actuated by compulsions and in being self-conscious and aware so that all his actions are guided by knowledge and deliberations. According to ancient Indian thinkers it is the attainment of this freedom that is the goal of human evolution. When a man attains this liberation he is free from fixed emotional and mental habits and he can be objective in his outlook towards himself, other people, the circumstances and incidents of life.

The goal of liberation is to overcome compulsive activities and to cultivate true self-determined activity.

The States of Consciousness

One of the unique contributions of the Upanishadic thinkers is the analysis of the various states of consciousness. The Upanishads identify four states of consciousness: waking (jagrat), dreaming (svapna), deep sleep (sushupti), and the fourth state (turiya) which transcends the other three states. Thus the first three states are common to all human beings and within the experience of all; but the fourth state is a superconscious state, a supramental state.

1. **Waking.** The first condition is the waking state. The individual is in interaction with the world through what are identified as the nineteen openings; the five sense organs (eyes, ears, skin, nose and tongue); the five motor organs (speech, handling, walking, evacuation and reproduction); the five vital principles of prana etc; and the four internal organs: the manas (mind), the buddhi (intellect), the ahamkara (egoism), and the chitta (memory). The objects and processes in the world stimulate the individual through the sense organs with which he perceives and he reacts through the motor organs. The whole process is organised and integrated by the four processes: mental, intellectual, memory and self-sense. Thus in the waking condition we are aware of the external world. In this state the dependence of the self on the body is predominant. The Upanishads use the terms Bhokta (experience) and karta (agent) which together characterise the conscious activities of the individual.

2. **Dream.** Like waking, the dreaming state also involves the functioning of the mind. It is intermediate between the waking state and the deep sleep state. As the sense organs are in a quiescent state, it is stated that the senses are united with manas. While in the waking state the

manas receives impressions from outside and builds them up as ideas, in the dream state the manas creates a world of its own. The manas uses the material of waking experience to form the dreams. Though the dreams are thus made or revived impressions, the dream experiences are quite unlike reminiscence. During the experience the dream is felt to be as real as perceptual experience; as a result dreams have been described as "perception without sensation" (Hiriyanna, p. 71, 1932).

3. Dreamless Sleep. In deep, dreamless sleep, the 'manas' as well as the senses are quiescent. So there is no experience in the normal sense. As the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says "He desires no desires and sees no dreams". But it is not a state of consciousness. There is no consciousness of individuality. However, there is a sense of personal identity since on waking one says that one slept well. But during the "sushupti" state itself there is no awareness of oneself or any awareness of any objects. While in the waking state one is conscious of one's social status, family relations, age, education, etc., and the dreams are to some extent based on the experiences of the waking state, in the state of deep sleep there is no such awareness at all. So it is said that the pauper feels in this state whatever the prince feels. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad puts it "There, a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother There, a thief is not a thief, the murderer is not a murderer" (IV 3.22). Another characteristic feature of the experience is the state of bliss, though one recalls this only after waking up. As the Mandukya Upanishad describes, in sushupti we have neither dreams nor desires. In deep sleep we are lifted above all desires and are freed from all conflicts and frustrations. This is why in deep sleep the self is said to be released from "the shackles of the body" and the "tyranny of flesh". (Radhakrishnan, p. 160, 1929).

4. Turiya. While all the above states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep are within the experience of all human beings, this "fourth" state is an unique state attained only by a few. It is brought about by the deliberate elimination of all discursive thought.

In this condition the individual is neither conscious of external objects nor of internal objects. This is a transcendental state which is imperceptible, uncommunicable, and indefinable. It is asserted that in this highest state there is pure self-knowledge and tranquility. The extracts from Prasna Upanishad and from Mandukya Upanishad describe this stage.

The turiya state resembles the sushupti state in all respects but one. Like in the sushupti state in the turiya state also there is the withdrawal

of normal consciousness, and absence of all desires and there is the manifestation of bliss. However, while the sushupti state is transitional and achieved without any effort on the part of a person without any training, the turiya state is the result of concentration and meditation; it results from personal effort and long training. The attainment of this state is regarded as the culmination of spiritual training.

The turiya state also bears resemblance to the anandamaya state, which is represented by the Taittiriya Upanisad (ii 1-5) as being higher than the experience of the conscious (manomaya) and the self-conscious (vijñanamaya) levels of life. In this transcendent state the individual goes beyond the conflicts and confusions typical of the conscious and self-conscious levels. However, this anandamaya experience, as in the case of contemplation of art, is transitory.

Thus one can get some insight into the turiya state of consciousness on the basis of the experience in the sushupti state and on the basis of the anandamaya experience (Hiriyanna, p. 72).

Body and Mind

In a dialogue between the teacher Prajapati and the pupil Indra, narrated in Chandogya Upanishad, there is progressive development in the definition of self. First, there is the identification of the self with the body. Prajapati asks Indra to adorn himself with his best clothes and look at himself in the water. Though Indra is able to see his reflection in the water, a doubt arises in him; the self reflected in the water is well adorned when the body is well-adorned; similarly, it would be blind if the body is blind, lame if the body is lame. So he concludes that the self cannot be identified with the body and returns to the teacher for further enlightenment. He is told by the teacher that "he who moves about happy in dreams is the self". On reflection Indra discovers that though it is true that in the dream the self is not rendered faulty by the faults of the body, the self in the dream becomes conscious of pain and sheds tears when one is struck. Indra again approaches Prajapati expressing his difficulty. This time Prajapati says, "When a man being asleep, reposing at perfect rest, sees no dreams, that is the self". The teacher indicates that there is a continuity of self even when the waking and the dreaming experiences are suspended. But Indra felt that this self, freed from all bodily experience and all experiences in the dream state is an "objectless self", a barren fiction. (Radhakrishnan, p. 155, 1929). Indra reflects that in dreamless sleep there is no self at all; this condition, free from the limits imposed by the organism, free from time and space, free

from the experience of objects, as well as internal states is nothing but simple annihilation according to Indra. However, Prajapati was trying to emphasise that while the self included the conscious states, it was not identical with the conscious states; the identity of the self is not affected by the changes of experience. The self is both subject and object, it is immanent as well as transcendent. All our states of consciousness revolve around this self. The self thus understood is the permanent subject persisting in waking and dreaming and dreamless sleeping.

The Chandogya Upanishad brings out the relation between speech, mind, thought and other processes. It is speech that helps memory as well as discrimination. Speech is identified with the universal principle, Brahman and one is asked to meditate on speech. But mind is greater than speech. It is mind which holds in itself speech as well as name. It is by making up one's mind that one can learn and act. Mind is the repository of desires. So one is asked to meditate on mind. Will (sankalpa) is greater than mind. And thought (chittam) is greater than will. It is when one thinks that he can will. It enables reflection. A learned but unthinking man is not respected. On the other hand, people will listen with attention to one who is thoughtful though he knows little. So one should meditate on thought.

Contemplation (dhyanam) is greater than thought. He who does not contemplate is given to quarrels, abuse and slander. Understanding (vijñanam) is greater than contemplation. Strength (bala) is greater than understanding. Food is greater than strength. A hungry man becomes a non-seer, non-thinker and non-knower.

Thus the physical and the mental are closely correlated, according to Chandogya Upanishad (VII. 2).

The Taittiriya Upanishad described the five sheaths (kosas) of an individual. First there is the body, the 'annamaya kosa', which is physical. Within this body is the 'pranamaya kosa', the vital force. Within this vital force is the 'manomaya kosa', the mental sheath. Inside the mental sheath is the 'vijñanamaya kosa', the self consisting of understanding capable of self-consciousness. Inside this intellectual sheath is the self consisting of bliss, the 'anandamaya kosa'.

This doctrine of the 'kosas' appears to be both analytic and evolutionary in its scope. There are the physical, the biological, the behavioural, the intellectual, and the self-actualizing or the self-realizing components. The behavioural component, the 'manomaya kosa' is common to animals and man. It is the intellectual component, the 'vijñanamaya kosa' that distinguishes the man from the animals and helps in the

development of civilization and culture. But the highest development of man consists in his self-realization leading to the 'anandamaya' state.

The Katha Upanishad gives another description of the relation between mind and body. The body is compared with the chariot and the self with the lord of the chariot. The intellect (buddhi) is the charioteer. The sense organs are the horses and the mind (manas) is the reins with which the horses are held in control. When the individual has no understanding and when the mind is unrestrained, the senses are out of control. He pursues the path taken by the horses instead of making the horses (the senses) take the path determined by himself. It is the man of understanding who has a control over the rein of his mind, and the senses that is able to reach the end of his journey and attain self-realisation.

Thus there is hierarchy here. The body and the sense organs with their objects are at the lowest level. The mind is superior to the sense organs; the intellect is superior to the mind; and the self is superior to the intellect. There is nothing superior to the self. The body, the sense organs, mind and intellect are all the instruments of the self. It is through them that the self knows, feels and acts. The self is the knower, the enjoyer and the agent of action. When the sense organs, together with the mind cease from their normal activities and the intellect itself does not stir, the self reaches its highest state. The ultimate goal of man is to attain this state.

Similar statement is made in 'Bhagavad Gita'. The senses, they say, are great, greater than senses is the 'manas', greater than the 'manas' is 'buddhi' but greater than 'buddhi' is the self. (III. 42). The body, the senses and the mind constitute the lower self. It is 'Kamarupam', it is in the form of desire and so is restless. Knowing that the self is beyond and above these levels one must be guided by oneself.

The Sankhya and Yoga systems admit two principles—'purusha' and prakriti. Prakriti is the fundamental substance out of which the world evolves. Prakriti is made up of three 'gunas', qualities, which are themselves substances. These three gunas are 'sattva', 'rajas' and 'tamas'. In the state of rest, the tendencies to manifestation (sattva) and activity (rajas) are held in check by the tendency to non-manifestation and non-activity (tamas). When there is a disturbance of the equilibrium, prakriti evolves. It is under the influence of 'purusha' that 'prakriti' evolves. The evolution is to fulfil the needs of purusha. As a result, the apparatus of thought and experience, as well as the objects of thought and experience are evolved. 'Mahat', or the great, the cause of

The whole universe, is the first product of evolution. It is the basis of intelligence (buddhi) of the individual. The term 'mahat' brings out the cosmic aspect and the term 'buddhi' brings out the psychological counterpart relating to each individual.

'Purusha' is devoid of all characteristics. It is pure 'chitta', consciousness: it is entirely passive. On the other hand, 'buddhi' is an evolute of 'prakriti' and so must not be confused with 'purusha'. 'Buddhi' is the subtle substance of all mental processes. The functions of 'buddhi' are inquiry and decision.

After 'buddhi', arises 'ahamkara', the 'I' - consciousness, or the ego-consciousness, which takes the experience as 'mine'. From this come the 'manas' and the ten 'indriyas'—five sensory organs and five motor organs.

Thus, 'buddhi', 'ahamkara', 'manas' and the ten indriyas are the evolutes of prakriti with 'sattva guna' predominating.

On the other side, out of 'tamas' arise the physical aspect of the universe, called 'bhutadi', constituting the five 'tanmatras' (the subtle basis of elements) and the five 'bhutas' (elements).

Though both the mental-sensory apparatus and the physical elements and objects are the evolutes of the prakriti, the difference between them is due to the predominance of the sattva in the former and the predominance of the 'tamas' in the latter: the 'rajo guna', the principle of activity is operating in both to bring about their evolution. The 'manas' and the 'indriyas', according to the systems, are not themselves psychological; they owe that character to the influence of the self, the 'purusha', the only principle of consciousness acknowledged by the 'Sankhya-Yoga' systems. By way of illustration to help us to understand this position, we can take up the mirror which reflects and the wall which does not, though both are physical. This is a clear recognition that the 'psychological' factors depend on the 'physical' factors of the nervous system and the sense organs. Another illustration is that of the lamp: the wick which is 'tamas' in conjunction with oil which is 'rajas' gives rise to the flame which is 'sattva'.

The purpose of the evolution of prakriti into the two series, mental and physical, is to secure worldly experience 'bhoga' for the individual or to bring about his liberation (apavarga) from the ties of 'samsara'. But the final aim of the evolution is to restore the self to its original condition of pure consciousness.

Buddha admitted only states of consciousness, but not the mind. To him, the self consists of the sensations and thoughts together with the

physical frame. This is why the self is looked upon as a 'samghata', an aggregate of the mental and physical aspects. The aggregate is sometimes described as 'nama-rupa'. Buddhaghosa in his 'Visuddhimagga' says that by 'nama', sensation, perception and predisposition are indicated and by 'rupa' the body. He asserts that 'nama' by itself cannot produce the physical changes involved in eating, drinking, movement etc. Nor can 'rupa', the body, by itself bring about these activities. Like the cripple and the blind, 'nama' and 'rupa' mutually help each other, to initiate these activities of the individual. Another analogy is used. There is no collection of material out of which are produced 'nama' and 'rupa'; 'nama-rupa' is like a lute; when played upon the sound arises (Warren, p. 184-186).

The Jaina notion of 'jiva' corresponds to that of 'atman' and 'puruṣa' of the other schools of Indian thought. The self not only exists but is an experient (Bhokta) and an agent (Karta). Its intrinsic nature is one of perfection, but because of its union with the matter, this feature is obscured. Thus the body is a limitation and prevents the full manifestation of perfection which is the quality of the self. The Jaina thinkers speak of three states of the self: 'bahiratman' consisting of the identification of the self with the body and other external belongings; 'antaratman', consisting of self-consciousness and discriminative knowledge; 'paramatman', which is free from all impurities, the pure and perfect self. As regards the relation between mind and body, Mahavira points out that it is not correct to maintain that consciousness is produced by the collection of the 'bhutas'; chetana is the quality of the self; it is different from the bodily aspect. The five sense organs are distinguished into 'dravya-indriyas' or physical sense organs and 'bhava-indriyas' or their psychical counterparts. Every 'jiva' is a composite of body and self; the body is inactive and passive; it is the self that is active. Jainism recognizes that the bodily changes take place by themselves and the 'jiva' undergoes its own changes. These two processes form independent series, suggesting psychophysical parallelism. In order to account for the interaction between the mental and bodily processes, the concept of 'nimittakarta' the casual agent was developed, it postulates a causal relationship between the two. "Just as the lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to milk, so the 'jiva' residing in its own body imparts its lustre or intelligence to the whole body". As Radhakrishnan comments: "The two self-determining agencies somehow get harmoniously blended. Since direct causal relation between the two series is rejected, no better explanation than a mysterious harmony

is possible. (Vol I, p. 310).

Thus the ancient Indian thinkers right from the Upanishadic times, i.e. from 1000 B.C., were concerned with the problem of the relation between mind and body. The 'Charvakas', of whose works none are extant today, denied that mind and consciousness are special categories. The Charvakas were contemporaries of Buddha. They believed that the ultimate principles are only the four elements: earth, water, fire and air. They asserted that sense perception is the only form of knowledge. They rejected inference and testimony, as means to provide knowledge. Consciousness is a modification of the four elements. It is produced in the same way in which red colour is produced from the combination of betel, areca nut, and lime. Another illustration given was alcohol, a material product, which alters consciousness. So, according to the Charvakas, thought is a function of matter. Consciousness is invariably found only in a living person. There is no self without a body. Therefore the 'atman' is the body itself (Radhakrishnan, I., Vol I, p. 279, 1929). There are many points of resemblance between the views of Charvakas, the Buddhists and the Sankhya systems regarding the relation between body and mind.

Patanjali's Yoga system attaches a great value to the close relation between body and mind. While the control of the fluctuations in attention and thought is the goal of yoga, two basic means adopted to attain it are the relaxed posture of the body in 'asana' and regulated and controlled breathing in 'pranayama'. The process of meditation can be successful according to Patanjali, if one learns by gradual effort to maintain a suitable posture that is easy and steady. With rhythmic breathing and retention of breath in Pranayama the mind becomes calm according to Patanjali. Just as by controlling breath we can control the various motions of the body, by controlling breath we can also control our attention and thought according to Yoga. Elsewhere Patanjali asserts "Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body and inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions". (I. 31)

Cognitive Processes

In the philosophical literature of ancient India there is elaborate treatment of the various cognitive processes. The different schools of philosophers had different views regarding perception, sense-organs, consciousness etc.

1. **Physical basis of perception.** The Buddhists recognize six varie-

ties of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and purely mental. Corresponding to them are the six organs of vision, audition, smell, taste, touch and mind. There are six varieties of objects, namely, colours, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles and ideas. The sense organs are divided into two classes: (a) 'prapoyakari', the sense organs which apprehend objects which come into direct contact with them like smell, taste and touch; and (b) 'aprapyakari', those which apprehend objects without coming into contact with them, like vision and audition.

The Jainas recognize five sense organs. They are of two kinds: objective senses 'dravyendriya' the physical sense organs and subjective senses (bhavendriya), the psychical correlates. The latter are of two kinds: 'labdhi', the manifestation of the sense-faculty by the partial destruction of the knowledge-obscuring karma relating to that sense and 'upayoga' the conscious attention of the self directed to that sense. The Jainas do not regard the mind as a sense organ.

According to Samkhya system there are eleven sense organs: five organs of knowledge (buddhindriya) and five organs of action (karmendriya), and the manas, which is called the internal organ (antahkarana). Sometime the 'manas', 'buddhi' and 'ahamkara' are described as the three forms of the internal organ. The organs of action are the vocal organ, the prehensile organ, the locomotive organ, the evacuative organ and the generative organ. The sense organs are not material (bhautika) but are products of ahamkara (egoism).

Generally, it is held that there is a correlation between the sense-organ and the object apprehended by it. The visual organ can apprehend colour because it is endowed with the quality of colour.

2. Stages of perception. The ancient Indian thinkers generally recognized two distinct stages of perception: 'nirvikalpa' (indeterminate) and 'savikalpa' (determinate).

In the first stage of perception there is mere apprehension of the form of the object. It is an undifferentiated and nonrelational mode of apprehension. It is purely sensory and presentative. It does not involve any verbal images.

In the later stage there is the perception of the object with its different properties and their relations to one another. There is also the naming process.

When the sense-organ is in contact with the object we experience an immediate apprehension of the object. At this stage we are not aware of the qualities of the object and their relation to the qualities of other objects. In the next stages of determinate perception there is the recall

of previous experience, we remember the particular class to which it belongs and the particular name with which it is known. Determinate perception involves the recall of the class to which the object belongs and its name. In fact, according to the older 'Naiyayikas', indeterminate perception is the perception of an object without a name, while determinate perception is the perception of an object with its name. According to some other thinkers, the main difference between the two stages is that in indeterminate perception there is apprehension of an object and its qualifications without their mutual relations, while in determinate perception there is the apprehension of the object as qualified with their mutual relations. Thus, determinate perception is a complex presentative-representative process, involving assimilation of the object to other like objects and discrimination of it from other unlike objects on the basis of the recall of past experience.

3. Theories of perception. According to the naiyayika theory, in perception there is not only the contact of the sense-organs with the object, but there is also the contact of the sense-organs with manas and the contact of the 'manas' with the self. The 'Mimamsaka' theory of perception is close to the 'Nyaya' theory. According to Jaimini perception requires the existence of an object, a sense organ with which the object comes into contact and the self in which the cognition is produced.

The Samkhya theory asserts that perception is the mental function 'buddhivritti' which goes out to the object and is modified by the particular form of that object. Thus the proximity of external object to 'buddhi' (intellect) is the indispensable condition of perception. Perception involves not only the existence of an object and the sense-organ but also the operation of the intellect (buddhi) which produces a definite and determinate cognition of the object. Thus, according to the Sankhya, perception involves the co-operation of the external sense-organs and the internal organ (Antahkarana).

The Jaina theory distinguishes between 'darsana' and 'jnana'. 'Darsana' is the simple apprehension of the object on peripheral stimulation. It involves the apprehension of the general features and not its particular features. But 'Jnana' is the apprehension of the special features of an object. Though darsana corresponds to indeterminate perception of the other systems, a special terminology is used here because the term 'Jnana' by definition is determinate always. In ordinary perception there are four stages. Just after 'darsana', there is 'avagraha', while 'darsana' gives an apprehension of the mere existence of an object in an

indefinite and indistinct manner, at the 'avagraha' stage there is an awareness of the general and special features; but all the details of the object are not perceived. This gives rise to desire to know more about the object. This is called 'iha'. Next there is 'avaya', the stage of ascertainment of the true nature of the object. At this stage there is assimilation and discrimination, similarities with other objects and differences from them are perceived. It involves the recognition of an object as belonging to a definite class. Thus at the 'avaya' stage there is definite and determinate perception. This gives rise to the final stage, 'dharana' or retention. There is now the formation of 'samakara', an impression which enables us to remember the object afterwards.

According to Buddhism, 'sanna', perception is one of the 'skandhas' which makes up the name 'rupa', the psycho-physical organism. According to Buddhaghosa, consciousness first comes into touch with its object and then perception, feeling and volition arise. When there is 'phassa', contact between the sense organ and the object, sensation arises. This impact leads to a modification of the mental continuum and results in feeling or ideation or both. Buddhaghosa uses a simile to describe the process of perception. A man went to sleep at the foot of a mango tree. A ripe mango fell on him. Awakened by the sound and touch, he opened his eyes and looked. He stretched out his hand, took the fruit and squeezed it and ate it. Four different processes of consciousness are necessary for the full perception of a sense object: (i) dependence on the five sense-organs; (ii) the reproductive process which links the different aspects of perception till a complete synthesis of the object is attained; (iii) the process of grasping the name of the object, and (iv) the process of grasping the meaning. Thus perception involves the reproductive, discriminative, classificatory, naming and other processes, also. All of them occur in quick succession. (Lama Angarika Govinda, 1961, pp. 134-147).

4 Illusion. All the various schools of Indian philosophy make a detailed analysis of illusions. Such analysis is coloured by their metaphysical presuppositions. This is the main source for innumerable controversies regarding the analysis of illusion.

Illusions are divided from one point of view into (a) those involving false ascription of an actually perceived object to another object present to the senses and (b) those involving false ascription of what is remembered to an object present to the senses. Illustration of the former is the bilious person perceiving the conch-shell as yellow and the illustration of the latter is the perception of silver in a nacre. Another illustration of

illusion is the perception of double moon when the eye-ball is pressed with a finger. Dreams and hallucinations are given as illustrations of the centrally initiated illusions. Thus in a broad way illusions are classified as those produced by the peripheral organs and those produced by the central organ or mind. Hallucinations are described as those which are centrally produced due to defect in the 'manas' and are not caused by any external stimuli or by defects in the sense organ.

With respect to the causation of illusions, they are ascribed either (a) to some defect in the conditions of perception, or (b) to some defect in the operation of sense-organs, or (c) to the subconscious impressions (samskara).

Seven different theories of illusions are mentioned: (1) 'Akhyati', non-apprehension, (2) 'Asatkhyati', apprehension of a non-existent object, (3) 'Prasiddharthakhyati', apprehension of a real object established by knowledge, (4) 'Atmakhyati', apprehension of a subjective cognition projected into the external world, (5) 'Anirvacaniyathakhyati', apprehension of an undefinable object, (6) 'Anyathakhyati', apprehension of an object as a different one and (7) 'Smritupramosha', obscuration of memory or 'vivikakhyati', non-discrimination. As noted above, all these various theories arose out of the differences in the metaphysical standpoints of the various schools (Sinha, Vol I, p. 285).

5. Attention. Attention is defined as one-pointedness of the mind, the act of focussing the mind on one object to the exclusion of other objects. Thus it involves selection, the positive aspect and rejection, the negative aspect.

Inattention is described as the dispersal of mind on various objects. 'Rajas' is the cause of restlessness of mind and fluctuation of attention. 'Tamas' is the cause of inattention arising from lethargy, bewilderment etc. When 'sattva' predominates, the mind is calm and stable, and concentration of attention is possible.

Attention requires not only the focussing of the mind on one object, it also involves the inhibition of all movements of the body and speech. Thus the body as well as the mind should be obtained towards the object attended to.

According to Buddhaghosa attention narrows the range of consciousness; it makes the object distinct; it promotes enlightenment; it leads to serenity (Visuddhimagga).

The Gita asserts that one should control the sense-organs with one's mind by abandoning all desires born of selfish will (VI. 24). It is by this

process that one can become a 'Vasyatomana', a self-controlled person (VI. 36).

Vyasa, in his commentary on the first sutra of Patanjali, describes the mind as restless (kshipta), infatuated (mudha) and distracted (vikshipta). By practice one has to build up 'ekagra', the singlemindedness (I.1). Thus, the normal tendency of the mind is to shift constantly from one object to another, from one thought to another. This shifting of attention can be arrested by the practice of concentration of attention.

Distraction of attention may be due to intense stimuli impinging on the sense-organ like the thunder or to preoccupation of the mind with another object. Emotions like desire, fear and rage distract the attention (Gita II. 56 and IV. 10). Attention is distracted by preoccupation with the objects of sense (Gita II. 62). Detachment (vairagya) promotes concentration of attention.

Vyasa, commenting on another sutra of Patanjali (I. 30) enumerates the following obstacles to concentration of attention: (1) illness, (2) langour (lack of activity), (3) doubt leading to dilemma, (4) heedlessness, (5) listlessness (lack of effort), (6) greed and addiction to objects of sense, (7) thinking about misconceptions.

Patanjali mentions that bodily pain, mental pain and despondency, unsteadiness of the body, changes in breathing are the accompaniments of distraction (viksepa) (I. 31).

6. The Internal Organs. According to Samkhya the three internal organs, 'buddhi', 'ahamkara' and 'manas' are the principal organs since they apprehend all objects past, present and future. The external organs are the subordinate organs since they apprehend and act upon only the objects present

Manas is the chief organ in relation to the functions of the external senses. 'Ahamkara' is the chief organ in relation to the function of 'manas' and 'buddhi' is the chief organ in relation to the function of 'ahamkara'. Together, the three constitute 'antahkarana', the internal organ.

(i) *Manas (Mind)* has the function of reflecting upon the object apprehended by the sense organ, relates it to its properties. The first apprehension is simple and immediate like that of a child. It is the apprehension of the mere thing. Then it is the manas which distinguishes the properties of the object, recognizes its class, name, quality, action etc. Thus manas is responsible for determinate perception, that the object has a certain quality, belongs to a certain class and has a certain name.

(ii) *Ahamkara*, the empirical ego, appropriates all experience to itself. It looks upon all objects apprehended by the sense-organs and perceived by the 'manas' as objects for one's own use. "I am supreme"; "everything belongs to me"; "everything is for my use". This self-appropriation of all objects and experiences, is designated 'ahamkara'. Self-appropriation (*abhimana*) is the function of *ahamkara*, the empirical ego.

(iii) *Buddhi* (*intellect*) is the chief organ because it has direct experience of the self (*purusha*), while the others are in contact with the self through the mediation of *buddhi*. It pervades all the sense-organs and the 'manas' and produces knowledge. 'Buddhi' is also the receptacle of all subconscious impressions (*samskara*). Finally, 'buddhi' enables recognition and recollection. It is 'buddhi' which receives the apprehensions of external objects by the sense organs which are communicated through the 'manas' and 'ahamkara' (the empirical ego) and produces a definite and determinate cognition of the object (*adhyavasaya*). It is the 'buddhi' which resolves what is to be done to the object thus perceived. The function of intellect (*buddhi*) is the ascertainment of its duty towards the object known.

Thus, the three internal organs of 'manas', 'ahamkara' and 'buddhi' are not to be regarded as three independent substances or faculties. Together they constitute one internal organ, the '*antahkarana*'. When the external senses apprehend an object, 'manas' reflects upon it (*manana*), determines the properties of the object; 'ahamkara' appropriates the objects to the self (*abhimana*); and 'buddhi' gets a definite and determinate knowledge of the object (*adhyavasaya*), resolves upon the course of action in relation to the object; and makes the experience available to the self (*purusha*).

However, 'Nyaya-Vaisesika' believes in only one internal organ or 'manas'. Further, 'manas' is not material. While the external senses apprehend only a limited number of objects pertaining to the organ, *manas* can apprehend all objects. Mind guides all the external senses. Finally mind apprehends directly pleasure, pain, etc.

7. **Memory.** The Chandogya Upanishad described how memory is affected by fasting. The pupil did not take food for fifteen days and found that he was unable to recite the Vedas which he had learnt earlier. "They do not occur to me, Sir" he says, when asked to recite them. Later on he was asked to eat food and he found that he could remember all that he had learnt earlier (p. 35).

Nagasena expounds the Buddhist view regarding memory. When

King Milinda asserts that it is the mind which recollects, Nagasena asks him whether he has forgotten some events in his life; when the King replies in the affirmative, Nagasena asks him whether this forgetfulness is an indication of the absence of mind in him. It is memory which failed. According to the Buddhist the self is a stream of ideas, feelings etc., the self is not a permanent principle. It is by association that one perception or idea recalls another perception or idea.

'Naiyayika' definition of recollection is that it is the process of recalling or recognizing an object that was perceived in the past by the same self. It is the same self which perceived it in the past and now remembers it in the present or recognizes it as having been an object of its past experience. Memory presupposes an impression (*samskara*) produced by the past experience, its retention (*dharana*) and its later recall (*smriti*). It also presupposes that it is the same self which had the experience in the past and recollects in the present.

According to 'Samkhya', recollection is the cognition produced by a past impression (*Smriti Samskarajanyam jnanam*). Patanjali similarly defines *smriti* as a mental mode which cognizes an object which was apprehended in the past. Vyasa in his commentary on Patanjali raises the question whether one remembers a cognition or the object cognized and concludes that recollection involves both.

As noted above, according to the Jaina view of perception, *dharana*, retention, is the final stage in the growth of perception itself. In retention, the past experience is retained in the form of mental disposition or *samskara*. Such retention of past experience forms a condition of the recall of the experience on a later occasion. But retention by itself is not a sufficient condition of memory. The experience that has been retained has to be recalled. It is the recall which establishes that there has been memory of the past experience. The emergence of the latent *samskara* (impression) by stimulation constitutes a necessary condition of '*smriti*'. The stimulation may be external or internal. Thirdly, there is the factor of '*pratyabhijna*' recognition. It is a synthetic judgement born of perception and recollection. So we say on seeing a jar 'this is that jar' already seen. In this sense recognition is different from recollection. In recognition the object is present before us; in recollection, what is recollected is not present to our senses. Thus according to the Jainas retention *dharana* is a condition of perception (*pratyaksa*), recollection (*smriti*), and recognition (*pratyabhijna*).

8 Association. Attention may be drawn to a long list of conditions of recall mentioned in "The Questions of King Milinda" and another long

list of conditions enumerated by Gautama in his Nyaya Sutra. An attempt has been made here to analyse these two lists in order to show that these ancient Indian thinkers were in a position to formulate some laws of association.

In Milindapanha are mentioned sixteen conditions of recall. Among them the following conditions indicate the awareness of some of the laws of association.

(1) Outward aid reminds a person of his past experiences. Those experiences forgotten by an individual are recalled when other people remind him of those experiences that he had.

(2) A deep impression left by the vivid perception of an interesting event can easily be recalled. For instance, the king remembers his coronation day. Prasastapada, in his commentary on 'Vaisesika Sutra' speaks of 'adarapratyaya'. An intense experience which afforded pleasure or joy to a person on a previous occasion tends to be recalled later when there are similar experiences.

(3) Similarity of appearance is a condition of recall. The sight of a person resembling the father or some other known person reminds us of the latter.

(4) When we see an object we recall a particular colour, smell, taste etc., of similar objects experienced in the past.

(5) A sign reminds us of the object signified by it.

Gautama gives a list of twenty five conditions of recall in his Nyaya Sutra. Among these conditions some describe the laws of association.

1. Intense experiences and vivid experiences bring about recollection later.

2. Suggestive signs (linga) remind us of the object with which they were associated in our past experience. They are of three kinds:

(a) Conjunct (samyogi)—An object reminds us of something with which it was invariably found to be in contact in our past experience.

(b) Inherent (samavayi)—An object reminds us of something in which it has always perceived to inhere in our past experience. Horns are always perceived to inhere in a cow; so the horns remind us of a cow.

(c) Contradictory (virodha)—Two objects, which were always perceived to be antagonistic to each other, remind us of each other. The serpent reminds one of the mongoose.

3. Similarity (sadrasya)—An object reminds us of another on account of its similarity with it. The picture of Devadatta reminds us of him.

4. (a) Ownership (*parigraha*)—When two entities are related to each other as the owner and owned, either of them reminds us of the other.

(b) The supporter (*asraya*) reminds us of the supported and the supported (*asrita*) reminds one of the supporter.

(c) A pupil reminds one of his teacher and vice-versa.

5. Immediate sequence (*anantarya*) is a condition of recall. In performing a complete act the performance of one item reminds us of the item that follows it by way of contiguity.

6. Separation (*viyoga*)—When two lovers are separated from each other, each constantly thinks of the other.

Thus we find a clear indication of the formulation of the primary and secondary laws of association by these ancient Indian thinkers

9. **Learning.** As noted above the ancient Indian thinkers concerned themselves with analysis of learning process.

In a broad way it may be said that they laid down two basic laws of learning: (a) 'Abhayasa', law of practice and (b) 'Vairagya', the law of detachment. The yoga sutra lays down that the fluctuations of mind can be restricted by means of practice and detachment (I. 12)

The next two sutras describe practice. It is indicated that *abhyasa* (practice) is repeated exertion to reach the goal. Practice is an effort (*prayatna*) in order to see that there is permanent acquisition of the skill etc. It is explained that practice depends upon 'singleness-of-intent' The effort starts with a specific volition (*iccha*). It is further indicated that practice must be cultivated for a long time; it must be cultivated without interruption; it must be undertaken with earnest attention and faith (*shraddha*). Then learning will become permanent. Finally, the commentator indicates that with all these efforts if one fails to reach the goal aimed at, one should not give up the practice. One should not become disheartened and give up the practice. One should continue to persevere.

The next sutra describes what may be called the law of detachment (*vairagyam*). Non-attachment consists in ridding oneself of the thirst for other objects. When one is engaged in acquisition of knowledge or skill one should not allow oneself to be carried away by other desires which come in the way of mastering what one has set himself to do. He must develop an indifference to the experiences around him and to the stimulations that may detract him from his goal. One should overcome the temptations which may prevent him from his pursuit.

Both these principles of learning are referred to in the Gita (VI. 33). Two further principles of learning are enunciated in the Gita. The

thoughts and activities of the irresolute person (avyavasayin) are “many-branched and endless”. Such a person can hardly succeed in mastering any area of knowledge or any skill. One should cultivate ‘Vyavasayatmika buddhi’, a resolute mind, so that there is single-pointedness. One should overcome distractions by the cultivation of one-pointedness (II. 41). The fourth principle enunciated by the Gita and which helps one to acquire stable learning is the principle of ‘nishkamakarma’. “Let not the fruits of action be the motive” (II. 47). “Do thy work abandoning attachment, with an even mind in success and failure, for evenness of mind is called yoga” (II. 48). The emphasis here is on the possible influence of emotional reaction to failure or success on one’s efforts to master an activity. Sense of failure may lead to depression and the abandonment of the learning process; sense of success may lead to overconfidence and thus become an obstacle to further improvement.

The extracts from Buddhism refer to the need for gradual training and practice and to the need for controlling wandering thoughts.

10. Concept. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika view the genus (jati or samanya) is known by assimilative knowledge, while individuals are known by discriminative knowledge. The common characteristics are cognized by assimilative knowledge and the distinctive characters of the individuals are cognized by discriminative knowledge. Both assimilative and discriminative knowledge are perceptual to start with. The lowest concepts are formed on the basis of the common characteristics among individuals and the higher concepts on the basis of the common characteristics among the lower concepts. The highest concept is existence (satva). It is the widest in scope. Below it are the concepts of substance (dravyatva), quality (gunatva) and motion (karmatva).

The recognition of common characteristics found in individuals or groups of individuals leads to the formation of the concept. Individuals are distinguished by their distinctive characteristics. It is the recognition of the common characteristics that produces the concept. General ideas are formed by comparing individuals and abstracting their common characteristics and by eliminating the distinctive characteristics. (II. 2, 169).

Affective-Conative Processes

1. Feelings. Kanada, in his ‘Vaisesika Sutra’ writes: “Pleasure and pain are different from each other, since they arise from the cognitions of a desirable object and an undesirable object and are hostile to each

other.” Thus pleasure arises from the presence of desirable objects and pain from the presence of undesirable objects.

According to Nyaya-Vaisesika systems, the self has six attributes: consciousness (jnana), love (raga), aversion (dvesha), pleasure (sukha), pain (dukha) and volition (yatna). Love and hatred are the result of pleasure and pain respectively. We like things that have given us pleasure and dislike things associated with pain. We have to know a thing before we can experience love or aversion or pleasure or pain which leads to a desire for the object or its rejection; it is to satisfy this want that we undertake action (yatna). Feeling thus mediates between cognition and pleasure and pain. According to these systems the desire to avoid pain is as strong a motive as the desire to obtain pleasure. But as all pleasure is transient, and all pain is to be avoided, the ideal of life is ‘apavarga’. It consists not in the attainment of happiness as in the removal of pain.

According to ‘Samkhya-yoga’ systems, pleasure, pain and dejection are produced by ‘sattva’, ‘rajas’ and ‘tamas’. They are not the qualities of the self but they are the modes of the mind. It is due to false knowledge (avidya) that one assumes that the self is experiencing pleasure and pain. Recollection of past pleasure leads to an attachment to the object that gave pleasure.

The Jainas look upon feelings of pleasure and pain as the modifications of the soul-substance.

According to Charaka, pleasure and pain arise when there is harmony and disharmony of the three humors of the body ‘vata’, ‘pitta’ and ‘kapha’, and the equilibrium or disequilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas of the mind. The body is the source of physical pleasure and pain and the mind the source of mental pleasure and pain. When there is a proper adjustment between the body and the mind there is pleasure; maladjustment leads to pain. Pleasure is the cause of desire and pain is the cause of aversion and vice versa—when a desire is fulfilled there is pleasure; when it is not fulfilled there is pain. Charaka also agrees with the Samkhya view that pleasure and pain are not the modification of the self but are only the modifications of the mind.

The Gita refers to three kinds of happiness based on sattva, rajas and tamas. The ‘sattvika’ happiness, it is said, has two characteristics: it is disagreeable in the beginning but very agreeable at the end; secondly, it arises from a clear understanding. By contrast the ‘rajasika’ happiness arises from the contact of the senses with the objects. Also it is very agreeable to start with but becomes disagreeable towards the end.

Finally, the happiness which arises from *tamas* deludes the individuals at the beginning and at the end. Also it arises from sloth and negligence (XVII. 37-39). A distinction is made between happiness and pleasure. Happiness is that which arises from a clear understanding of the self. Pleasure, on the other hand, arises from the gratification of desire and by contact of the senses with the objects. The happiness that arises out of *tamas* is merely based on a delusion. It is *rajasik* on sloth and laziness. This is not pleasure at all. It appears like pleasure at the given moment.

Patanjali also distinguishes between sentient pleasure and rational happiness (II. 42). Sentient pleasure is due to the gratification of desire while happiness is based on the eradication of desires.

Buddhaghosa recognizes three kinds of feelings: pleasure, pain and (neutral feeling) '*upeksha*'. While pleasure is agreeable and pain is disagreeable, the neutral feeling is free from both pleasure and pain. It is positive feeling; it is not mere absence of pleasure or pain.

Feeling '*vedana*' is a state of consciousness, and is one of the five '*skandhas*'. The function of '*Vedanaskandha*' is to exploit the environment. Pleasure leads to acceptance of the object and pain leads to its rejection. Pleasure and the neutral feeling are subtle in comparison with pain. Pain disturbs and overpowers one. Pleasure and the neutral feeling are quiet and satisfying. However, both pleasure and pain are gross in comparison with the neutral feeling because they bring about disturbance in one. It is the neutral feeling which is peaceful and quiet. All these three feelings can be experienced at the sensory level or at the mental level. It is the neutral attitude of mind that leads to equanimity: it is not disturbed at the occurrence of bodily pleasure, bodily pain, mental joy and mental grief.

Thus, there is some similarity between the Buddhist position and the '*Samkhya-Yoga*' position with respect to feelings. While '*Nyaya-Vaisesika*' position looks upon pleasure and pain and desire and aversion as the qualities of the self, '*Samkhya-Yoga*' regards the self (*purusha*) as neutral, unconnected with the feelings and emotions which are merely mental modes and Buddhism recognizes that the goal is neutral feeling at the mental level.

According to the *Samkhya* there are three kinds of pain. (1) '*Adhyatmika*' pain which may be physical pain or mental pain. Physical pain is due to the disturbance of the '*vata*', '*pitta*' and '*kapha*' in the body and mental pain is due to desire, anger, greed, delusion etc. (2) The '*adhibhautika*' pain is caused by men, beasts and inanimate objects.

(3) 'Adhidaivika' pain is caused by ghosts etc. This threefold pain can be completely eradicated by the discriminative knowledge (viveka): when one realise that the self is different from the body, the sense organs, the 'manas', the 'ahamkara' and the 'buddhi' which are the evolutes of 'prakriti'.

Patanjali mentions three kinds of pain: 'parinama dukha', 'tapa dukha' and 'samaskara dukha'. (II. 15). (1) Attachment for sense pleasures can never be allayed by enjoyment. Craving increases with gratification. Therefore one can never become free from craving by the gratification of the cravings. It continually leads to further pain. This is 'parinama dukha' or painfulness arising from mutation. (2) 'Tapa dukha' or painfulness of anxiousness arises out of aversion which leads one to thwart others or cause injury to them. (3) 'Samaskara dukha' or painfulness of subliminal impressions is generated by the dispositions produced by pleasure and pain. They generate attachment and aversion and thus lead to further action to gain the objects to which one has attachment or to avoid those to which one has aversion.

One can overcome these three kinds of pains by resorting to 'samyag-darsana', focussed-insight and destroy the seed out of which this huge aggregate of pain grows forth in 'avidya', undifferentiated consciousness.

2. Emotions. Generally most systems of thought of ancient India trace all emotions to the three gunas—'sattva', 'rajas' and 'tamas'. 'Sattva' gives rise to cheerfulness, joy and equanimity. Emotions like lust, anger, greed, vanity, conceit, grief, etc. are attributed to 'rajas'. Infatuation and delusion are regarded as the manifestations of 'tamas'.

According to 'Samkhya-Yoga', the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas are the constituents of the prakriti. They are the three tendencies, the three strands making up the twisted rope of nature. 'Sattva' reflects the light of consciousness and so has the quality of radiance (prakasha). Rajas is an outward movement (pravritti) and tamas is characterized by inertia (aprvritti), and heedless indifference (pramada). Thus 'sattva' is perfect purity and 'rajas' is impurity leading to activity while 'tamas' is impurity leading to inertia. Because the self (purusha) identified itself with the modes of nature (pravritti), it uses mind, sense organs and body for egoistic satisfaction. To attain liberation the self must rise above these modes of nature and become 'trigunatita' and thus become free from the three gunas which bind and enchain the self.

'Sattva' is potential consciousness and causes pleasure to the individual. 'Rajas' is the source of all activity and produces pain. It leads to

restless effort and feverish enjoyment. 'Tamas' resists activity and produces a state of apathy and indifference: it leads to ignorance and sloth. Thus 'sattva' produces pleasure, 'rajas' pain and 'tamas' produces sloth. But the three gunas are never separate. They are closely related as the flame, the oil and the wick of a lamp (Samkhya Karika, 13). It is the predominance of one of the three that characterises the mental state.

From this point of view one may say that emotional life is due to the preponderance of 'rajas'. When 'tamas' preponderates the individual is devoid of emotion and motivation. In the person in whom 'sattva' predominates the emotions are there but they are under his control in contrast to the condition of preponderance of 'rajas' when he is in the grip of emotions.

According to the Gita, 'sattva' binds an individual to happiness and knowledge: 'rajas' is of the nature of attraction springing from craving (trishna) and attachment; but 'tamas' is born of ignorance and deludes (moha) all persons; it binds by developing the qualities of negligence, indolence and sleep (Gita, XIV. 6-9). Thus it is the preponderance of 'rajas' which leads to craving and attachment, the manifestations of emotional life.

The close relationship between feeling and emotion is brought out by Patanjali. "Sukhanusayi ragaha", "dukhanusayi dvesaha" (II. 7 and 8). Vyasa comments that greed, thirst and desire are generated by attachment on the basis of pleasure on recollection of pleasure. Similarly repulsion, wrath or anger are generated by aversion on the basis of the experience of or recollection of pain.

According to the Gita, attachment (raga) is the effect of rajas on the mind and generates clinging (asanga) by yearning (trishna). Attachment compels one to seek the objects of enjoyment. The essential characteristic of attachment (raga) is constant attention to its objects. It makes one engrossed in the object and generates a desire for perpetual enjoyment of those objects. Its chief manifestations are with respect to wealth, sex and sensual objects. As the Gita puts it "when a man dwells in his mind on objects of sense, attachment to them is produced" (II. 62).

'Asanga' is clinging to the desired object that has been attained. There is extreme delight in that object. There is constant thinking about it. This clinging is even more typical of hatred. It is difficult for one to avoid being preoccupied constantly with the person whom one hates. Thus clinging (asanga) characterizes both love and hate.

While 'asanga' refers to the clinging to the desired object that has been attained, 'trishna', yearning or thirst is with reference to the object that has not yet been attained. One has yearning for all objects which give pleasure.

There is satisfaction (*santosha*) and joy (*harsha*) when one's desire is gratified, when one attains the desired object. It gives one a sense of exaltation (*utkarsha*). It produces 'utsaha' (energy), when one attains the cherished object or meets the beloved person.

With respect to anger (*krodha*), the Gita says "from attachment springs desire and from desire comes anger" (II. 62). Both attachment and anger are born of *rajas* (III. 37). The triple gate to "hell" and the ruin of one's self are lust (*kama*), anger (*krodha*) and greed (*lobha*) (XVI. 21). Thus, according to the Gita, anger arises out of frustration of desire and lust. When there is obstruction, anger arises. Anger leads to aversion (*dvesha*) of the hated object. It gives rise to a desire to inflict injury on the person who is obstructing one or to destroy the object that is standing in the way of one's desire.

Hate (*dvesha*) is the repulsion towards the person or object which caused pain to one. It is the opposite of love and attachment. It leads to the avoidance or the destruction of the hated object. There is anger when there is hatred.

Fear (*bhaya*) arises from the possibility of danger to oneself. According to Buddhaghosa, it is the knowledge of danger that gives rise to fear and one can overcome fear by true knowledge. Fear also arises when one perceives that one may lose a cherished object, or when one perceives that one may be subjected to pain, and injury.

Anxiety (*udvega*), mental agitation or bewilderment is caused by fear. It is generated by a threat to one's life and security.

Attachment (*raga*) as well as hatred (*dvesha*) are actuated by *delusion* (*moha*). A person, under delusion feels attraction and repulsion towards persons and objects. A person free from delusion can overcome attachment as well as hatred. So the aim of a person must be the destruction of delusion so that he can free himself from the grip of emotions. According to the Gita it is 'tamas' or inertia which causes delusion and leads to emotional behaviour; it can be counteracted by 'sattva', understanding one's self. As the Gita puts it "unillumination, inactivity, negligence and mere delusion arise when 'tamas' increases" (XIV. 13). When the light of knowledge streams forth in all the gates of the body, then it may be known that 'sattva' has increased (XIV. 11).

Thus according to ancient Indian thought when 'tamas' predomi-

nates there is delusion; there is no clear thinking about one's self, the other persons and the situation in which one finds himself. This, in its turn, leads to high emotional activity by the predominance of 'rajas' which creates restlessness and craving as a result man is overpowered by 'raga' (attachment) and 'dvesha' (aversion). He is full of arrogance, pride, anger, harshness (XVI. 4). Giving himself up to insatiable desire, full of hypocrisy, excessive pride, holding wrong views through delusion, he acts with impure resolves (XVI. 10). He can overcome the delusion as well as the emotionality by increasing the 'sattva' in him so that there is understanding and illumination.

The whole position regarding the way in which emotions are generated and how they affect one's behaviour is summarised in two famous verses in the Gita. When a man dwells in his mind on the objects of sense, attachment to them is produced. From attachment springs desire and from desire comes anger (II. 62). From anger comes infatuation which leads to loss of memory which results in destruction of intelligence. From destruction of intelligence he is utterly ruined (II. 63). Thus there is a clear sequence of events starting from allowing one's mind to dwell on the objects of sense, to the loss of memory and destruction of intelligence leading to self destruction under the grip of uncontrollable emotions.

The Gita also enjoins freedom from the sway of feelings and emotions. It is said that a sage of settled intelligence is one who is unaffected either by feelings of pleasure when there is success, or feelings of sorrow, when there is failure. The mature person is also one who is free from passion, fear and rage (II. 56). Thus the Gita ideal is that one should not be perturbed by feelings and emotions and lose one's balance. But this does not mean that the Gita enjoins insensitivity and coldness. In the same chapter it is stated that the mature person is one in whom desires enter without upsetting him. The analogy of the sea is given. Though rivers discharge their water continuously into the sea, the sea is ever motionless. In the same way the mature person experiences continually feelings and emotions, but he does not allow himself to be overpowered by them or to be swayed by them. (II. 70).

3. Springs of Action. According to 'Nyaya Sutra' the moving forces of action are the three 'doshas', the three faults, namely 'raga' (attachment), 'dvesha' (aversion) and 'moha' (delusion) (IV. 1.2. and I.1.18). Attachment is the desire to possess the object that afforded pleasure in the past. Aversion is the desire to avoid an object that caused pain in the past. Delusion is false knowledge (mithyajnana) which promotes at-

tachment and aversion. Thus these constitute a chain. If false knowledge is destroyed by right knowledge then one will not be a prey to either 'raga' or 'dvesha'.

Vatsyayana in his commentary on the 'Nyaya Sutra' describes five springs of action under 'raga' (attachment), namely (1) sexual craving ('kama'), (2) jealousy (*matsara*), (3) desire for acquisition (*spriha*), (4) will-to-live (*trishna*), and (5) greed (*lobha*).

Dvesha (aversion) leads to another set of five conditions to action, namely (1) anger (*krodha*), (2) envy (*irshya*), (3) jealousy (*asuya*), (4) malevolence (*droha*), and (5) resentment (*amarsha*).

While *matsara* is solicitude for the preservation of one's wealth, *asuya* is intolerance of the good qualities of another person, *irshya* is the desire to prevent others from possessing the common objects which have not been taken by anybody else.

Delusion (*moha*), according to Vatsyayana, leads to (1) error (*mithyajnana*), (2) doubt (*vichikitsa*), (3) pride (*mana*), and (4) negligence (*pramada*).

Pride is self-conceit, false sense of superiority attributing non-existing qualities to oneself or exaggerating the importance of one's existent qualities. It is vanity.

'Prasastapada' in his commentary on 'Vaisesika Sutra' mentions the following eight desires as springs of action: (1) desire for sex (*kama*), (2) desire for eating food (*abhilasha*), (3) attachment (*raga*), (4) desire to realise a remote end (*sankalpa*), (5) compassion (*karunya*), (6) dispassion (*vairagya*), (7) desire to deceive others (*upadha*) and (8) a desire concealed in the mind (*bhava*).

According to Buddhism, thirst (*trishna*) is threefold: (1) thirst for sensual pleasures (*kama-trishna*), (2) thirst for being or will-to-live (*bhava-trishna*), and (3) thirst for wealth and power (*vibhava-trishna*). Thus, craving for sensual delight, craving to continue to exist and craving for success, power and wealth are the three fundamental springs of action.

According to Charaka the three fundamental desires are (1) desire for the preservation of life (*pranaishana*), (2) desire for wealth (*dha-naishana*), and (3) desire for after-life (*paralokaishana*). Since health is the most fundamental, since all achievements depend on one's health, one should try to preserve one's health and keep himself free from illness. Next comes the desire for wealth (Sinha, II, Ch. V).

4. **Analysis of Sexual Behaviour.** The ancient Indians recognised the pursuit of pleasure as one of the goals of man's life. 'Kama' is one

of the four 'purusarthas' along with 'Dharma', 'Artha' and 'Moksha'. In the Asrama theory of life, while sex expression is forbidden during the first phase of life, 'brahmacharya', a man is enjoined to marry and set up a home and fulfil his obligations to society in the second stage of life as 'grhastha'. Procreation is looked upon as the fulfilment of one of the three debts in the life of a person. It is *pitratina*. It is the debt one owes to the fact of being born. It is the means of continuing the human lineage. As noted above the generative organ is included as one of the five *karmendriyas*, the motor organs in the body, including hands, feet, speech and organs of elimination. All these show that sexual desire is linked up with other aspects of life. It is not something to be suppressed. One need not be guilty of it. It is something which should be given appropriate expression at the appropriate stage in the life of man.

Early indulgency is condemned since it is against the duty of a 'brahmacharin'. Excessive indulgence is condemned since it is against 'dharma' (righteousness). Sex desire should be expressed within the limits of marriage which is an obligation in the second stage of man's life. Even within marriage, continence is looked upon as an ideal since continence was regarded as a necessary condition in the development of the personality, which helps the attainment of the final goal of man's endeavour, namely, liberation, 'moksha'.

Ancient Indian thought looked upon 'Kamasashtra' as one of the fields of learning. A person has to learn about the art of love just as he learns the other arts in life. Vatsyayana who wrote his 'Kama Sutra' around the fifth century A.D., defines 'kama' as the enjoyment of objects with the help of the senses according to the dictates of his mind and in consonance with his self. He discusses whether a learned text on this problem is necessary since sexual instinct is to be found among the animals. Vatsyayana shows that appropriate training has to be given. A maiden should prepare herself for marriage by studying this science. He enjoins the couple to study the science even after marriage so that they can lead a contented life. He goes to the extent of asserting that fulfilment of the sex desire is as essential for the proper maintenance of the human body and well-being as 'dharma' itself. He grants that there are dangers in the expression of sex desire. He asks: "Do people not sow the seeds of barley in spite of the deer eating their sprouts?"

Vatsyayana classifies men and women into three types according to the duration of their passion, whether it is of short duration, medium duration or long duration. He gives the various combinations. If the couple is not properly matched along this dimension there is the possi-

bility of frustration.

He also shows that there is a fundamental difference in sexual behaviour between men and women. While men are excited quickly, women take a longer time. The sexual union will not give mutual satisfaction unless the man knows this fact and courts the woman by taking appropriate steps to rouse her desire. He gives a detailed description of the ways of courting and winning the heart of the bride.

Over and above these physiological differences between the two sexes, Vatsyayana also refers to the differences that arise as a result of upbringing and training with respect to attitudes and feelings.

A significant contribution of Vatsyayana to the psychology of sex is his analysis of the way in which love may arise. It may arise in one due to the perception of some external objects. A second source is imagination, mental stimulation. The third source, according to him, is sheer habit. Finally, love may arise in one due to "self-belief and belief of others". This is more deliberate and voluntary than the other forms: further, it involves a consideration of the needs of the other person.

Vatsyayana's 'Kama Sutra' has become one of the bestsellers in the world because it gives detailed description of the various forms of kissing and the various forms of sexual behaviour. The sculptors in temple art have tried to portray all these various forms of sexual behaviour. Vatsyayana realises that such descriptions will undoubtedly stimulate sex desire. But he makes it clear that such stimulation will not lead to a satisfying act unless there is reciprocation. He writes, "Every lover must reciprocate the beloved's gesture with equal intensity, kiss by kiss and embrace by embrace." He asserts that if there is no reciprocity the union will be highly unsatisfactory. "To keep passion alive and inflamed, reciprocity is absolutely essential." In this, the efforts of the man to take the necessary steps to rouse the passion in the woman is absolutely essential. This comes with training in the art of love. Otherwise the sexual act will be at the animal level devoid of romance. Instead of leading to satisfaction, the union will lead to frustration with its own repercussions on the individuals concerned and their relationship.

Vatsyayana also gives a detailed analysis of lovers' quarrels and how to resuscitate mutual relationship *

5. The Fivefold Afflictions—Pancha Klesah. Patanjali described

* Sinha has given a detailed description of the analysis of sex consciousness and sexual behaviour as given by Mammata in his *Sahitya Darpana* and by Rupa Goswami in his *Ujjvalanilamani* (Vol II, pp 341-351)

five afflictions which serve as obstacles to the growth of personality: (1) Avidya (ignorance), (2) asmita (egoism), (3) raga (attachment), (4) dvesha (aversion) and (5) abinivesa (clinging to life) (II.3). These fivefold ties bind down the individual and hinder the development of self. Among these 'avidya' is the most fundamental: the remaining four afflictions flow out of it. The next five 'sutras' explain the function of each of these five afflictions.

'Avidya' consists in looking upon the impermanent, the impure, the painful and the non-self as the permanent, the pure, the pleasant and the self. We tend to look upon our body, the sense-organs etc., as the real self and identify the self with these transient phenomena.

The hindrance called 'asmita', egoism, arises out of the identification of the seer, the real self with thinking substance. The seeing and that by which one sees are distinctly two powers, the self and the non-self. It is due to avidya that non-self, the buddhi etc., is identified as the self. With self-esteem and egoism, the need to expand and gain power is a necessary urge in the earlier stages of the development of personality, it becomes an obstacle for further development. Achievement of further development of personality depends on our ability to overcome this urge and discard it.

The self is identified with the instruments by which one sees, and we say "I am happy", "I am angry" etc. Through ignorance we identify ourselves with the chitta, and think that we feel pleasure and pain.

The third and fourth affliction follows from this: "Attachment (raga) is that which dwells upon pleasure (sukha)" and the fourth, Aversion is that which dwells upon pain (dukha)". Pleasure and recollection of pleasure leads to attachment to some persons, objects, situations etc. Similarly pain and recollection of pain leads to aversion to some persons, objects, situations etc. We seek the pleasant and avoid the painful.

Man gets himself entangled in sensuous and emotional experiences on account of desire and attachment. The craving for food, activity, etc., the love of comfort, the craving for amusement and excitement, the pleasure of possession, the urge for sex, all these are based on desire and attachment. This pursuit, though necessary for survival and for development at the earlier stages becomes an obstacle for further development. Growth of personality is arrested by the pursuits generated by these cravings. According to Patanjali, the aim is not withdrawal from all these pursuits but overcoming the sense of identity with these cravings. One should learn to realize that the craving of the body and the senses

and entanglement in one's feelings and emotions are exterior to one's higher self. Then one can live through these experiences as a master, hold them under one's control, instead of being a slave to one's urges and desires and cravings. He will not be impelled by them. He can regulate them and hold them in check.

Aversion is not only the opposite of attachment, it is also an anti-social and divisive tendency. Hatred of other persons and groups is a definite barrier to self-development. Aversion also leads to contempt, withdrawal and increase in social distance. Aversion also promotes the habit of destructive criticism which inhibits social development and increases social disharmony, with its own repercussions on the sense of inner harmony in the members of the group. It promotes large scale violence and social disorder, besides increasing crime and delinquency. However, training in 'yoga' aims at the recognition of unity of mankind and the promotion of the feeling of brotherliness.

Patanjali recommends the cultivation of friendliness (*maitri*) towards those who are happy, compassion (*karuna*) towards those who are in pain, joy (*mudita*) towards those who are good and indifference (*upeksa*) towards those who are anti-social (I. 33). According to Vyasa, one should cultivate friendliness towards all and compassion towards those in misery and pain.

The final obstacle is 'abhinivesa', the clinging to life. This fear of death is there in all living beings. It is there in stupid persons as well as in the learned. This is based on 'Vasana', the inherited tendencies, in other words, this is instinctive and common to all living beings. According to the yoga system this attachment to life, though instinctive and though it promotes life and growth at the earlier stages, becomes an obstacle for further development of man, since it generates a sense of insecurity and anxiety. He is unable to accept life as it comes.

The aim of 'ashtanga yoga', the eight practices, is to help one to overcome these obstacles and afflictions.

Samskara

Vyasa, commenting on one of Patanjali's sutras, asserts mental fluctuations, whether ideas or feelings or actions produce 'samskaras'; subliminal impressions and these 'samskaras' produce in their turn mental fluctuations. In this manner a wheel of 'vrittis' and 'samskaras' ceaselessly rolls on until 'samadhi' is attained (Bhasya, I. 5).

The five afflictions (*kleshas*) are responsible for the various experiences in man. These five afflictions arise from greed (*lobha*), infatua-

tion or delusion (moha) and anger (krodha). The thoughts, feelings, action etc., generated by them leave their impressions on the mind. They constitute the 'karmasyaya', the storehouse of all these impressions (samskaras) and dispositions (II.12), they are subliminal; they constitute the subconscious.

These subliminal impressions (samskaras) do not lie inactive. They continually strive to manifest themselves in thoughts, feelings and activities, when suitable environmental and mental conditions in the individual are present. Thus a man's activities are influenced not only by the stimuli from outside, and the five afflictions of 'avidya', egoism, attachment, aversion and clinging to life and fear of death, from inside, but also by the subliminal impressions, the 'samskaras', left behind by his previous actions etc. Behaviour, thus, according to the 'yoga' system, is conditioned by these three sets of forces, external, internal and subliminal.

Patanjali says "So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from them" (II. 13). So long as the latent-deposit of karma exists man will be influenced by them. The result of the latent deposit of 'karma' is pleasure and pain: since pleasure and pain are linked to attachment (raga) and aversion (dvesha), the individual is impelled to thoughts, actions etc., which in their turn produce a further set of 'samskaras'. As Vachaspati Misra, in his explanation of the 'Vyasa Bhasya' puts it "So this soil of the self sprinkled with the water of the hindrances (kleshas) become a field propagating the fruits of karma. Thus it is true that the hindrances (kleshas) cooperate with the latent-deposit of karma (samskaras) for producing also the after-effects of the fruits". He says further, "Although the latent-deposits are endless and their period of ripening is unsettled, still, when in their condition as seeds, they are burned by elevation (prasamkhyana), they cannot be in a position to bear fruit". The cycle of 'vrittis' 'samskaras' 'vrittis' again can be broken by the emergence of true knowledge regarding the self with the aid of meditation and concentration.

According to Patanjali the 'samskaras' exist in four different states: (i) the dormant form (prasupta), or (ii) the attenuation form (tanu), or (iii) the intercepted form (vichchhinna), or (iv) the manifest form (Udara) (II.4). Vyasa explains these four forms in his commentary on the sutra in the following manner:

(1) In the 'prasupta' form the tendencies are dormant. They could become active when appropriate conditions are present. But in a 'yogi' who is in an advanced state these dormant 'samskaras' will not become

active, will not be 'awakened' since he has destroyed the seeds by burning them.

(2) In the 'tanu' form, in the attenuated or feeble form, the afflictions are overpowered by the cultivation of their opposites. Their potency is weakened by the thinking about the opposite. Thus with proper training in 'yoga', the afflictions are attenuated and weakened so that they cannot manifest themselves.

(3) In the 'Vichchinna' form, or intercepted alternating form, one affliction is overpowered by a stronger affliction so that it cannot manifest itself. As an illustration, Vyasa says that when one is in love one does not become angry.

(4) Finally, in the 'udara' or expanding form, the affliction is fixed on an object and is sustained by the activity. This is state in which the affliction has found helpful conditions for its manifestation in consciousness and activity.

Thus, these afflictions and their 'samskaras' could vary all the way from the manifest condition to the dormant condition. The intermediate stages could be deliberately brought about either by thinking about the opposite affliction or by overpowering it by a stronger affliction.

However, as far as the 'yogi' is concerned, he looks upon all these four forms as painful, leading to 'dukha', since they are the sources of experience and bondage. So his aim is to root them out by appropriate discipline so that they exist in the dormant form where they are without any potency.

So we have to recognise two types in the dormant form: (a) the type in which the afflictions and the 'samskaras' are dormant but can become active when the appropriate environmental and internal conditions are available and (b) the type in which they are rendered impotent by the 'yogi' by burning the seeds. In ordinary human beings they are in the former type of dormant form and hence they can become active when appropriate conditions arise.

The man who has not been properly trained will constantly find himself in situations where the afflictions are in the 'Udara' condition. They manifest themselves freely since no attempt is made by him to control them, or rather, since he has not been trained to control them.

The aim of the yogi is to make the afflictions burnt seed (dagdhabija) so that the afflictions and the samskaras have no power to manifest themselves and influence his vrittis. In other words, the samskaras are there in the subconscious level. They cannot be got rid of. But with viveka, discrimination, he can render them lose their potency.

As noted above in another Sutra, Patanjali speaks of three kinds of dukha: (i) parinama dukha, (ii) tapa dukha and samskara dukha (II. 15)

Vyasa, in his commentary explains that every experience of pleasure leads to greater attachment to the pleasure and also generate latent-deposit of aversion and delusion. This kind of pain Patanjali calls 'parinama dukha' or pain arising out of mutation. Next there is the 'tapa dukha', the pain which arises out of aversion (dvesha). Finally there is 'samskara dukha', the pain arising out of subliminal impressions. Experiences of pleasure as well as pain produce these impressions on the mind. This stream of 'samskaras' goes on increasing with every experience of pleasure or pain. This 'samskara' stream agitates even the 'yogi' because its essence is counteractive 'pratikula'.

In other words, the subliminal impressions, the 'samskaras', go on accumulating so long as there is experience. No agency can prevent this. These 'samskaras' have the power of manifesting themselves when the appropriate conditions in the environment and in the mind of man are there. The seed is there. The only thing which training in yoga gives is to burn the seed so that it loses its potency by means of 'viveka' (discrimination).*

Sleep and Dream

1. **Sleep.** In Brihadaranyaka Upanishad there is the incident regarding 'Ajatasatru' taking the pupil Gargya and addressing a man who is asleep. When the man did not get up on being called, 'Ajatasatru' wakes him up by rubbing him with his hand and then says that when a man falls asleep all his sense organs are collected within his 'manas'. "When the person takes in these (senses), he is said to be asleep."

In another section it is stated that like a bird which is weary and is

*In the present section the term 'samskara' is used in the context of one's life experiences. It must be mentioned that in the traditional use of the term, and in the way in which Patanjali and Vyasa use it, reference is made not only to the impressions made by one's present life experiences, but also to the impressions made by experiences in one's past lives. Since this involves the assumption of the theory of reincarnation, the term in the above exposition is limited to the experiences in one's life. Patanjali used another term 'Vasana' to refer to the inherited tendencies. This term has a double reference. It refers not only to the tendencies inherited from experiences in the biological sphere but also to one's experiences in past lives as in (Iv. 8). In the opinion of the present writer, the term 'samskara' may be limited to the latent impressions made by one's experiences in one's life and reserve the term 'vasana' to those latent impressions made in the organism by the evolutionary forces. Such a use of the two terms does not involve the assumption of the hypothesis of reincarnation which, in essence, can neither be proved nor disproved as it is not amenable to hypothetico-deductive study.

borne down to its nest, a person hastens to the state of sleep when he is weary; then he has no desires and he sees no dreams; he is in deep, dreamless sleep. Thus fatigue is the cause of sleep. In this state he is like "a man who is in the embrace of his beloved wife, he knows nothing without or within; so the person when in the embrace of the intelligent self knows nothing without or within". (IV. 3.21). He is free from desire; he is free from sorrow. In that state there is neither self-awareness nor status awareness. In that condition, the father, the thief, the murderer are all in the same position.

While 'Nyaya-Vaisheshika' does not regard sleep as a mental mode or as involving cognition, Patanjali defines sleep as a mental mode which has for its object the cognition of dreams or the absence of waking cognitions. (I. 10). 'Samkhya' recognises two degrees of sleep; namely half sleep and deep sleep. In half sleep there are mental modes in the form of pleasure, pain and delusion subsisting in the mind. This is the basis for such recollection on waking as "I slept happily, unhappily or heavily etc". But in deep sleep there are no mental modes at all, neither objects as in waking state nor feelings as in half-sleep state. In this, the state of deep sleep is said to resemble 'samadhi' and 'moksha'; in all the three states there is no consciousness of objects. However, the state of deep sleep differs from the state of 'samadhi' in that the former is a natural state of the organism while the latter is the result of repeated practice of concentration.

Vyasa, commenting on Patanjali's sutra, asserts that there is a form of experience in deep sleep also. If there was no experience, there would be no recollection on waking up. According to Vyasa sleep is a particular mental mode which apprehends the absence of cognition

Nagasena, the Buddhist sage, asserts that sleep overcomes a man who has weakness, slackness, inertness and so on.

Charaka asserts that a person goes to sleep when he is fatigued. In sleep all his sense organs are withdrawn from their objects. He also holds that sleep is due to excess of 'tama-guna', 'kapha' (phlegm), fatigue, disease and the general influence of night (lack of stimulation).

According to Bharata, sleep is caused by weakness, exertion and fatigue, intoxication, overeating etc.

Thus in a broad way there are three theories of sleep expounded in the ancient Indian writings. One is the fatigue theory of sleep, the theory that sleep arises when the sense-organs are withdrawn into the manas and thirdly the theory that sleep occurs as habit formation during night time.

Some Main Themes in Ancient Indian Psychology

2. **Dreams.** In 'Prasna Upanishad' the teacher says that in dreams a man experiences whatever he has experienced in waking life and also what he has not experienced; what exists as well as what is non-existent (IV. 5). According to 'Mandukya Upanishad', in the dream state one cognizes the internal objects. The 'Brihadaranyaka Upanishad' says that in dreams a man becomes a great king or a poor person; in dreams a man moves about as he pleases (II.1.18). In another section it is stated that a man takes with him all the material of the waking experiences, tears it apart, and rebuilds it. He creates his own chariots, his own tanks, pools etc. He is a great creator in dream state.

According to 'Vaisesika Sutra', dreams result from a particular conjunction of self and 'manas' and the latent impression ('samskaras') as in memory. They occur when the senses have ceased to be active and when the 'manas' is in a quiescent state. There are three kinds of dreams: (i) re-productive dreams; (ii) dreams arising from afflictions of the body, and (iii) dreams due to unseen causes.

According to 'Purva Mimamsa', the cognitions in dreams have no real substratum.

Nagasena, the Buddhist sage, says that in dreams a man experiences what he has already experienced in waking life and also what he has not. He says that "it is a suggestion coming across the path of the mind". Dreams may arise out of bodily conditions or by the influence of a god or out of the influence of one's own habits or by way of prognostication.

According to the Jaina view, dream is wish fulfilment. A poor man may dream that he is very rich, with respect to causes of dreams, it is stated that dreams may arise out of previous experience, wish fulfilment, disturbance of health, influence of god etc. Thus dreams arise out of some cause ('nimitta'). The dream experiences exist and dreams are presentative.

Charaka mentions various kinds of dreams; those of objects already experienced, of objects desired, of objects imagined, due to morbidity ('dosaja') and those which are premonitions of the future.

Thus ancient Indian thinkers classified dreams as reproductive, constructive, wish-fulfilling, and those which are prophetic. Many tried to find the reasons why dreams arise.

The 'Self'

The Upanishads constitute the greatest intellectual heritage of India. They constitute a rich mine of ideas out of which the different systems have drawn their inspiration. This is certainly true regarding the theo-

ries of 'self' developed by the various systems of thought all the way from the Charvakas, who identified the self with the body, to the 'Advaita Vedantins', who identify the self with the Absolute.

Since the original works of the Charvaka school are now lost, and what we know about it is from the other works which quote from the system to refute it, no attempt has been made to give extracts from this system of thought in this volume. Since the Charvaka system admitted only four elements, namely, earth, water, fire and air as constituting the entire universe, and since the system recognised only perception as means of valid knowledge, it denied the self (atman) as an entity surviving death. The 'self' comes into being as a result of combination of elements into the living body and it ceases with death. As a result, the system denies a conscious or spiritual principle. It is property of the physical aggregate of the body and disappears when the body distintegrates. The 'self' is like the intoxicating quality that arises by mingling of certain ingredients. Further, it is pointed out, that consciousness depends on the physical organism and is never found apart from it. Thus the Charvaka looks upon mind and consciousness as a function of matter.

As noted above, the Chandogya Upanishad speaks of the body as the self. The teacher asks 'Indra' to adorn himself and look into the water or the mirror to see the self. The Charvaka view described above conforms to this. At the other end, the '*Katha Upanishad*' as well as the '*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*' identify the self with the Absolute; there is the famous statement '*tattvamasi*', 'thou art that', the 'atman' is Brahman. According to this view, the self is absolutely unconditioned, it has no attributes. As Yagnavalkya says, it can only be described as 'not this', 'not that'; no positive description is possible. According to '*Kena Upanishad*' the self cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs since it is devoid of sensible qualities. Nor can it be perceived by the internal organ (manas) since it is devoid of pleasure, pain and the like. Similarly, '*Katha Upanishad*' asserts that the self cannot be defined by speech nor perceived by the external or internal organs. This view closely approximates the Samkhya and Yoga view of 'purusha' who exists but has no attributes. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad goes further and asserts that the self is beyond the categories of space, time and causality so it cannot be comprehended by intellect, since the intellect (buddhi) can only know phenomena bound by space, time causality. So the self is beyond the grasp of intellect. Yagnavalkya also asserts that the self cannot be known since it is the knower of all things.

He questions how the knower can be known, how the seer can be seen. The 'Mundaka Upanishad' and the 'Svetasvatara Upanishad' look upon the self as the witness (sakshin). All these descriptions of the self make it clear that the Charaka view as well as the Buddhist view, both of which deny the very existence of 'self', are quite reasonable since by Upanishadic definition the 'self' is devoid of attributes and cannot be known either by the external sense organs or by the internal organs like the 'manas' and the 'buddhi'. But the 'Katha Upanishad' as well as the 'Mundaka Upanishad' make it clear that some men can perceive the self by withdrawing their senses from the external objects and by concentrating the mind on the self. The self cannot be perceived but it can be realized in meditation. The atman can be realized by 'prajana' in a supra-intellectual way.

The 'Mundaka Upanishad' distinguishes between the empirical 'self' and the transcendental 'self'. The empirical 'self' "eats the sweet fruit" while the transcendental self "looks on without eating". The empirical self is immersed in the sorrows of the world, is deluded and grieves on account of his helplessness.

According to 'Nyaya Sutra', 'atma' and 'manas' are two 'dravyas' (substances) along with earth, water, fire, air, 'akasa', time and space. Desire ('iccha'), aversion ('dvesha'), effort ('prayatna'), pleasure, pain and cognition are the indications of the 'self'. Pleasure and pain and consequent desire and aversion lead to know and understand. Further, one can know oneself directly. Each self has its own 'manas', which is only an instrument of knowing. So it is not correct to translate the term 'manas' as mind since 'manas' is inert, it is not mental. But the co-operation of the 'manas' is a necessary condition of all cognition, whether of external objects or of internal states. 'Manas' is postulated as a substance by this system because mere sense organs by themselves do not lead to cognition. Our eyes may be open but we may not see the object if the 'manas' is preoccupied with something else. Another reason for postulating the 'manas' is the fact of non-appearance of simultaneous cognition. The 'manas' helps the self to know only one object or one group of objects at a time. Thus it is through the 'manas' that the self is in contact with the senses. Another interesting feature of the system is that it does not postulate 'buddhi'. It asserts that intellection, apprehension and cognition are synonymous terms.

The 'Vaiseshika' system postulates the 'self' since there must be some object in which experience must reside and since there must be an agency which uses the sense organs as instruments. The body and the

senses cannot be the seat of perception because the parts of the body do not have consciousness in them. Knowledge is a mark of the existence of the self by inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, and by the fact of recognition which needs the same self to be aware that the object one sees now was the object which one saw earlier; finally, there is the experience of self as an object of perception when we say "I feel pleasure", "I am in pain". This cognition is a direct experience; it is not due to inference or testimony. We are able to infer the existence of other selves on the basis of their behaviour.

'Samkhya' postulates the 'purusha' since 'prakriti' is for the use of another. Just as a chariot needs a charioteer to control it, there must be the self to control the body. Because there must be someone to experience the objects of experience and because the final aim of evolution is the final cessation of the three kinds of pains, the system postulates the self. However, the self is without the three attributes of 'sattva', 'rajas' and 'tamas', which are constituents of 'Prakriti'. 'Purusha' is mere sentience. It is entirely passive since all activity is due to 'prakriti'. The 'purusha' is an enjoyer ('bhokta') without being a doer ('karta'). All action is due to 'buddhi', 'ahamkara', 'manas', the five sense organs and the five motor organs. These are the evolutes of prakriti and are not 'psychical' factors. 'Prakriti' evolves under the influence of 'purusha'. The cause of the evolution is the fulfilment of the ends of 'purusha', namely, 'bhoga', experience, and 'Kaivalya', liberation. The functions of the 'buddhi' are ascertainment and decision. 'Buddhi' works directly for the 'purusha' and enables the 'purusha' to experience all existence and to discriminate between itself and 'prakriti'. The function of 'ahamkara' is 'abhimana' self-love. Agency belongs to 'ahamkara' and not to 'purusha'; however, the 'purusha' identifies itself with the acts of 'prakriti' through 'ahamkara'. Formation of concepts and decisions are the other functions of 'ahamkara'. 'Manas' is the organ which synthesises the sense-data into percepts and communicates it to 'ahamkara'. This is the afferent aspect of the function of 'manas'. Another function of 'manas' is to carry out the decisions of 'manas' is necessary for both perception and action. The order of evolution of the various instruments of cognition and action appear as if it is the reverse of the process as it is generally understood. But when one starts with the 'susupti' state of deep, the dreamless sleep, one can see the meaning in the order of presentation adopted by the Samkhya system. The state of dreamless sleep corresponds to the state of 'prakriti' at rest. When one wakes up there is first the rise of consciousness followed immediately

by the rise of the sense of self-hood; then follows the functions of 'manas' and the 'indriyas' (Radhakrishnan, II, p. 275). According to 'Samkhya', 'purusha' is of the form of consciousness (chidrupa). It is not related to 'prakriti'. It is mere witness. It is a passive spectator. The empirical individual is the 'jiva'; it is the 'purusha' in conjunction with 'ahamkara' and not the 'purusha' itself. It is 'jiva' that is subject to pleasure and pain, action and its fruits. 'Antahkarana' or the inner organ, being an evolute of 'prakriti' is itself nonconscious, 'achetana'. So by itself it cannot be the agent. It is on account of its union with the purusha, it is illuminated. This conjunction of 'purusha' with 'prakriti' is not a permanent one. So long as this temporary union continues as a consequence of wrong identification (avidya), there is experience. When this identification is overcome the purusha comes into his own. This is the state of Kaivalya. The union of purusha with prakriti is compared to a lame man with good vision on the shoulders of a blind man with sturdy legs.

Patanjali accepts in general the Samkhya position. While the first evolute of prakriti is mahat and buddhi according to Samkhya, it is citta according to Yoga system. The Yoga concept of citta is comprehensive and includes all the three concepts of buddhi, ahamkara and manas of Sankhya. Citta is essentially unconscious; it becomes conscious by the reflection of the purusha, the self. It undergoes modifications when it is affected by the objects through the senses. The aim of yoga discipline is to turn back the citta to its original status, by withdrawing the citta from its functions. It is by means of citta that the purusha becomes aware of objects. Liberation consists in freeing the self from the citta, so that the purusha regains its true nature as the mere spectator of the mind's activities. According to yoga the means to liberation is not mere knowledge as postulated by Samkhya but through the processes of discipline and concentration.

According to Buddha the universe is a continuous flow which is 'nissatta' or substanceless and 'nirjiva' or soulless. Every person, like every object, is a synthesis, a compound, an organisation. In all individuals, the relation of component parts to one another is ever-changing. It is never the same for two consecutive moments. It is due to ignorance that man looks upon the self as the bodily form, or as something having a bodily form. There is no permanent self. We have no consciousness of any such changeless entity as the atman. Man is composed of five skandhas—the bodily form, the feeling, the perception, the disposition, and the intelligence. This is the 'nama rupa'.

Buddha was more keen on describing the psychical phenomena than on discussing the nature of the psyche. He emphasised the fact that we go beyond experience when we assert that there is a permanent self behind the phenomena. What we know is only the phenomenal self. To posit a soul is to go beyond the descriptive standpoint. Nagasena and Buddhaghosa interpret the Buddhist doctrine of the self in a highly logical manner. Nagasena points out that the word 'chariot' is only a name for a group of things. Similarly the self is a name for a group of mental processes. When Milinda asks him whether Nagasena is the outward form (rupa) or the sensation (vedana) or the perceptions (sanjna) or the synthesis of the constituent elements of character (samskara) or the consciousness (vijnana) to each of these questions Nagasena answered no. When he was asked if all these skandhas combined constituted Nagasena he said no. When he was asked if there is anything outside the five skandhas, again he said no. Thus Nagasena drops the word self altogether and speaks only of the stream of mental processes. The mind (nama) is no more a permanent self than the body (rupa) is a permanent substance. Each conscious phenomenon is not a modification of an eternal atman, but only a compound constantly changing and giving rise to new combinations. There is a continuity but there is no identity. According to Buddhaghosa the flux of consciousness is only a sequence of states of mind caused by the casual impact of sense and object. Just as the objects of senses are five, namely, sight, sound, smell, taste and touch the objects of thought are also of five classes: (1) citta (mind), (2) cetasika (mental properties), (3) pasada rupa, sensitive qualities of the body and suksma rupa, the subtle qualities of the body, (4) pannatti, name idea, concept and (5) nirvana. All these constitute mental presentation. The citta, a material organ, forms intellectual ideas out of the sensation. According to the Buddhist standpoint every conscious state is said to be a disturbance of the stream of being, bhavanga, which is both organic existence and subconscious existence. The subconscious is called Vidhimutta or free from process, as distinct from vidhicitta or waking consciousness. The two are divided by the threshold of consciousness, the manodvara, or the door of the mind. The continuity of self is explained with analogy of the flame by Nagasena. One element is always coming into being another is always ceasing and passing away. Buddhaghosa uses the analogy of the tree. Just as the elements of being which go under the name of tree bear fruit, similarly those groups which go under the name of self become happy or miserable as a result of his activities etc. Though the present self may not be the same as the

self which was, it is yet the outcome of the past, the resultant of the series, the *santana*. Nagasena gives another illustration to explain the persistent continuity as well as unceasing change. He asks Milinda if he is the same as the baby he once was. When Milinda does not accept this, Nagasena asks him whether he was never a baby and a child brought up by his parents. Buddhaghosa gives the illustration of the yoghurt arising out of the milk. Thus there is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference. The whole is a series. The past has its influence on the present and the present on the future. This is explained by the doctrine of 'prātītyasamutpada'. "From ignorance spring the *samskaras*; from the *samskaras* springs consciousness, from consciousness spring name and form; from name and form spring the six provinces (the five senses and the *citta*), from the six provinces springs contact, from the contact springs sensations, from sensations springs thirst (or desire), from thirst springs attachment, from attachment springs grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. Again, by the destruction of ignorance, which consists in complete absence of lust, the *samskaras* are destroyed; by the destruction of *samskaras*, consciousness is destroyed; by the destruction of consciousness, name and form are destroyed; by the destruction of name and form, the six provinces are destroyed; by the destruction of six provinces, contact is destroyed; by the destruction of contact, sensation is destroyed; by the destruction of sensation, thirst is destroyed; by the destruction of thirst, attachment is destroyed; by the destruction of attachment, becoming is destroyed . . ." (Mahavagga). Thus in the doctrine of the *prātītyasamutpada*, the interrelated or mutually dependent order in sentient existence is formulated. The first factor in this series is *avidya*, the false sense of 'I'. Ignorance is the cause of egoism. The whole series shows that *vijnana* or consciousness of "I" does not reside in an eternal *atma*, but is a continuous phenomenon arising by way of cause and effect. Ignorance and individuality are mutually dependent.

Jainism postulates the *jiva* which in general corresponds to the *atma* and the *purusha* of the other schools of thought. It is a bio-psychological concept. The self not only exists but it is also an experient (*bhokta*) and an agent (*karta*). Its intrinsic nature is one of perfection, but as a result of its union with matter, this is obscured. The object of life is to subdue the material element so that the *jiva* can reveal all its inherent excellences. The self is a matter of perception; there is *aham-pratyaksa*; there is self-consciousness. It can also be inferred from the behaviour of

others. The first characteristic of the self is 'Upayoga'. It is the source of experience. It is a vital impulse of urge to action. From the phenomenal point of view the jiva possesses four pranas: sense (indriya), energy (bala), life (ayu), and respiration (ana). Thus the pranas refer to the psycho-physical factors of the organism. The Jaina thinkers distinguished three states of the self: (1) bahiratman, consisting of the identification of the self with the external belongings, this is due to ignorance; (2) the antaratman, that which is free from all sense of otherness; it has discriminative knowledge; and (3) the paramatman, the pure and perfect self free from all impurities; it is characterised by perfect cognition. This pure consciousness, suddha chaitnya, cannot be known by the senses; it has no indriyas and no manas. According to the Jaina view, manas is the internal organ which controls the mental functions. Manas is postulated since the contact of the sense organ with the self by itself does not give rise to cognition. The operation of manas is necessary in every act of perception; it is also involved in the various mental processes like doubting, imagining, expecting, dreaming etc; it is also characterised by pleasure, pain and desires. Manas is an instrument of the self like the sense organs; it is the antahkarana, the internal organ. The Jainas believe in the inherent capacity for self-realisation. This is the goal. It is the upward tendency of the self to reach perfection. But self-realisation is a long process; it is an arduous and difficult path. The Jainas believe that there are fourteen stages, gunasthanas, of development. It is a development from wrong attitudes and false beliefs to right attitude and right knowledge through self-control.

Personality Types

The term personality indicates the integrated and dynamic organisation of the physical, mental, moral and social qualities of the individual. It indicates the influence of the constitutional conditions on behaviour and mental processes.

It has been noted above that according to the Samkhya system, the development of prakriti arises by means of its three constituent powers or gunas. It has also been noted that the psycho-physical apparatus for perception, feeling, thought etc., have been evolved out of prakriti. The three gunas also influence the behaviour of organisms.

The medical thinkers Charaka and Sushruta recognize the influence of bodily humors: vata, pitta and kapha over and above the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas. Charaka enumerates seven sattvic types of persons, six rajas types and three tamas types, altogether sixteen types.

According to Charaka the line of treatment for disease should take into account the type of personality.

Susruta speaks of seven different types of personality according to the deranged doshas of the body. He asserts that the temperament (prakriti) of a person is determined by the preponderance of the particular doshas at the time of conception. The Vataja temperament makes a man wakeful, averse to bathing, vain and dishonest; he is given to biting his finger nails and grinding his teeth; he is impulsive and vacillating in temper; his mind is never steady, he makes few friends, he talks incoherently; he is capable of accumulating very little money. The Pittyaja man is irritable in temper but cools down very soon; he is intelligent and possesses good money; he loves to monopolize conversation by pulling down other speakers; he is never overpowered by fear; he protects the suppliant. The Kaphaja temperament makes a man self-controlled, forbearing and unselfish; he does not hastily form opinions; he is possessed of the qualities of the sattvika stamp, capable of sustaining pain and fatigue. Sushruta also described the various types of sattvika, rajasika and tamasika persons. He says that a man's dreams are influenced by the three humors of the body. Finally he describes the influence of temperament on intoxication. A man of phlegmatic temperament (Kapha-prakriti) can stand alcohol well; the person of vata temperament becomes tipsy very soon. The sattvika type of person is quite jolly under the influence of intoxication; he continues to be pure and compassionate. A man of rajasika type becomes either melancholy or pugnacious. A person of tamasa type boasts about his excellences and is highly sexual; with more intoxication he falls asleep.

Insanity, Epilepsy and Intoxication

Charaka took a psychosomatic view of all diseases. According to him diseases occur when both the body and mind are vitiated. There are three vitiating elements in the body, namely, vata, pitta and kapha. There are two vitiating elements in the mind, namely, rajas and tamas.

He classifies diseases as belonging to one or the other of three types: endogenous, arising from the discordance in the bodily humours; exogenous, arising from poisons, injuries, fire, etc., and psychic, arising from the gain of undesired as well as desired things.

He says that when an intelligent man finds himself afflicted by a psychical disease, he should examine himself and endeavour to abstain from what is not conducive to dharma, artha and kama, the three purusarthas, and endeavour to undertake only such actions as are condu-

cive to these three objectives.

Charaka speaks of three therapies: divine therapy consisting of propitiatory rites, sacrifices, vows, fasting, pilgrimages etc; scientific therapy consisting of prescriptions on the lines of dietetic regimen and medication; and mental control, restraining the mind from the desire for unwholesome objects. He says that the stupid man fails to recognise the seriousness of a disease till he is tormented by it; but a man who cares for happiness should take immediate steps to get the disease treated even at the incipient stage itself.

Insanity. Mental disease involves derangement of the understanding will and memory. Among the causative factors of insanity are diet that consists of articles which are unwholesome, vitiated and incompatible; disrespect to other persons, that is wrong social relations; mental shock resulting from excess of fear or joy; faulty bodily activity. The general symptoms of insanity are confusion of intellect, extreme fickleness of mind, agitation of eyes, incoherence of speech and mental vacuity. The symptoms of insanity due to vata are laughing, dancing, singing, weeping, though such reactions are out of place; the symptoms due to pitta are intolerance, turbulence, running about, anger, etc; the symptoms due to kapha are slowness of speech and action, anorexia, sexual excitement, fondness of solitude, vomiting, dribbling of saliva etc.

Epilepsy. It is defined as a paroxysmal loss of consciousness due to disturbance of memory and understanding attended with convulsive seizures.

There are four kinds of epilepsy. In that kind caused by vata there is visual aura of dusky-red or black colour; the patient trembles, gnashes his teeth, throws out foams from the mouth. In pitta type, the visual aura is of yellow or red colour; he is affected with thirst and heat. In the kapha type the visual aura is white in colour; the saliva, limbs, mouth and eyes are white; the body is cold, horripilated and heavy; he takes a long time to recover from the fit. The fourth type of epilepsy is produced by the tridiscordance of all the three humours; all the symptoms will appear in all their intensity; this type is incurable.

The patient should be subjected to oleation and sudation and then purified by emesis and purgation. Later he should be nourished with foods and drinks that serve as brain tonics. In addition, his friends and sympathizers should speak to him about what contributes to his moral and material good and instill in him understanding, resolution, memory and concentration.

Intoxication. Alcohol is looked upon as the destroyer of sorrow, unhappiness, fear and distress. It is nourishing and induces joy and stimulates speech. But it is productive of good as well as bad effects. If taken in right dose, in right time along with wholesome food, alcohol is like ambrosia. It acts like a poison if a person drinks whatever kind come in hand and whenever he gets an opportunity. By excessive use of alcohol the brain becomes disordered along with the body elements.

Charaka as well as Susruta describe the various stages of intoxication. In the first stage, it produces exhilaration, delight, a finer discrimination of the qualities of food and drink, music, jokes and stories. It promotes sound sleep and he will wake up in a happy mood. In the second stage, memory is slightly impaired; there is fitful recollection and fitful forgetfulness; speech becomes frequent, indistinct, thick and indiscriminate; the gait becomes unsteady, there is impropriety in sitting, drinking and eating. In the third stage the persons of rajasika and tamasika types commit all kinds of indiscretions; finally they become paralysed and resemble a dead man; the person lies down unconscious bereft of all powers of action, memory and judgement.

Susruta also asserts that temperament influences the reaction to intoxication. As noted above, he says that a person of bilious temperament (pitta) becomes easily intoxicated. A person of phlegmatic temperament (kapha) can consume a large amount of alcohol and retain his composure. The vata type also becomes tipsy with a little. The person of sattvika type becomes jolly; the rajasika type becomes melancholy or pugnacious; the tamasika type becomes boastful, sexually excited, etc.

Mental Health

As noted in the first section, the goal of all effort is to attain mental health and mental stability. The thinkers of various schools realized the need for and the value of an unified and integrated mind. The ultimate goal of human development is the last purusartha, moksa, liberation. Mental health, mental stability and integration of the various levels of mind were looked upon as the prerequisites for attaining liberation. According to Charaka, health includes mental health and all illness, physical or mental, involves the vitiating elements of body as well as the mind.

According to Buddhism man is intertwined within the tangles of desire, tanha jata. The only way in which he can get out of it is by the practice of right discipline (sila), concentration (samadhi), and wisdom

(panna). Sila is desisting from deeds promoted by bad desires. It helps to remove the asavas or depravities. These asavas are classified into (i) Kamasavas, desire, attachment, pleasure, thirst after qualities associated with the senses; (ii) bhavasava, will for existence and attachment to it; (iii) dittasava, holding wrong views and (iv) avidyasava, ignorance regarding sorrow, its cause, its extinction and means to its extinction. Samadhi is a more advanced effort than sila. By it all the roots of kīlasas are destroyed, and desires removed. Panna is the direct result of samadhi.

Three characteristics are emphasised by Jaina thinkers: (1) jnana, knowledge of the reality as it is; (2) sraddha, faith in the teachings of the jinas; and (3) charitra, cessation from evil deeds. It consists of ahimsa (non-violence), sunruta (truth), asteya (non-stealing), brahmacharya (sexual continence) and aparigraha (not accepting gifts). In life an individual is generally overpowered by the four kasayas (passions): (1) krodha (anger), (2) mana (vanity and pride), (3) maya (insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and (4) lobha (greed). So he must gain control over himself; he should not allow himself to be overpowered by the four passions. All our acts become controlled when the mind is controlled. All attachment and antipathy (ragadvesa) can be removed by manasuddhi, the purification of the mind. When one learns to look upon all beings with equality (samatva), one can overcome attachment and antipathy. Then he is fit to practice dhyana, meditation or deep concentration. According to Jaina view, samatva and dhyana are interdependent; without one the other is impossible. One should cultivate (1) maitri (universal friendship), (2) pramoda, the habit of emphasising the good side of men, (3) karuna, universal compassion and (4) madhyashta, indifference to the wickedness of people. The development of these qualities will help to steady the mind and promote dhyana.

The Gita can be looked upon as a manual of mental health. In several verses the Gita emphasises the need for mental integration. There are several sections in the Gita which describe the characteristics of a well-integrated personality. One of the themes often recurrent is the ideal of being unmoved by the opposites. The ideal set forth is that one should not be ambivalent, one should be free from contradictory feelings towards the same person or object. It asks a person to treat alike pleasure and pain, victory and defeat, gain and loss (II. 3). It enjoins freedom from dualities and to be firmly fixed without the eagerness to acquire what one does not possess or entertaining a fear regarding what one

possesses already (II. 45). One of the most famous sections of the Gita is the last section of the second chapter which describes the characteristics of the man of steady intelligence (II. 54-71). In particular two verses in this section describe how a person who constantly dwells on the objects of senses; acquires attachment to them and becomes full of rage when he is thwarted in his attempts to gain it. Anger and rage cause bewilderment and this leads to a loss of memory. He forgets all the principles of conduct which he may have cherished. As a result of this he perishes (II. 62-63). Two other famous verses describe how there are two aspects in one's personality, the lower and the higher. If he allows the lower aspect to hold sway he will be ruined. But if he sees that the higher aspect of his personality prevails he will be a well-integrated man. So the Gita says that one is himself one's greatest enemy and is himself the greatest friend of oneself (VI. 5-6). In other words, one should not throw the blame on external agencies either for one's destruction or for one's well-being. The Gita accepts that one of the most difficult tasks of life is to control one's restless mind. But it asserts that it is possible to control the mind by constant practice and detachment (VI. 35). The Gita also shows how important social attitudes are in ensuring steadiness of mind. He must be one who does not generate fear and ill will in others and who bears no ill will towards others is the model. He must be friendly and compassionate.

The main emphasis of the Gita is on equanimity, not being moved by success or failure, joy or sorrow, pleasure or pain, on giving up interest in the fruits of action but doing one's work free from desire and egoism; freedom from emotions and feelings; on drawing away from objects of senses; on being temperate in food, recreation and sleep; on seeing others with a sense of equality and on being self-dependent. All these promote mental health as well as efficiency in action.

Patanjali's 'Yoga sutra' also constitutes a manual of mental health. It is a system of training to achieve mental health. The aim is to make a person become fully self-conscious and abandon automatic behaviour. The goal of yoga is attainment of liberation from restlessness, imperfections, uncertainties and insecurities. It is a method to train a person to gain self-direction, so that he acts on the basis of knowledge of circumstances and deliberate will; this enables one to be psychologically free: This will enable a person to free himself from emotional associations and emotional conflicts and see oneself and the problems in an impersonal way Patanjali also declares that positive, constructive thoughts and emotions should be cultivated in order to remove the disturbing

mental states. One should cultivate friendliness towards those who are happy, compassion towards those in pain, joy towards those who are good and indifference towards those who are anti-social (I. 33). He prescribed the eightfold path to overcome these afflictions. Like all the ancient Indian thinkers, Patanjali attaches great value to ethical behaviour. It is impossible to make any progress in one's development unless one pursues the path of yama and niyama. Secondly, he emphasises the need for developing perfect bodily control through asana and pranayama. Thirdly, he emphasises the need to withdraw the senses from objects (pratyahara). Finally, he describes the methods to be followed to concentrate one's mind and practice meditation.

Superconscious State

While illusions, hallucinations, dreams, conditions of insanity, epilepsy etc. illustrate the sub-normal functioning of mind, auto-suggestions, telepathy, clairvoyance, mystic trance and samadhi constitute illustrations of super-normal functioning of the mind.

Though most of the ancient Indian thinkers believed in the possibility of these supernormal functions and have even developed systems of training to develop them, the Charvakas and Mimamsakas questioned the validity of these experiences. The Charvakas does not believe in any source of knowledge other than sense-perception. What is not perceivable is non-existent. Thus the consistent adaptation of the perceptual theory of knowledge led to nihilism and scepticism. The Mimamsakas also denied yogic perception and experience. They questioned whether yogic perception was sensuous or non-sensuous. Is it produced by external sense organs or by the internal organ (mind)? External sense organs can produce cognitions only when they come into contact with their objects. Since they can never come into contact with the distant, the past and the future, they can never produce any cognition of these non-existing objects. Nor can yogic perception be produced by the internal organ. The mind can perceive only mental states. It cannot produce perceptions of external sense-organs. They conclude that yogic perception is only illusory.

As noted above the Buddhists describe different levels of consciousness. The subliminal consciousness is below the threshold of consciousness (manodvara) and consciousness is above the threshold. The consciousness is again divided into the normal consciousness or kama chitta and the super-normal consciousness or mahaggata chitta, which is again divided into rupa chitta, the sphere of forms and arupa chitta, the

sphere of formlessness. In order to go from *kāma chitta* to *rūpa chitta*, severe discipline and concentration of mind is necessary. All these states are clearly defined.

The Jaina thinkers distinguish between sensuous perception and non-sensuous perception. The latter is derived from the self alone; it is neither derived from sense organs nor from the mind. The non-sensuous perception is of two kinds: imperfect (*vikala*) and perfect (*sakala*). The imperfect leads to clairvoyance (*avadhi*) or to the direct perception of the thoughts of others telepathy, *manah-paryaya*. The perfect non-sensuous perception leads to perfect knowledge of all objects, omniscience, *kevalajñana*. By hypothesis, according to Jainism, the knowledge of all objects exists in the self; but it is veiled by karma-matter. When this veil is destroyed, the self realises its omniscience.

According to Patanjali the practice of concentration helps to gather the mental forces which are scattered and dissipated by emotional urges and conflicts. The restless thoughts and feelings can be controlled by meditation and by making the mind *ekagra*, one-pointed. Steady practice of concentration relaxes the mind. It will promote rest and sleep. The Gita and Patanjali agree that the restless mind is hard to subdue, but it can be brought under control by constant practice and detachment.

By constitution, the mind is outgoing (Katha 4.1). The sense organs are constantly stimulated by the processes in the environment, physical as well as social. This constant flow of new sensations and experiences keeps the mind in a restless condition. Next there are the internal urges coupled with imagination and memory. The various urges make one feel restless and pursue all kinds of undertakings to satisfy these urges.

Finally, there are the residuals of past experiences, the *samskaras*, stored up in the subconscious level and which are waiting to manifest themselves at the conscious level. As a result of all these three forces, the mind is normally in a restless condition. The whole system of Yoga is designed by Patanjali to control this restlessness by moral discipline, physical relaxation, and concentration and meditation.

This process involves a vicious circle. A person cannot develop the ability to concentrate unless he has, to some extent, overcome the conflicting urges and the aggressive tendencies provoked by frustrations. On the other hand, he cannot overcome these disturbing elements unless he develops the ability to concentrate. This is the reason why emphasis is laid on the twin conditions of persistent practice and development of detachment. A third technique suggested is to cultivate

the opposite and more constructive emotions when one is in the grip of attachment or antipathy. Finally, one is asked to think about the reality situation clearly so that one can overcome the delusion, moha. All these require years of practice. When the mind is in a relaxed condition one can succeed in concentrating upon some desired object (ishta). The novitiate is also asked to take up some concrete object for meditation. However, one is cautioned not to be discouraged by one's failures and give up the practice of concentration, because it is very difficult to hold the mind on one object for more than a few seconds to start with. As Patanjali says with persistent and steady practice the mind becomes steady and peaceful (I. 21-23). The automatisms of thought and feeling are overcome and self-determined activity is promoted. This is the manifestation of liberation. Freedom from bondage is sought through a progressive awareness of the self and through self-determined thoughts, feelings and activities.

In Book III, Patanjali describes the way in which meditation is to be practiced. Concentration (dharana) is holding the attention fixed upon an object. Sustained concentration upon one object is dhyana. When all consciousness is lost except that on which the mind is fixed, there is samadhi. These three stages of dharana, dhyana and samadhi constitute samyama; and this gives rise to lucid knowledge and insight (prajna). It is pointed out that the aspirant should go to the succeeding stage after having fully mastered the preceding stage.

When the emerging subliminal impressions (samskaras) are controlled and when the restricted (nirodha) samskaras arise and are controlled, one is said to have attained the stage of controlling the modifications of the mind. As a result of the nirodha-samskara becoming habitual there will be a peaceful flow of the chitta; at this stage one-pointedness can be sustained at will (III. 9-10).

The mind has two inherent tendencies: dispersiveness, or vikshepa, and one-pointedness, or ekagra. When the tendency for dispersiveness is destroyed and the tendency for one-pointedness is cultivated, samadhi is possible (III. 11).

Through samyama one can know the past and future; telepathy and clairvoyance are possible; one can excel in friendliness, compassion etc; one can develop enormous physical strength; one can control hunger; one can develop great sensitivity to sensations etc. But Patanjali warns that these powers are really obstacles to samadhi. The real goal of concentration is to make the sattva of the chitta free from defilement of rajas and tamas by burning the seeds of hindrances so that the chitta has

the same purity as that of the self. When such purity of *citta* is obtained there is cessation of experience which is falsely attributed to the self. This is the state of *Kaivalya* (III. 55). There will be complete self-awareness and complete self-control at this level of personality development.

Liberation may be defined as the state of freedom from defensive automatisms which make one a slave of impulses and emotions on the one side and a slave of social customs and conventions on the other. By liberation is meant complete self-awareness and self-control over all one's actions. In ordinary life we are hardly aware of our real motives and the implications of our habitual and conventional reactions. From this point of view yoga is a conscious and deliberate attack on our imperfections and sense of insecurity. It is a search for interior solution. It is a method by which one can train oneself to have a conscious control over oneself and to develop self-direction of one's activities. The cultivation of self-determined activities is the manifestation of liberation.

Social Behaviour

The ancient Indian thinkers seem to have been more influenced by customs and traditions, as far as social behavior and human relations were concerned, though they were very bold and free with respect to philosophical and psychological speculations. We find evidence of this conservative and uncritical social outlook even in the Upanishads and the Gita, not to speak of the later Dharma Sastras.

It is one of the features of ancient societies all over the world that no distinction is drawn between the religious, the ethical and the social spheres of man's life. Man's social behaviour is determined by usage and custom. This is true of the ancient Indian society also. Another characteristic feature is the dominance of the final goal in the ancient societies. All social activities were dominated by the final purpose of life as believed by them. In the case of ancient Indian society, as the Upanishads clearly show, the final purpose of life is liberation or self-realization. So all the social activities and the whole social order was determined by this final purpose. Tradition and rituals became very important and all social activities were determined by usage and custom and by this final goal of liberation.

The most important social concepts are *dharma*, *karma* and *samsara*. *Dharma* literally means that which holds a thing together and prevents it from breaking up and changing into something else. Thus, *dharma*

stands for a corpus of duties essential for a sound social organization. Dharma emphasises custom, moral laws and duties in general. It is obvious that it makes more for the conservation of the social order than for social change. According to the concept of karma, nothing can happen without a sufficient cause in the moral as well as in the physical world. The pleasures and pains experienced by a person are the results of his actions in the past; the present actions influence the experiences in the future. Thus, the doctrine of karma traces all suffering to oneself and removes bitterness towards God or the neighbour or the social order. It stresses individual responsibility for the situation in which one finds himself. In other words, it is not the social forces which are responsible for one's well-being or misfortune but one's own previous actions. However, the doctrine is not limited to this life. One's present sufferings are not only attributed to one's past actions in this life but also to one's actions in the past lives. Thus it is associated with the doctrine of rebirth; the constant stream of births and deaths is what is known as samsara or transmigration. This cycle of births and deaths will stop with the attainment of moksha (liberation).

The social aspects of the concepts of dharma, karma and samsara are seen in the social institution of varna and jati or the caste system. Caste is based on hereditary membership and controls the occupation, food, drink, marriage and social intercourse. There are four varnas: the Brahmana belonging to the priestly order, the Kshatriya belonging to the military order, the Vaisya, belonging to the agricultural-artisan-commercial order and the Sudra belonging to the servile order. The Gita, the Manusmṛti and the Artha Sastras describe the duties or the dharma of each varna. According to the Gita, the four-fold division of varna is based on differences in work (karma) and quality (guna) (Gita IV. 13). According to Mahabharata, all human beings were originally of one varna and were later divided into four varnas on account of specific duties. Also Yudhisthira says that it is difficult to find out the caste of persons on account of the mixture of castes since men beget offspring in all sorts of women. So conduct is the only determining feature of caste. But the Dharma sastras and the Artha Sastra call upon the state to enforce the duties of the various castes. They looked upon this enforcement as a major part of the social and economic functions of the State. Thus Varnadharma prescribes the duties of individuals according to birth, dividing the members of the various social orders into water-tight compartments. Not only do one's dharmas vary according to one's birth, but birth in that particular caste is also determined by one's karma

in the previous birth. The Chandogya Upanishad says "Just as he acts, just as he behaves, so will he be born. He who does good will be born good, he who does evil will be born evil Man is altogether and throughout composed of desire (kama), in proportion to his desire so is his discretion (kratu), in proportion to his discretion so he performs acts (karma)" (III. 14.1). It is also said that a man is born candala due to his performance of evil deeds in a past birth (V. 10,7). Thus dharma, varna, karma and punarjanma are all closely linked into one system. If a man does not fulfil his varnadharma he will be born again in a lower caste. So a man was forced to fulfil his caste duties lest he be born in a lower caste in his next birth. The Gita says that women, Vaisyas and Sudras are born of sinful wombs (papayoniya). The prevailing social order was thus rigidly enforced not only by the political and legal order but also by the caste panchayats and the village panchayats. Even more it was preserved by the fear of individuals that any transgression of the dharma of their caste will lead them to peril in the next birth and imperil all possibility of moksha.

Closely associated with varna dharma is the concept of ashrama-dharma which divides a man's life into four stages: brahmacharya (studentship), grhastha (householder), vanaprastha (hermit) and sannyasa (the ascetic). Here again the Dharma sastras and the Arth Sastra lay down elaborate rules for each stage of life.

Thus an individual's life, as a member of the group into which he is born, and as a member of group in which he grows up, is closely determined by the rules and regulations laid down in the Dharma sastras and enforced by the parent, the social groups and by the political order. Indeed there are few situations, at any stage of life, in any caste group, in connection with which the duty of an individual is not prescribed.

This freedom of individual to shape his own destiny within the framework of varnashrama dharma was made possible by the development of the concept of purusharthas, namely, dharma, artha, kama and moksha. These are the four ends or goals of men. What a man does by way of duty and righteousness is dharma. Through other activities a man seeks to gain something for himself or he is pursuing other activity

* This clearly shows the enormous problems encountered in modern India to change the social structure. Even when caste has been abolished by constitution and by law, it is persisting as a social fact in the rural as well as in the urban areas, in the illiterate as well as in the highly educated groups, in the lower castes as well as in the upper castes. It continues to be a social force.

for his own pleasure. When the object of activity is material gain, it is called artha; when it is to gratify lust or to seek pleasure, it is called kama. Finally, action pursued in order to liberate oneself from worldly gains and bodily pleasures is moksha. Manu asserts that pursuit of pleasure and pursuit of wealth and power should be guided by righteousness (II. 224). The ancient thinkers differentiated between actions undertaken in the pursuit of pleasures, wealth, power and duty (pravritti) and actions undertaken in the pursuit of liberation (nivritti). On several occasions there is a discussion in the Gita as well as in the Shantiparva of Mahabharata regarding the claims of the superiority of one path over the other. The life of a householder involves the pursuit of material gain and gratification of pleasure. On the other hand, the sannyasin has renounced all these and pursues only those actions which lead to liberation. This is the central theme of the Gita. Arjuna desires to renounce the worldly life of the householder because he has a horror of killing the elders and the relatives. He wanted to take up sannyasa. But Krishna points out that mere abstention from action does not enable a man to be free from action nor does it enable him to attain perfection (III. 9). True perfection, says Krishna, lies in doing what one has to do without attachment to the action or to the fruits of the action (III. 19). Krishna also emphasises that it is only when each man does his duty that there can be order in the world, lokasamgraha (III. 20). Society cannot function if every individual becomes a sannyasin. This is why the Gita enjoins action on two grounds. One should do one's duty in order to maintain the world, lokasamgraha (III. 20). Secondly, unselfish performance of action leads to liberation (V. 2).

The discussion regarding this problem in Shantiparva is even more forceful against the gospel of renunciation frequently expounded in the Upanishads. For example Yaganvalkyia says "Realising their very self as Brahman . . . they gave up the desire for sons, desire for wealth, and desire for the worlds of the manes and gods and wandered as monks living on alms" (Br. Up. III. 5). While before the great Mahabharata war Arjuna becomes despondent and desires to abandon the war, at the end of it when victory is won, Yudhishtira is dejected by the destruction, particularly of the youth, in the war. So he tells his brothers that he wants to expiate the sins he has committed by renouncing the world and doing penance. Arjuna asks him not to abandon his duty through fickleness of heart. He shows that a mendicant cannot enjoy the good things of life; it is a wretched mode of life. It is the abandonment of dharma and artha, righteousness, wealth and well-being. He

goes on to describe that poverty is the most undesirable thing. It is wealth that enables a man to live well and to discharge his duties to the society. Continuing the argument Vyasa says that renunciation breeds idleness and idleness, though temporarily agreeable, ends in misery. Bhīma rebukes his elder brother for his desire to run away from the responsibility of the Kingdom. He jeeringly asks whether the wild animals have succeeded in attaining liberation because of their living in the forest.

Thus while some were in favour of renunciation of duties and the acceptance of the sannyasa way of life, many looked upon it as simple avoidance of the responsibility which one owes the society in which he lived and the family in which he was born and brought up. The life of the householder is looked upon as the support of all the other three ashramas of life. If people do not labour and acquire wealth who will provide the wherewithal to the students and the sannyasi? It is the grhastha who pursues the various occupations and sees that the whole social fabric is in operation without a breakdown. It is the parents who not only bring up the children but contribute to their moral development. On several occasions it is asserted in the Shantiparva that the grhastha-ashrama is the best ashrama.

Thus the concept of purusarthas has provided full liberty to the individual to pursue whatever path he likes within the framework of varnashrama dharma as it was conceived in the ancient Indian society.*

Another recurrent theme of great significance regarding social behaviour is the theme of equality in the Gita, Buddhism and Jainism. It is true that the concept of social equality has been for ages suppressed by the social institution of caste which emphasises social inequality and makes birth the only qualification for membership in a caste.

*It may be noted that in the Bhakti movement in the medieval period and in the movement for establishing a secular society on socialistic pattern since independence, the liberty of the individual and the scope for the development of the individual have been stressed. While in the ancient Indian society education was the prerogative of the "guardians" of society, namely the Brahmans and the Kshatriyas, today the aim is to provide free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen to all children. Occupation is now completely bifurcated from varna and jati. Each man can pursue whatever occupation he likes. The legal restrictions regarding marriage have now been removed, still the custom of arranged marriage within the sub-caste is to a large extent operating. The method of upbringing also promotes the hold of custom regarding marriage on the individual though the legal barriers have been removed. The taboos regarding pollution are practically extinct. The caste system does not any more fix a man's station in life.

The Gita says "Sages see with an equal eye, a learned and humble Brahman, a cow, an elephant or even a dog or an outcaste" (V.18). Edgerton writes "One of the most striking and emphatic of the ethical doctrines of the Gita is substantially that of the Golden rule. Man must treat all creatures alike, from the highest to the lowest" (Edgerton, II, p. 83). "He who sees with equality everything, in the image of his own self, whether in pleasure or in pain, is considered a perfect yogi" (VI. 32). Radhakrishnan writes "Atma-aupamyia means equality of others with oneself. Even as he desires good to himself, he desires good to all . . . He harms no creatures as, in the words of Samkara, 'he sees that whatever is pleasant to himself is pleasant to all creatures, and that whatever is painful to himself is painful to all beings'" (The Bhagavad Gita, p. 205). The perfected man "delights in the welfare of all beings", *sarvabhutahita ratah*. (V. 25). The person who has acquired wisdom and peace is full of love and compassion to all beings. This high ethical standard is a logical deduction from the metaphysical position that the real self of all beings is one. "He whose self is harmonized by yoga seeth the self abiding in all beings and all beings in the self; everywhere he sees the same" (VI. 29). Further, "He who is equal-minded among friends, companions and foes, among those who are neutral and impartial, among those who are hateful and kinsmen, among the saints and sinners, he excels" (VI. 9). It is this conception that is at the basis of the practical doctrine of ahimsa, "For, as he sees the Lord present, equally everywhere, he does not injure his true self by the self" (XIII. 28). The ethics of ahimsa is expressed in the significant expression of Padma Purana 'Do not do unto others, what you do not desire for yourself', 'Atmanah pratikulani paresam na samacarat'. (I.56.33)

Buddhism as well as Jainism were protestant movements in the sixth century B.C. They were the first proselytising religions in the history of man. Both claimed universality. They were not religions confined to a group. Their object was to lead all men to salvation. So they appealed not only to elitist Aryans but also to the low-born Sudras and the alien Mlechhas. Both Buddha and Mahavira claimed that they attained enlightenment not by the help of a teacher, nor by the revelation of the Vedas but by their own self-effort. Both of them wanted the suffering humanity to learn the truth and exert themselves to attain liberation. So they undertook preaching to the masses. As a result, they did not use the elitist language, Sanskrit, but the languages of the masses, Pali and Prakrit. They raised their banner of revolt against animal sacrifice in the name of yaga and yajna. The Bhagavad Gita also revolted against the

Vedic ritualism and Vedic sacrifices.

Buddha set out to discover truth because he was overwhelmed by the sight of decrepitude, illness and death, in short, by the suffering of the fellow human beings. After attaining enlightenment he himself wandered all over the country and asked his disciples to wander “for the gain of many, for the welfare of many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain and for the welfare of men”. When he saw one of the monks suffering from dysentery and lying in filth, he washed him and changed his bed clothes. He told his disciples, “whoever would nurse me should nurse the sick”. He wanted his disciples not only to preach to the people but to actively work to relieve the suffering of the people. He did not believe in social hierarchy. He said that the people of the four varnas lose their former names when they preach the Doctrine and Discipline in the same way in which the rivers lose their names when they join the oceans. He laid a great emphasis on love of fellow man. He said that love sets free the heart and gives light and radiance. He said “As a mother, at the risk of her life, watches over her only child, so let everyone cultivate a boundless love towards all beings.” (Hiriyanna, 1932)

One unique feature of Buddha is his faith in the possibility of change. He said that every man can build himself up by good thoughts, good words and good deeds. According to him the self is built up by effort, discipline and striving. The self is something which evolves and grows; the self is something to be achieved and built up by pain and labour. The reality of the person is in his creative will. We start growing when we break down our clinging to our body, feelings, etc. This is why Buddha denies the view that the ego is permanent and unchanging. He also found that the great obstacle to human striving is the dependence on an external agency. Dependence on an external agency leads to a surrender of personal effort. So Buddha rejected the conception of God as a personal being who can be relied on to promote our well-being. He said that the world is made, not by gods and angels, but by the voluntary choices of men. It is true that a person operates in a given physical and social environment. But by his exertion he can modify and reshape his environment to some extent. Thus Buddha preached the possibility of personality change as well as environmental change through exertion. He preached this to the lowliest of the low. Every human being has the ability to change himself and the conditions in which he is living by his exertion (Radhakrishnan, *Gautama Buddha*, Hind Kitabs, p. 19). He wanted people to cherish maitri (loving-kindness), karuna (compas-

sion), *mudita* (cheerfulness) and *upeksha* (impartiality) towards all people. His aim was to make the sentiments of love, sympathy etc., extend over ever-widening groups till the whole world of humanity is included. The cultivation of universal love (*maitri*) and compassion (*karuna*) were looked upon as the means for self-purification.

Among the twelve *Angas* of the Jaina scripture, *Samaiya* (equality) occupies the first place and is known as the *Acaranga Sutra*. Mahavira lays stress on the principle of equality. Among the six rites prescribed for the ascetics and the laity in Jainism, *samaiya*, equality, is the most important. It is this attitude of equality that found its expression in non-violence in conduct as well as in philosophical thought in Jainism.

As noted above, according to the Jaina view, *samatva* (equality of all human beings) and *dhyana* (meditation) are interdependent. Without one, the other is impossible. *Samatva* consists in the cultivation of (1) *maitri*, universal love, (2) *pramoda*, the habit of emphasising the good side of men, (3) *karuna*, universal compassion and (4) *madhyastha*, indifference to the wickedness of people. When these qualities are cultivated the mind becomes steady and *dhyana* is possible.

In a similar way Patanjali emphasises the need to cultivate friendliness (*maitri*) towards all persons, compassion (*karuna*) towards those in pain, joy (*harsha*) towards those with merit and indifference (*upeksha*) towards those with demerit. When these qualities are cultivated the mind becomes calm and when calmness is attained one-pointedness (*ekagra*) is possible (I. 33).*

Aesthetic Experience

Two outstanding ancient Indian contributions to the theory of aesthetic experience are Bharata's *rasa* theory, believed to be propounded by him in 200 B.C. in his "*Natya Sastra*" and Anandavardhana's *Dhvani* theory propounded in the middle of 9th century A.D.

Bharata approached the problem of aesthetic experience from the psychological standpoint. He tried to find out how aesthetic experience

* People of other countries and cultures often wonder how in Asia, Indians who follow caste system which stands for hierarchy of human groups based on birth are able to cherish democratic ideal of equality of citizenship. The villager may uphold his caste whether it is high or low, but he has also great attachment to all the members of the village. This is another illustration of coexistence of seemingly contradictory social values in the Indian society. Similarly, though the *Gita* and the *Manusmriti* look upon women as an inferior group of human beings yet, woman has always been held with great reverence and love as the 'mother' and today, with equality of sexes constitutionally guaranteed, Indian women are taking leadership position in various walks of life.

is roused in the spectators who are witnessing a drama. He devoted a whole chapter to describe the qualities of the ideal spectators. According to Bharata the ideal spectator is one who is happy at the sight of happiness on the stage or who suffers when grief is portrayed or who experiences pity at the sight of the piteous scene. Later writers on aesthetics called this empathy, *hrudaya samvada*. Bharata also recognizes that the drama must appeal to all tastes, to those of illiterate and the cultured, the wealth-seeker and the world-weary, the young and the old.

Rasa is the emotional element in the theme which reveals a regular pattern; but it is not identical with the emotions and the mental states. Though in life we have an interplay of emotions, there is no artistic pattern. Everyday life is generally characterized by personal interests. It is the creative imagination of the playwright which gives a law and order into the clash of desires and conflicting emotions in ordinary life. Though the artist takes the events from everyday life, he selects only those features and emphasises those aspects which make the representation appear like the reality. The dramatist and the poet idealize the objects, events and the personalities. It is by this process that the poet raises the everyday problems to the level of art and gives them aesthetic significance. Though what he depicts is not real, it evokes the interest of the spectator and the reader. As a result of the idealized character, the art objects lose their appeal to the practical self and egoistic interests. It is this which makes the art objects possess universal interest. They become impersonal in their appeal and therefore become enjoyable in and for themselves. The Rasa theorists speak of this as *sadharanikarana*, the universalization of experience.

As a result of this process of creative imagination of the artist, the contemplation of art leads to an attitude of mind which is quite impersonal. Another characteristic of the aesthetic experience is that the spectator forgets himself altogether. He will be aware of nothing besides the object or the situation portrayed by the artist. As a consequence of such self-forgetfulness, the contemplation of art gives rise to a unique form of spontaneous pleasure.

While ordinary life experiences generate tension in the mind, the aesthetic experience generates relaxation. This is why people are eager to visit theatres and music halls. They are eager to read dramas, poems and novels.

The imagination of the fictitious situation created by the artist is also self-complete, it is perfect in itself. Further it is impersonal, because the

incidents represented on the stage are unreal. As Hiriyanna writes "A frightful object appearing there will not incline even the most timid in the audience to shrink from it; nor will an alluring one prompt even the most covetous to cast a wishful eye on it" (*Art Experience*, p. 26). The restful joy experienced at the time is traced to the perfect unity of the situation depicted in the play. It satisfied the desire in man for complete knowledge. The unity makes him overcome doubts and 'discomposing thoughts'. Thus, the contemplation of art helps one to transcend the egoistic self; as a result, the nature of the pleasure derived from aesthetic experience becomes unique, unlike the pleasures of ordinary life, which involve not only personal interest but also promotes desire to use the object to satisfy other motives. To quote Hiriyanna (1954) again "It means that the spectator, in appreciating art rises above the duality of pain and pleasure as commonly known, and experiences pure joy" (p. 32). This is the unique feature of aesthetic delight.

Another significant feature in the Indian analysis of creativity is that the poet or the dramatist is not expressing his personal feeling through the poem or the drama. He is not preoccupied with his own immediate reaction to the situation; he does not depict his own feelings; he is depicting the objective situation which gave rise to the feeling. In other words, he idealizes the situation, and thus universalizes it so that people of varying standards of cultural attainments and varying experiences can enjoy the depiction. Thus, the dramatist or the poet is not communicating in the work of art his own feelings and emotions. According to the Rasa theory the artist is awakening in the spectator an emotion similar to the one he is depicting. The aim of the poet or the dramatist is not to influence the reader or the spectator but only to give expression to his unique experience through the work of art.

The distinguishing feature of the Rasa theory is that it analyses the drama from the point of view of the spectator. Later critics applied it to the reader of poetry also. What does the spectator of a play or the reader of a poem get? The answer given is that he gets pleasure; rather, it stands for a state of the self or a mode of experience of which pleasure is a constant and conspicuous feature. Thus, pleasure by itself does not constitute the whole of the aesthetic experience; it is only an aspect of that experience.

Another significant feature of the Rasa theory is that the work of art is dominated by some emotion, one of, what Bharata calls, the *sthayi bhavas*. Though the other emotions may be there, they are subordinated to this dominant emotion. It is this which gives the unity to the

experience. This is why Bharata speaks of drama as the ideal representation of man's dominant emotions.

Rasa arises when the emotion is impersonalized and universalized as a result of the poet's genius. In other words, Rasa is impersonal, disinterested, aesthetic joy. According to Bharata, the major function of art is to evoke Rasa in the spectator's mind.

But Bharata did not try to define rasa. He used descriptive terms like *nishpatti* (causation), *bhavana*, (stimulation) and *abhivyakti* (manifestation), to describe the way in which rasa is generated in the mind of the spectator. His chief concern was to contrast the raw emotional states in life (*chittavrttis*) with the rasa in art. In everyday life, the moods are momentary and fleeting; they change as situations change; man has no control over these situations. In life one is involved in the emotional experience; he has neither the time nor the inclination to contemplate on the emotions in a disinterested way. The creative artist used these ever-fleeting moods and feelings to fall into a pattern around a more or less permanent nucleus of a dominant emotion—*sthayi bhava*.

Bharata classifies all possible emotional experiences into eight enduring emotional states, *sthayi bhavas*, and thirty three transitory emotional states, *vyabhicari bhavas*. The eight enduring emotional states are love, laughter, sorrow, anger, energy, fear, disgust and astonishment. The transitory emotional states include discouragement, envy, anxiety, contentment, shame, joy, despair, etc. Bharata also uses a third category of what he calls the *sattvika bhavas*. They are eight in number, they are really bodily changes; they are perspiration, paralysis, trembling, weeping, change of colour, horripilation, change of voice and fainting.* All these help to portray the enduring emotional states. All these three categories are *bhavas* or states of mind; they are *chittavrtti vishesa*.

The eight enduring emotional states are transformed by the dramatist

*The *sattvika bhavas* are the spontaneous bodily manifestations of emotions. Later commentators said that they are not only expressions of the emotions, but they also strengthen and intensify the emotions. However, they are not emotions themselves. They also show that the same expressions may occur with different emotions. For instance, there are tears of joy, fear, anger and grief, change of colour takes place in anger, fear, excessive joy, dejection and grief, trembling is the expression of fear, joy, anger etc. similarly change of voice, horripilation, perspiration accompany different emotions, immobility may arise when there is anger or fear, or wonder or joy or dejection. They also showed that these organic expressions may occur even when there is no emotion, for instance, tears may arise in yawning, winkless gazing, in the presence of smoke etc, trembling may follow disease, cold, exertion etc, perspiration follows fatigue, physical exercise, heat, fever etc. These bodily manifestations help the spectators to understand and feel the emotions expressed by the actors on the stage (Sinha, II, p. 277)

into eight rasas, namely, erotic (sringara), comic (hasya), pathetic (karuna), fierce (raudra), heroic (vira), terrible (bhayanaka), odious (bibhatsa) and marvellous (adbhuta).

According to Bharata, rasa is produced from a combination (samyoga) of determinants (vibhava), consequents (anubhava) and transitory states (vyabhicari bhava), in the same way in which taste results from a combination of various spices, vegetables etc. Bharata writes that just as the discerning people enjoy (asvadayanti) the taste of good food and attain pleasure and satisfaction, so the cultured people enjoy the enduring emotional state when it is represented by an expression of the various mental states with words, gestures and the psychophysical states (sattva) and derive pleasure and satisfaction.

Bharata next raises the question whether the mental states come out of the rasa or the rasa comes out of the mental states and answers that the rasa arises out of the mental states. He shows how each rasa arises out of each of the enduring emotions as, for instance, the erotic rasa arises out of the emotion of love (rati). The emotion of love is aroused when one sees bright, well-dressed, young men and women on the stage. It has two bases: union (sambhoga) and separation (vipralamba). Appropriate transitory emotion and bodily states are used by the actors to depict the enduring emotion in order to evoke the corresponding rasa in the minds of the spectators. Bharata gives detailed behavioural characteristics of the eight enduring, thirty three transitory and the eight bodily states so that they can be effectively portrayed by the trained actor on the stage.

According to Bharata it is rasa which makes the drama (and other artistic creations) so enchanting. It makes the spectator's mind steady and free from distractions and evokes the dormant pleasurable state of mind (bhava) in him. This joy is called by the literary critics the realization or relish of rasa (rasasvada).

Bharata asserted that drama is the source of the removal of anxieties and worries (catharsis) and is also the cause of aesthetic pleasure. He considered drama as the presentation of life and its affairs in all their manifold aspects; these aspects are brought out in the conduct of the people; the conduct of the people is the sole outcome of their emotions. Thus he emphasised that the conduct of the people is caused by the emotions. The actors on the stage present the conduct and from this presentation the spectators derive their delight. Thus it is the behaviour of the actors on the stage that is the link between the mental states of the *dramatis personae* and the mental stages of spectators. In order to evoke

the rasa in the minds of the spectators, the playwright must bring the incidents of the plot together, each in its proper place, solely with reference to the emotions appropriate to each.

The actors, according to Bharata must employ the speech, dress and manners and mode of conduct appropriate to the characters in the drama. This is what Bharata calls pravritti. Their words, actions and facial expressions must bring out the mental dispositions, the vrittis, of the characters. The emotions should be depicted by appropriate words, gestures and actions.

The final goal of the drama is to make the discerning spectator forget himself and his own identity by his absorption in the play he is watching. He must also come out of the theatre with involuntary expressions of appreciation.

The full implications of Bharata's rasa theory were worked out by Anandavardhana (9th century A.D.) through his Dhvanipaddati or method of suggestiveness and Aucityapaddati or the method of adequacy. This was further elaborated by Abhinavagupta (10th century A.D.).

The earlier rhetoricians asserted that while rasa may be communicated in the drama by the words, gestures and actions of the actors on the stage it is communicated in poetry only through various embellishments like style, figures of speech etc. It was Anandavardhana who unified literary criticism by treating the problems of poetry and drama as being fundamentally identical. He thus restored the supreme place of emotion in aesthetic enjoyment. While he conceded that words can convey only ideas and that emotions could not be communicated by mere mention of words, he said there is no doubt that poetry conveys feelings and emotions; it rouses sentiments of love etc. in a responsive reader. How is this done? According to the earlier writers, the essential element of poetry is alamkara, the figure of speech or riti, the specified arrangement of words and so on. According to Anandavardhana, words convey different meanings. There is the primary meaning of the word which is denotative; it is the abhida-vyapara. Next there is the secondary meaning of the word which arises as a result of figures of speech etc; this is the lakshana vyapara. Over and above these two generally accepted meanings, Anandavardhana asserted that there is a third type of meaning that is conveyed by the word; this is identified as the vyanjana vyapara, the suggested meaning. He said that while the denotative meaning resides in the word only, the suggestive meaning resides both in the word (shabda) and in the meaning (artha). The suggestive

meaning is also different from the secondary meaning. In lakshana, the primary denotative sense yields completely to the secondary or the implied sense. But in vyanjana the primary sense reveals itself along with the suggested sense (dhvani).

Anandavardhana also asserted that in poetry the suggested meaning (dhvani) occurs in three forms: vastumatra, mere matter of fact, alamkara, the figure of speech and thirdly, rasadi, namely rasa, bhava etc. He showed that it is the suggested meaning that is of the essence of poetry. The words in poetry do not have the same meaning as in practical life or in scientific discourse. The poetic meaning emerges suddenly into view when one turns the attention away from the conventional meaning. It is only those with imagination that can grasp this suggested meaning, the dhvani. Mere grammatical or logical analysis of the sentences in the poem can never reveal this. Poetry is not primarily addressed to the intellect. Poetry abounds in emotive suggestions. So a sound literary taste is necessary to appreciate poetry.

Thus he showed that the earlier writers, with their emphasis on the secondary meaning of words, namely, figures of speech and styles, missed the subjective element in poetry. He asserted that this subjective element identified a thousand years earlier by Bharata as rasa enters into the process of composition as well as into the process of appreciation of poetry and art.

Anandavardhana admits that at first attention should be paid to the explicit sense of the words. The analogy of lamp is given to explain this. When a man is anxious to see things in the night, he seeks a torch. But the torch is not an end in itself; it is a means to see the object. In the same way, the poet uses the explicit sense of words in order to communicate other ideas suggestively.

The Dhvani theory therefore has three fundamental postulates: Dhvani exists apart from the primary sense; it is most intrinsic to poetry and it cannot be explained either in terms of denotation (abhidha) or indication (lakshana); it involves suggestion (vyanjana). It is the emotional associative elements in poetry which draw a sympathetic and appreciative response from the sahrdaya. The reader as well as the critic must realise the emotional experience and take note of the associative meanings in order to appreciate the poems. Thus, it is the emotional imaginative element that is important and intrinsic in poetry. In this way Anandavardhana extended Bharata's rasa theory, confined earlier to drama, to poetry and other forms of literary creation through the theory of dhvani. He included the emotive and other associative

meanings also under linguistic meaning.

Another significant contribution of Anandavardhana to the theory of aesthetic appreciation is his emphasis that the poem should be taken as a whole. According to him any proper literary estimate of a poem is possible only when the poem is considered as a whole, and all the elements that account for its unity are traced. This outlook he owes to Bhartrhari's sphota doctrine. Bhartrhari had emphasised the importance of taking the whole utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. Anandavardhana extended this holistic outlook to poetry and showed its importance in aesthetic appreciation.

Psycholinguistics

Various schools of philosophy and grammar of ancient India devoted considerable thought to the problem of meaning. In a broad way these are two approaches to the study of meaning: the khanda paksha (analytical) and the akhanda paksha (holistic). These are roughly analogous to the association theory and the gestalt theory respectively in modern psychology.

The ancient Indian thinkers agreed that the essential nature of a word lies in its significative power, which is defined as the relation that exists between the word (shabda) and its meaning (artha). The Mimamsakas held that this relation is 'natural'. The significative power is inherent in the word itself. We learn our language from our parents and elders. They in their turn learnt it from their forebears. This is why the Mimamsaka speaks of the "eternity" of words. It is impossible to trace the origin of the relationship of the word and the meaning to any person. It is *apauruseya*. It is self-existent and has no author at all. According to the Naiyayikas it is conventional. They reject the theory of natural relationship between words and their meanings. According to Gautama the meaning of a word is understood because of its conventional significance. There is no natural relationship between a word and its meaning as in the case of fire and burning. The word does not coexist with the object it denotes. The word 'fire' does not burn the mouth, nor does the word 'razor' cut, nor does the word 'honey' sweeten the mouth. Another argument advanced against the natural relationship is the fact of variation in the meanings of words; also different words are used to indicate the same object. It is convention (*rudhi*) which fixed the meaning of a word.

With respect to the primary meaning of a word different views are expressed. According to Naiyayikas a word means the *vyakti*, the

particular, the *akṛti*, the generic shape or form and the *jaṭi*, the universal (Nyayasutra, II. 2.65). According to the Samkhyas, the primary meaning of a word is the percept of the particular. It is only the particulars that become the objects of sense perception and which are relevant to practical activity. The Mimamsakas hold that the primary meaning of a word is the universal which is the essential quality common to the particular instances of the class, though it is admitted that all practical activities that follow the word pertain to the particular.

According to the Khanda paksha or the analytical method, the word is considered as the unit of thought and the sentence is taken to be a concatenation of words. With respect to the syntactic relation between the words in a sentence these theorists accepted "mutual expectancy (*akamksha*), consistency (*yogyata*) and proximity (*sannidhi*); they also recognized the importance of contextual factor and the intention of the speaker as determining the meaning of words" (Raja, p. 9).

Bhartrhari (5th century A.D.) in his 'Vakyapadiya' advocated that the sentence is the fundamental linguistic fact and thus developed the akhanda paksha view of meaning. He defines the sentence as 'a single integral symbol'. He asserted that the meaning is conveyed by *vakyasphota*. The sentence is indivisible and integral linguistic unit. The meaning is conveyed as an 'instantaneous flash of insight' (*pratibha*). According to him, words have no reality of their own; they are the means by which the listener arrives at the meaning.

"In the sphota doctrine, Bhartrhari gives a penetrating and minute analysis of the speech situation. First, we have the actual sounds of the words uttered: this is the *vaikṛta-dhvani*. These sounds reveal the permanent *prakṛta-dhvani* which is an abstraction from the various *vaikṛta-dhvanis*, or which may be considered as the linguistically normal form devoid of the personal variations. The third stage is the *sphota* which is the whole utterance considered as an integral unit, as an indivisible language-symbol" (Raja, pp. 14-15). Thus it is the *sphota* which reveals the meaning in the form of an insight.

According to Bhartrhari words or sentences can be considered under two aspects, as sound-patterns (the phonetic aspect) or as meaning-bearing symbols (the semantic aspect) (I. 44). The sound pattern is the external fact of the language symbol (*dhvani*) and the meaning is the semantic facet (*artha*). Thus the word has a double power; it can convey the form of an expression as well as its content. He uses the analogy of light to explain this. Language is similar to light and to consciousness insofar as it can reveal itself and also reveal other things (I. 50 and 55)

Every word has the power of referring to itself as well as to the external things symbolized by it. He emphasises that words are psychical entities (*sabdo buddhisthah*) which reveal themselves through the articulate sounds (*Vakyapadiya*, I. 46).

According to Bhartrhari, the *sphota* is revealed by the sounds produced in a fixed order. The sounds are only the manifesting agencies and have no function other than that of revealing the word-symbol. Even though the *sphota* is an integral symbol which is indivisible, it can be revealed only by means of the sound in a time-series pattern. Each sound helps in manifesting the *sphota*, the first one vaguely, the next one more clearly and so on, until the last one reveals it clearly and distinctly (I.85). Bhartrhari gives the analogy of a student who tries to learn a verse by heart; it is the last reading, aided by the impressions left behind by the previous readings, that helps him to know the verse fully (I. 83). Thus, it is the cognition of the whole that is significant. Much earlier Vyasa, in his commentary on Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras*, anticipated this. He said, "The power of speech has its function in the utterance of sounds: the ear has as its object the series of sounds; it is the *buddhi* that grasps the word as significant sound by seizing the sounds and binding them together as the word" (III. 17).

But there have been criticisms of this holistic view of meaning. Among the critics the most important are the *Mimamsakas* and the *Naiyayikas*.

Long ago Sabara maintained that the word is nothing more than the phonemes found in it. Thus each word is an aggregate of phonemes and conveys the unit of meaning. It is true that all the phonemes are not perceived simultaneously; but the phonemes apprehended in succession leave behind the impressions which give rise to the cognition of unity of meaning. So according to the *Mimamsakas* there is no need to postulate an indivisible entity like *sphota*. In refutation of this the grammarians say that the memory impressions do not account for the particular order of the phonemes. The impressions will be the same even if the order is reversed, as in 'Raja' and 'jara' or 'nadi' and 'dina'. They also question how the memory impressions of the phonemes can produce meaning. Thus, they assert the postulation of the *sphota* is necessary. The *Mimamsaka's* answer to this objection is what the speaker utters the phonemes of a word in their fixed order and they are heard by the listener in that order. But this does not explain how the meaning of the word arises.

The Naiyayikas also do not accept the sphota theory. According to them the word is only an aggregate of phonemes produced by the vocal organs of the speaker. The listener apprehends the meaning when he hears the last phoneme of a word together with the recollection of the previous phonemes. They assert that there is no need to postulate the sphota apart from the combination of the phonemes. The grammarians reply that the phonemes are not directly associated with the meaning; hence the need to postulate the sphota concept as a meaning-bearing entity.

However, these critics really do not explain how the cognition of meaning arises on the audition of the word or the sentence. As Sabara correctly pointed it out long ago, the meaning of a word is learnt during childhood because of usage by the parents and others and later because of explanations given in the lexicons etc. But when one hears a sentence, the meaning of the sentence (vakyasphota) cannot be grasped by going through the dictionary meanings of each word in the sentence. The meaning arises, if at all, in a flash. This is the truth in Bhartrhari's hypothesis.

PART II

PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES

Chapter 2

The Upanishads

The Upanishads form the concluding portions of the Vedas and hence called the Vedanta, 'the end of the Veda'. They have dominated the life and thought in India for over three thousand years. Though there are more than a hundred Upanishads, about ten to twelve of them are looked upon as the principal Upanishads. All these are definitely pre-Buddhistic and they are assigned to around 1000 B.C. It is the ideas in these Upanishads that form the basis of the various systems of thought in India right down to the present century. Etymologically, the word Upanishad is formed of three terms "sitting (*sad*) nearby (*upa*) devotedly (*ni*)", indicating that these are the secret instructions imparted by the teacher to the pupils who sat near him to dispel their ignorance. Thus they are the utterances of sages who spoke out of their illumined experience. As a result, they do not contain systematic reflection. Their aim was practical rather than speculative, to help the pupils to attain spiritual freedom through knowledge.

The principal Upanishads have a wealth of material that is of psychological interest. There are several speculations and keen observations regarding man and his nature. The concepts of *atma* and *purusha* and the relation between the self and the body are dealt with in a number of Upanishads. Though there is a common body of doctrine regarding the self, its relation to the body and the means by which man obtains experience and attains liberation, each Upanishad has its own special features also. The existence of the soul or the self is a necessary presupposition of all experience according to the Upanishadic seers. "By which one knows all this—thereby could one know that? Lo, by what means could the known be known?" (Er. Up. II. IV. 14). As a result the Upanishads do not attempt to adduce direct proof of the existence of the self. *Purusha*, the self, is explained as *puri-saya*, "What lies in the citadel of the body" Thus the body with its diverse but co-operating parts implies the existence of the self whose end the body serves.

The Katha Upanishad uses the analogy of the chariot to show the

interrelationship between the self (atman), the intellect (buddhi), the mind (manas) and the senses (indriyas). The 'indriyas' include the five cognitive and the five executive organs. Most Upanishadic as well as later thinkers agree about the number of the 'indriyas' and also the distinction between the mind (manas), the discriminative intellect (buddhi) and the self (atman).

The Taittiriya Upanishad develops the doctrine of the "Kosas". Man is looked upon as being formed of five sheaths: the outermost is the physical, within it is the biological, within which is the psychological (manomaya kosa), within it is the intellectual (vignanamaya kosa), the innermost being the sheath of bliss (anandamaya kosa).

The Mandukya Upanishad asserts that the self has four quarters, namely, the waking state (jagrat), the dream state (svapna), the deep-sleep state (sushupti) and finally the (turiya) state of self-realization.

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad gives a remarkable analysis of the dream state, the deep-sleep state and the fourth state of self-realisation.

Note. The selections are taken from S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upanishads* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1953).

I. Katha Upanishad

(I. 1) 10. *Nachiketa's first wish.* That Gautama (my father) with allayed anxiety, with anger gone, may be gracious to me, O Death, and recognising me, greet me, when set free by you and this, I choose as the first gift of the three.

11. (Yama said): 'As of old will he, recognising thee (the father) Auddalaki, the son of Aruna, through my favour will he sleep peacefully through nights, his anger gone, seeing thee released from the jaws of death.'

20. *Nachiketa's third wish.* There is this doubt in regard to a man who had departed, some (holding) that he is and some that he is not. I would be instructed by thee in this knowledge. Of the boons, this is the third boon.

23. (Yama said:) Choose sons and grandsons that shall live a hundred years, cattle in plenty, elephants, gold and horses. Choose vast expanses of land and life for thyself as many years as thou wilt.

25. Whatever desires are hard to attain in this world of mortals, ask for all those desires at thy will. Here are noble maidens with chariots and musical instruments; the like of them cannot be won by men. Be served by these whom I give to thee. O Nachiketa, (pray) ask not about death.

26. (Nachiketa said:) Transient (are these) and they wear out, O Yama, the vigour of all the senses of men. All life (a full life), moreover, is brief. Thine be the chariots, thine the dance and song.

(I. 2) 1. (Yama said): Different is the good (Sreyas), and different, indeed, is the pleasant (Preyas). These two, with different purposes, bind a man. Of these two, it is well for him who takes hold of the good; but he who chooses the pleasant, fails of his aim.

2. Both the good and the pleasant approach a man. The wise man, pondering over them, discriminates. The wise chooses the good in preference to the pleasant. The simple-minded, for the sake of worldly well-being, prefers the pleasant.

3. (But) thou, O Nachiketas, hast rejected (after) examining, the desires that are pleasant and seem to be pleasing. Thou hast not taken to the way of wealth, where many mortals sink (to ruin).

4. Widely apart and leading to divergent ends are these, ignorance and what is known as wisdom. I know (thee) Nachiketas, to be eager for wisdom for (even) many desires did not distract thee.

20. Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the self is set in the heart of every creature. The unstriving man beholds him, freed from sorrow. Through tranquillity of the mind and the senses (he sees) the greatness of the self.

23. This self cannot be attained by instruction, nor by intellectual power, nor even through much hearing. He is to be attained only by the one whom the (self) chooses. To such a one the self reveals his own nature.

24. Not he who has not desisted from evil ways, not he who is not tranquil, not he who has not a concentrated mind, not even he whose mind is not composed can reach this (self) through right knowledge.

(I. 3) 3. Know the Self as the lord of the chariot and the body as, verily, the chariot, know the intellect (Buddhi) as the charioteer and the mind as, verily, the reins.

4. The senses, they say, are the horses: the objects of sense of paths (they range over); (the self) associated with the body, the senses and the mind—wise men declare—is the enjoyer.

5. He who has no understanding, whose mind is always unrestrained, his senses are out of control, as wicked horses are for a charioteer.

6. He, however, who has understanding, whose mind is always restrained, his senses are under control, as good horses are for a charioteer.

8. He who has the understanding for the driver of the chariot and

controls the rein of his mind, he reaches the end of the journey, that supreme abode of all-pervading.

10. Beyond the senses are the objects (of the senses) and beyond the objects is the mind; beyond the mind is the understanding and beyond the understanding is the great self.

13. The wise man should restrain speech in mind; the latter he should restrain in the understanding self. The understanding he should restrain in the great self. That he should restrain in the tranquil self.

14. Arise, awake, having attained thy boons, understand (them). Sharp as the edge of a razor and hard to cross, difficult to tread is that path (so) sages declare.

(II. 1) 1. The Self is not to be sought through the senses. The Self-caused pierced the openings (of the senses) outward; therefore, one looks outward and not within oneself. Some wise man, however, seeking life eternal, with his eyes turned inward, saw the self.

2. The small-minded go after outward pleasures. They walk into the snare of widespread death. The wise, however, recognising life eternal do not seek the stable among things which are unstable here.

3. That by which (one perceives) form, taste, smell, sounds and touches of love, by that alone one perceives. What is there that remains (unknown to it)? This, verily, is that.

4. That by which one perceives both dream states and waking states, having known (that as) the great, omnipresent Self, the wise man does not grieve.

5. He who knows this Self, the experiencer as the living spirit close at hand as the lord of the past and the future—one does not shrink away from him. This, verily, is that

11. By mind alone is that to be obtained. There is nothing of variety here: whoever perceives anything like variety here, goes from death to death.

(II. 3) 6. Knowing the separate nature of the senses, which spring separately (from the various subtle elements) and (knowing also) that their rising and setting (are separate), the wise man does not grieve

7. Beyond the senses is the mind; above the mind is its essence (Buddhi - intelligence); beyond the intelligence is the great self; beyond the great (self) is the unmanifest (Avyakta).

8. Not within the field of vision stands this form. No one so-ever sees Him with the eye. By heart, by thought, by mind apprehended, they who know Him become immortal.

10. When the five (senses) knowledges together with the mind cease (from their normal activities) and intellect itself does not stir, that, they say, is the highest state.

11. This, they consider to be Yoga, the steady control of the senses. Then one becomes undistracted for Yoga comes and goes.

12. Not by speech, not by mind, not by sight can he be apprehended. How can he be comprehended except by him who says, 'He is'?

13. He should be apprehended only as existent and then in his real nature—in both ways. When He is apprehended as existent, his real nature becomes clear (later on).

14. When all desires that dwell within the human heart are cast away, then a mortal becomes immortal and (even) here he attaineth to *Brahman*.

15. When all the knots that fetter here the heart are cut asunder, then a mortal becomes immortal. Thus far is the reaching.

18. Then Nachiketas, having gained this knowledge declared by Death and the whole role of yoga attained *Brahman* and become freed from passion and from death. And so may any other who knows this in regard to the self.

II. Mundaka Upanishad

(III.1) 1. Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two, the one eats the sweet fruit and the other looks on without eating.

2. On the self-same tree, a person immersed (in the sorrows of the world) is deluded and grieves on account of his helplessness. When he sees the other, the Lord who is worshipped and his greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow.

5. This self within the body, of the nature of light and pure, is attainable by truth, by austerity, by right knowledge, by the constant (practice) of chastity. Him, the ascetics with their imperfections done away, behold.

8. He is not grasped by the eye nor even by speech nor by other sense organs, nor by austerity nor by work, but when one's (intellectual) nature is purified by the light of knowledge then alone he, by meditation, sees him who is without parts.

9. The subtle self is to be known by thought in which the senses in five different forms have centred. The whole of men's thought is pervaded by the senses. When it (thought) is purified, the self shines forth.

(III.2) 2. He who entertains desires, thinking of them, is born (again) here and there on account of his desires. But of him who has his desires fully satisfied, who is a perfected soul, all his desires vanish even here (on earth).

3. This self cannot be attained by instruction nor by intellectual power nor even through much hearing. He is to be attained by the one whom (the self) chooses. To such a one the self reveals his own nature.

4. This self cannot be attained by one without strength nor through heedlessness nor through austerity without an aim. But he who strives by these means, if he is a knower, this self of his enters the abode of *Brahman*.

5. Having attained Him, the seers (who are) satisfied with their knowledge (who are) perfected souls, free from passion, tranquil, having attained the omnipresent (self) on all sides, those wise, with concentrated minds, enter into the All itself.

8. Just as the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean casting off name and shape, even so the knower, freed from name and shape, attains to the divine person, higher than the high.

III. Prasna Upanishad

The Fourth Prasna. 1. Then Gargya, the grandson of Surya, asked him (Pippalada): Venerable Sir, what are they that sleep in this person? What are they that keep awake in him? What is the god that sees the dreams? Whose is this happiness? In whom, pray, are all these established?

2. To him, then, he said: O Gargya, as all the rays of the setting sun become one in this circle of light and as they spread forth when he rises again and again, even so does all this become one in the supreme god, the mind. Therefore, in that state, the person hears not, sees not, smells not, tastes not, touches not, speaks not, takes not, rejoices not, emits not, moves not. (Then) they say, he sleeps.

5. There, in sleep, that god (mind) experiences greatness. He sees again whatever object has been seen, he hears again whatever has been heard, he experiences again and again whatever has been experienced in different places and directions. What has been seen and not been seen, what has been heard and what has not been heard, what has been experienced and what has not been experienced, what is existent and what is non-existent, he sees all; being all he sees (all).

6 When he is overcome with light, then in this state, the god (mind) sees no dreams. Then here in this body arises this happiness.

IV. Mandukya Upanishad

2. All this is, verily, *Brahman*. This self is Brahman. This same self has four quarters.

3. The first quarter is Vaisvanara, whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, who cognises external objects.

4. The second quarter is *Taijasa*, whose sphere (of activity) is the dream state, who cognises internal objects.

5. Where one, being fast asleep, does not desire any desire whatsoever and does not see any dream whatsoever, that is deep sleep. The third quarter is *prajna*, whose sphere (of activity) is the state of deep sleep, who has become one, who is verily, a mass of cognition, who is full of bliss and who enjoys (experiences) bliss, whose face is thought.

7. Turiya is not that which cognises the internal (objects), not that which cognises the external (objects), not what cognises both of them, not a mass of cognition, not cognitive, not non-cognitive. (It is) unseen, incapable of being spoken of, ungraspable, without any distinctive marks, unthinkable, unnameable, the essence of the knowledge of the one self that into which the world is resolved, the peaceful, the benign, the non-dual, such they think, is the fourth quarter. He is the self; He is to be known.

V. Taittiriya Upanishad

(II) 1. This, verily, is the person that consists of the essence of food. . . .

2. From food, verily are produced whatsoever creatures dwell on earth. Verily, different from and within that which consists of the essence of food is the self that consists of life. By that this is filled.

3. Verily, different from and within that which consists of life is the self consisting of mind. By that this is filled.

4. Verily, different from and within that which consists of mind is the self consisting of understanding. By that this is filled.

5. Verily, different from and within that which consists of understanding is the self consisting of bliss. By that this is filled.... Pleasure (*priyam*) is its head; delight (*moda*) the right side; great delight (*pro-moda*) the left side, bliss (*ananda*) the body, *brahma* the lower part, the foundation.

VI. Svetasvatara Upanishad

(II). 4. The sages of the great all-knowing control their mind and control their thoughts

8. Holding the body steady with the three (upper parts, chest, neck and head) erect, causing the senses and the mind to enter into the heart, the wise man should cross by the boat of Brahman all the streams which cause fear,

9. Repressing his breathings here (in the body), let him who has controlled all moments, breathe through his nostrils, with diminished breath; let the wise man restrain his mind vigilantly as (he would) a chariot yoked with vicious horses.

14. Even as a mirror stained by dust shines brightly when it has been cleaned, so the embodied one when he has seen the (real) nature of the Self becomes integrated, of fulfilled purpose and freed from sorrow.

IV. 6. Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two the one eats the sweet fruit, and the other looks on without eating

7. On the self-same tree, a person immersed (in the sorrows of the world) is deluded and grieves on account of his helplessness. When he sees the other, the Lord who is worshipped and his greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow.

VIII. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad

(I. 5) *Mind, Speech and Breath*. 3. 'Three he made for himself', Mind, speech, breath, these he made for himself, '(They say) my mind was elsewhere, I did not see it, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear'. It is with the mind, truly, that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears. Desire, determination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, intellection, fear, all this is truly mind. Therefore even if one is touched on his back, he discerns it with the mind. Whatever sound there is, it is just speech. Verily, it serves to determine an end (object), but is not itself (determined or revealed). . . . Verily, the self consists of speech, mind and breath.

(II.1) *Sleep*. 15. Gargya goes to Ajatasatru to learn about Brahman. Ajatasatru taking him by the hand he rose. The two together came to a person who was asleep. They addressed him with these names: Great, white-robed, Radiant, *Soma*. The man did not get up. He woke him by rubbing him with his hand. He then got up.

16. Ajatasatru said: 'When this person who consists of intelligence fell asleep thus, where was it and whence did it come back'. And this also Gargya did not know.

17. Ajatasatru said: 'When this being fell asleep thus, then the person who consists of intelligence, having by his intelligence taken to

himself the intelligence of these breaths (sense organs) rests in the space within the heart. When the person takes in these (senses), he is said to be asleep. When the breath is restrained, speech is restrained, the eye is restrained, the ear is restrained, the mind is restrained.

(II.2) *Dream*. 18. When he moves about in dream these are his worlds. Then he becomes, as it were, a great king. He enters, as it were, states, high and low. Even as a great king, taking his people, moves about in his country as he pleases. So also here, this one, taking his breaths (senses), moves about in his own body as he pleases.

19. 'Again, when one falls sound asleep, when he knows nothing whatsoever, he rests. Verily, as a youth or a great king or a great *Brahmana* might rest when he has reached the summit of bliss, so does he then rest'.

(II.4) *The Dialogue of Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi on the Self*. 5. When Maitreyi asked her husband to teach her the way to immortality, Yajnavalkya said: 'Verily, not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear but a husband is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear but a wife is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of wealth is wealth dear but wealth is dear for the sake of the self.'

Verily, O Maitreyi, it is the Self that should be seen, heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. Verily, by the seeing of, by the hearing of, by the thinking of, by the understanding of the Self, all this is known.

14. 'For where there is duality as it were, there one smells another, there one sees another, there one hears another, there one speaks to another, there one thinks of another, there one understands another. Where, verily, everything has become the Self, then by what and whom should one smell, then by what and whom should one see, then by what and whom should one hear, then by what and to whom should one speak, then by what and on whom should one think, then by what and whom should one understand? By what should one know that by which all this is known? By what, my dear, should one know the knower?'

(III.2) *The organs of perception*. 1. Then Artabhaga questioned him. 'Yajnavalkya', said he, 'how many perceivers are there, how many over-perceivers?' 'Eight perceivers. Eight over-perceivers' 'Those eight perceivers and eight over-perceivers, which are they?' (They are the nose, tongue, eye, ear, skin, mind, hands, and speech.)

(III.4) *The theoretical unknowability of Brahman*. 2. Ushasta Chakrayana said: 'This has been explained by you as one might say "This is a

cow", "this is a horse". Explain to me the *Brahman* that is immediately present and directly perceived, that is the self in all things'. 'This is your self that is within all things'. 'Which is within all things, Yajnavalkya?' 'You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot understand the understander of understanding. He is your self which is in all things. Everything else is of evil' Thereupon Ushasta Chakrayana kept silent.

(III.7) *The Self the inner controller*. 15. 'He who dwells in all beings, yet is within all beings, whom no beings know, whose body is all beings, who controls all beings from within, he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal. Thus far with reference to the beings. Now with reference to the self'.

16. 'He who dwells in the breath, yet is within the breath, whom the breath does not know, whose body the breath is, who controls the breath from within, he is yourself, the inner controller, the immortal'.

23. He is never seen but is the seer, he is never heard but is the hearer. He is never perceived, but is the perceiver. He is never thought but is the thinker. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other thinker but he. He is your self, the inner controller, the immortal. Everything else is of evil. After that Uddalaka Aruni kept silent.

(II.9) 26. That self is not this. It is incomprehensible for it is not comprehended. It is indestructible for it is never destroyed. It is unattached for it does not attach itself. It is unfettered. It does not suffer. It is not injured.

(IV.2) *The light of man is the self*. King Janaka of Vidcha asked Yajnavalkya.

2. 'What light does a person here have? (What serves as the light for man?)' 'He has the light of the sun, Your Majesty', he said 'for with the sun indeed as the light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns'. 'Just so, Yajnavalkya'.

6. 'When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, and the moon has set, and the fire has gone out and speech has stopped, what light does a person here have?' 'The self, indeed, is his light', said he, 'for with the self, indeed, as the light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns'.

The different states of the self. 7. 'Which is the self?' 'The person here who consists of knowledge among the senses, the light within the heart. He, remaining the same, wanders along the two worlds seeming to think, seeming to move about. He, on becoming asleep (getting into

dream condition), transcends this world and the forms of death.

9. 'Verily, there are just two states of this person (the state of being in) this world and the state of being in the other world. There is an intermediate third state, that of being in sleep (dream). By standing in this intermediate state one sees both those states, of being in this world and of being in the other world. Now whatever the way is to state of being in the other world, having obtained that way one sees both the evils (of this world) and the joys (of the other world).

When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up he sleeps (dreams by his own brightness, by his own light). In that state the person becomes self-illuminated.

10. 'There are no chariots there, nor animals to be yoked to them, no roads but he creates (projects from himself) chariots, animals to be yoked to them and roads. There are no joys there, no pleasures, no delights, but he creates joys, pleasures and delights. There are no tanks there, no lotus pools, no rivers but he creates tanks, lotus pools and rivers. He, indeed, is the agent (maker or creator).

11. Having struck down in sleep what belongs to the body, he himself looks down, on the sleeping (senses). Having taken to himself light he goes again to his place, the golden person, the lonely swap (the one spirit).*

13. 'In the state of dream going up and down, the god makes many forms for himself, now as it were enjoying himself in the company of women or laughing or even beholding fearful sights.

14. 'Everyone sees his sport but himself no one ever sees. Therefore they say that one should not wake him (the sleeping person) suddenly. Others, however, say that (the state of sleep) is just his waking state for whatever objects he sees when awake, those too, he sees, when asleep.

16. 'After having tasted enjoyment in this state of dream, after having roamed about and seen good and evil, he returns again as he came to the place from which he started to the state of waking. Whatever he sees in that state he is not followed (affected) by it for this person is not attached (to anything).

18. 'Even as a large fish moves along both banks of a river, the hither and the further, so also this person moves along both these states,

* Radhakrishnan comments: "Sleep is the indispensable condition of physical health and mental sanity. In sound sleep there is a respite from craving and aversion, fears and anxieties."

the state of dream (or sleep) and the state of waking.

Deep, dreamless sleep. 19. As a falcon or any other (swift) bird having flown around in the sky becomes weary, folds its wings and is borne down to its nest, even so this person hastens to that state (of self) where he desires no desires and sees no dream.

20. Now when (he feels) as if he were being killed, as if he were being overpowered, as if he were pursued by an elephant, as if he were falling into a well, he thinks (imagines) through ignorance whatever fear he has seen (experienced) in the waking state. But when he thinks that he is a god, as it were, that he is a king, as it were, that I am all this, that is his highest world.

21. This, verily, is his form which is free from craving, free from evils, free from fear. As a man when in the embrace of his beloved wife knows nothing without or within, so the person when in the embrace of the intelligent self knows nothing without or within. That, verily, is his form in which his desire is fulfilled, in which the self is his desire, in which he is without desire, free from any sorrow.

22. 'There (in that state) a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother, the worlds are not the worlds, the gods are not the gods, the Vedas are not the Vedas. There a thief is not a thief, the murderer is not a murderer, a *chandala* is not a *chandala*, a *paulkasa* is not a *paulkasa*, a mendicant is not a mendicant, an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed (affected) by good, he is not followed by evil for then he has passed beyond all the sorrows of the heart

23. Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) he does not see

26. 'Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) he does not speak.

28. 'Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) he does not think.

30. Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) he does not know.

(V.2) *Three interpretations of 'Da'* 1. The threefold offspring of *Prajapati*, gods, men and demons, lived with their father *Prajapati* as students of sacred knowledge. Having completed their studentship the gods said, 'Please tell (instruct) us, sir'. To them he uttered the syllable *da* (and asked 'Have you understood?') They (said) 'We have understood, you said to us "Damyate", "control yourselves". He said, 'Yes, you have understood'.

2. Then the men said to him, 'Please tell (instruct) us, sir' To them he uttered the same syllable *da* (and asked) 'Have you understood?' They said, 'We have understood. You said to us "datta (dana) give" He said, 'Yes, you have understood'.

3. Then the demons said to him 'Please tell (instruct) us, sir'. To

them he uttered the same syllable *da* and asked, 'Have you understood?' They said, 'We have understood', you said to us, "*dayadhvam*", "be compassionate". He said, 'Yes, you have understood'.

This very thing the heavenly voices of thunder repeats *da, da, da*, that is, control yourselves, give, be compassionate. One should practise this same trait, self-control, giving and compassion.

(VI. 1). *The supremacy of life-breath*. 7. These vital breaths, disputing among themselves about their self-superiority went to Brahma and said, "Which of us is the most excellent?" He then said that one of you is the most excellent after whose departure this body is thought to be worse off.

8. (The organ of) speech departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, 'How have you been able to live without me?' They said, 'As the dumb, not speaking without speech but breathing with the breath, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived'. Then speech entered in

9. The eye departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, 'How have you been able to live without me?' They said, 'As the blind not seeing with the eye, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived'. Then the eye entered in

10. The ear departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, 'How have you been able to live without me?' They said, 'As the deaf not hearing with the ear, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, seeing with the eye, knowing with the mind, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived'. Then the ear entered in.

11. The mind departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, 'How have you been able to live without me?' They said, 'As the stupid not knowing with the mind but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived.' Then the mind entered in

13. Then as the life breath was about to depart, even as a large fine horse of the Sindhu land might pull up the pegs to which his feet are tied, even so did it pull up those vital breaths together. They said, 'Venerable Sir, do not go out, verily, we shall not be able to live without you' 'If I am such make me an offering' 'So be it'.

VIII. Chandogya Upanishad

(III 4) *Purpose*. 1. Now verily, a person consists of purpose (*kratu-maya*). So let him frame for himself a purpose.

(VI.7) *Hunger lowers memory*. 1. A person, my dear, consists of sixteen parts. For fifteen days do not eat (any food), drink water at (your) will. Breath which consists of water will not be cut off from one who drinks water.

2. Then for fifteen days he did not eat (any food); and then he approached him saying, 'What, sir, shall I say?' 'The *Rg*. verses, my dear, The *Yajus*, formulas and the *Saman* chants.' He replied, 'They do not occur to me, Sir'.

3. He said to him, 'Just as, my dear, of a great lighted fire, single coal of the size of a firefly may be left which would not thereafter burn much, even so, my dear, of your sixteen parts only one part is left and so with it you do not apprehend (remember) the Vedas. Eat. Then you will understand me'.

4. Then he ate and approached him (his father). Then whatsoever he asked him he answered it all.

(VII.2) *Speech, mind, thought etc.* 1. Speech assuredly is greater than name. Speech, verily, makes known the *Rg Veda*, etc. Verily, if there were no speech neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the pleasing nor the unpleasing Speech, indeed, makes all this known. Meditate upon speech.

(VII 3) 1. Mind, assuredly, is greater than speech. For as the closed fist holds two *amalaka* fruits so does mind hold speech and name. For when one through mind has in mind to learn the sacred hymns, then he learns them When he has in mind to desire for sons and cattle, then he desires them. When he has in mind to desire this world and yonder, then he desires them Mind is, indeed, the self, mind is, indeed, the world, mind is indeed *Brahman*. Meditate on the mind.

(VII.5). 1 Thought (*chittam*), assuredly, is more than will Verily when one thinks, then he wills, then he reflects, then he utters speech and he utters it in name.

2. Verily, all these centre in thought, have thought for their goal and abide in thought. Therefore, even if a man be possessed of much learning, but is unthinking, people say of him that he is nobody, whatever he may know. Verily, if he did know he would not be so unthinking On the other hand, if he is thoughtful, even though he knows little, to him people are desirous of listening. Truly indeed thought is the centre of all these, thought is their soul, thought is their

support. Meditate on thought.

(VII.6). 1. Contemplation (dhyanam), assuredly, is greater than thought. . . . Therefore he among men here attains greatness, he seems to have obtained a share of (the reward of) contemplation. Now the small people are quarrelsome, abusive and slandering, the superior men seem to have obtained a share of (the reward of) contemplation. Meditate on contemplation.

(VII.7) 1. Understanding (vijnanam), assuredly, is greater than contemplation, verily, by understanding one understands the *Rg Veda*. etc . . all this one understands just with understanding. Meditate on understanding.

(VIII.7) *Instruction concerning the real self*. 1. The self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose desire is the real, whose thought is the real, he should be sought, him one should desire to understand. He who was found out and who understands that self, he obtains all worlds and all desires. Thus spoke *Prajapati*.

2. The gods and the demons both heard it and said, "Well, let us seek that self, the self by seeking whom one obtains all worlds and all desires". Then Indra from among the gods went forth upto him and Virochana from among the demons. Then without communicating with each other, the two came into the presence of *Prajapati*, fuel in hand.

3. Then *Prajapati* asked them, 'Desiring what have you been living?' The two said, 'The self which is free from evil, etc.'

4. *Prajapati* said to the two, 'The person that is seen in the eye, that is the self. That is the immortal, the fearless That is Brahmana ' 'But, Venerable Sir, he who is perceived in water and in a mirror, who is he?' He replied, 'The same one, indeed, is perceived in all these'.

(VIII.8) *The bodily self*. 1. Look at your self in a pan of water and whatever you do not understand of the self, tell me. Then the two looked in a pan of water. Then *Prajapati* said to the two, 'What do you see?' Then the two said, 'We both see the self thus altogether, Venerable Sir, a picture even to the very hairs and nails'.

2 Then *Prajapati* said to the two, 'After you have well adorned yourselves, put on your clothes, make yourselves tidy, look into the pan of water ' Then the two adorned themselves well, put on their best clothes and made themselves tidy and looked into the pan of water. Then *Prajapati* said to the two, 'What do you see?'

3 The two said, 'Just as we are, Venerable Sir, well adorned, with our best clothes and tidy, thus we see both these, Venerable Sir, well

adorned, with our best clothes and tidy'. 'That is the self', said he. 'That is the immortal, the fearless, that is *Brahman*'. They both went away with a tranquil heart.

4. Then Prajapati looked at them and said, they go away without having perceived, without having known the self. Whosoever will follow such a doctrine, be they gods or demons they shall perish. Then Virochana with a tranquil heart went to the demons and declared that doctrine, one's (bodily) self is to be made happy here, one's (bodily) self is to be served. He who makes his own self happy here and he serves his own self, he obtains both worlds, this world and the yonder.

(VIII.9) 1. But Indra, even before reaching the gods saw this danger.

2. He came back again with fuel in hand. To him Prajapati said, 'Desiring what, O Maghavan, have you come back, since you along with Virochana went away with a tranquil heart?' Then he said, 'Even as this self (the bodily self) is well adorned when his body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, tidy, when the body is tidy, that self will also be blind when the body is blind, lame when the body is lame, crippled when the body is crippled. It perishes immediately then the body perishes. I see no good in this'.

3. 'So is he indeed, O Maghavan'. said he (Prajapati). 'However, I will explain this further to you'.

(VIII.10) *The dream self*. 1. He who moves about happily in a dream, he is the self, said he, he is the immortal, the fearless. He is *Brahman*. Then he (Indra) went forth with a tranquil heart. But even before reaching the gods he saw this danger.

3. He came back again with fuel in hand. To him Prajapati said, 'Desiring what, O Maghavan, have you come back since you went away with a tranquil heart?' Then he said, 'Venerable Sir, even though this self is not blind (when the body) is blind, lame (when the body) is lame, even though he does not suffer defects from the defects of the body.

4. 'He is not slain (when the body) is slain. He is not lame (when the body) is lame, yet it is as if they kill him, as if they unclthe him. He comes to experience as it were what is unpleasant, he even weeps as it were. I see no good in this'. 'So is he indeed, O Maghavan', said he (Prajapati) 'However, I will explain this further to you.'

(VIII.11) *The self in sleep*. 1. When a man is asleep, composed serene, and knows no dream, that is the self, said he, that is the immortal, the fearless. That is *Brahman*. Then he went forth with tranquil heart. Even before reaching the gods he saw this danger. In

truth this one does not know himself that 'I am he', nor indeed the things here. He has become one who has gone to annihilation. I see no good in this.

2. He came back again with fuel in hand. To him Prajapati said 'Desiring what, O Maghavan, have you come back, since you went away with a tranquil heart?' Then he said 'Venerable Sir, in truth this one does not know himself that I am he, nor indeed the things here. He has become one who has gone to annihilation. I see no good in this'.

3. So is he, indeed O Maghavan, said he. However, I will explain this further to you and there is nothing else besides this; it is the highest self.

(VIII.12). *The self of spirit.* 1. O Maghavan, mortal, verily, is this body. It is held by death. But it is the support of that deathless, bodiless self. Verily, the incarnate self is held by pleasure and pain. Verily, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain for one who is incarnate. Verily, pleasure and pain do not touch one who is bodiless.

2. Bodiless is air, clouds, lightning, thunder, these are bodiless. Now as these, when they arise from yonder space and reach the highest light appear each with its own form.

3. Even so that serene one when he rises up from this body and reaches the highest light appears in his own form. Such a person is the Supreme Person

5. Now he who knows, let me think this, he is the self, the mind is his divine eye. He, verily, seeing these pleasures through his divine eye, the mind rejoices.

Chapter 3

The Bhagavad Gita

The Gita forms a part of the great epic Mahabharata. Though it is not a philosophical treatise, it deals with themes concerned with metaphysics and ethics. It has been a very popular and powerful religious classic. In the twentieth century it became a great power in the national and cultural revival of India. Great political leaders like Tilak, Aurobindo and Gandhi have written commentaries on it. Gandhi and later Vinoba made the people recite the verses in the last part of the second chapter describing the characteristics of the *sthitha prajna*, the man of settled intelligence, firmly founded in wisdom. Vinoba's lectures on the Gita have been translated in most of the Indian languages and millions of copies have been sold in recent decades.

According to the tradition, the epic Mahabharata was composed by Vyasa describing the great war waged in ancient times between the two branches (the Pandavas and Kauravas) of one royal family, that of the Bharatas, in the thirteenth or the twelfth century B.C. The epic is assumed to have been composed about 500 B.C. on the basis of the old tales in the different parts of the country.

The great hero Arjuna comes to the battlefield prepared to fight the enemy. But when he sees his kinsmen on both the sides, his heart is torn with anguish; he shrinks from his duty. In his despondence he is ready to repudiate his duty, renounce his life and take to the path of a sannyasin. In his agony, he asks, Krishna, his charioteer, to enlighten him about his duty. Krishna warns Arjuna against dejection of spirit. He analyses his motives and shows how an individual freed from passion and fear can attain wisdom and also do his duty in the world. As a result we find in the Gita many passages of great psychological insight.

The author of the Gita, like the authors of the Upanishads, speaks of the self, the intellect (*buddhi*), the mind (*manas*) and the ten senses (*indriyas*) as the basic constituents of a personality. One has to control the senses which are the destroyers of wisdom and discrimination. A man can have mastery over his self only when he has conquered his

senses and when he acts without being *involved* in action (*nishkama karma*).

All the sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain and the emotions of love, fear and hatred, arise from the contact of the sense organs with objects. When one realises that these sensations, feelings and emotions are transitory and when one learns to remain unperturbed by his joys and sorrows, when one's intelligence is firmly set then he attains self-realization. He can then conquer the impulses born of nature due to the action of the three *gunas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. No human being can live without action, but wisdom and mental well-being consists in action without involvement. One of the most famous verses of the Gita states that an individual has a right only to act and not to the fruits of his action. Giving up the fruits of action does not mean that one should develop an attachment to inaction.

Among the most insightful verses are those in Chapter VI.

(5) Let a man lift himself by himself; let him not degrade himself; for the self alone is the friend of the self and the self alone is the enemy of the self.

(6) For him who has conquered his (lower) self by the (higher) self, his self is a friend; but for him who has not possessed his (higher) self, his very self will act in enmity, like an enemy.

(7) When one has conquered one's lower self and has attained to the calm of self-mastery, his supreme self abides ever concentrate, he is at peace in cold and heat, in pleasure and pain, in honour and dishonour.

These verses show how an individual can overcome his impulses, feelings and emotions by conquering his lower self and by building up an integrated self. The life of impulse, feelings and emotions should not be destroyed but should be controlled and made use of in the process of self-integration. This is reflected in two verses at the end of the second chapter of the Gita:

(70) He, unto whom all desires enter as water into the sea, which, though ever-being filled is ever-motionless, attains peace and not he who hugs his desires.

(71) He who abandons all desires and acts free from longing, without any sense of mineness or egoism, attains peace.

As the 48th verse of the second chapter puts it, "evenness of mind is called yoga", and the 50th verse says "therefore strive for yoga, yoga is skill in action". Thus the individual who attains self-integration is characterised by detachment as well as efficiency.

Note. The selections have been made from S. Radhakrishnan's

translation of *The Bhagavad Gita* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1948).

When Arjuna surveyed the battlefield and saw his kinsmen he said:

I. 28. When I see my own people arrayed and eager for fight, O Krishna!

29. My limbs quail, my mouth goes dry, my body shakes and my hair stands on end.

30. (The bow) Gandiva slips from my hand and my skin too is burning all over. I am not able to stand steady. My mind is reeling

38. Even if those whose minds are overpowered by greed, see no wrong in the destruction of the family and no crime in treachery to friends;

39. Why should we not have the wisdom to turn away from this sin, O Janardana (Krishna); we who see the wrong in the destruction of the family?

47. Having spoken thus on the (field of) battle, Arjuna sank down on the seat of his chariot, casting away his bow and arrow, his spirit overwhelmed by sorrow.

II. Arjuna said: 7. My very being is stricken with the weakness of (sentimental) pity. With my mind bewildered about my duty, I ask Thee. Tell me, for certain, which is better. I am thy pupil; teach me, who is seeking refuge in Thee.

8. I do not see what will drive away this sorrow which dries up my senses even if I should attain rich and unrivalled kingdom on earth or even the sovereignty of the gods.

11. Krishna said: Thou grieveest for those whom thou shouldst not grieve for, and yet thou speakest words about wisdom. Wise men do not grieve for the dead or for the living.

14. Contacts with their objects, O Son of Kuntī (Arjuna), give rise to cold and heat, pleasure and pain. They come and go and do not last for ever, these learn to endure, O Partha (Arjuna).

15. The man who is not troubled by these, O Chief of men (Arjuna), who remains the same in pain and pleasure, who is wise makes himself fit for eternal life.

41. In this, the resolute (decided) understanding is single; but the thoughts of the irresolute (undecided) are many-branched and endless.

47. To action alone hast thou a right and never at all to its fruits; let not the fruits of action be thy motive; neither let there be in thee any

attachment to inaction.

48. Fixed in Yoga, do thy work, O winner of wealth (Arjuna), abandoning attachment with an even mind in success and failure, for evenness of mind is called yoga.

50. One who has yoked his intelligence (with the Divine) (or is established in his intelligence) casts away even here both good and evil. Therefore strive for yoga, yoga is skill in action.

Arjuna said:

54. What is the description of the man who has this firmly founded wisdom, whose being is steadfast in spirit, O Kesava (Krishna)? How would the man of settled intelligence speak, how should he sit, how should he walk?

Krishna said:

55. When a man puts away all the desires of his mind, O Partha (Arjuna) and when his spirit is content in itself, then is he called stable in intelligence.

56. He whose mind is untroubled in the midst of sorrows and is free from eager desire amid pleasures, he from who passion, fear, and rage have passed away, he is called a sage of settled intelligence.

57. He who is without affection on any side, who does not rejoice or loathe as he obtains good or evil, his intelligence is firmly set (in wisdom).

58. He who draws away the senses from the objects of sense on every side as a tortoise draws in his limbs (into the shell), his intelligence is firmly set (in wisdom).

61. Having brought all (the senses) under control, he should remain firm in Yoga intent on Me; for he, whose senses are under control, his intelligence is firmly set.

62. When a man dwells in his mind on the objects of sense, attachment to them is produced. From attachment springs desire and from desire comes anger.

63. From anger arises bewilderment, from bewilderment loss of memory; and from loss of memory, the destruction of intelligence and from the destruction of intelligence he perishes.

64. But a man of disciplined mind, who moves among the objects of sense, with the senses under control and free from attachment and aversion, he attains purity of spirit.

66. For the uncontrolled, there is no intelligence: nor for the uncontrolled is there the power of concentration and for him without concentration, there is no peace and for the unpeaceful, how can there be

happiness?

67. When the mind runs after the moving senses, it carries away the understanding, even as a wind carries away a ship on the waters.

69. What is night for all beings is the time of waking for the disciplined soul; and what is the time of waking for all beings is night for the sage of vision.

70. He unto whom all desires enter as waters into the sea, which though ever being filled is ever motionless, attains to peace and not he who hugs his desires.

71. He who abandons all desires and acts free from longing, without any sense of mineness or egoism, attains peace.

III. Krishna said: 3. In this world a two-fold way of life has been taught of yore by Me, the path of knowledge for men of contemplation and that of works for men of action.

5. For no one can remain even for a moment without doing work; every one is made to act helplessly by the impulses born of nature.

6. He who restrains his organs of action but continues in his mind to brood over the objects of sense, whose nature is deluded, is said to be a hypocrite (a man of false conduct).

7. But he who controls the senses by the mind, O Arjuna, and without attachment engages the organs of action in the path of work, he is superior.

19. Therefore, without attachment, perform always the work that has to be done, for man attains to the highest by doing work without attachment.

21. Whatsoever a great man does, the same is done by others as well. Whatever standard he sets, the world follows.

25. As the unlearned act from attachment to their work, so should the learned also act, O Partha (Arjuna), but without any attachment, with the desire to maintain the world-order.

35. Better is one's own law though imperfectly carried out than the law of another carried out perfectly. Better is death in (the fulfilment of) one's own law than to follow another's law is perilous.

Arjuna said:

36. But by what is a man impelled to commit sin, as if by force, even against his will, O Varsneya (Krishna)?

Krishna said:

37. This is craving, this is wrath, born of the mode of passion, all—devouring and most sinful. Know this to be the enemy here.

38. As fire is covered by smoke, as a mirror by dust, as an embryo

is enveloped by the womb, so is this covered by that (passion).

39. Enveloped is wisdom, O Son of Kunti (Arjuna), by this insatiable fire of desire, which is the constant foe of the wise.

40. The senses, the mind and the intelligence are said to be its seat. Veiling wisdom by these, it deludes the embodied (soul).

41. Therefore, O Best of Bharatas (Arjuna), control thy senses from the beginning and slay this sinful destroyer of wisdom and discrimination.

42. The senses, they say, are great, greater than the senses is the mind, greater than the mind is the intelligence but greater than the intelligence is he.

IV. 16. What is action? What is inaction?—as to this even the wise are bewildered. I will declare to thee what action is, knowing which thou shalt be delivered from evil.

17. One has to understand what action is, and likewise one has to understand what is wrong action and one has to understand about inaction. Hard to understand is the way of work.

18. He who in action sees inaction and action in inaction, he is wise among men, he is a yogin and he has accomplished all his work.

19. He whose undertakings are all free from the will of desire, whose works are burned up in the fire of wisdom, him the wise call a man of learning.

20. Having no desires, with his heart and self under control, giving up all possessions, performing action by the body alone, he commits no wrong.

21. Having abandoned attachment to the fruit of works, ever content, without any kind of dependence, he does nothing though he is ever engaged in work.

22. He who is satisfied with whatever comes by chance, who has passed beyond the dualities (of pleasure and pain), who is free from jealousy, who remains the same in success and failure, even when he acts, he is not bound

38. There is nothing on earth equal in purity to wisdom. He who becomes perfected by yoga finds this of himself, in his self in course of time.

39. He who has faith, who is absorbed in it (i.e. wisdom) and who has subdued his senses gains wisdom and having gained wisdom he attains quickly the supreme peace.

V 2. The renunciation of works and their unselfish performance both lead to the soul's salvation. But of the two, the unselfish perform-

ance of works is better than their renunciation.

3. He who neither loathes nor desires should be known as one who has ever the spirit of renunciation; for he who is free from dualities is released easily from bondage.

7. He who is trained in the way of works, and is pure in soul, who is master of his self and who has conquered the senses, whose soul becomes the self of all beings, he is not tainted by works, though he works.

8. The man who is united with the Divine and knows the truth thinks "I do nothing at all" in seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, walking, sleeping, breathing.

9. In speaking, emitting, grasping, opening and closing the eyes he holds that only the senses are occupied with the objects of the senses.

10. He who works, having given up attachment, resigning his actions to God, is not touched by sin, even as a lotus leaf (is untouched) by water.

11. The yogins (men of action) perform works merely with the body, mind, understanding or merely with the senses, abandoning attachment, for the purification of their souls.

20. One should not rejoice on obtaining what is pleasant, nor sorrow on obtaining what is unpleasant. He who is (thus) firm of understanding and unbewildered, (such a) knower of God is established in God.

21. When the soul is no longer attached to external contacts (objects) one finds the happiness that is in the Self. Such a one who is self-controlled in Yoga on God (Brahma) enjoys undying bliss.

22. Whatever pleasures are born of contacts (with objects) are only sources of sorrow, they have a beginning and an end, O Son of Kuntī (Arjuna), no wise man delights in them.

23. He who is able to resist the rush of desire and anger, even here before he gives up his body, he is a yogin, he is the happy man.

24. He who finds his happiness within, his joy within and likewise his light only within, that yogin becomes divine and attains to the beatitude of God (brahmanirvana).

VI. 5. Let a man lift himself by himself; let him not degrade himself; for the Self alone is the friend of the self and the self alone is the enemy of the self.

6. For him who has conquered his (lower) self by the (higher) Self his Self is a friend but for him who has not possessed his (higher) Self, his very Self will act in enmity, like an enemy.

7. When one has conquered one's self (lower) and has attained to the

calm of self-mastery, his Supreme Self abides ever concentrate, he is at peace in cold and heat, in pleasure and pain, in honour and dishonour.

8. The ascetic (yogi) whose soul is satisfied with wisdom and knowledge, who is unchanging and master of his senses, to whom a clod, a stone and piece of gold are the same, is said to be controlled (in yoga).

9. He who is equal-minded among friends, companions and foes, among those who are neutral and impartial, among those who are hateful and related, among saints and sinners, he excels.

16. Verily, yoga is not for him who eats too much or abstains too much from eating. It is not for him, O Arjuna, who sleeps too much or keeps awake too much.

17. For the man who is temperate in food and recreation, who is restrained in his actions, whose sleep and waking are regulated, there ensues discipline (yoga) which destroys all sorrow.

18. When the disciplined mind is established in the Self alone, liberated from all desires, then is he said to be harmonized (in yoga).

VII. 3. Among thousands of men scarcely one strives for perfection and of those who strive and succeed, scarcely one knows Me in truth.

4. Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind and understanding and self-sense—this is the eightfold division of My nature.

5. This is My lower nature. Know my other and higher nature which is the soul, by which this world is upheld, O Mighty-armed (Arjuna).

16 The virtuous ones who worship Me are of four kinds, the man in distress, the seeker for knowledge, the seeker for wealth and the man of wisdom, O Lord of the Bharatas (Arjuna).

17. Of these the wise one, who is ever in constant union with the Divine, whose devotion is single-minded, is the best. For I am supremely dear to him and he is dear to Me.

VIII. 8. He who meditates on the Supreme Person with his thought attuned by constant practise and not wandering after anything else, he, O Partha (Arjuna), reaches the Person, Supreme and Divine.

XII. 4. By restraining all the senses, being even-minded in all conditions, rejoicing in the welfare of all creatures, they come to Me indeed (just like the others).

13 He who has no ill will to any being, who is friendly and compassionate, free from egoism and self-sense, even-minded in pain and pleasure.

14. The Yogi who is ever content, self-controlled, unshakable in determination, with mind and understanding given up to Me—he, My

devotee, is dear to Me.

15. He from whom the world does not shrink and who does not shrink from the world and who is free from joy and anger, fear and agitation, he too is dear to Me.

16. He who has no expectation, is pure, skilful in action, unconcerned, and untroubled, who has given up all initiative (in action), he My devotee, is dear to Me.

17. He who neither rejoices nor hates, neither grieves nor desires, and who has renounced good and evil, he who is thus devoted is dear to Me.

18. He who (behaves) alike to foe and friend, also to good and evil repute and who is alike in cold and heat, pleasure and pain and who is free from attachment.

19. He who holds equal blame and praise, who is silent (restrained in speech), content with anything (that comes), who has no fixed abode and is firm in mind, that man who is devoted is dear to Me.

XIII. 3. Hear briefly from Me what the Field is, of what nature, what its modifications are, whence it is, what he (the knower of the field) is, and what his powers are.

5. The great (five gross) elements, self-sense, understanding as also the unmanifested, the ten senses and mind and the five objects of the senses.

6. Desire and hatred, pleasure and pain, the aggregate (the organism) intelligence and steadfastness described, this in brief is the field along with its modifications.

7. Humility (absence of pride), integrity (absence of deceit), non-violence, patience, uprightness, service of the teacher, purity (of body and mind), steadfastness and self-control.

8. Indifference to the objects of sense, self-effacement and the perception of the evil of birth, death, old age, sickness and pain.

9. Non-attachment, absence of clinging to son, wife, home and the like and a constant equal-mindedness to all desirable and undesirable happenings.

19. Know thou that prakriti (nature) and purusha (soul) are both beginningless, and know also that the forms and modes are born of prakriti (nature).

20 Nature is said to be the cause of effect, instrument and agent (ness) and the soul is said to be the cause, in regard to the experience of pleasure and pain.

23. He who thus knows soul (purusha) and nature (prakriti) together

with the modes, though he acts in every way, he is not born again.

24. By meditation some perceive the Self in the self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and still others by the path of works.

29. He who sees that all actions are done only by nature (prakriti) and likewise that the self is not the doer, he verily sees.

IV. 5. The three modes (gunas) goodness (sattva), passion (rajas), and dullness (tamas) born of nature (Prakriti) bind down in the body, O Mighty-armed (Arjuna), the imperishable dweller in the body.

6. Of these, goodness (sattva) being pure, causes illumination and health. It binds, O blameless one, by attachment to happiness and by attachment to knowledge

7. Passion (rajas), know thou, is of the nature of attraction, springing from craving and attachment. It binds fast, O Son of Kuntī (Arjuna), the embodied one by attachment to action.

8. But dullness (tamas), know thou, is born of ignorance and deludes all embodied beings. It binds, O Bharata (Arjuna), by (developing the qualities of) negligence, indolence and sleep.

9. Goodness attaches one to happiness, passion to action, O Bharata (Arjuna), but dullness, veiling wisdom attaches to negligence.

10. Goodness prevails, overpowering passion and dullness, O Bharata (Arjuna). Passion prevails, (overpowering) goodness and dullness and even so dullness prevails (overpowering) goodness and passion.

11. When the light of knowledge streams forth in all the gates of the body, then it may be known that goodness has increased.

12. Greed, activity, the undertaking of actions, unrest and craving—these spring up, O Best of the Bharatas (Arjuna), when rajas increases.

13. Unillumination, inactivity, negligence and mere delusion—these arise, O Joy of the Kurus (Arjuna), when dullness increases.

17. From goodness arises knowledge and from passion greed, negligence and error arise from dullness, as also ignorance.

18. Those who are established in goodness rise upwards; the passionate remain in the middle (regions); the dull steeped in the lower occurrences of the modes sink downwards.

Arjuna said:

21 By what marks is he, O Lord, who has risen above the three modes, characterized? What is his way of life? How does he get beyond the three modes?

Krishna said

22. He, O Pandava (Arjuna), who does not abhor illumination, activity and delusion when they arise nor longs for them when they

cease.

23. He who is seated like one unconcerned, unperturbed by the modes, who stands apart, without wavering, knowing that it is only the modes that act.

24. He who regards pain and pleasure alike, who dwells in his own self, who looks upon a clod, a stone, a piece of gold as of equal worth, who remains the same amidst the pleasant and the unpleasant things, who is firm of mind, who regards both blame and praise as one.

25. He who is the same in honour and dishonour and the same to friends and foes, and who has given up all initiative of action, he is said to have risen above the modes.

XVII. Krishna said: 2. The wise understand by "renunciation" the giving up of works prompted by desire: the abandonment of the fruits of all works, the learned declare, in relinquishment.

8. He who gives up a duty because it is painful or from fear of physical suffering, performs only the relinquishment of the "passionate" kind and does not gain the reward of relinquishment.

9. But he who performs a prescribed duty as a thing that ought to be done, renouncing all attachment and also the fruit—his relinquishment is regarded as one of "goodness".

13. O Mighty-armed (Arjuna), learn of Me, these five factors, for the accomplishment of all actions, as stated in the Samkhya doctrine.

14. The seat of action and likewise the agent, the instruments of various sorts, the many kinds of efforts and providence being the fifth.

15. Whatever action a man undertakes by his body, speech or mind, whether it is right or wrong, these five are its factors.

16. Such being the case, the man of perverse mind who, on account of his untrained understanding, looks upon himself as the sole agent, he does not see (truly).

18. Knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knowing subject, are the threefold incitement to action: the instrument, the action and the agent are the threefold composite of action.

36. And now hear from Me, O Best of the Bharatas (Arjuna), the three kinds of happiness. That in which a man comes to rejoice by long practice and in which he reaches the end of this sorrow.

37. That happiness which is like poison at first and like nectar at the end, which springs from a clear understanding of the Self is said to be of the nature of "goodness".

38. That happiness which arises from the contact of the senses and their objects and which is like nectar at the first but like poison at the

end—such happiness is recorded to be “passionate”.

39. That happiness which deludes the soul both at the beginning and at the end and which arises from sleep, sloth and negligence—that is declared to be of the nature of “dullness”.

47. Better is one's own law though imperfectly carried out than the law of another carried out perfectly. One does not incur sin when one does the duty ordained by one's own nature.

48. One should not give up the work suited to one's nature, O Son of Kuntī (Arjuna), though it may be defective, for all enterprises are clouded by defects as fire by smoke.

49. He whose understanding is unattached everywhere, who has subdued his self and from whom desire has fled—he comes through renunciation to the supreme state transcending all work.

50. Hear from me, in brief, O Son of Kuntī (Arjuna), now, having attained perfection, he attains to the Brahman, the supreme consummation of wisdom.

51. Endowed with a pure understanding, firmly restraining oneself, turning away from sound and other objects of sense and casting aside attraction and aversion.

52. Dwelling in solitude, eating but little, controlling speech, body and mind, and ever engaged in meditation and concentration and taking refuge in dispassion.

53. And casting aside self-sense, force, arrogance, desire, anger, possession, egoless and tranquil in mind, he becomes worthy of becoming one with Brahman.

Chapter 4

Gautama's Nyaya Sutras

Though the Nyaya and the Vaisesika systems were independent of each other in their origin, since they are closely allied in their realistic outlook, they have been actually amalgamated by the exponents themselves in the later times.

The word Nyaya is commonly understood to mean argumentation. It is an intellectual and analytic method.

Gautama, the author of the Nyaya Sutras is regarded as a teacher belonging to the time before Buddha. The Sutras constitute a unique form of literature developed in India some centuries before the Christian era, when writing was not in use and knowledge was acquired through memorising. The sutras are aphorisms. They are hardly intelligible without explanation. This is why the Indian systems of thought have commentaries, *bhashyas*. The commentary on Nyaya Sutra is by Vatsyayana (A.D. 400).

The system postulates the self (*atma*) with six attributes, namely, consciousness (*jnana*), desire (*raga*), aversion (*dvesha*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*dukha*) and effort or volition (*yatna*). Thus the system recognizes the cognitive, conative and affective attributes of the self. It is asserted that at first there is knowledge, then desire and finally effort to satisfy the desire. Thus feelings and emotions mediate between cognition and action.

Like the Upanishads and the Gita this system also differentiates between the self, the *buddhi* and the *manas*. The self is the cogniser and the *manas* is an instrument, an *indriya*. It is the means of experiencing pain, pleasure, hunger etc., as well as the sensations of colour, sound etc. Thus *manas* (mind) is the instrument by means of which the self acquires knowledge through the sense organs and knowledge of the internal states. Knowledge is the quality of the self, the cognitive agent and not of the *manas*. The self is the cogniser and recollection also belongs to the self. The 41st Sutra of the third chapter enumerates the conditions under which recollection occurs, the main conditions being attention and association.

Cognition is not something durable. Cognitions appear only one

after another. The illustration of the whirling fire-brand is given to show that at each moment there is a single act of cognition. Because of the failure to perceive the sequence in the whirling fire-brand which is moving rapidly, there occurs the notion that cognitions appear simultaneously.

Three groups of defects (dosha) affect the self, namely, the desire (raga) group, the hatred (dvesha) group and the delusion (moha) group. In the desire or attachment group are sex, love, selfishness, greed etc. In the hatred group are anger, jealousy, envy, malice etc. In the delusion or infatuation group are error, suspicion, pride etc. Of these three, delusion is the worst because unless one is affected by it desire and hatred do not appear.

The analogy of the state of deep sleep is given to show that liberation (moksha) is possible. Just as a man in deep sleep is free from all attachment, hatred and delusion, from all pleasure and pain, in the same way liberation will enable a man to be free from all these feelings and emotions. All misapprehensions cease to appear with true knowledge, which arises when a person realises that the self is not equivalent to the body, the sense-organs, the manas and the cognitions.

(I.1) 3. Perception, Inference, Analogy and words are the Pramanas.

4. *Sense-perception is that cognition - (a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ, (b) which is not expressible (by words), (c) which is not erroneous, and (d) which is well defined.*

9. *Self, body, sense-organs, things, apprehension (buddhi), mind (manas), activity, defect, re-birth, fruition, pain and ultimate good really constitute the objects of cognition.*

The Self

10. *Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the indications of the self (atma).*

Bhasya The self (atma) having experienced pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of things. . . wishes to acquire that thing—it is thus that 'desire' becomes an indicative (a sign of proof) of the self.

Similarly it is only when one and the same agent perceives things, that on recollecting a previous perception, he comes to have 'aversion' to the thing that has been the cause of pain to him.

It is through 'effort' that one makes an attempt to obtain the thing which have pleasure and get rid of what has been found to be a cause

of pain.

The self is the experiencer of 'pleasure' and 'pain' in the past, their rememberer, and their experiencer in the present

When a man is desirous of knowing or understanding (the real character of a certain thing), at first ponders over it in the form—'what may this be?' and pondering thus he comes to know it in the form—'this is so and so'. This 'knowing' of the thing is by the same agent as the previous desire to know and the consequent pondering. Thus knowledge, cognition, becomes an indicative of the presence of the common agent in the shape of the self.

The Body

11. *The body is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects*

Bhashya. "How is the body the vehicle of actions?" With regard to the things that the self desires to obtain or to discard, there arises in the self the desire to obtain or to discard it respectively; urged by this desire, the self puts forth exertion embodying the operation of the means for obtaining or discarding it; and that wherein this exertion appears is the body.

"How is the body the vehicle of sense-organs?" That thing alone can be regarded as the vehicle of the sense-organs by whose benefit the sense-organs are benefited, and by whose injury they are injured, and it is according to their benefit or injury, that they act upon their objects good and bad; and such a thing is the body.

"How is the body the vehicle of objects?" That is to be regarded as the vehicle of objects in which receptacle there appear the feelings of pleasure and pain caused by the contact of the sense-organs with those objects; and such a receptacle is the body.

The Sense-organs

12. *The olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the cutaneous and the auditory organs, proceeding from material substances*

13. *The material substances are earth, water, fire, air and 'Akasa'*

14. *Odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, which are the qualities of earth (water, fire, air and akasa) are the objects of the aforesaid (sense-organs)*

Buddhi

15. *Buddhi (intellection), apprehension and cognition are synony-*

mous terms.

Bhashya. It is not possible for cognition (jnanam) to belong to the unconscious buddhi (intellection), as the Samkhya philosophy holds: as, if it were, then buddhi could be a conscious entity.

Manas

16 The non-appearance of simultaneous cognition is indicative of the existence of mind (manas).

Bhashya. Even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects, odour and the rest, are in close proximity to the respective perceptive sense-organs, the olfactory organ and the rest, yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them: and from this we infer that there is some other cause, by whose proximity cognition appears, and on account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear, this other organ being in contact with the several sense-organs, and helping them and being non-pervasive (limited) in its dimension. If the proximity of sense-organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the mind, were the sole cause of cognition, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.

17. Activity (pravrutti) consists in the operating of speech, of mind and of body

These activities may be sub-divided as good or bad.

Bodily actions: *Bad*—killing, stealing and committing adultery.

Good—giving, protecting and serving.

Vocal actions: *Bad*—telling a lie, using harsh language, slandering and indulging in frivolous talk.

Good—speaking the truth, speaking what is useful, speaking what is pleasant and reading sacred books.

Mental actions: *Bad*—malice, covetousness and scepticism.

Good—compassion, refraining from covetousness, and devotion (Sinha, p. 8).

18. Defects (doshas) have urging or inciting for their distinguishing feature.

Bhashya. Persons affected by attachment, aversion and delusion (moha) (which are inciters to activity) are characterized by their action: the man who has attachments does that action whereby he experiences pleasure or pain: similarly the man who has aversion, or one who has delusion.

20. Fruition (phalam) is a thing produced by activity and defect.

Bhashya. Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to pleasure and pain. . . each time this fruition is received by man, it is relinquished by him; and each time it is relinquished, it is again received; and there is no end or absolute cessation of these receivings and relinquishings; and it is by this unceasing current of receivings and relinquishings that the entire worldly process is carried on.

21. *When connected with annoyance (or irritation) is pain (dukham).*

Bhashya. By 'annoyance' is meant suffering, injury. Everything (i.e., body, speech and mind and also pleasure and pain), being intermingled with, i.e., invariably accompanied by, never existing apart from pain, is inseparable from pain; and as such is regarded as pain itself. Finding everything to be intermingled with pain, when one wishes to get rid of pain, he finds that life itself is nothing but pain; and thus becomes disgusted (with life) and being disgusted, he loses all attachment; and being free from attachment, he becomes released.

23. *Doubt (samsayah) is that wavering judgement in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting and which arises either (a) from the cognition of the characteristics common to the objects concerned, or (b) from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects, or (c) from the presence of contradictory opinions, the appearing of such wavering judgments is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions.*

24. *That object, aiming at which one acts, is called motive—(prayojana).*

Perception (II.1)

24. Cognition (jnana) forming the characteristic feature of the self (atma), there can be no non-inclusion of it. (This objection is answered in the following sutras.)

Bhashya. Cognition (jnana) is a characteristic feature of the self, because it is its quality (which shows that self-contact is essential).

26. Inasmuch as it is only the contact of the sense-organ and the object that forms the (distinctive) cause of perception, it has been mentioned (in the sutra) by means of words directly expressing it.

Bhashya. The contact of the mind (manas) and of the self (atma) is the common cause of perception, as well as inferential, analogical and verbal cognitions: while the contact of the sense-organ with the object is the distinctive cause of perception only.

27. Also because, in the case of persons whose mind is asleep or preoccupied, (perception is held to be) brought about by means of the contact of sense-organ and object (only).

Bhashya. We have (in the definition of perception) the mention of the sense-object contact, and not that of mind-self contact because:

(A) Sometimes a man goes to sleep after having determined that he would wake up at a certain time,—and by force of this determination (which gives rise to the effort necessary for bringing about the requisite mind-self contact) he wakes up at that time; but sometimes it happens that during sleep he is awakened either by a very loud sound or by a forcible shaking; and in these cases the waking cognition (of sound or touch) by the sleeping man is brought about (primarily) by the contact of the sense-organ. . . in such cases there is no desire to know on the part of the self, to give rise to its effort which would urge the mind and bring it into contact with it (and it is only when this happens that mind-self contact is possible).

(B) (When the mind of a man is) entirely preoccupied, there appears in him a cognition brought about by forcible, sudden impact of the object, without the desire to cognize or mental effort on his part, the contact of the sense-organ with the object is the principal cause of the cognition.

28. And also because individual cognitions are named after these.

Bhashya. As a matter of fact we find that individual cognitions are named after the sense-organs and the objects concerned. For instance when one smells with the olfactory organ, his cognition is called 'olfactory cognition' and 'cognition of smell' (and so on). Further, perception is held to be of five kinds, simply because of the number of sense-organs and that of perceptible objects being each five-fold. And all this goes to prove that in the bringing about of perception, the sense-object contact is the principal cause.

The Self (Atma) (III.1)

1. The self is something distinct from the sense-organs, because the same thing can be apprehended by sight and by touch.

The Self is different from the mind.

15. (Says the opponent). . . the reasons adduced in support of the notion of the self are all applicable to the mind (manas).

16. (Answer) Inasmuch as the instrument of cognition can belong only to the cogniser, it is merely a difference in names.

Bhashya. It is a well-known fact that the instruments of cognition belong to the cogniser,—a fact which is vouched for by such expressions as ‘he sees with the eye’ etc. . . Similarly the mind also is known to be only an instrument for conceiving all things. . . it is by means of this mind that the conceiver does the conceiving. . . though admitting that there is a cogniser, (the opponent) does not bear the idea of his being named self and though admitting an instrument of cognising, the name mind is not given. So it turns out to be a question of names—there being no difference of opinion as to the thing, the conceiving self itself. If, however, you deny what has been said above, that would mean the dropping out of all sense-organ that is to say, if you deny that to the conceiver of all things there belongs an instrument which brings about the conceiving of all things and hold that there is no such instrument,—when a similar denial may be made in regard to the instruments of cognition of colour etc., also, and this would mean the total denial of all sense-organs.

26. Longing (and aversion) are due to anticipation.

Bhashya. Longing is found to arise from anticipation or conviction (that such and such an object is the source of pleasure or of pain)—this anticipation arises from the recalling to mind of previously experienced objects.

The Sense Organs and their Material Character

36. (Senses are five) because the objects of the sense-organs are five.

Bhashya. (There are five objects viz., colour, sound, smell, taste and touch.) Thus from the fact that the purpose of one sense-organ is not served by another, it follows that there are five sense-organs.

Buddhi (III.2)

1. The doubt arises by reason of the similarity (of cognition) to action and akasa.

Bhashya. It is a fact known to every living being that cognition is transient just like pleasure and such experiences. . . it is liable to production and destruction.

Buddhi. . . is a quality of, and belongs to, the conscious person; and it is only the conscious person that re-cognises what he has cognised before; so that it is to this conscious person only that ‘eternality’ can be attributed on the ground of recognition. . . it thus becomes established that cognition belongs to the self and not to the internal organ, buddhi.

The mind, which is of limited magnitude (not all-pervading), comes into contact with the several sense-organs one by one (and at distant points of time).

7. The non-apprehension of one thing is due to (the mind) being occupied with other things.

18. Knowledge belongs neither to the sense nor to the object since it continues to exist also when these two have been destroyed.

Bhashya. . . even after the object (seen) and the sense-organ (the eye) have been destroyed we have the cognition in the form 'I have seen'. On the other hand, after the cogniser (the self) has been destroyed, there can be no cognition at all.

As a matter of fact, there are two kinds of cognition: (a) the cognition which proceeds from the contact of the sense-organ and the object (perceptual) and (b) the cognition which proceeds from the contact of the mind and the self; and it is only natural that these latter should persist (even upon the destruction of the sense-organ and the object).

19. Knowledge cannot be the quality of the mind whose existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous.

Bhashya. Knowledge is a quality of the cognitive agent, as it is he who is the controller.

As a matter of fact, controller is the cogniser, and that which is controlled is the instrument. So that if the mind has knowledge for its quality, it would cease to be an instrument.

From the fact that apprehension of odour etc., belongs to the cognitive agent who is equipped with such instruments as the olfactory organ etc., we infer the apprehension of pleasure etc., as also recollection, which belongs to that cognitive agent who is equipped with the instrument in the shape of the internal organ (mind).

(Opponent) what is the reason that recollections are not simultaneous, even though their causes are present at one and the same time?

33. Recollections are not simultaneous, because such causes as attention, perception of the sign and the rest are not all present at one and the same time.

Bhashya. Just as the contact of the self with the mind and impressions are the cause of recollection, so also are attention and perception of the sign and such other things; and inasmuch as these latter do not appear at one and the same time, it is to this that the non-simultaneity is due.

What actually happens is that, when there appear in the mind a

number of ideas pertaining to several things, it is only someone of these several things that brings about recollection in some men (and not in others).

(Further) an instrument has power to bring about cognitions only one by one. . . several cognitions are never produced, at one and the same time, either with regard to one or with regard to several objects.

Some people hold the theory that jnana, cognition, is a property of the self, but desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain are the properties of the internal organ (antahkarana).

34. Inasmuch as activity and cessation from activity are caused by desire and aversion of a self (desire and aversion must belong to this self).

Bhashya. As a matter of fact, what happens is that the person cognises a certain thing as a source of pleasure and another as a source of pain to him,—then he desires to obtain that which gives him pleasure and desires to get rid of what causes him pain. . . and puts forth an effort to obtain what gives him pleasure; this effort is what is called activity; thus we find that cognizing, desiring, effort, aversion, pleasure and pain, all these belong to one and the same stratum; that is, cognizing, desiring and acting have one and the same agent. . . they are properties of the cognizer, the intelligent self and not of a non-intelligent thing (the internal organ).

40. Recollection (must belong) to the self; for it is the self that is endowed with the character of the cognizer.

41. (Recollection arises) from such cases as (a) attention, (b) association, (c) retentiveness, (d) indicative mark, (e) distinguishing feature, (f) likeness, (g) ownership, (h) supporter (container), (i) supported (contained), (j) relationship, (k) sequence, (l) separation, (m) co-profession, (n) enmity (opposition), (o) superiority, (p) acquisition, (q) cover, (r) pleasure and pain, (s) desire and aversion, (t) fear, (u) need, (v) profession (action), (w) affection.

Cognition is transient

Introductory Bhashya. The doubt arises—Is apprehension entirely evanescent (disappearing soon after appearance) like sound?—or is it durable for some time longer like the jar?

We accept the view that it is totally evanescent.

42. Because there is apprehension of movement, which is fleeting.

Bhashya. In the case of the arrow shot from the bow we perceive a series of movements. . . so there must be a series of corresponding

cognitions. In the case of the apprehension of (comparatively) durable things also (like a jar). . . there is a series of evanescent cognitions. . . If cognitions were durable (not evanescent), then the perceptual cognition of the jar should continue even when the jar has been hidden from view.

The phenomenon of recollection also does not prove the durability of cognitions, for what brings about recollection is the impression produced by the cognition (and not the cognition itself).

If cognition were something durable, then the perception itself would continue for a long time and there would be no room for recollection at all.

Consciousness is not a quality of the body

Introductory Bhashya Consciousness or sentience would appear to be a quality of the body, as it is found to be present when the body is present, and absent when the body is absent.

Consciousness cannot be a quality of the body.

53. Because it differs in character from the qualities of the body.

Bhashya. Qualities belonging to the body are of two kinds—(i) imperceptible e.g., gravity and (ii) perceptible by the senses, e.g., colour etc. Consciousness is a quality of a totally different kind from the said qualities: It cannot be regarded as imperceptible because it is capable of being perceived by itself; nor can it be regarded as perceptible by the senses, because it is cognizable by the mind.

Examination of the mind

56. There is unity of mind since there is non-simultaneity of cognition.

Bhashya. The non-simultaneity of cognitions of several things produced through several sense-organs. . . indicates the singleness of mind. . . the cognitions of things appear only one after another.

Sequence, even though present, fails to be perceived by reason of the rapidity of the cognitions or actions, as in the case of the whirling fire-brand which is perceived as the fire-circle due to the rapidity of motion. Because of the failure to perceive the sequence, there arises the notion that the actions or cognitions appear simultaneously.

59. For reasons already mentioned, the mind is an atom.

Bhashya. That the mind is atomic and that it is one—both these properties of the mind follow from the non-simultaneity of cognition.

Three grounds of defects (Dosha) (IV.1)

Bhashya. Defects (1.1.18) are regarded as qualities of the self; they are regarded as the cause of 'samsara', birth-rebirth. Wrong knowledge ceases when right knowledge is attained and on the cessation of wrong knowledge, the whole series of affections and aversions drop off; whereupon follows final release.

3. There are three groups of defects—desire (raga), hatred (dvesha), and delusion (moha), which are distinct from one another.

Bhashya. Of defects there are three groups:

I. The desire group under which are included love (for the other sex) selfishness, longing for acquiring in a lawful manner what belongs to another, hankering and greed (desire for obtaining in an unlawful manner what belongs to another).

II. The hatred group under which are included anger, jealousy, envy, malice and resentment.

III. The 'moha' group under which are included error, suspicion, pride and negligence.

Since all defects are included under one or the other of these three groups, they are not described individually.

These three groups are distinct from one another (though all of them are causes of activity, yet each has a distinctive character of its own). Desire is characterised by attachment, hatred is characterised by aversion and moha (delusion) is characterised by wrong notion).

6. Of the three, delusion is the worst because in the case of a person who is not deluded the other two do not come into existence (Sinha, p. 134)

Bhashya. Unless one is affected by 'moha', desire and hatred do not appear; and when a man has become influenced 'moha' (delusion), either desire or hatred appear in accordance with the man's notion. . . when the wrong notion (mithyajnana) is destroyed by right knowledge, both desire and hatred cease to appear.

Examination of the Nature of Pain

Introductory Bhashya. Pain is mentioned in 1-1-9 and defined in 1-1-21 as 'that which is connected with annoyance. However, there is no mention of pleasure, (in 4-1-52) it is stated that "happiness subsists in the self"; it is objected that the attainment of fruits of actions like attaining food, gold, cattle, wife, son etc., produces happiness (4-1-53).

55. The birth of the body etc., is only pain, because it is beset with annoyances (distresses).

Bhashya. When a person perceives that every condition of life is beset with annoyances, he becomes confirmed in his idea that pleasure and its causes, in the shape of the body, the sense-organs and cognitions are all to be regarded as pain; and when he has come to look upon all these as pain; he loses all attachment to all things of the world; and after he has harboured this dis-attachment, all his longings come to an end, he becomes freed from all sufferings. . .

Introductory Bhashya. The teaching that all things should be looked upon as pain is not meant to be a denial of pleasure;—Why?

56. It is not so; because pleasure also is accomplished during intervals.

Bhashya. . . as a matter of fact, in the intervals of annoyances, pleasure is actually experienced by all living beings; hence it (pleasure) cannot be denied.

57. There is no denial (of pleasure); because in as much as the man experiencing pleasure is oppressed with the frailty of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him.

Bhashya. . . When a man experiences pleasure from a certain thing, he desires that thing; there is longing for it.

This is the idea that has been expressed in the following:

1. For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him.

2. Even though a man obtains the entire sea-girt earth. . . that seeker after wealth does not become satisfied with that wealth; what pleasure, then, can there be for one who desires wealth?

58. Also because there are several kinds of pain which people wrongly regard as pleasure.

Bhashya. The ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards pleasure as the highest end of man. . . and under the influence of delusion he becomes attached to the pleasure. . . becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure; and while he is trying for it, there come down upon him several kinds of pain in the form of disease, old age, death, the contact of disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the non-fulfilment of desires and so forth; and yet he regards all these several kinds of pain as pleasure. In fact pain is a necessary factor in pleasure; without suffering some pain, no pleasure can be obtained; hence as leading to pleasure, this pain is regarded by man as pleasure. And it is as an antidote of this notion of pleasure that we have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as pain.

The Nature of Final Release

Bhashya. When a man reaches the last quarter of his life, he enters the state of the renunciate and thus becomes freed from the obligation of performing the acts.

63. Release is possible; in as much as (we find that) there are no aberrations (klesha) in the case of the man in deep sleep, who dreams no dreams.

Bhashya. As a matter of fact, we find that when a man is in deep sleep and dreams no dreams, there is an end (for the time being) of all connection with attachment, as also of all connection with pleasure and pain. Exactly in the same way, there could be an end of all these at release also. In fact people who have realised the real nature of Brahman actually describe the condition of the released self as similar to that of deep sleep.

True knowledge (IV.2)

Introductory Bhashya. 'Moha' (delusion) consists in wrong notion, misapprehension, not mere absence of true knowledge. (Opponent) What is that wrong notion? (Answer) The notion of what is not self as self, the notion of 'I' (ahamkara, egoism). (Opponent) What are those things in regard to which people have the notion of 'I'? (Answer) They are the body, the sense-organs, the mind, feelings and cognitions.

When a man looks upon the body, etc., as "this is 'I' ", he regards their destruction as his own destruction; he becomes imbued with a longing for the non-destruction of those. . . so that not being freed from these, he is never released. On the other hand, the man who looks upon pain, the receptacle of pain (the body) and pleasure intermingled with pain—all these things as pain,. . . when he looks upon defects (doṣha) and action also as sources of pain; and that until the defects have been removed, there is no possibility of cessation of pains; hence the man renounces the defects; and when the defects are renounced, activity does not lead to (further desires and longings).

Thus the man comes to the conclusion that fruition and pain are things to be known, that action and defects are things to be abandoned, final release is a thing to be attained and true knowledge is the means of attaining it.

Thus when a man attends to, repeatedly looks upon and ponders over, the objects of cognition as grouped under the aforesaid four categories (i) things mistaken as self, namely, body etc.; (ii) things to be known, namely, fruition, etc., (iii) things to be renounced, namely,

defects and action, and (iv) things to be attained*, namely release—there comes to him right perception, i.e., the cognition of things in their real character, i.e., true knowledge.

Development of True Knowledge

38. (True knowledge proceeds) from the practice of a particular form of meditation.

Bhasya. When the mind having been withdrawn from the sense-organs, is kept steady by an effort tending to concentration—the contact that takes place between this mind and the self, and which is accompanied by a conscious eagerness to get at the truth, is what is called meditation. During this meditation, no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses. From the practice of meditation proceeds true knowledge.

46. For that purpose (there should be) purification of the self (atmasamskaraḥ) by means of external and internal self-control (yama-niyamabhyāsa) and such other methods of internal discipline as may be learnt from the science of yoga.

47. (There should also be) repetition of the study of this treatise as also friendly discussions with persons learned in the treatise.¹

¹ The selections are from Ganganath Jha's translation of *Gautama's Nyaya Sutras* with Vatsayana Bhasya (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1939) This is supplemented by some extracts from Nandalal Sinha's *Nyaya Sutras of Gautama (The Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. III, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1930)*

Chapter 5

The Vaiseshika Sutras of Kanada

It is assumed that Kanada, like Gautama, the author of Nyaya Sutras, lived before Buddha. His age is somewhere between the sixth and tenth century B.C. He sought to teach his disciples the nature of the self, a knowledge of which enables one to become free from the troubles of worldly existence. Kanada tells his disciples that their immediate need is to make an intelligent discrimination between the self and the non-self which ultimately leads to liberation. Thus the standpoint of Vaiseshika is practical and spiritual, to analyse and explain the self and the non-self.

The self (atma) and the manas (mind) are substances, along with earth, water, fire, air, ether, time and space. The self is not a by-product of physiological process, nor is it identical with the stream of consciousness. The self is a distinct entity with distinct attributes. However, it is not an object of immediate perception like the other substances. It is also not an object of internal perception for ordinary persons. It is a particular conjunction of the self and the manas which enables a few persons of high development to have an immediate consciousness of the self. The breath, the movement of eye-lids, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition etc., are the marks of the existence of the self.

Like the self, the mind (manas) is also not an object of ordinary perception. Its existence is inferred from cognition. The mind is the organ which enables internal perception. This system does not postulate buddhi as a separate substance.

Perception is produced by the contact of the self with the sense organs and their objects.

Desire (raga) and aversion (dvesha) arise from pleasure and pain, which result from the contact of the self with mind, sense and object. They are the attributes of the self along with understanding. This gives rise to action. But when the mind has become steady in the self then there is no pleasure or pain and there is no action. This can be achieved by yoga; in yoga the self acquires perfect control over the internal and

the external organs.

Liberation, therefore, consists of the final cessation of pain which binds one to life and action.

The extracts are from Nandalal Sinha's translation of Vaiseshika Sutras of Kanada [*Sacred Books of the Hindus*, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1923.]

Substance and Attributes (I. 1.)

5. Earth, water, fire, air, ether (akasa), time, space, atma (self), manas (mind) are the only substances.

6. Attributes are colour (etc.)...understandings, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion and volitions.

Bhashya. The plural number in understandings, (buddhayah), indicates the refutation of the theory of one and only one understanding held by the Samkhya thinkers, on the ground of its division into knowledge etc. The dual number in pleasure and pain is intended to point out that both of them are causes of one effect which is distinguished as experience (bhoga) and that they are equally instrumental to the inference of 'adrishtam' and also that even pleasure resolves into pain. The dual number in desire and aversion indicates that both of them are causes of activity. The plural in volitions (prayatnah) is meant to show that ten kinds of volitions which comprise both permitted and prohibited acts, are causes of virtue and ten other kinds are causes of vice.

Perception (III. 1.)

There is no consciousness in the causes (i.e., the component parts of the body).

Bhashya. It is meant (that the body of the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, etc.

IV. 1. 6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an object possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of what is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its colour

7. The non-perception of air, in spite of there being substances and magnitude, is due to the non-existence of colour.

8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination with a compound of substances more than two and from (its possession of) some special characteristics of colour.

9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in the case of taste,

smell and touch.

Bhashya. As perception of colour arises from some special characteristic of colour, so perception of taste arises from some particularity of taste, this should be applied to other cases.

The Mind (III. 2.)

1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of self (atma) with the senses and their objects, are the marks (of the existence) of the mind (manas).

2. The substance-ness and eternality of mind are explained by (the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of) air.

Bhashya. As the ultimate atom of air, inferred from substance made up of parts is a substance, because it possessed attribute and action, so mind, inferred from the non-production of simultaneous cognition, is a substance, because it possesses attribute.

Moreover, the presentation of pleasure etc. (to the self) must have a sense as its instrument. . . Hence mind is proved as an instrument or sense.

3. From the non-simultaneity of volitions (prayatna) and from the non-simultaneity of cognitions (jnana), (it follows that there is only) one (mind in each organism).

Bhashya. If there were many minds in a single organism, then cognitions and volitions would be simultaneous.

VII. 1. 23. In consequence of the non-existence of universal expansion the mind is atomic or infinitely small.

The Self (III.1)

2. The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) object different from the senses and their objects.

Bhashya. Now this universal experience must reside somewhere, either as an effect as a water-pot, or as an attribute, or as an action. This universal experience, again; since it is an act. . . must be produced by an instrument. That which is the instrument of the universal experience is the sense and the latter, being an instrument, must be employed by an agent. . . Thus, that in which this universal experience resides, and which employs the olfactory and other organs for its instruments, is the self.

4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because there is no consciousness in the cause (i.e., the component parts of the body).

18. That (knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the self, the sense and object is other (than a false mark).

Bhashya. Knowledge is, in two ways, a mark of the existence of the self; either by the inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is an effect-or by assuming the form of recognition e.g., 'I, who saw, am the same as I who am touching'.

19. And activity and inactivity (pravrutti-nivrutti), observed in one's own self, are the mark of (the existence of) other selves.

Bhashya. Pravrutti-nivrutti are particular volitions caused by desire and aversion. By them are produced bodily actions, characterised as "chestha" or muscular motion, of which the objects are the acquisition of the agreeable and the avoidance of the disagreeable. So that, on observing muscular motion in another body, the inference of another self takes place in the following manner: this muscular motion must have been produced by volition, because it is muscular motion as is my muscular motion. And that volition is the product of a self, is seated in a self, because it is volition, as is my volition.

2. 4. The breath (prana - apana), the closing and opening of the eyelids, the movement of the mind and the affections of the other senses and also pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are marks (of the existence) of the self.

5. Its substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of) air.

9. (The proof of the existence of the self is) not (solely) from revelation, because of the non-application of the word 'I' (to other designates or objects).

Bhashya. Revelation alone is not the proof of the self; but the self is proved also by the inference that the word "I", or the word 'self' must have some designate (or objective really corresponding to it), because it is a word, like the word water-pot etc.

14. Because the intuition "I" exists in one's own self, and because it does not exist otherwise, therefore the intuition has the individual self as the object of perception.

Bhashya. "Arthantara-pratyakshah" is that intuition in which "arthan-taram", i.e., the self itself is the percept. . . if, on the other hand, the primary reference were to the body, then the intuition would be produced by the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception, and the intuition, 'This is I' is mental, being produced even without the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its object the self as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the

form of “I am sorry”, “I am happy” etc. This intuition is not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of inference.

The cognition “I feel pleasure” or “I am in pain” is neither scriptural nor verbally communicated, nor inferential.

Therefore, the cognition in the form of ‘I’ . . . should be explained by the innate idea of egoity or I-ness and its perceptible attributes, and not by reference to the body. . .

20. (Answer) plurality of selves is proved by status.

Bhashya. Selves are many. Why? Because of status, Status means several conditions, as one is rich, another miserable etc.

VII.1. 22. Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, is immensely large. So also is the self.

Bhashya. As ether is immensely vast, since it possesses universal pervasion, that is, the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies, so is also the self immensely vast. . . The self, however, is not only one like ether, since, as has been already pointed out, difference of status or condition is observed.

VIII.1. 2. Among substances, the self, the mind and others are not objects of perception.

Pleasure, Pain, Desire and Aversion (V. 2)

15. Pleasure and pain (result) from contact of self, sense, mind and object.

16. Non-origination of that (follows) on the mind becoming steady in the self; (after it, there is) non-existence of pain in the embodied self. (This is) that yoga.

Bhashya. Believing in the vanity of all objects of enjoyment, when the mind comes to stay only in the self, owing to the absence of volition, action is not produced in the mind; it becomes comparatively steady. It is this (state) which is (called) yoga, since the characteristic of yoga is the inhibition or restraint of the internal organ.

18. Moksha consists in the non-existence of conjunction with the body, when there is, at the same time, no potential body existing and consequently, re-birth cannot take place.

Bhashya. The power of yoga produces intuitive knowledge of the self. False knowledge, attended with desire, is thereby annihilated, consequently attraction, aversion and delusion and other faults due to it, disappear; then inclination or activity goes away,. . . pain bound up with birth also vanishes away.

From Pleasure (arises) Desire (VI.2.10)

Bhashya. From pleasure derived from the enjoyment, desire is produced for pleasure of a similar kind. Similarly pain produces aversion. Desire, aversion and delusion are called faults, in as much as they are incentives to activity (which serve to bind the agent down to this world).

11. (Desire and aversion arise) through habituation to that.

12. (Desire and aversion arise) from 'adrushtam' also.

Bhashya. The supposition (assumption) of 'adrushtam' becomes necessary when desires and aversions arise though there are no impressions (samskaras).

13. (Desire and aversion arise) also from racial (jativiseshat) distinctions.

Bhashya. Thus, human beings have desire for rice etc.

X. 1. 1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes, in the form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of (their mutual) opposition, pleasure and pain stand in the relation of objects different from each other.

Bhashya. The difference between pleasure and pain arises because of difference in their causes; in one case it is due to desirable objects and in the other to undesirable objects. Also the two are opposed to each other. Pleasure and pain are not experienced in one and the same self at one and the same time.

2. And the non-inclusion (of pleasure and pain) in doubt or certainty is the mark that they are other than cognition.

Bhashya. Pleasure and pain are different from cognition. Were pleasure and pain a kind of cognition, it would either have the form of doubt or certainty.

The perception of pleasure and pain is mental i.e., by the inner sense, in the form of "I feel pleasure", "I feel pain" whereas perception of them does not take such shape or form as in 'I know', 'I am doubtful' 'I am certain'.

Neither pleasure nor pain is produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks.

Memory (IX.2)

6. Reminiscence—Smruti (results) from a particular conjunction between the self and the mind and also from impression or latency.

Bhashya. Memory results from contact or contiguity (samyoga vise-shat); it results from impression or retention or latency (samskarat). . .

(However), it does not follow that reminiscence should take place at all times or continually, since it depends on the resuscitation of the mental impression.

Dreams

7. So (also is) dreaming.

Bhashya. Just as reminiscence results from a particular conjunction between the self and the mind and from impression or latency, so also does the cognition in dreaming of impression or facility of reproductiveness, as in a man who, in love or in anger, thinks intently on some object, when he goes to sleep. (2) It partly arises from derangement of the humors or affections of the body, viz., wind, bile, and phlegm; in consequence of disorder of wind, one dreams of moving about in the sky, wandering about on the earth, fleeing with fear from tigers etc.; under the influence of an excess of the bile, one dreams of entering into fire, embracing flames of fire, golden mountains etc., while, through predominance of phlegmatic derangement, one dreams of swimming upon the sea, impression in river etc. (3) Dreams appear also under the influence of 'adrushtam' (the invisible after-effects of past acts).

These (dream) cognitions (are) produced in one whose internal sense (mind) has been lulled to sleep or overpowered with sleep, in respect of the experiences of the present or previous states of existence.

8. (So is) consciousness accompanying dreams.

Bhashya. Like dreaming, the consciousness accompanying dreaming arises from a particular conjunction between the self and the mind and also from impression or retention.

True Knowledge and False Knowledge

10. False knowledge, 'avidya' (arises) from impressions of the senses (indriya doshat) and from imperfection of impression (samskara doshat).

11. That (i.e., avidya) is imperfect knowledge (dushta-jnanam).

Bhashya. Avidya is cognition which is unduly applied, cognition that a thing is what in fact it is not; in other words, cognition determined in the manner of a divergent object, and having the mode which does not reside in the object in question.

12. (Cognition) free from imperfection is (called) vidya or true knowledge.

Bhashya. Vidya is the experience of a thing in its proper place, or the experience of a thing in the same manner in which another thing having a common substratum with the former is experienced.

Chapter 6

The Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna

This is the earliest book of authority on the classical Sankhya now in existence and the author is presumed to have lived in the fifth century A.D. However, the system is very old and was influential even at the time when Mahabharata was composed. Some authorities are of the opinion that the Sankhya system is as old as the Upanishads themselves. There is a reference to Kapila, the founder of Sankhya system, in the Svetasvatara Upanishad. There is a close relation between the Sankhya and the Yoga systems, though the former is atheistic and the latter theistic.

The Sankhya system postulates the purusha. But purusha cannot be equated with the concept of the self (atma) since it remains external to everything and cannot, therefore, stand for the subject of experience. Nor can mahat or buddhi be equated with the self. Though it is an aid in the process of knowing, it is non-sentient (jada) as it is derived from prakriti. Therefore experience cannot be ascribed to it. According to the system the purusha and the buddhi together serve as the subject of experience, while the buddhi is involved in the activity of knowing, the purusha is the element of awareness (chaitanya). Though physical, the buddhi can reflect the purusha. Illumined by purusha, the buddhi serves as the conscious subject. Thus while the purusha is the transcendental self, by uniting with the physical medium the buddhi, it forms the empirical self.

By evolution, the prakriti, forms the eleven indriyas (including manas) and ahamkara and buddhi. It is these thirteen factors which assist the individual to acquire experience. They constitute the psychic apparatus with which the purusha is endowed in the empirical state. Though they are all the products of the prakriti (primordial matter), they are psychic in the sense that they lend themselves to be illumined by the purusha unlike the other evolutes. Thus the psychic apparatus mediates between the purusha and the external world and thus enables the purusha to have experience (bhoga) and later, the final freedom (apavarga) through right knowledge.

Experience arises when the object first impresses one or the other of the senses. Next the ahamkara appropriates the experience to the self. If this perception is to lead to any action, the buddhi intervenes, decides on the course of action and issues messages to the proper motor organ (karmendriya). As a result the organism acts or desists from action.

In internal perception, the process is the same except that the external senses (jnanendriya) are not involved.

When the buddhi is purified by continuous self-discipline, the common deficiencies of knowledge are overcome and we arrive at true knowledge, and liberation is attained. As noted above, according to the Sankhya system, neither buddhi by itself nor the purusha by himself can be the conscious subject. Experience is possible when the two are together. True knowledge (viveka) arises when it is realized that there are these two factors. The failure to notice these two factors gives rise to experience. In other words, experience is due to aviveka, non-discrimination of the two factors of buddhi and purusha involved. It leads to a confusion between the two; the characteristics of each are ascribed to the other. This leads to the wrong conclusion that buddhi is the knowing factor and the purusha is responsible for action. The aim of life is the removal of this error and the attainment of liberation (mukti) through viveka, through the realization of the difference between buddhi and purusha.

The extracts are based on the translation by Suryanarayana Sastri of *Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna*. . . (University of Madras 1930). For some Karikas Ganganath Jha's translation of Vachaspati Misra's *Tattva Kaumudi* is given (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1965).

I. From torment by three-fold misery (arises) the inquiry into the means of terminating it.

Bhashya. The three kinds of pain are (i) the intrinsic (Adhyatmika), (ii) the extrinsic (Adhibhoutika) and (iii) the divine or superhuman (Adhidaivika). Of these the intrinsic is twofold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm, and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are twofold: extrinsic and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts etc. and inanimate things and the superhuman are all due to the evil influence of

planets etc. (Jha).

III. Primal Nature (mula Prakruti) is not an evolute; the seven, beginning with the Great One (the intellect) are both evolvents and evolutes; the sixteen (the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind, and the five gross elements) are evolutes only; the spirit (purusha) is neither evolvent nor evolute.

The swollen state that precedes sprouting is known as mahat, the Great One, otherwise known as buddhi the intellect. From that comes the sprout, ahamkara, individuation (consciousness), which in turn produces in one aspect the subtle elements and in the other the organs of cognition and action. These organs do not themselves produce any further mode of being. Hence those eleven (the five organs of sense, the five of action and the mind) are only evolutes. Of the subtle elements, on the contrary, each produces its appropriate gross element; thus sound produces the ether, touch produces the air, taste produces water, sight produces fire, and smell produces the earth. The gross elements themselves do not produce anything in their turn. These five, therefore, together with the eleven organs constitute the sixteen bare evolutes. Mahat, ahamkara, and the tanmatras (the five subtle elements) are the seven categories which are both evolvent and evolute. The spirit (Purusha) is unchanged and causes nothing.

VII. (Non-perception may be) because of extreme distance, (extreme) proximity, injury to the organs, non-steadiness of the mind (or absence of mind), subtlety, veiling, suppression, and blending with what is similar.

XI. The evolved is (composed) of the three constituents, non-discriminated, objective, general, non-intelligent and productive; so is the unevolved (pradhanam, prakruti); the spirit (purusha), though similar, is (yet) the reverse of these.

Bhashya. The three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion belong to the Prakruti and not to the Purusha (the self).

This is why though there are points of similarity (between Prakruti and Purusha) such as being 'without a cause' and the rest, yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of being devoid of the three attributes and the rest (Jha).

XII. The constituents are of the nature of pleasure (sukha), pain (dukha) and delusion (moha); they serve to illumine, to actuate and to restrain; each of these functions through suppression, co-operation, transformation and intimate intercourse with and by the rest.

Bhashya. Priti being pleasure, the sattva attribute is of the nature of

pleasure. Apriti being pain, the rajas attribute is of the nature of pain. Lastly, vishada being delusion, the tamas attribute is of the nature of delusion.

Pleasure and pain are not mere negations of one another; on the contrary, they are positive entities. . . The idea of pleasure, pain and delusion being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, is vouched for by common experience. If they were mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other.

Having thus described the nature of the attributes, the author next describes their several functions; "they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint." The rajas-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant sattva-attribute to action if it were not restrained by the sluggish tamas-attribute; . . . Thus the tamas-attribute becomes a restraining force.

The author next proceeds to describe the method of their operation—"They are mutually subjugative and supporting and productive and co-operative."

The attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other, e.g., the sattva attribute attains its calm state only after having subdued the rajas and tamas attributes. Similarly, the rajas attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the sattva and tamas attributes; and the tamas attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the sattva and rajas attributes.

They are mutually supportive. Sattva attribute by itself, without the help of rajas, would remain inert, and never be moved to action. Similarly rajas attribute helps the other two by its activity. Tamas attribute helps the other two by its restraint. (Jha).

XIII. Sattva is considered to be buoyant and bright, rajas to be stimulating and mobile; tamas alone is heavy and enveloping; their functioning for the goal (of the Spirit) is like (the action of) a lamp.

Bhashya. The sattva attribute is buoyant (laghu) as opposed to the sluggishness (guru) of tamas. . . Thus generally buoyance may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments; sluggishness, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient.

Sattva and tamas, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects: the driving force is supplied by rajas. . . Thus rajas is necessary for all activity. . . while tamas is the restrainer. . . the cause

of pleasure is the attribute of *sattva*, the essence of which is pleasure; the cause of pain is the attribute of *rajas*, the essence of which is desire; and lastly, the cause of delusion (*moha*) is the attribute of *tamas*, the essence of which is delusion.

Pleasure, illuminativeness and buoyancy are the properties attributed to *sattva*; pain, mobility and activity are the properties of *rajas*; delusion, sluggishness and envelopment are the properties of *tamas* (Jha).

XVII. Spirit (*purusha*, self) exists (as distinct from matter), since collocations serve a purpose of some (being) other than themselves, since this other must be the reverse of (what is composed of) the three constituents and so on, since there must be control (of the collocations), since there must be an enjoyer, and since there is activity for the purpose of release (from three-fold misery).

Bhashya. The *purusha* must be there, apart from the Unmanifest (Nature) because (a) all composite objects are for another's use; (b) because there must be absence of the three attributes (pleasure - *sattva*, pain - *rajas*, delusion - (*tamas*), . . . There must be something which is not composite, and this is *purusha*; (c) because there must be control, like the chariot which is controlled by the charioteer and this controller must be beyond the three attributes and independent, (d) because there must be someone to experience the objects of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively and (e) because there is tendency towards Isolation (*Kaivalya*), the final cessation of the three kinds of pain. (Jha)

XIX. And from the contrast with that (which is composed of the three constituents, etc.) there follows for the Spirit, the character of being a witness, freedom (from misery), neutrality, percipience and non-agency.

Bhashya. Since the *purusha* has the property of being without the three attributes and since he is sentient and nonobjective he has the character of being a 'witness' and a 'seer'. . . nature exhibits its creations before the *purusha*, which latter, therefore, becomes the witness and the seer. The *purusha* is without pleasure, pain or delusion. Devoid of both pleasure and pain the *purusha* is neutral, indifferent (*udasina*). As the *purusha* is non-productive he is inactive.

Objection: Sentience and activity are coexistent in the same person. And this goes against the Sankhya tenets which make the 'sentient' being 'inactive' and the 'active' agent 'insentient' (Jha)

XX. Hence, from their association, the non-intelligent *linga* (com-

prising the intellect, individuation, etc.) becomes intelligent, as it were.

The present verse seeks to explain the common appearance of the union of intelligence (sentience) and activity in a single entity. The union cannot but be illusory, since the two belong to distinct entities, Purusha and Prakruti. The illusory appearance is due to the association of the two. Such association is, of course, not a conjunction or intermingling of parts, the Spirit being impartible; it consists in the presence of the Spirit and the presentation of nature to spirit.

Bhashya. Answer: The sense is that in as much as 'sentience' and 'activity' have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. . . The cause of the mistake is said to be the 'union' i.e., proximity of the purusha with the 'evolute'. (Jha)

But if Spirit and Nature thus come together, it must be for the realisation of some purpose common to one or both of them. How this happens is stated in the next verse.

XXI. The association of the two, which is like that of the lame man and the blind one, is for the purpose of Primal Nature being contemplated (as much) by the Spirit, and for the release of the Spirit (from three-fold misery); from this (association) creation proceeds.

Bhashya. Nature is an object, something to be enjoyed. This enjoyability, however, is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes needed by nature.

The Purusha, while in union with the 'enjoyable' nature, believes the three kinds of pain—the constituents of nature—to be his own, 'Isolation' (kaivalya) is dependent upon due discrimination between the Purusha and the three attributes; this discrimination is not possible without the nature (and its evolutes in the shape of buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge of any kind is possible). Thus it is clear that for his own 'Isolation' the purusha needs prakruti.

It is from this union or association that evolution proceeds. The said union (of purusha with prakruti) cannot by itself suffice either for 'enjoyment' or 'Isolation' if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the union itself brings about the evolution for the sake of 'enjoyment' and 'Isolation.'

The process of evolution is now explained. (Jha)

XXII. From Primal Nature (Prakruti) proceeds the Great One (buddhi—intellect), thence individuation (ahamkara), thence the aggregate of the sixteen, and from five out of these sixteen, the five gross elements.

The sixteen comprise the eleven indriyas (i.e., the five organs of cognition, the five of action, and the mind), and the five subtle elements (tanmatras). These subtle elements, in turn, produce the gross elements.

XXIII. Buddhi (Intellect) is determinative. Virtue, wisdom, non-attachment, the possession of lordly powers constitute its sattvic form (i.e., its form when the constituent sattva, goodness, predominates); the reverse of these are of its tamasik form (i.e., of its nature, when tamas, darkness, preponderates).

The faculty that resolves upon a course of action is the buddhi-intellect. This it does, not in the light of its own intelligence, for it has none, but because of the proximity of intelligence, i.e., Spirit. In its sattvic form, virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and power characterise it.

Virtue is that which leads to success in the world or prosperity hereafter. Wisdom is the discriminative knowledge of the spirit, purusha as other than the intellects, buddhi. Non-attachment is of various grades. It may be at the rudimentary level of willing to control all desires or it may have advanced to the stage where some at least are controlled, while others yet distract the mind and delude the senses. A third stage is when the senses are controlled, but the mind alone continues to long for this or that. When desire completely ceases for the things whether of this world or of the next, then non-attachment is perfect.

XXIV. Individuation (ahankara) is self-consciousness. Therefrom, creation proceeds in two ways, as the eleven-fold aggregate, and as the five-fold subtle elements.

Self-consciousness of the form "I exist", "I know", "I have this or that duty to perform or abstain from", etc., precedes determination and is the ground on which determination is based.

XXV. From that form of individuation (which is known as) Vaikṛta (and is) characterised by sattva (goodness) the eleven-fold aggregate proceeds; the subtle elements from (that form known as) bhūtādī; it is of the nature of tamas (darkness); both (proceed) from (that form of individuation known as) tajasa.

Though individuation is a single principle, it gives rise to different kinds of evolutes, according to the domination of sattva or tamas. There is a certain degree of dominance of rajas in either case, as there can be no activity otherwise. Once the activity is thus originated, the form of the evolute is dependent on the dominant constituent. When sattva predominates the eleven organs appear; the subtle elements (tanmatras)

when *tamas* predominates. It must not be thought that the constituent *rajas* has no function, since no specific result follows from its dominance; for, it is the root of the origination of the *sattvik* and *tamasik* evolutes. If *sattva* and *tamas* are the material causes of these evolutes, *rajas* is their efficient cause.

XXVI. Eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin are called organs of cognition; voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation are said to be the organs of action.

XXVII. Among these, the mind is of the nature of both (organs, cognitive and active); it is explicative; it is also an *indriya* because of community of nature (with other *indriyas*); from specific modifications of the constituents proceeds diversity, (as do) differences of external form.

Note. The mind (*manas*) is an organ both of cognition and action, as seen from its function. *Samkalpa* has been differently understood by the commentators Gaudapada and Vachaspati Misra. The former takes it that the mind intends the functioning of both sets of organs, that this intention is *samkalpa* and that thus the mind has a function common to both sets of organs. Vachaspati's interpretation is more interesting.

He contends that the senses of cognition of themselves apprehend objects vaguely and indefinitely. This apprehension is called *alochana* or *nirvikalpaka pratyaksha*. The mind supervenes on this, analyses it, explicates what is implied, distinguishes between substance and attribute, the *that* and the *what*, and makes clear what was before vague. This is also perception.

XXVIII. Bare awareness in respect of sound, etc., is acknowledged to be the function of the five (organs of cognition), while of the five (organs of action, the functions are) speech, grasping, motion, excretion and sexual enjoyment.

XXIX. What is definitive (of each) of the three, is the function (of each); this is not common (to all); the (circulation of the) five vital airs, i.e., *prana* and the rest, is the common function of the (internal) organs.

The distinctive functions are determination (for the *buddhi*), self-consciousness (for *ahamkara*), and explication (for the *manas*). The common functions are the circulation of the five forms of vital air—*prana*, *apana*, *undana*, *smana*, and *vyana*. They exist when the internal organs exist, and when these cease to be, they also cease to be.

XXX. In the case of what is present to perception, the functioning of the four (the three internal organs and an organ of the outer sense) is said to be either simultaneous or successive; so, too, in the case of what is not present to perception, (where) the functioning of the three (inter-

nal organs) is preceded by that (viz., cognition of what is present to perception).

An example of simultaneous functioning is the recognition of a tiger or cobra revealed by a flash of lightning and the instantaneous flight consequent thereon. The stages of the indeterminate perception, the explication thereof, the reference of it to the self and the determination to act in any way may be analysed by reflective thought at a later stage, but the situation itself seems to be simple and instantaneous. The frightened man clears off at one bound.

XXXI. (The organs, external and internal) discharge their respective functions, prompted by mutual impulsion; the goal of the spirit is alone the cause; by nothing else is any instrument actuated.

XXXII. Instruments are of thirteen varieties, they function by grasping, sustaining and disclosing; their objects (which are of the nature of) what is grasped, sustained or disclosed are ten-fold.

The thirteen instruments are the ten external and the three internal organs.

XXXIII. The internal organ is of three kinds; the external (organs) which make known objects to (those) three, are ten-fold; the external (organ functions) in the present; an internal organ (functions in respect of all) three times, (past, present and the future).

XXXIV. Of these, the five organs of cognition have objects, specific and non-specific (i.e., gross and subtle); speech has sound (alone) for its object; as for the rest (of the organs of action), they have the five for their objects.

XXXV. For the reason that the intellect as allied to the (other) internal organs ascertain (the nature of) objects (of sense), the internal organs are the principal (ones), while the rest (of the organs) are the entrances (thereto).

XXXVI. (The external organs, the mansas and the ahamkara) these mutually distinct specifications of the (three) constituents, comparable (in their functioning) to a lamp, disclosing the goal of the spirit in its entirety, present it to the Intellect (buddhi).

XXXVII. (The material worked up by the other organs is presented to the intellect) for the reason that the intellect brings about the enjoyment of the spirit in respect of all (things) and it is that (intellect) itself, which further, reveals the subtle difference between Primal Nature and Spirit.

XLIII. The primary dispositions are innate; the acquired ones, like virtue and the rest, are seen to be dependent on the instruments (i.e.,

intellect, etc.); (while) the embryo and the rest are dependent on the effected (i.e., the body).

XLV. Through virtue (comes about) departure upwards, and through vice departure down below; through wisdom is release (acquired), and bondage through ignorance. From non-attachment (results) merger in Primal Nature, migration from passionate attachment; from power (comes about) non-obstruction, and the opposite thereof, from the contrary.

LVIII. Just as (in) the world (one) undertakes action in order to be rid of desire (by satisfying it), even so does the unevolved function for the release of the Spirit.

LIX. As a dancer desists from dancing, having exhibited herself to the audience, so does Primal Nature desist, having exhibited herself to the Spirit.

The goal of the Spirit may explain evolution, but not the cessation thereof. The present verse tells us why at a certain stage the course of evolution seems to cease for the Spirit. If it did not cease, but continued to be perceived by the Spirit, there would be no release. When Nature has been realised to be different from Spirit, when discriminative knowledge has been attained, there is nothing else to prompt Nature to evolve. Its purpose has been fulfilled like that of the *danseuse* who has exhibited her dancing; hence it desists from further activity.

LXIII. Primal Nature binds herself by herself through the seven forms (i.e., dispositions); she herself through one form (i.e., disposition) releases herself for the benefit of the Spirit.

Bondage and release are effected with the help of the dispositions—virtue and vice, wisdom and ignorance, non-attachment and attachment, power and its reverse. Of these, the seven excluding wisdom serve to bind; wisdom releases. It will be noted that while the verse seems to imply that the dispositions are means external to Prakruti wherewith she binds herself, they, in fact, are themselves evolutes of Prakruti. They are products of the very process of evolution, which results in bondage and later in release.

LXIV. Thus, from the repeated study of the truth, there results that wisdom “I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not” which leaves no residue (to be known), is pure, being free from ignorance, and is absolute.

This discriminative wisdom leaves nothing else to be known; hence it is residueless (*aparishesha*). It is pure, since it is free from ignorance, whether in the form of doubt or error.

The three forms of this negative knowledge are thus explained: “I do

not exist” means “I do not act”, all functions like perception, self-consciousness, determination and so on being functions of Nature; or it may mean “I exist as the Spirit, and as the evolving principle”. “I am not” means “I am not the agent”, since activity does not belong to the spirit. Agency being denied there cannot be possession either; hence the statement “naught is mine”.

LXV. Thereby does the pure Spirit, resting like a spectator, perceive Primal Nature which has ceased to be productive, and, because of the power of discriminative knowledge, has turned back from the seven forms (dispositions).

The productivity of Nature had but two objects—enjoyment by purusha and his final release. These having been accomplished, she ceases to be productive. And since discriminative wisdom is opposed to virtue, vice, ignorance and so on, these cease to be, as such, and get merged in the unevolved. But nature does not cease to exist. It continues to be perceived. Spirit is not affected by intellect in so far as it is constituted of rajas and tamas; but through intellect that is sattvik, nature continues to be perceived. This reconciled the perception of nature with the purity and inactivity of spirit.

LXVII. Virtue and the rest having ceased to function as causes, because of the attainment of perfect wisdom, (the spirit) remains invested with the body, because of the force of past impression, like the whirl of the (potter's) wheel (which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse).

Though discriminative wisdom is reached, the body continues to exist and in that condition nature continues to be perceived through intellect that is sattvik. If, thus, final release is delayed even after the acquisition of wisdom, what is the value of the latter?

The moment wisdom supervenes, all the seeds of karma become incapable of sprouting, for, the ground is rendered barren, deprived of all moisture of the nature of ignorance. Yet the body continues for a time, because of the force of past impressions, as the potter's wheel continues to whirl for a time with the original momentum, even after the potter has ceased to make it go round. These past impressions are of prior karma which has begun to take effect. Wisdom has the capacity to destroy all karma except that which has begun to take effect, and when this too is worked out by enjoyment, release comes.

LXVIII. Primal Nature, her object accomplished, ceasing to be active, (the spirit) on obtaining separation from the body, attains release (which is) both certain and final.

Chapter 7

Patanjali's Yoga Sutras

Patanjali, the author of the Yoga Sutras, lived in the third century A.D. Vyasa who wrote the commentary on the Yoga Sutras lived around 500 A.D.

The distinguishing feature of the yoga system is that it is practical in its orientation. It gives instruction in self-development, mind-control, concentration and efficiency. Its focus is on *chitta vrtti* the mental processes and the possibility of restraining their function so that the *chitta* becomes deliberate and efficient, and is free from unconscious impulsions. The book is a manual of practical instruction.

Patanjali speaks of five kinds of functions: cognition (*pramana*), illusion (*viparyaya*), imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidra*) and memory (*smriti*). Thus according to the yoga system sleep is a positive mental condition, a state of repose when the organism is not stimulated by external presentations, nor by imaginative constructions like the dreams. It is comparatively contentless, but it is positive since on waking from sleep one recollects whether one slept well or poorly.

Mental activities are influenced by the impressions (*samskaras*) left behind by the earlier mental activities. These *samskaras* are not mere passive memory traces but dynamic processes influencing mental activities, though sub-conscious. They constitute the unconscious according to yoga system.

Mental activities are of two types: afflicted by impressions and predisposition (*klista*) and unafflicted (*aklista*). The mental activities of an ordinary person are unafflicted, caught up in the worldly meshes. While those of a highly developed person are *aklista*, unafflicted. The five obstacles enumerated by Patanjali are: ignorance (*avidya*), egoism (*asmita*), attachment (*raga*), aversion (*dvesa*) and will-to-live (*abhini-vesa*). Ignorance relates to absence of true knowledge. *Asmita*, the feeling of personality, arises when there is failure to distinguish the self from the thinking-substance, when the self is identified with the desires and the body. It is the identification of the *purusha* with the senses, emotions, feelings and the mind. The next two are concerned with excessive attachments and aversions. Finally there is the will or the

urge to live, the clinging to life and the fear of danger and death. These obstacles overpower a person and mislead him from a life of self-discipline and self-actualization. So the aim of an individual should be to become free from these afflictions. It is the operation of these afflictions that lead to restlessness, infatuation and distraction. It is by the cultivation of concentration (*ekagra*) and restraint (*niruddha*) that a person can overcome these obstacles.

Precise and minute instructions are given to build up stability and tranquility, by practice (*abhyasa*) and detachment (*vairagya*). Restraint of ceaseless mental activities can be obtained by practice, that is, by repeated effort and exertion, cultivated for a long time without interruption, and by passionlessness (*vairagya*), by ridding oneself of the thirst for objects—sex, food, drink, power, wealth etc. Such a detachment arises when one discerns the inadequateness of all these objects of desire.

Patanjali has formulated eight exercises or practices to overcome the afflictions. These are known as the eight limbs (*astanga*) of the yoga system. Of these the first four are the means to deal with the problems of everyday life, the control of the body and the senses; and the last four are exercises in meditation of *samadhi*. The first two are *yama*—abstention from harm (*ahimsa*), from falsehood, from theft, from incontinence (*brahmacharya*) and from acceptance of gifts, and *niyama*—cleanliness—both outer, bodily and inner, mental, contentment, discipline (*tapas*), study and resignation to God. Thus the first two stages involve the development of high standard of ethical life and study to prepare oneself for self-actualization. Mental conflict cannot be overcome unless a life of discipline is developed, mental health is grounded on the physical and mental cleanliness.

The third and fourth stages relate to the cultivation of an easy and steady bodily position (*asana*) and regulation and control of breath (*pranayama*).

The fifth stage consists in withdrawal (*pratyahara*) of the sense-functions from their normal outward orientation and directing the mental energy inwards.

The last three stages pertain to *samadhi*. The sixth stage is the attainment of fixed attention (*dharma*) so that the mind does not wander about but is bound to the object of meditation. The aim is to focus the mind on one object free from distraction. The seventh stage is contemplation (*dhyana*) so that it is continuously focused on the object. The advanced state of this contemplation is *samadhi*, when the conscious-

ness is free and tranquil.

The mind has two inherent tendencies, dispersiveness and one-pointedness. The aim of meditation is to overcome the tendency of dispersiveness, fluctuations and to cultivate one-pointedness (*ekagra*) which ultimately leads to *samadhi*, when one attains mastery over the three *gunas* and all mental processes (*chitta vrttis*) are transcended. Incidentally this attainment leads to the *siddhis*, the occult powers, such as the control of pulse, heart-beat, telepathy, levitation etc. Patanjali frequently warns the student that these *siddhis* or occult powers are a definite hindrance to the attainment of liberation (*kaivalya*). The aim of the whole training is not the attainment of *siddhis* but the attainment of liberation.

The extracts of the sutras and the commentary by Vyasa are from the translation by J.H Woods, *The Yoga System of Patanjali* (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 17, Harvard University Press, 1914).

PATANJALI'S YOGA SUTRAS AND VYASA'S YOGA-BHASYA

I. Concentration (*Samadhi Pada*)

1. *Now the exposition of yoga (is to be made).* (To give a provisional definition:) *yoga* is concentration (*samadhi*); but this is a quality of the mind (*chitta*) which belongs to all the stages. The stages of the mind-stuff are these: the restless (*kshipta*), the infatuated (*mudha*), the distracted (*vikshipta*), the single-in-intent (*ekagra*), and the restricted (*niruddha*). Of these (stages the first two have nothing to do with *yoga* and even in the distracted state of the mind (its) concentration is (at times) overpowered by (opposite) distractions and (consequently) it cannot properly be called *yoga*. But that (state) which, when the mind is single-in-intent, fully illumines a distinct and real object and causes the hindrances (*klesha*) to dwindle, slackens the bonds of *karma*, and sets before it as a goal the restriction (of all fluctuations—*chitta-vritti*), is called the *yoga* in which there is consciousness of an object (*samprajnata*). This (conscious *yoga*), however, is accompanied by deliberation (upon coarse objects), by reflection (upon subtle objects), by joy, by the feeling-of-personality (*asmita*). This we shall set forth later. But when there is restriction of all the fluctuations (*vrtti*) (of the mind-stuff), there is the concentration in which there is no consciousness (of an object).

2. *Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff.* Now mind-stuff has three aspects (*guna*), as appears from the fact that it has a disposition to vividness (*prakhya*), to activity (*pravrtti*) and to inertia (*sthiiti*). For the mind-stuff's (aspect) *sattva*, which is vividness, when commingled with *rajas* and *tamas*, acquires a fondness for supremacy and for objects-of-sense; while the very same (constituent-aspect, *sattva*,) when pervaded with *tamas*, tends towards demerit and non-perception and passionateness and towards a failure of (its own rightful) supremacy; (and) the very same (*sattva*),—when the covering of error has dwindled away,—illuminated now in its totality, but finally pervaded by *rajas*, tends towards merit and knowledge and passionlessness and (its own rightful) supremacy; (and) the very same (*sattva*),— the stains of the last vestige of *rajas* once removed,—grounded in itself and being nothing but the discernment (*khyati*) of the difference between the *sattva* and the Self (*purusha*), tends towards the Contemplation of the Rain-cloud of (knowable) Things. The designation given by contemplators (*dhyayin*) to this (kind of mind-stuff) is the highest Elevation (*prasamkhyana*). For the Energy of Intellect (*citi-sakti*) is immutable and does not unite (with objects); it has objects shown to it and is undefiled (by constituent-aspects) and is unending. Whereas this discriminate discernment (*vivekakhyati*), whose essence is *sattva*, is (therefore) contrary to this (energy of Intellect and is therefore to be rejected). Hence the mind-stuff being disgusted with this (discriminative discernment) restricts even this Insight. When it has reached this state, (the mind-stuff), (after the restriction of the fluctuations) passes over to subliminal impressions (*samskara*). This is the (so-called) seedless concentration. In this state nothing becomes an object of consciousness: such is concentration not conscious (of objects). Accordingly the yoga (which we have defined as) the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff is two-fold.

The mind being in this (unconscious) state, what will then be the condition of the Self? For it is the essence (atman) (of the Self to receive) knowledge (*bodha*) (reflected upon it) by the thinking-substance (*buddhi*), (as this in its turn receives the impression of external objects, and in this case) there is a (total) absence of objects (in the thinking-substance).

3. *Then the Seer (that is, the Self,) abides in himself.* At that time the Energy of Intellect is grounded in its own self, as (it is) when in the state of Isolation (*kaivalya*). But when the mind-stuff is in its emergent state, (the Energy of Intellect) although really the same, (does) not

(seem) so.

4. *At other times it (the Self) takes the same form as the fluctuations (of mind-stuff).* In the emergent state (of the subliminal-impressions), the Self has fluctuations which are not distinguished from fluctuations of the mind-stuff; . . . The mind-stuff is like a magnet: and, as an object suitable to be seen (by the Self as Witness), it gives its aid (to the Self) by the mere fact of being near it, and thus the relation between it and the Self is that between property (*svam*) and proprietor (*svamin*). Hence the reason why the Self-experiences (*bodha*) the fluctuations of the mind-stuff is its beginning-less correlation (with the thinking-substance).

5. *The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or unhindered.* The hindered (*klisha*) are those which are caused by the hindrances (*klesha*) (undifferentiated-consciousness, etc., see II. 3) and are the field for growth of the accumulation of the latent-deposit of *karma*; the unhindered have discriminative discernment as their object and thus obstruct the task (*adhikara*) of the aspects (*guna*). These corresponding subliminal-impressions are produced by nought else than (these) fluctuations, and fluctuations (are made) by subliminal-impressions. In this wise, the wheel of fluctuations and subliminal impressions ceaselessly rolls on (until the highest concentration is attained). Operating in this wise, this mind-stuff, having finished its task, abides in its own likeness, or (rather) becomes resolved (into primary substance) — These, either hindered or unhindered, are the five-fold fluctuations (*vruttis*). (They are:).

6. Sources-of-valid-ideas (*pramana*), misconceptions (*viparyaya*), predicate-relations (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidra*) and memory (*smruti*).

7. Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication.

8. Misconception (*virargaya*) is an erroneous idea (*jnana*) not based on that form (in respect of which the misconception is entertained).

9. The predicate-relation (*vikalpa*) is without any (corresponding perceptible) object and follows as a result of perceptions or of words.

10. Sleep is a fluctuation (of mind-stuff) supported by the cause (*pratyaya*, that is *tamas*) of the (transient) negation (of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations).

And this (fluctuation) by (the operation of) connecting-memory becomes, upon awakening, a special kind of presented-idea (*pratyaya*). How is it that one can reflect: 'I have slept well, my mind is calm, it makes my understanding clear'; 'I have slept poorly, my mind is dull,

it wanders unsteadfast'; 'I have slept in deep stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed (*klanta*) and languid and as it were stolen (from my grasp)?' (The answer is:) the man (just after) awakening would of course not have this connecting-memory, had there not been (during sleep, some) experience of (this form) of a cause (*pratyaya*, that is *tamas*); nor would he have the memories based upon it and corresponding with it (at the time of waking). Therefore sleep is a particular kind of presented-idea (*pratyaya*); and in concentration (*samadhi*) it also, like any other presented-idea, must be restricted.

11. *Memory (smṛiti) is not-adding-surreptitiously (asampramosa) to a once experienced object.* Does the mind-stuff remember the presented-idea or does it (remember) the object? The presented-idea, if affected by the object-known (*grahya*), shines-forth-in-consciousness (*nirbhasa*) in a form of both kinds, both of the object-known and of the process-of-knowing (*grahana*), and gives a start to the corresponding subliminal-impression (*samskara*). This subliminal-impression (of these two kinds changes into) its phenomenal (form) by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomenalize (*vyajaka*) it (that is to say, the subliminal-impression), and brings forth in its turn a memory which (also) consists of the object known and of the process-of-knowing. With regard to these two,—in the case of the idea (*buddhi*), the form of the process-of-knowing is predominant; and in the case of memory, the form of the object-known is predominant. The latter (that is, memory) is of two kinds, in that the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined (*bhāvita*) or not imagined. In a dream the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined, whereas in waking the-things-to-be-remembered are not imagined. All memories arise out of an experience either of sources-of-valid-ideas or of misconceptions or of predicate-relations or of sleep or of memory. And all these fluctuations have as their being pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*dukha*) and infatuation (*moha*); and pleasure and pain and infatuation are to be explained among the hindrances (*klesha*) (II.3-9): "Desire is that which dwells upon pleasure" (II.7); "Aversion is that which dwells upon pain" (II.8); while undifferentiated-consciousness is the same as infatuation. All these fluctuations (*vṛttis*) must be restricted. Because it is (only) upon their restriction (*nirodha*) that there ensues concentration (*samadhi*) whether conscious (*samprajñata*) or not conscious (*asamprajñata*) (of objects).

12. *The restriction of them is by (means of) practice and passionlessness (abhyasa-vairagyam).* The so-called river of mind-stuff, whose flow is in both directions, flows towards good and flows towards evil.

Now when it is borne onward to Isolation (*kaivalya*), downward towards discrimination, then it is flowing unto good; when it is borne onward to the whirlpool-of-existence (*samsara*), downward towards non-discrimination, then it is flowing unto evil. In these cases the stream towards objects is dammed by passionlessness, and the stream towards discrimination has its flood-gate opened by practice in discriminatory knowledge. Thus it appears that the restriction of the mind-stuff is dependent (for its accomplishment) upon means of both kinds (practice and passionlessness).

13. Practice (*abhyasa*) is (repeated) exertion to the end that (the mind-stuff) shall have permanence in this (restricted state).

14. But this (practice) becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention.

15. Passionlessness (*vairagyam*) is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects.

The mind-stuff (*chitta*), — if it be rid of thirst for objects that are seen, such as women, or food and drink, or power, — if it be rid of thirst for the objects revealed (in the Vedas), such as the attainment of heaven or of the discarnate state. . . (if it is) aware of the inadequateness of objects,—(then the mind-stuff) will have a consciousness of being master, (a consciousness) which is essentially the absence of immediate experience, (*abhoga*) (and) has nothing to be rejected or received (and that consciousness is) passionlessness.

16. This (passionlessness) is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirstlessness for qualities (and not merely for objects).

17. (Concentration becomes) conscious (of its object) (*samprajnata*) by assuming forms either of deliberation (upon coarse objects) or of reflection (upon subtile objects) or of joy or of the sense of personality.

Deliberation (*vitarka*) is the mind-stuff's coarse direct-experience (*abhoga*) when directed to its supporting (object). Reflection (*vichara*) is the subtile (direct-experience). Joy (*ananda*) is happiness. The sense-of-personality (*asmita*) is a feeling which pertains to one self (wherein the self and the personality are one). Of these (four) the first, (that is, deliberation-sa*vitarka* *samadhi*) which has all the four associated together is concentration deliberating (upon coarse objects). The second, (that is, reflection-sa*vichara*) which has deliberation (*vitarka*) subtracted (from it) is (concentration)reflecting (upon subtile objects). The third, (that is, joy,) which has reflection subtracted from it, is

(concentration) with (the feeling) of joy. The fourth, (that is, the sense-of-personality-asmita) which has this (joy) subtracted from it, is (concentration) which is the sense-of-personality and nothing more. All these kinds of concentrations (samadhyah) have an object upon which they rest (salambana).

18. *The other (concentration which is not conscious of objects-asamprajnata samadhi) consists of subliminal-impressions (samskara) only (after objects have merged), and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation (of fluctuations).* The concentration which is not conscious (of objects) is that restriction of the mind-stuff in which only subliminal-impressions (samskaras) are left and in which all fluctuations have come to rest. The higher passionlessness (vairagya) is a means for effecting this. For practice when directed towards any supporting-object is not capable of serving as an instrument to this (concentration not conscious of an object). . . Mind-stuff, when engaged in the practice of this (imperceptible object), seems as if it were itself non-existent and without any supporting-object. Thus (arises) that concentration (called) seedless, (without sensational stimulus), which is not conscious of objects.

20. *(Concentration not conscious of objects), which follows upon belief (and) energy (and) mindfulness (and) concentration (and) insight, is that to which the others (the yogins) attain.* (That concentration not conscious of objects, which is) caused by (spiritual) means is that to which yogins attain. Belief is the mental approval (of concentration); for, like a good mother, it protects the yogin. For him (thus) believing and setting discrimination (before him) as his goal there is the further attainment of energy. For him who has reached the further attainment of energy mindfulness is at hand. And when mindfulness is at hand the mind-stuff is self-possessed and becomes concentrated. When his mindstuff has become concentrated he gains as his portion the discrimination of insight, by which he perceives things as they really are. Through the practice of these means and through passionlessness directed to this end there (finally) arises that concentration which is not conscious (of any object).

28. *Repetition of it and reflection upon its meaning (should be made).* The repetition of Mystic Syllable (pranava), and reflection upon the Isvara who is signified by the Mystic Syllable. Then in the case of this yogin who thus repeats the Mystic Syllable and reflects upon its meaning, mind-stuff attains to singleness-of-intent.

What else comes to him?

29. *Thereafter comes the right-knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, and the removal of obstacles.* Whatever obstacles there be, disease and the rest, all these are removed by devotion to the Isvara, and (the yogin) comes to a sight of his own real self. He has the right knowledge which sees that as the Isvara is a Self and is undefiled and undisturbed (by hindrances) and isolated and exempt from accidents, so he also is a Self conscious (by reflection) of its thinking-substance. But what are these obstacles? Those which distract the mind-stuff. But what are these (that are distractive) and how many are they? (He replies).

30. *Sickness and languor and doubt and heedlessness and listlessness and worldliness (avirati) and erroneous perception and failure to attain any stage (of concentration) and instability in the state (when attained)—these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles.* There are nine obstacles for the distractions of the mind-stuff. These appear together with the fluctuations of the mind-stuff. And they are not found where the aforesaid fluctuations of mind-stuff are not. Sickness is a disorder in the humours (of the body) or in the secretions or in the organs. Languor is a lack of activity in the mind-stuff. Doubt is a kind of thinking which touches both alternatives of a dilemma, so that one thinks 'This might be so; might not be so.' Heedlessness is a lack of reflection upon the means of attaining concentration. Listlessness is a lack of effort due to heaviness of body or of mind-stuff. Worldliness is greed of the mind-stuff; and its essence lies in addiction to objects of sense. Erroneous perception is the thinking of misconceptions. Failure to attain any stage is not attaining any stage of concentration. Instability in the state (when attained) is the failure of the mind-stuff to remain in the stage attained. If the concentrated stage of development had been reached, (the mind-stuff) would, of course, have remained in it.—Thus it is that these distractions are called the nine blemishes of yoga (and) the nine foes of yoga (and) the obstacles of yoga.

31. *Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body and inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions (vikshepta).* Pain proceeding from self (Adhyatmika) (and) proceeding from living creatures (Adhibhoutika) and pain proceeding from the gods (Adhidaivika). Pain is that by which living beings are stricken down and for the destruction of which they struggle. Despondency is agitation of mind due to an impediment (to the fulfilment) of a desire. Unsteadiness of the body is that which makes it unsteady (and) makes it tremble. Inspiration is breathing which sips in the air which is outside. Expiration is that which makes abdominal air flow outwards.

These occur in one whose mind-stuff is distracted (vikshipta). These do not occur in one whose mind-stuff is concentrated (samahitacitta). Furthermore these distractions, the foes of concentration, are to be restricted by the same practice and passionlessness. Of these (two), in summing up, he describes the object to which the practice (applies).

32. *To check them (let there be) practice upon a single entity.* To check them let (the yogin) practice his mind-stuff by making it rest upon a single entity. . . If this (mind-stuff when single-in-intent) is withdrawn from all (objects) and concentrated upon one (entity) then it may be said to be single-in-intent (and) hence not limited to one object after another.

Of which (stable mind-stuff) this purification is enjoined by the system. By what means is this?

33. *By the cultivation of friendliness towards (those with) happiness and compassion towards (those with) pain and joy towards (those with) demerit and indifference towards (those with) demerit (the yogin should attain) the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff.* Of these (four) he should cultivate friendliness towards all living beings that have reached the experience of happiness; compassion towards those in pain; joy towards those whose character is meritorious; indifference towards those whose character is demeritorious. When he thus cultivates (friendliness and the rest) the white quality (of karma) comes into being (within him). And then the mind-stuff becomes calm; and when calm it becomes single-in-intent and reaches the stable state.

34. *Or (he gains stability) by expulsion and retention of breath.* Expulsion is the ejection of the abdominal air through the apertures of the nose by a special kind of effort. Retention is restraint of the breath.—(Or) by these two he should attain to a stability of the central-organ (manasah sthitim).

35. *Or (he gains stability when) a sense-activity (pravrtti) arises connected with an object (and) bringing the central-organ into a relation of stability.* Therefore (if) only for the sake of reinforcing books and inferences and the instruction of masters, some one particular thing must necessarily be made an object of perception. Then after a portion of the intended-object as taught by these (three means) has been made the object of perception, the whole, even unto such an exceeding subtle object as Release, is thoroughly believed. For precisely this purpose the purification of the mind-stuff is enjoined. If there are fluctuations unrestrained (as contrasted with this portion), then, when the Consciousness of being Master with regard to these has been

produced, (the mind-stuff) would be adequate to effect a perception of these various intended-objects. And this done, (the yogin) will without hindrance acquire belief (and) energy (and) mindfulness (and concentration) (I. 20).

36. Or an undistressed (and) luminous (sense-activity when arisen brings the central-organ into a relation of stability).

For (1) the sattva of the thinking-substance becomes resplendent and (all-pervasive) like the air (akasa). Thus (2) his mind-stuff comes to a state of balance with regard to the feeling-of-personality (asmita) and becomes waveless like the Great Sea (and) peaceful (and) infinite (and) the feeling-of-personality and nought beside. With regard to which it has been said "pondering upon this self which is a mere atom, one is conscious in the same way as when one is conscious to the extent that one says 'I am'. This undistressed sense-activity is of two kinds: 1. in connection with an object, and 2. the feeling-of-personality and nought beside; (and) is called luminous. By means of which the mind-stuff of the yogin gains the stable state.

37. Or the mind-stuff (reaches the stable state) by having as its object (a mind-stuff) freed from passion.

38. Or (the mind-stuff reaches the stable state) by having as the supporting-object a perception in dream or in sleep.

39. Or (the mind-stuff reaches the state) by contemplation upon any such an object as is desired.

Let (the yogin) contemplate whatever object he desires. Having reached stability there, the mind-stuff reaches the stable state elsewhere also.

40. His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude.

Now when the mind has reached stability, what is the balanced-state (samapatti) as such (svarupa) and as directed to an object? This is told (in the sutra):

41. (The mind-stuff) from which, as from a precious gem, fluctuations have dwindled away, is, with reference either to the knower or to the process-of-knowing or to the object-to-be-known, in the state of resting upon (one) of these (three) and in the state of being tinged by (one) of these (three), and (thus) is in the balanced-state.

Just as a crystal is tinged by the various colours of the different things next to which it lies and appears as having the form of the coloured (rupa) thing-next-to-which-it-lies (upasraya), so the mind-stuff is influenced by referring to the object-to-be-known and comes

into a state-of-balance with the object-to-be known and appears as having the form of the object-to-be-known as it is in itself. . .

Similarly, influenced by referring to the Self as knower it comes into a state-of-balance with the self as knower and appears as having the form of the Self as knower. Similarly, influenced by referring to a liberated Self it comes into a state-of-balance with the liberated Self and appears as having the form of the liberated Self.

43. When the memory is quite purified, (that balanced-state) which is, as it were, empty of itself and which brightens (into conscious knowledge) as the intended object and nothing more—is super-deliberative (*nirvitarka*).

That insight which, when the memory is quite purified from predicate; relations (in the form) of ideas either of inferences or of anything that has been heard, and from the conventional usage of words, is influenced by the thing in itself (*svarupa*) which is to be known; and which, after as it were in its form of insight throwing off itself, the essence of which is a process of knowing, become the thing-intended (*padartha*) and nothing more; (and becomes) as it were changed into the thing in itself which is to be known—this is the super-deliberative balanced-state (*nirvitarka*).

44. By this same (balanced-state) the reflective (*savichara*) and the super-reflective (*nirvichara*) (balanced-states) are explained as having subtle objects (*sukshma vishaya*).

46. These same (balanced-states) are the seeded concentration (*sabija samadhi*).

These four balanced-states have external (perceptible) things as their seed. Therefore the concentration is seeded. Of these four the deliberative and the super-deliberative refer to a coarse intended-object, the reflective and super-reflective to a subtle intended-object. Thus in four kinds, one after another, concentration has been enumerated.

47. When there is the clearness of the super-reflective (balanced-state, the yogin gains) internal undisturbed calm.

When freed from obscuration by impurity, the *sattva* of the thinking-substance, the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not overwhelmed by the *rajas* and *tamas*. This is the clearness. When this clearness arises in the super-reflective balanced-state, then the yogin gains the internal undisturbed calm, (that is to say) the vision by the flash (*sphuta*) of insight which does not pass successively through the serial order (of the usual processes of experience) and which has as its intended-object the thing as it really is.

And in this sense it has been said, "As the man who has climbed the crag sees those upon the plain below (*bhumistha*), so the man of insight who has risen to the undisturbed calm of insight, himself escaped from pain, beholds all creatures in their pain."

48. *In this (calm) the insight is truth-bearing (rtambhara).* In one whose mind-stuff is concentrated, the insight which arises in this (calm) receives the technical name of "truth-bearing (*rtambhara*)" And this is a (term) whose meaning is intelligible of itself: (this insight) bears truth and nothing else; in it there is not even a trace of misconception. And in this sense it has been said, "By the Sacred Word (and) by inference and by eagerness for practice in contemplation, in three ways he promotes his insight and gains the highest yoga."

When the yogin has gained concentrated insight, the subliminal-impression made by the insight is reproduced again and again.

50. *The subliminal-impression (samskara) produced by this (super-reflective balanced-state) is hostile to other subliminal-impressions.* The subliminal-impression arising from concentrated insight (*samadhi-prajna*) inhibits the latent-impression from the emergent subliminal-impression. After emergent subliminal-impressions have been repressed, the presented-ideas arising from them do not occur. When presented-ideas are restricted, concentration follows after. Then concentrated insight; after that, subliminal-impressions made from insight, thus latent-impression from subliminal-impressions are reproduced again and again. Thus first comes insight and then (follow) subliminal-impressions.

How is it that this excess of subliminal-impressions will not provide the mind-stuff (*citta*) with a task? (The answer is:) these subliminal-impressions made by the insight (*prajna*) do not provide the mind-stuff (*citta*) with a task since they cause the dwindling of the hindrances (*kleshas*). For they cause the mind-stuff to cease from its work. For the movement of the mind-stuff terminates at (the time of) discernment (*khyati*).

What further does he gain?

51. *When this (subliminal-impression) also is restricted, since all is restricted, (the yogin gains) seedless concentration (nirbija-samadhi).* This (seedless concentration) is counter not only to concentrated insight but is opposed even to subliminal-impressions made in insight. Why? Because the subliminal-impression produced by restriction inhibits the subliminal-impressions produced by concentration.

The existence of subliminal-impressions made by the mind-stuff in

restriction may be inferred from the experience of the lapse of time during which there is stability (*sthit*i) of the restriction. Together with the subliminal-impressions which arise out of the emergent and restricted concentrations and which are conducive to Isolation (*kaivalya*), the mind-stuff resolves itself into its own permanent primary-matter. Therefore these subliminal-impressions are counter to the mind-stuff's task and are not causes of its stability. Consequently, its task ended, together with the subliminal-impressions which are conducive to Isolation, the mind-stuff ceases (from its task). When it ceases, the Self abides in himself and is therefore called pure and liberated (*shuddha* and *mukta*).

Means of Attainment (*Sadhana Pada*)

It has been stated what the yoga is of one whose mind is concentrated (*samahita citta*). (This *sutra*) gives the start to the problem (which considers) how even one whose mind-stuff is emergent (*vyuthita citta*) may be concentrated (*yukta*) in concentration (*yoga*).

1. *Self-castigation (tapaha) and study and devotion to the Isvara are the Yoga of action (Kriya yoga)*. Yoga is not perfected in him who is not self-castigated (*tapasvi*). Impurity—which is variegated with sub-conscious-impressions (*vasana*), from time without beginning, coming from the hindrances and from karma,—and into which (the meshes of) the net of objects have (therefore) found entrance, is not reduced (*sambhedam apadyate*) except by (self-castigation). This is the use of self-castigation. And this (kind of self-castigation), not being inhibitory to the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff, is therefore deemed (by great sages) to be worthy of his (the yogin's) earnest attention. (Recitation) is the repetition of purifying formulae such as the Mystic Syllable (*pranava*) or the study of books on Liberation. (Devotion to the Isvara) is the offering up of all action to the Supreme Teacher or the renunciation of the fruit of (all) these (actions).

Now this yoga of action is—

2. *For the cultivation of concentration (samadhi) and for the attenuation of the hindrances (klesha nasha)*. For when the yoga of action is given earnest attention, it cultivates concentration; attenuates the hindrances to an extreme degree; (and) will make the hindrances, when they are extremely attenuated, disqualified for propagation, like seeds burned by the fire of Elevation (*prasamkhyana*). But the subtle insight (*sukshma prajna*), which is the discriminative discernment between the *sattva* (*prakruti*) and the Self, untouched by the hindrances because

they are so much attenuated, with its task finished, will be ready for inverse-propagation (*pratiprasava*).

Now what are these hindrances and how many are they?

3. *Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) and the feeling-of-personality (asmita) and passion (raga) and aversion (dvesha) and the will-to-live (abhinivesha) are the five hindrances (klesha)*. This means that the so-called hindrances are five misconceptions (*viparyaya*) (I.8)

4. *Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained*. Of these (five), undifferentiated-consciousness (*avidya*) is the field (or) propagative soil. The others are feeling-of-personality (*asmita*) and the rest (of the five hindrances). In four kinds of forms, the dormant (*prasupta*) and the attenuated (*tanu*) and the intercepted (*vicchinna*) and the sustained (*udara*).

1. Of these (four), what is the dormant state? It is the tendency (of the hindrances) which remain merely potential in the mind towards the condition of seed. The awakening of that (dormant hindrance) is coming of face-to-face with the (particular) object (which makes that dormant hindrance manifest). But for one who has (reached) Elevation (*prasamkhyana*), and whose hindrances have become burned seed, there is not that (awakening of the hindrances) even when he is brought face-to-face with the object (which manifests them). For out of what can burned seed germinate? For this reason the fortunate (*kushala*) man whose hindrances have dwindled away is said to be in his last body (*charamadeha*). In him only the burned state of the seeds, the fifth stage of the hindrances (is found), and not in other (persons). So although the hindrances are existent, the vitality (*samarthyā*) of the seed is said to be already burned. Accordingly, even when the object is face-to-face, there is no awakening of these (hindrances). Thus dormancy and the failure of the burned seed to propagate have been described.

2. Attenuation (*tanutva*) is now described. The hindrances, when overpowered (*upahata*) by the cultivation of their opposites, become attenuated.

3. When this is the case, (the other hindrances) intercept (the attenuated hindrances) repeatedly, and move forth actively again in this or that (unattenuated) form (*atmana*). In that case they are called intercepted (*vicchinna*). How is this? Since (for instance) when one is in love, no anger is felt, inasmuch as, when one is in love, anger does not actively move forth; and love, when felt in one direction, is by no

means unfelt towards another object. When Caitra is known to be in love with one woman, it is not assumed that he is out of love for other women. Rather, his love finds its fluctuation fixed in this direction, in other directions its fluctuation is yet to come. For this (third fluctuation) is for the moment both dormant and attenuated and intercepted.

4. That fluctuation which is fixed upon an object is sustained (udara). No one of all these (four) passes beyond the limits of the hindrances (and therefore all four are to be rejected).

If this is so, what is this hindrance that is intercepted (or) dormant (or) attenuated or sustained? The answer is now given. It is exactly true (that all hindrances are forms of undifferentiated-consciousness). But only when these (hindrances) are particularized, do they become intercepted and so on. For just as these stages cease when their opposites are cultivated, so they become manifest (abhivyakta) when (changed) into the phenomenal-form (anjana) by the operation of their phenomenalizing-conditions (vyanjaka).

So all those hindrances without exception are varieties of undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya). Why is this? Since, it is undifferentiated-consciousness and nothing else that pervades all (hindrances). Whatever (perceptible) object is given a form by the undifferentiated-consciousness, it is that (object) which is permeated by the hindrances. Whenever there is a misconceived idea, they become apperceived; and when undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) dwindles (kshina), they too dwindle away.

At this point undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) itself is described.

5. The recognition of the permanent (nitya), of the pure, of pleasure (sukha), and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not self is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya).

1. It is the recognition of the permanent in an impermanent effect, for example, that the earth should be perpetual, that the sky with the moon and stars should be perpetual, that celestial beings are deathless.

2. Likewise in the impure and highly repulsive body there has been the recognition of purity.

3. Similarly (Patanjali) described the recognition of pleasure in pain in the words, "By reason of the pains of mutations and of anguish and of subliminal-impressions and by reason of the opposition of fluctuations of the aspects (*guna*)—to the discriminating all is nothing but

pain" (II.15). Undifferentiated-consciousness is the recognition that there is pleasure in this (pain).

4. Likewise the recognition of a self in the not-self, either in external aids whether animate or inanimate, or in the body as the seat of outer experience, or in the central-organ (manas) which aids the Self,—this is the recognition of a self in the not-self. In this sense it has been said of this, "He who counts any existing thing, whether phenomenalized or unphenomenalized (primary matter); as himself; or who rejoices in the success of these (things), deeming it his own success, or who grieves at the ill-success of these (things), deeming it his own ill-success,—these are all unenlightened."

And this undifferentiated-consciousness (*a-vidya*), precisely as in the case of a foe (*a-mitra*) is to be conceived as a really existing object (*vastusatattva*). Just as a foe is not a negative friend (and) not something amounting to a friend, but the opposite of this (friend), a rival (*shatru*),—. Precisely so, undifferentiated-consciousness is not a source-of-valid-ideas nor the negation of a source-of-valid-ideas, but another kind of thinking the reverse of knowledge.

6. *When the power of seeing (drik) and the power by which one sees (darsana) have the appearance of being a single-self, (this is) the feeling-of-personality (asmita).* The Self is the power of seeing; the thinking-substance (buddhi) is the power, by which one sees. The hindrance called the feeling-of-personality is a change by which these two appear to become a single essence (*svarupa*). When there is any kind of failure to distinguish him who has the power of the enjoyer (*bhogyā*), which are as distinct as possible and as unconfused as possible, enjoyment is ready at hand. But when each has recovered its own essence, there is Isolation (*kaivalya*).—How is it that (at that time there could be anything) that could be called enjoyment? In this sense it has been said, "He who should fail to see that the Self is other than the thinking-substance, distinct in nature and in character and in consciousness and in other respects, would make the mistake of putting his own thinking-substance in the place of that (Self)."

7. *Passion (raga) is that which dwells upon pleasure (sukha).* That greed (or) thirst (or) desire, on the part of one acquainted with pleasure, ensuing upon a recollection of pleasure, for either the pleasure or for the means of attaining it, is passion.

8. *Aversion (dvesha) is that which dwells upon pain (dukha).* That repulsion (or) wrath (or) anger, on the part of one acquainted with pain, ensuing upon a recollection of pain, for either the pain or for the means

of attaining it, is aversion.

9. *The will-to-live (abhinivesa) sweeping on (by the force of) its own nature exists in this form even in the wise.* In all living beings this craving for one's self ceaselessly rises, 'May I not cease to live! May I live!' This craving for one's self does not arise except in one in whom the experience of death resides. And from (the existence) of this (hope) the experience of other births is made clear. And this is that well-known hindrance (called) the will-to-live. This (fear of death), inconceivable as a result of either perception or inference or verbal-communication, sweeping on (by the force of) its own nature, as a vision of extermination, forces the inference that the pangs of death have already been experienced in previous births. And just as it is evident that this fear is to be found in the unspeakable stupid, so also even in the wise, who have some understanding of the prior limit (of human lives), and of their final limit (that is, Isolation). Why is this? Because this subconscious-impression (vasana), the result of the fear of death, is alike in both fortunate and unfortunate.

10. *These (hindrances) (when they have become) subtile (sukshma) are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation (prati prasava).* These five hindrances (panchaklesha) when they have become like burned seeds, after the mind which has predominated over the deeds of the yogin is resolved (into primary matter), come with it to rest. But of permanent hindrances consigned to the condition of seeds

11. *The fluctuations (vritti) of these should be escaped by means of contemplation (dhyana).* Those fluctuations of the hindrances which are coarse (sthula), after having been attenuated by the yoga of action (kriya yoga), should be escaped by the Elevated (prasamkhyana) contemplation until subtilized (and) made like burned seeds. And just as a spot of coarse matter upon pieces of cloth is first shaken off and afterwards the spot of fine matter is removed with an effort and by (some appropriate) means, so coarse fluctuations are those whose opposition to hindrances is very slight, but the subtile fluctuations are those whose opposition is very great.

13. *So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it (that is) birth (and) length-of-life (and) kind-of-experience (anubhava).* While the hindrances exist, the latent-deposit of karma starts the fruition, but not so the cut root of the hindrances. Just as the grains of rice, when encased within the chaff, as seeds in an unburned condition, are fit for propagation, but neither the winnowed chaff nor seed in the burned condition is so (fit), similarly the latent-deposits of karma, when en-

cased within hindrances, are propagative of fruition, but neither the winnowed hindrances nor seed in the condition of having been burned by the Elevation (*prasamkhyana*) (is propagative).

But this mind-stuff like a fish-net made in different shapes on all sides and having, from time without beginning, a form-fixed (*sammurcīta*) by subconscious impressions, which are like knots, caused by the experience of the fruition of the karma from the hindrances, is spread abroad.

Those subliminal-impressions which produce memory are said to be subconscious-impressions (*vasana*) and these are said to subsist, from time-without-beginning.

14. These (fruits) have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the quality of their causes whether merit or demerit (*punya, apunya*).

Those with merit as cause have pleasure as result; those with demerit as cause have pain as result. And just as the nature of this pain is counteractive, so for the yogin, even at the moment of pleasure in an object, there is nothing but counteractive pain.

How can this be accounted for?

15. As being the pains which are mutations (*parinama*) and anxieties (*tapa*) and subliminal-impressions (*samskara*), and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of the aspects (*guna*), — to the discriminating (*viveki*) all is nothing but pain.

1. For every one this experience of pleasure is permeated with passion (*raga*). . . In this case we have a latent-deposit of karma arising from passion. . . There is also a latent-deposit made by aversion (*dvesha*) and by infatuation (*moha*). . .

3. But what is the painfulness of subliminal-impressions (*samskara dukha*)? There is a latent-deposit of subliminal-impressions of pleasure arising from the experience of pleasure; and there is a latent-deposit of subliminal-impressions of pain arising from the experience of pain. This same system is set forth in its four divisions.

16. That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come.

Pain past, that is, transferred beyond experience, cannot properly be called a thing to be escaped. And present pain in its own moment (of existence) has attained experience: so it cannot at the next moment (of existence) have attained experience; so it cannot at the next moment be so changed that it can be escaped. Consequently only that pain which is yet to come is that which hinders the yogin only, who is like an eyeball, but (this does) not (hinder) any other perceiver. Only this pain

becomes so changed that it may be escaped.

Therefore the cause of this same thing that is described as something to be escaped is once more specified.

17. The correlation of the seer and the object-of-sight (drusya) is the cause of that which is to be escaped.

The Seer is the Self conscious by reflection of the thinking-substance (buddhi). Objects-of-sight are all external-aspects (dharma) which have struck upon the sattva of the thinking-substance. So this same object-of-sight giving its aid, like a magnet, by the mere fact of being near, becomes, by reason of its being an object-of-sight, the property of the Self, its proprietor, whose nature is seeing. It becomes changed into an object upon which experience operates,—in so far it has the nature of another. Having acquired (this new) being, although self-dependent, (it becomes) by serving one-not-itself, dependent on one-not-itself.

The correlation of these two, the power of seeing and the power by which one sees, is from time-without-beginning and is effected for (two) purposes. (This correlation is) the cause of that which is to be escaped, in other words, the cause of pain.

He tells what the object-of-sight (drusya) itself is.

18. With a disposition to brightness and to activity and to inertia, and with the elements and the organs as its essence, and with its purpose the experience (anubhava) and the liberation (moksha) (of the Self),- (this is) the object-of-sight (drusya).

The sattva has the disposition to brightness; the rajas has the disposition to activity; the tamas has the disposition to inertia. These aspects (guna) with the (three) separate parts influencing each other.

For the object-of-sight exists for the sake of the experience (anubhava) and the liberation (moksha) of the Self. Of these (two), experience is the ascertainment of things with desirable qualities and of things with undesirable qualities so long as this (ascertainment) does not divide (the Self from the thinking-substance). Liberation is the ascertainment of the enjoyer himself. Thus there is no other process-of-knowing in addition to these two. And in this sense it has been said, "But he who in the three aspects (guna) which are agents and in the Self which is not an agent, — but which is of the same kind in some respects and of a different kind in other respects,—sees all the produced states presented to the fourth, the witness of their action—he has no suspicion that there is another kind of knowledge (the pure intelligence)." (1)

'How is it that these two, experience and liberation, made by the thinking-substance (buddhi) and existing in the thinking-substance only.

are attributed to the Self?" Just as a victory or a defeat on the part of actual fighters is ascribed to their commander, for he, as we know, is the experience of the result, so bondage and release, existing in the thinking-substance only, are ascribed to the Self. For he, as we know, has the experience of the results of these. Bondage is of the thinking-substance only and is the failure to attain the purpose of the Self. Release is the termination of the purpose of the Self.

The object-of-sight (drusya) has been explained. Now this sutra is introduced with the intent of determining what the Seer (drshta) as such is.

20. The Seer, who is nothing but (the power of) seeing, although undefiled (shuddha), looks upon the presented-idea.

The self is nothing but the power of seeing untouched by any qualifications. This self becomes conscious-by-reflection of the thinking-substance (buddhi). He is not homogeneous with the thinking-substance nor utterly heterogeneous. . . . Because the thinking-substance is something that enters into mutations.

Whereas the fact that, in the case of the Self, its object is always known, proves that the Self does not enter into mutations. Why (do we say this)? Because it surely is not possible for the thinking-substance to be an object to the Self, and at the same time be something now comprehended and something again not comprehended (by the Self). Hence it is proved that the Self always knows its object. And from this it follows that the Self does not enter into mutations. Moreover the thinking-substance exists for the sake of another, since it acts by combining causes, whereas the Self exists for its own sake.

Thus, the thinking-substance (buddhi) is a complex of the three aspects because it determines each thing as consisting of one or another the three aspects, that is, as pleasurable or as painful or as indifferent. And since it consists of the three aspects (guna), it is inanimate.

The Self, on the other hand, is that which later beholds the aspects (by being reflected in them). Hence it is not homogeneous with buddhi.

21. The object-of-sight (drusya) is only for the sake of the Self.

The object-of-sight itself (svarupa) exists only for the sake of the Self. But inasmuch as it is itself only so long as it has acquired its being as having the form of another, it is no (longer) seen by the Self when once it has accomplished the purpose of the Self, (of giving the Self) experience and liberation. So by escaping from itself is attaining cessation; but it does not utterly cease to be.

Why (does it not utterly cease to be)?

22. *Though it has ceased (to be seen) in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others (besides himself).* Although the object-of-sight has ceased in so far as one Self whose purpose has been accomplished is concerned, it has not ceased to be, because it is common to others besides him. . . So for these persons it becomes the object-of-the-action of seeing and receives its form of being as having the form of another. And therefore since the power of seeing and the power by which one sees are permanent, the conjunction (of the two) is said to be from time-without-beginning. And in this sense it has been said, "The substances being in correlation from time without beginning, the external-aspects in general are also in correlation from time without beginning."

The intent of this sutra is to describe what the correlation (samyoga) itself is.

23. *The reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and what is the power of the proprietor is correlation.* The Self as proprietor becomes correlated for the purpose of sight with the object-for-sight as property. That apperception of the object-for-sight which results from this correlation is experience (anubhava). Whereas the apperception of what the Seer is, liberation. Since the correlation (samyoga) lasts until sight is effected, sight is said to be the cause of disconnection (viyoga). Since sight and non-sight are opposite to each other, non-sight is said to be the instrumental cause of correlation. Sight in this (system) is not the cause of release; but the absence of bondage results from the absence of non-sight. This is release (moksha). Where there is sight, non-sight, which is the cause of bondage, ceases (to be felt). Thus the perception which is sight is said to be the cause of isolation (kaivalya).

But there is a correlation of an individual consciousness (purusha) with its own thinking-substance (buddhi).

24. *The reason for this correlation) is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya).* In other words, (undifferentiated-consciousness) is a subconscious-impression (vasana) from erroneous thinking. The thinking-substance pervaded (vasita) by subconscious-impressions from erroneous thinking does not attain to the discernment of the Self, which is the goal of its actions, (and) returns again with its task yet unfulfilled. But that (thinking-substance) which terminates in the discernment of the Self attains the goal of its actions, and, its task done, and its non-sight repressed, does not, since the cause of its bondage no longer

exists, return again.

Then release is nothing but the cessation of the thinking-substance. Why then is there this confusion of ideas of his that is so much out of place?

The pain which is to be escaped and the cause of pain, the so-called correlation, together with their reasons, have been described. Next the higher escape (*hana*) is to be described.

25. *Since this (non-sight—adarshana) does not exist, there is no correlation. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer.* Now what is the means of attaining escape (*hana*)?

26. The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative discernment.

Discriminative discernment (*viveka khyati*) of the presented-idea of the difference between *sattva* and the Self. But this discernment wavers when erroneous perception is not repressed. When erroneous perception, reduced to the condition of burned seed, fails to reproduce itself, then the flow of the presented-ideas of discrimination—belonging to the *sattva*, which is cleansed from *rajas* belonging to the hindrances, and which continues in the higher clearness (and) in the higher consciousness of being master—becomes stainless. This unwavering discriminative discernment is the means (*upaya*) of escape. After this, erroneous perception tends to become reduced to the condition of burned seed. And its failure to reproduce itself is the path (*marga*) to Release, the way-of-approach (*upaya*) to escape.

27. For him (there is) insight (*prajna*) seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest.

The seven forms, as follows, 1. The thing to be escaped has been thought out; nor need (the yogin) think it out again. 2. The reasons for the thing to be escaped have dwindled away; nor need they dwindle away again. 3. The escape is directly perceived by the concentration of restriction; (nor need anything beyond this be discovered). 4. The means of escape in the form of discriminative discernment has been cultivated: (nor need anything beyond this be cultivated). So this is the four-fold final release (*vimukti*), belonging to insight, which may be effected. But the final release of the mind-stuff is three-fold (as follows). 5. The authority of the thinking-substance is ended. 6. The aspects (*guna*, like rocks fallen from the top of the mountain peak, without this support, of their own accord, incline towards dissolution and come with (thinking-substance) to rest. And when these (aspects) are quite dissolved, they do not cause growth again, because there is no

impelling-cause. 7. In this stage the Self has passed out of relation with the aspects (guna), and, enlightened by himself and nothing more, is stainless and isolated. The Self beholding this seven-fold insight advancing in stages to the highest is denominated fortunate (kusala). Even when there is also the inverted generation (laya) of the mind-stuff (manas) the Self is said to be released (and) fortunate, because he has passed beyond the aspects (gunatita).

When discriminative discernment (vivekakhyati) is perfected there is the means of escape. And there is no perfection without the means (of attaining it). So this (topic of the means) is begun.

28. After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of perception reaching up to the discriminative discernment.

In this (sutra) the aids to yoga are determined.

29. Abstentions (yama) and observations (niyama) and postures (asana) and regulations-of-the-breath (pranayama) and withdrawal-of-the-senses (pratyahara) and fixed attention (sharana) and contemplation (dhyana) and concentration (samadhi) are the eight aids.

The follow up of these must be performed in succession. And what they are we shall describe.

Of these (eight)—

30. Abstinence from injury (ahimsa) and from falsehood (satya) and from theft (asteya) and from incontinence (brahmacharya) and from acceptance of gifts (aparigraha) are the abstentions (yama).

32. Cleanliness (soucha) and contentment (samtosha) and self-castigation (tapas) and study (svadhyaya) and devotion to the Isvara are the observances (niyama).

As for these abstentions and observances.

33. If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations (vitarka), there should be cultivation of the opposites.

34. Since perverse-considerations such as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and in lack of thinking, there should be the cultivation of their opposites.

35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets a suspension of enmity.

36. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and consequences depend upon him.

40. As a result of cleanliness there is disgust at one's own body and

no intercourse with others.

As soon as there is disgust with his own body, he has begun cleanliness. Seeing the offensiveness of the body, he is no longer attached to the body and becomes an ascetic (yati).

41. Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the sight of the self—.

As a result of cleanliness there is purity of sattva; therefrom (it acquires) gentleness: from this (it acquires) singleness-of-intent; therefrom (it acquires) subjugation of the senses; and from this fitness for the sight of the self is acquired by the sattva of the thinking-substance (buddhi). So to this (last) there is access, as a result of his being established in cleanliness.

42. As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of superlative pleasure.

43. Perfection in the body and in the organs after impurity has dwindled as a result of self-castigation (tapas).

44. As a result of study there is communion with the chosen deity (ishtadevata).

45. Perfection of concentration (samadhi) as a result of devotion to the Isvara.

The abstentions and observances together with their perfections have been described. We have the following to say of the postures and the other (aids to yoga). In this (sutra, it is said)—

46. Stable-and-easy posture.

For example, the lotus-posture (padmasanam) and the hero-posture (virasanam) and the dicent-posture (bhadrasanam) etc.

47. By relaxation of effort or by a (mental) state-of-balance with reference to Ananta.

When efforts cease the posture is completed, so that there is no agitation of the body. Or the mind-stuff comes into a balanced-state with reference to Ananta and produces the posture.

48. *Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes.* As a result of mastering the postures he is not overcome by the extremes, by cold and heat and by the other (extremes).

49. *When there is this (stability of posture), the restraint of breath cutting off the flow of inspiration and expiration (pranayama) (follows).* After the mastery of posture (follows the restraint of the breath). Inspiration is the sipping in of the outer wind; expiration is the expulsion of the abdominal wind. Restraint of the breath is the cutting off of the flow of these two, the absence of both kinds.

But this (restraint of breath-pranayama) is,

50. *External (bahya) or internal (antara) or suppressed in fluctuation (nischala) and is regulated in place and time and number and is protracted and subtle.* It is external in case there is no flow (of breath) after expiration; it is internal in case there is no flow (of breath) after inspiration; it is the third (or) suppressed in fluctuation in case there is no (flow) of either kind (neither of expiration nor inspiration), as the result of a single effort (to suppress both), just as water dropped upon a very-hot stone shrivels up wherever it falls, so both at once cease to be. And each of these three is regulated in space; (each deals with a certain amount of space). (Each) is regulated in time; in other words, defined by a limitation to a certain number of moments. (Each) is regulated in number. . . So then, practised in these ways, (it becomes protracted and subtle. Furthermore,

53. For fixed attentions (dharana) also the central organ (manas) becomes fit.

Merely in consequences of practice in restraint of breath (the central organ becomes fit for fixed attentions).

Now what is the withdrawal of the senses (pratyahara)?

54. The withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation of the mind-stuff itself on the part of the organs by disjoining themselves from their objects.

When there is no conjunction with their own objects, the organs in imitation of the mind-stuff, as it is in itself, become, as it were, restricted. When the mind-stuff is restricted, like the mind-stuff they become restricted; and do not, like the subjugation of the senses, require any further aid. Just as when the king-bee flies up, the bees fly up after him and when he settles down, they settle down after him. So when the mind-stuff is restricted, the organs are restricted. This then is the withdrawal of the senses.

55. *As a result of this (withdrawal) there is complete mastery of the organs (indriya).*

III. Vibhuti Pada (Supernormal Powers)

The five indirect aids (to yoga) have been described. Fixed attention (dharana) is (now) to be described.

1. *Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention (dharana).* Binding of the mind-stuff, only in so far as it is a fluctuation, to the navel or to the heart-lotus or to the light within the head or to the tip of the nose or to the tip of the tongue or to other places of the same kind

or to an external object,—this is fixed-attention (*dharana*).

2. *Focusedness of the presented idea upon that place is contemplation (dhyana)*. The focusedness of the presented idea upon the object to be contemplated in that place, in other words, the stream (of presented ideas) of like quality unaffected by any other presented idea.

3. *This same (contemplation). shining forth (in consciousness) as the intended object and nothing more, and, as it were, emptied of itself, is concentration (samadhi)*. When the contemplation only shines forth (in consciousness) in the form of the object-to-be-contemplated and (so) is, as it were, empty of itself, in so far as it becomes identical with the presented-idea as such, then, by fusing (itself) with the nature of the object-to-be-contemplated, it is said to be concentration.

4. *The three in one are constraint (samyama)*. When having a single object the three means are called constraint. So the technical term (now laid down) in this system for these three is constraint.

5. *As a result of mastering this constraint, there follows the shining path of insight (prajna)*. As a result of mastering this constraint there follows the shining path of concentrated insight. Just in proportion as constraint enters the stable state, in that proportion the concentrated insight becomes clear.

6. *Its application is by stages*. The application of it, that is the constraint, is to that stage which is next the stage already mastered. For by overleaping the next stage without having first mastered the lower stage, (the yogin) does not gain constraint in the highest stages.

7. *The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous (five)*. The same three, fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, are direct aids to conscious concentration in comparison with the previous means, the five beginning with the abstentions (*yama*).

8. Even these (three) are indirect aids to seedless (concentration) (*nirbija samadhi*).

Even these, the three direct means-of-attainment, are indirect aids to seedless yoga. Why is this? Since this latter occurs even when these are absent.

Now since during the restricted moments' of the mind-stuff the changes of the aspects (*guna*) are unstable, of what sort at those times is the mutation of the mind-stuff (*chitta parinama*)?

16. As a result of constraint upon the three mutations (there follows) the knowledge of the past and the future.

19. (As a result of constraint) upon a presented-idea (there arises intuitive) knowledge of the mind-stuff of another.

23. (As a result of constraint) upon friendliness and other (sentiments there arises) powers (of friendliness).

Friendliness (*maitri*) and compassion (*karuna*) and joy (*mudita*) are the three sentiments. As to these (three), by feeling friendliness for living beings who are in happiness he discovers the power of friendliness; by feeling compassion for those in pain he discovers the power of compassion; by feeling joy for those who are disposed to merit he discovers the power of joy. As a result of the sentiments there arises the constraint which is concentration, and from it there arise powers of unfailing energy. Indifference, however, for those disposed to evil is not one (of those practised) sentiments. And therefore there is no concentration upon it. For this reason, since it is impossible to perform constraint upon it, there is no power resulting from indifference.

33. Or as a result of vividness (*pratibha*) (the yogin discerns) all.

35. Experience (*anubhava*) is a presented-idea which fails to distinguish the *sattva* and the Self, which are absolutely uncommingled (in the presented-idea). Since the *sattva* exists as objects for another, the (intuitive) knowledge of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon that which exists for its own sake.

37. In concentration these (supernal activities) are obstacles; in the emergent state they are perfections (*siddhi*).

These, the vividness and so forth, arising in the yogin whose mind-stuff is concentrated, are obstacles, in that they go counter to the sight which belongs to this (concentrated mind-stuff), (but) arising (in the yogin) whose mind-stuff is emergent, they are perfections.

46. Beauty and grace and power and the compactness of the thunderbolt,—(this is) perfection of body.

The perfect body is handsome and alluring and unexcelled in power and compact as the thunderbolt.

47. As a result of constraint (*samyama*) upon the process-of-knowing (*grahana*) and the essential-attribute and the feeling-of-personality and the inherence and the purposiveness, (there follows) the subjugation of the organs (*indriyajaya*).

49. He who has only the full discernment into the difference between the *sattva* and the Self is one who has authority over all states-of-existence and is one who knows all (*sarvajna*).

50. As a result of passionlessness (*viragya*) even with regard to these (perfections) there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds of the defects, Isolation (*kaivalya*).

When, after the dwindling of hindrances (*klesha*) comes to him thus,

'This presented idea of discrimination (vivekajnana) is an external-aspect of the sattva. And sattva is to be reckoned with those things that are to be escaped. The Self moreover is immutable (aparinami), undefiled (shuddha) (by the aspects), and other than the sattva, '—when he is thus unaffected (by the aspects), those seeds of the hindrances which, like burned seeds of rice, are incapable of generation, go together with the central-organ (manas) to their rest,—and when, these being resolved into the primary cause, the Self does not again have the experience of the three pains (tapa),—then these aspects, in that they are manifested in the central-organ as being karma and hindrances (klesha) and fruitions (vipaka), have fulfilled their purpose, and invert-the-process-of-generation (laya). Then there is the absolute absence of correlation of the Self with the aspects, (which is) Isolation. Then the Self is nought else than the Energy of Intellect (chiti) grounded in itself.

51. In case of invitations from those-in-high-places, these should arouse no attachment or pride, for undesired consequences recur.

55. When the purity of the sattva and of the Self are equal (there is) Isolation (kaivalya).

When the sattva of the thinking-substance (buddhi) is freed from the defilement of the rajas and tamas, and when it has no task other than with the presented-idea of the difference of (the sattva) from the Self, and when the seeds of the hindrances within itself have been burned, then the sattva enters into a state of purity equal to that of the Self. Purity is the cessation of the experience which is falsely attributed to the Self. In this state (of purity) Isolation follows. In this state the aspects, their task done, do not again submit themselves as objects-for-sight to the self. That is the Self's Isolation. Then the Self having its light within itself becomes undefiled and isolated.

IV. Kaivalya Pada (Isolation)

1. Perfections proceed from birth (janma) or from drugs (aushadhi) or from spells (mantra) or from self-castigation (tapas) or from concentration (samadhi).

6. Of these (five perfections) that which proceeds from contemplation leaves no latent-deposit (asaya).

7. The yogin's karma is neither-white-nor-black; (the karma) of other is of three kinds.

Karma as a class is, as everyone knows, quadripartite (chatuspat), black and white-and-black and white and neither-white-nor-black. Of

these (four), 1. the black is found in villains (duratma). 2. The white-and-black is attainable by outer mean-of-attainment. . . The accumulation of the latent-deposit of karma in this (division) is by means of injury or of benefit to others. 3. The white belongs to those who do tapas and recite the sacred texts (svadhyaya) and practise contemplation (dhyana). Because this kind of karma is confined to the central organ (manas) alone, it does not depend upon outer means and it does not grow as a result of injury to others. 4. The neither-white-nor-black is found in the mendicant-saints (sannyasin), whose hindrances have dwindled away, and whose (actual) bodies are their last. Of these four, the yogin alone has the not-white karma, since he has renounced (sannyasat) the fruition (even of good), and has not-black, since he will have nought of it. But the three kinds just mentioned are found in other living beings.

9. There is an uninterrupted (causal) relation (of sub-conscious-impressions), although remote in species (jati) and point-of-space (desa) and moments-of-time (kala), by reason of the correspondence between memory (smriti) and subliminal-impressions (samskara).

Because subliminal-impressions are like experiences, and the latter correspond with the subconscious-impressions of karma, and because memory is like subconscious-impressions, (therefore) memory arises from subliminal-impressions, (although) species and points-of-space and moments-of-time intervene, and again, subliminal-impressions arise from memory. Relation of the determination to the determined is not cut through.

10. *Furthermore these (subconscious-impressions-vasana) have no beginning (that we can set in time), since desire is permanent.* Those subconscious-impressions, because of the permanence of desire, have no beginning. This well-known desire (II.9) for one's self, 'May I not cease to be! May I be!' which is found in every one, is not self-caused. Why (not)? (The answer is,) how could the fear of death, determined by the recollection of hatred and of pain, arise in an animal (*jantu*) just brought into life, in a condition wherein death has never been experienced? . . .

This (mind-stuff) furthermore requires such efficient-causes as right-living. And this efficient-cause is of two kinds, that which is external and that which has to do with self. The external requires the body and other means, such as praises and alms giving and salutations. That which like belief, for instance, has to do with self is subject to the mind-stuff only. And in this sense it has been said "As for friendliness

and such (exalted states-of-mind), they are the diversions of contemplative (yogins); they are in their essence unaided by outer means; they bring right-living to perfection." Of these two, (the inner and the outer means), that of the central-organ is the stronger. How is this? (The answer is, that intuitive) knowledge (jnana) and passionlessness (viragya) are unsurpassed by any other (force).

11. *Since (subconscious-impressions-vasana) are associated with cause and motive and mental-substrate (ashraya) and stimulus, if these cease to be, then those (subconscious-impressions) cease to be.* (1) As to cause. From right-living (dharma) results pleasure; from wrong-living (adharma), pain; from pleasure, passion; from pain, aversion; and from this struggle (prayatna). Quivering in central-organ (manas) or in vocal-organ (vaca) or in body (kaya) with this (struggle), he either helps or injures another. From this again result right-living and wrong-living, pleasure and pain, passion and aversion. Thus revolves the six-spoked wheel of the round-of-rebirths. And as it ceaselessly revolves, undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya), the root of all the hindrances, is its motive-power. Such is cause. (2) But motive (phala) is that (human purpose) with reference to which any condition such as right-living becomes operative (in the present). For it is not the rise of anything new. (3) The central-organ (manas), however, while its task is yet unfulfilled, is the mental-substrate of subconscious-impressions (vasana). For when the task of the central-organ is fulfilled, the subconscious-impression, now without mental-substrate, are not able to persist. (4) When a thing confronted (with some object) phenomenalizes any subconscious-impression (in itself), then (that object) is the stimulus of that (subconscious-impression). Thus all subconscious-impressions (vasana) are associated with these causes and motives and mental-substrates and stimuli. If they cease to be, the subconscious-impressions cohering with them also cease to be.

Since there is no production of that which is non-existent nor destruction of that which is existent, how will subconscious-impressions, by reason of their existence as things, cease to exist?

12. *Past and future as such exist; therefore subconscious-impressions do not cease to be). For the different time-forms belong to the external-aspects.*

17. A thing is known or not known by virtue of its affecting (or not affecting) the mind-stuff (chitta).

Object-of-sense like magnets, bind to themselves the mind-stuff, as if it had qualities of iron, and affect it. The object whereby the mind-

stuff is affected is known. But (the Self), who is other than this, is not known. The mind-stuff enters into mutations (parinama) because the nature of the thing is now known and now not known.

But as for (the self) for whom this same mind-stuff is an object-of-sense.

18. Unintermittently the Master of that (mind-stuff) knows the fluctuations of mind-stuff (and thus) the Self undergoes-no-mutations (aparinami).

If, like the mind-stuff, the Master also, that is, the Self, should undergo mutation, then fluctuations of mind-stuff which are its objects would be, like objects-of-sense, the sounds and other (perceptible things) sometimes known and sometimes not known. The fact, however, that the central organ (chitta) is unintermittently known by its Master, the Self, leads us to infer that (the Self) is an entity that undergoes-no-mutations.

Should the doubt arise whether the mind-stuff (chitta) like fire illumines itself and at the same time illumines objects—

19. It does not illumine itself, since it is an object-for-sight (drushya).

Just as the organs-of-sense and the sounds and other perceptible (things) do not illumine themselves, since they are objects for sight so the central-organ is also to be represented. And accordingly, fire, as an example could not apply to it.

24. This (mind-stuff-chitta), although diversified by countless subconscious-impressions (vasana), exists for the sake of another, because its nature is to produce (things as) combinations.

Although diversified by absolutely countless subconscious-impressions, this same mind-stuff exists for the sake of another, for the sake of the experience and the release of another; not for its own sake. . . The mind-stuff must act as a combiner (for the Self) and not for its own sake. Pleasurable mind-stuff is not for the pleasure (of the mind-stuff). The mind-stuff of thought is not for the thought (of the mind-stuff). But both of these two kinds exist for the sake of another. And that very Self which has its purpose in the two purposes of experience (anubhava) and liberation (kaivalya) is this (other), not any other in general.

25. *For him who sees the distinction, the pondering upon his own states-of-being ceases.* Because a blade of grass sprouts during the rains we infer the existence of seed. Just so in the case of him who betrays thrills of joy and falling tears in hearing of the way of release, we may likewise infer that there is in him (good) karma rooted in the knowledge of the difference (between the sattva and the Self), conducive to

liberation, and brought to completion (in the past).

When there is no longer undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya), the Self is purified and untouched by the conditions of the mind-stuff. For this reason this skilful person ceases pondering upon his own states-of-being.

26. *Then the mind-stuff (chittam) is borne down to discrimination (viveka), onward towards Isolation (kaivalya).* That mind-stuff of his which formerly was borne onward towards objects-of-sense, down to non-thinking, becomes changed for him. It is borne onward towards Isolation, down to the thinking which comes from discrimination.

27. *In the intervals of this (mind-stuff) there are other presented-ideas (coming) from subliminal-impressions (samskara).* The mind-stuff which is (borne) down towards discrimination of the presented-idea and the flow of which is towards nothing but discernment of the difference between the *sattva* and the Self, has in its intervals other presented-ideas, either 'It is I' or 'It is mine' or 'I think' or 'I do not think'. From what source? From the dwindling seeds, from previous subliminal-impressions.

28. *The escape from these (subliminal-impressions) is described as being like (the escape from) the hindrances.* The hindrances when in the condition of burned seed are unfit for generation. Just so a previous subliminal-impression, when in the condition of seed burned by the fire of (intuitive) thinking, does not generate presented-ideas. But because the subliminal-impressions of (intuitive) knowledge are dormant until the task of the mind-stuff is completed, they are not considered here.

30. *Then follows the cessation of the hindrances and of karma.* After this attainment, the undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) and the other hindrances are extirpated root and (branch). And the latent-deposits of karma, good and bad, are destroyed with their roots. Upon the cessation of the hindrances and of karma, the wise man, even while yet alive, is released.

32. *When as a result of this the aspects (guna) have fulfilled their purpose, they attain to the limit of the sequence of mutations.* As a result of the rise (into consciousness), when the aspects have fulfilled their purpose, they end the sequence of their mutations. For (the aspects) having completed their experience and their liberation, and having attained the limit of their sequence, are incapable of lingering even for a moment.

Isolation is said to follow after the sequence of the task of the aspects (*guna*) has been completed. The nature of this is defined.

34. *Isolation is the inverse generation of the aspects, no longer provided with a purpose by the Self, or it is the Energy of Intellect grounded in itself.* When the aspects (guna), whose essence is causes and effects, are inversely generated,—now that experience and liberation have been accomplished (for the Self) and now that a purpose is no longer provided by the Self,—this is Isolation. The Self's Energy of thought becomes isolated, since it is grounded in itself and is not again related to the *sattva* of the thinking-substance. Its continuance thus for evermore is Isolation (kaivalya).

Chapter 8

Jaimini's Mimamsa Sutas with Sabara Bhashya

The Mimamsa system accepts the Veda as an infallible authority. Since revealed truth comes to us through the medium of words, there is the need for mimamsa, the investigation of the principles according to which the texts are to be interpreted. Thus the primary aim of the system is to get back from the expression to the idea behind it, to solve the problem of the relation of speech and thought. It takes the view that language is independent of the individual using it. Such a psychological inquiry is of great value to the modern science of Semantics, the branch of knowledge dealing with meaning in relation to linguistic form and particularly to the branch psycholinguistics.

The main source of authority for this system is Jaimini's Mimamsa Sutra. It is assigned to about 200 A.D., though the system of thought is much older. Sabara wrote his commentary on the Sutra probably about 400 A.D.

The conception of the self in the system is somewhat like that of Nyaya-Vaisesika view; the self is conceived as both an agent (karta) and an enjoyer (bhokta). Jnana or knowledge is a mode of the self; it is described as an act (kriya) or process (vyapara). When jnana arises in the self, the object is illumined, while it can reveal other objects, it has no power to manifest itself. As a result jnana is known only indirectly through inference and not directly through introspection as in Nyaya-Vaisesika.

Like the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the mimamsa also recognises manas as a sense (indriya) and its co-operation is indispensable for all jnana. While the senses including the manas induce a change in the self constituting knowledge, it is the dissociation of the self from them that will set the self free as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika.

The Veda is a form of uttered word; it is held by the system to be self-existent. The relation between the word and its meaning is natural and therefore necessary and eternal. The word and the thing it names go together; it is impossible to think of either the word or the object named by it as having had a beginning in time.

A word (*shabda*) consists of two or more phonemes (*varna*) and is regarded as merely an aggregate (*samudaya*), and not as a whole (*avayavin*) distinguishable from the constituent parts. However, the phonemes occur in a specific order; for otherwise words like *dina* (pitiful) and *nadi* (river) which consist of the same phonemes but placed in a different order, would not differ in their connotation. But this order refers only to their manifestation; it does not refer to the phonemes (*varnas*) themselves which are, by hypothesis, present everywhere and at all times. The unity of the word is not affected by the gradual or progressive utterance of the phonemes. It is a perceptual process similar to the perception of an object like a tree. In both cases, whether it is in the perception of a word, or an object, there is unity though the perceptual process is gradual.

The significance of the word is general, though when it forms part of a sentence along with other words it might denote a particular meaning.

The word and the meaning are both eternal (*nitya*). So the relation between them is also eternal, consequently the view is held that language is not the creation of the human or the divine mind. The relation between the word and the object is primordial, original and self-sufficient.

If the relationship between the word and its meaning were not dependent upon any other cognition then it may be pointed out that the person who hears the word for the first time ought to be able to know the object the word denotes, but he does not. To this objection it is answered that it is only when a word is actually denoting a thing that we can regard it as a denoter. The word heard for the first time does not denote anything. The meaning of a word, it is pointed out, can be understood only when it has been used several times so that the relation between the 'name' and the 'named' is established. The analogy of the eye is given. One can see only when there is external light, but this does not mean that the eye has no power to see. Further, it is pointed out that the young learn the meanings of words when the older people use the words for their own purpose; this process has gone on without any beginning in time from generation to generation. This 'usage' theory, it is asserted, is more plausible than the 'creation' theory which assumes that some person, human or divine, created the relation between the word and its meaning or its denotation. The 'usage' theory is based on experience while the 'creation' theory is based on an assumption.

This relationship between the word and its meaning is assumed in order to establish the eternity of the Veda. The Veda is eternal because

there is a permanence of the text; the unique feature of the Veda is that there is a particular order (anupurvi) in which the words occur in it. According to the Mimamsaka, the Veda is not produced by any author, human or divine; he maintains that the Vedic text has been preserved intact during a beginningless period by being handed down from teachers to pupil with scrupulous care.

The point of interest is that the view of the eternity of the Veda tied these ancient thinkers to analyse the nature of meaning and the relation of word to the object.

[The extracts have been taken from Ganganath Jha, *Sabara Bhashya*, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1933].

PURVA MIMAMSA

I. Sense Perception

4. *That cognition by a person which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs is 'sense-perception', and it is not a means (of knowing Dharma), as it apprehends only things existing at the present time.*

5. *The relation of the word with its denotation is inborn (autpattika)—Instruction is the means of knowing Dharma. . . Bhasya—What we mean by 'autpattika' is 'constant'. It is existence (presence) that is figuratively spoken of as 'origin'. What is meant is that the relation between word and its meaning is inseparable. It becomes a means of knowing. . .*

Dharma is not known by sense-perception. It is known by the word in the form of Instruction or Injunction. It is infallible, i.e., the cognition brought about by that means never fails (is never wrong).

Objection. When a shell is perceived as silver, the sense-perception is wrong; and if sense-perception may be wrong, it follows that inference and other means of cognition, being based upon sense-perception, may also be wrong.

Siddhantin. It is not so; as what is real sense-perception is never wrong; what is wrong is not sense-perception. When the sense-organs are in contact with the object actually perceived, the resultant cognition is real sense-perception. . . So that in a case where the 'shell' has been perceived as 'silver'. What is perceived is the silver while the eye is in contact with the shell, not with the silver; hence this is not a case of real sense-perception at all.

Perception takes place when there is contact with the object actually perceived; when the contrary is the case, the perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived.

Question. How can this be ascertained? . . . At the time a person perceives the 'shell' to be 'silver', he thinks that his eyes are actually in contact with the real silver.

Answer. In cases where a perception is subsequently followed by a sublative cognition to the contrary—such as 'in reality it is not as I have perceived, my perception has been wrong';—it is understood that the perception in question had appeared on the contact of the sense-organ with something other than the object perceived; while in cases where no such sublative cognition appears, it is understood that the perception had appeared on actual contact with the object perceived.

Question. How can this distinction be made before the appearance of the sublative cognition? In fact, at the time that the perception actually appears, there is nothing to differentiate a 'right' cognition from a 'wrong' one.

Answer. A cognition is wrong, (a) when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement, or (b) when the sense-organ concerned is beset by some disability, or (c) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too subtle for perception and so forth.

In the cases where none of the three (mind, sense-organ and object) suffers from these defects, the cognition is right.

What brings about a right cognition is the contact of the sense-organ, the mind and the object; when there is no such contact, the cognition is wrong.

Question. How is one to know if any of the three is defective or free from defects?

Answer. Even on careful scrutiny, if we do not find any defect, we should conclude that there is no defect, simply because there is nothing to show that there is a defect.

Cognition in Dream and Waking States

Objection. In the case of dreams, cognition has no real substratum; waking cognition is also similar to a dream cognition—hence waking cognition also must be without a real substratum.

Answer. It is not so; in the case of dream-cognition we find that it is sublated on waking, which is not the case with the waking cognition.

Objection. But from the analogy of the dream-cognition, to which the waking cognition is similar, it may be presumed that the sublation

will follow in the case of the waking cognition also.

Answer. The falsity of the dream cognition is inferred from other reasons; when a man is sleepy, his mind is inactive, not alert; hence it is sleepiness which is the cause of falsity in the cognition appearing at the beginning and the end of sleep; and during sleep, there is no cognition at all; as it is only when a man is entirely unconscious that he is said to be in 'deep sleep'. From all this we conclude that the cognition of the waking man is not false.

II. The Self

(Bhasya to Sutra 5 of first section of first chapter)

The Vedic passage says "the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeds straight to the heavenly regions." As a matter of fact the body is burnt. So what is referred to is not the body but the entity to whom the body belongs.

Opponent. What is this other entity? We do not know of any such entity (apart from the body).

Answer. We infer the existence of such an entity through such acts as breathing and the like.

Opponent. But it is the body itself that breathes in and breathes down.

Answer. Not so; breathing and the rest cannot belong to the same category as the properties of the body, because they do not continue to exist as long as the body lasts; as a matter of fact we find that the properties of the body, colour and the rest, continue to exist as long as the body is there; on the other hand, breathing and the rest cease to exist even while the body is there. Further, pleasure, pain and such other feelings are cognised only by the person himself, while colour and other properties belonging to the body are perceived by other persons also. (This also shows that there are certain activities of the person which belong to an entity other than the body.) The conclusion is that the entity spoken of as "equipped with the sacrificial implements" is other than the body.

Opponent. How is it known that there is an entity other than pleasure and other cognitions to whom these latter belong? As a matter of fact, we do not see any form of such an entity apart from pleasure and other cognitions. . . .

From this we conclude that there is no entity apart from pleasure and the rest to whom these latter belong. . . . Why not rest content with positing the *Vijnana* (Idea, cognition) pure and simple and desist from

all further assumptions.

Answer. If there is no entity apart from the cognition, then who is it that is spoken of as 'he knows'? The entity spoken of by this phrase is the nominative agent of the act of cognising; for the purpose of making this phrase give some sense, we should assume the existence of the self distinct from the cognition.

Further, it is through desire that we perceive the self. Desire appears only when the desired object is one that has been perceived before. Nor does desire appear in one person for an object that has been perceived by another person. And yet desire does appear in a person for an object perceived by him on the previous day. From this we conclude that the person desiring and the person perceiving must be the same. . . . Otherwise the phenomenon of desire would be impossible.

Opponent. As a matter of fact, we do not know anything other than cognition. What we do not know we conclude to be non-existent, like the hare's horn. Nor is it impossible to have cognition without that unknown something; because we actually have a direct perception of cognition. That the cognition has a momentary existence—that too is a fact directly perceived.

Even though we have no cogniser apart from the cognition, and even though the cognition is not a lasting entity (as it has only a momentary existence), it is not impossible for desire to appear on the next day, because we actually perceive the desire so appearing.

From all this we conclude that there is no self apart from cognitions like pleasure and the rest.

Answer. It is not possible that persons who do not remember a thing should desire it; nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before; hence it is impossible that there should be remembrance in what is a mere momentary cognition. . .

As a matter of fact, it is only when one sees a thing on one day that he has the notion (remembrance) on the next day in the form 'I have seen it'; and this notion (of remembrance) appears only in the self, not in anything else. Hence it follows that there is something apart from cognitions, and it is to this something that the term 'I' is applied.

Opponent. If there is a cogniser distinct from the cognition, then leaving aside the cognition, please point out the cogniser—'This and such is the cogniser'. You cannot point out such cogniser. Hence we conclude that there is no cogniser apart from the cognition.

Answer. As a matter of fact, the cogniser is self-cognised, he cannot be perceived by another; how then could he be pointed out to another?

Just as for instance, when a man with eyes himself sees a colour, but he cannot point it out to another who is blind,—and yet, simply because the colour cannot be pointed out to another, it is not concluded that it does not exist;—in the same manner, a person cognises his own self, but cannot point it out to another person. . . . So that all individual selves cognising themselves must exist, even though none of them cognised the other selves. . . . In support of the view that one self is not apprehended by another we have the statement “Being inapprehensible, it is not apprehended” (Br. Up. 3.9.25); what this means is that it is not apprehended by another. This is why the self is spoken of as self-luminous (Br. Up. 4.3.9), (which means that the self is cognised by itself, not by another self).

Opponent. By what means then can the self be explained to another?

Answer. This has been indicated in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad itself: “He said that this self is not this, not that” (Br. Up 4.23);—that is to say, it can not be asserted that ‘the self has such and such a form’; the method by which it can be indicated to another is by denying (i.e., rejecting) what the other person regards as self; that is, if the other person regards the body as the self, he is taught ‘the body is not the self, the self is something different from the body.’ Similarly with respect to life-breath, pleasure and other cognitions.

Lastly, that ‘the self is not different from one who perceives himself’ is also inferred from the activities of the person himself; for instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it and complete it on the next day; from this action it is inferred that the person regards himself as enduring in relation to things (like actions) that are evanescent. (In other words, on the basis of the evanescent activities one comes to cognise the enduring self.)

Thus, on the ground of this self-realization, it is concluded that there is a self distinct from cognition.

III. (a) Word and Its Meaning

In Sutra 5 it is asserted that the relation between the word and meaning does not originate from the human being i.e., it is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not dependent upon any other means of cognition.

(If the connection of the word with its meaning were dependent upon other means of cognition, then all those words and expressions which speak of things not amenable to the other means of cognition,

might be regarded as of doubtful validity—when, however, the said connection is self-sufficient, then there is nothing to shake the inherent validity of what is spoken of in the words of the Veda).

Objection. In reality there is no relationship between the word and its meaning. . . . If the relationship between the word and the thing denoted by it were held to be of the nature of 'contact' (conjunction) then on the utterance of the word "Sweets", the mouth of the speaker would become filled with sweets. As for the other kinds of relation — (a) that between the material cause and its product, or (b) that between the efficient cause and its effect, or (c) that between the container and the contained, or (d) that of birth and so forth,—these are not possible at all in the case of word.

Answer. The only relation that is possible to assert in the case, you do not assert; that is, the relation that subsists between the denoter, and the denoted, which is the relation called 'that between the name and the named.'

Objection. If the word is the denoter (of its meaning), then why does it not denote it when it is heard for the first time?

Answer. In every case experience is our guide; it is only when we find a word actually denoting a thing that we regard it as its 'denoter'; this is not possible in the case of a word heard for the first time, as in its case we have never found it denoting anything; in fact the meaning of a word is understood only when it has been heard (used) as many times as makes it definitely recognized that 'this word is the 'name' and this thing is the 'named' '. In the case of the eye also it is found that it is unable to 'see' if there is no external light, and yet this does not mean that the eye has not the power to see. (Thus, then, the conclusion is that there is a definite relation between the word and what is denoted by it.)

Objection. If (as has been just stated) the word does not express anything when it is heard for the first time, then the relation between the word and the thing denoted by it must be one that is created (artificial) (a) because *sui generis*, the word and the thing denoted are not related, as is clear from the fact that the word is uttered while the thing denoted is found in the ground; (b) because people clearly make such a distinction as "this is the 'word' "; and (c) because there is a clear difference in the forms of the two also.

(In answer to this objection, the author discusses three questions—(1) What is 'word'? (2) What is 'meaning' (the denoted thing)? and (3) What is the 'relation' between the two?)

Answer. (1) In the case of 'gauh' what is it that is called the 'word'? The letters constitute the word. Among people the term 'word' is applied to what is apprehended by the ear.

Objection. If that is so, then no cognition of the meaning (of the word) is possible, because, as a matter of fact, the cognition of the meaning does not appear on the hearing of the single component letters severally; and apart from the component there is no single entity in the form of a composite whole, from which the cognition of the meaning would follow.

Answer. There is no force in all this; because what happens is that each letter, as it is uttered, leaves an impression behind and what brings about the cognition of the meaning of the word is the last letter along with the impressions of each of the preceding letters.

Objection. If that were so, then the assertion of the ordinary people that 'we cognise the meaning from the 'word' ' would be unjustifiable.

Answer. Simply because a certain popular assertion is unjustifiable, it cannot be right to admit the existence of something which is not vouched for by any means of cognition, sense-perception and the rest. As a matter of fact, popular assertions are found to be of both kinds—some are justifiable (true) and some are unjustifiable (false); for instance, such assertions as "Devadatta, please drive the cow" are justifiable (reasonable, serving a definite purpose); while such other assertions as "ten pomegranates, six cakes" and the like are unjustifiable (unreasonable, entirely purposeless, having no meaning).

Further, there is nothing unreasonable in the view (stated by us) that the letters (composing a word) produce impressions, and from them follow the apprehension of meaning; the letters would be the cause.

Objection. In that case, the word would be only a subordinate cause (of the apprehension of meaning).

Answer. Not so; the causal efficiency of the letters is by no means subordinate,—because, as a matter of fact, the apprehension of the meaning comes only when the letters are there, and it does not come when they are absent (which shows that the letters are the principal, not the subordinate cause).

As a matter of fact also, a word is never actually perceived apart from the letters, for the simple reason that no difference is perceived between the word and its component letters; they are actually found to be non-different. From this it is clear that the word is only the letters themselves; hence there is no such thing as 'word' apart from those letters.

Objection. The assumption of impressions (left by the component letters) involves the assumption of something that is not perceived.

Answer. The theory of the word (as distinct from the letters) involves the assumption of the word and also that of the impressions in order to explain the process of denotation; (on the other hand, our view necessitates the assumption of impressions only; so that while the opponent's theory involves two assumptions, our theory involves only one assumption). From all this we conclude that the letters themselves are the word.

(2) (The next question is) what is the denotation (meaning) of the word 'gauh' (cow)? What we assert is that the class (or genus) characterized by dewlap and other features is what is denoted by the word.

Opponent. Is this 'class' something to be accomplished or not? (If the class is something to be accomplished then its relation to the word cannot be eternal.)

Answer. Being actually perceived, it cannot be something yet to be accomplished; as what is actually perceived is only an accomplished entity.

Objection. This (notion of class) may be a mere illusion.

Answer. That cannot be; unless we find a conception set aside or negated by a subsequent conception, we cannot regard it as an illusion.

Objection. As a matter of fact, we find such conceptions as 'series', 'group', 'forest' (as single entities), while in reality there are no such single entities apart from the component individuals. Thus the 'class' being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, the conception of the class must be a misconception, a mere illusion.

Answer. Not so; you have put forward a most incoherent statement. Do you mean to deny the validity of perception (which provides us with a clear notion of the forest as a real entity)? If so, then you might as well say that the trees do not exist. Thus the assertion (of Jaimini) that 'the class forms the denotation of the word' is fully established.

(3) (The third question is) what is the 'relation' (between the word and its denotation)?

The relation between the word and its denotation is that on the word being cognised, what is denoted by it becomes cognised.

Objection. This relation between the 'name' and the 'named' is artificial hence we opine that a certain person created the relations of words with their denotations and then with a view to make use of the words, he composed the Vedas.

We would deduce the existence of the creator of word-relations from presumption. As a matter of fact we do not find people comprehending the meaning of those words whose relation (to the meaning) has not been fixed. If people were to comprehend the meaning of such a word, they could comprehend the meaning of such words also as they hear for the first time; as a matter of fact, however, they are not found to do so; hence there must be a person who fixes (creates) the relations (of words and meanings).

Answer. This is not right. Because words are taught as accomplished entities (having inherent power of denoting their meanings).

If it were a fact that in the absence of a creator of word-relations, the meanings are never comprehended, then alone could we deduce a creator by presumption.

In reality, however, there is another way (in which the meanings of words are comprehended); for instance, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purpose, the younger men who happen to hear those words are actually found to understand them; these old people also, when they were young, understood the words as used by older people at the time; and so the process has gone on without any beginning in time. This is one possible explanation of the phenomenon (of the use and comprehension of words).

The other explanation (proposed by the opponent) is that in the beginning there was no relation at all between a word and its meaning, subsequently someone set going the relations.

Now, as between these two possible explanations, so long as the explanation based upon the usage of older people is available (and it is actually perceived in every day life), it would not be right to presume a creator of relations. Further, the upholders of the 'usage theory' point to a fact of direct perception (in proof of their theory), while the other party only presume a creator of relations; and certainly presumption has no force as against a fact of direct perception. From all this it follows that there can be no creator of word-relation.

Further, the same word 'go' denotes the cow in various places; how could it be possible for the many creators of the word-relation to come together? Certainly, no single person could create a relation (that would receive such universal acceptance). For this reason also there can be no creator of word-relations.

Further, there can be no point of time when the word-relation has been totally absent, and when no word has been related to any meaning, because, if there were, then the act of creating the relation would not be

possible; for when the creator of the relation would proceed to create a relation, he could do so only by means of words. The question arises—who created the relations of the words that the said creator uses when creating the new relation? If those were created by some other creator, then who created the relations of the words used by the older creator? And so on and so forth; there would be no end to this enquiry. Consequently it has to be admitted that when a person would proceed to create new word-relations, he would make use of words whose relationships have come down through the usage of older people, and have not been created by anyone. And when 'usage' has to be admitted (at a certain point), why should it be at all necessary to presume any creator of word-relations at any point of time?

Thus it is clear that there can be no valid presumption (in support of a creator of word-relations).

Opponent. How is it possible for the younger people, to whom the word-relations are not known, to learn meanings of words from the older people?

Answer. The question of possibility cannot arise in regard to a directly perceived fact. Younger people are actually found to learn the meanings of words from older people; on the other hand, they are not found to have any such comprehension of a creator of word-relations. Hence the cases (of words and creators) do not stand on the same footing.

III. (b) Eternality of Words

Sūtra 6. (Purvapaksha)—*Word is a product (non-eternal), because it is seen to follow (after effort).*

Bhashya. Says the opponent: It has been said above that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal. But this is not possible because the word itself is not eternal. The word is often destroyed, so that when it comes to be produced (uttered) again, its relation (to its meaning) cannot but be artificial (newly made). Then again, no one ever comprehends the meaning of a word heard for the first time. The word itself is non-eternal because as a matter of fact, it is seen to follow after effort; finding that there is an invariable concomitance (between the appearance of the word and human effort, the word appearing only when there is human effort) we infer that the word is 'produced' by the effort.

Sūtra 7 (Purvapaksha continued)—*Because it does not persist.*

Bhashya. The opponent continues: when the word is uttered, we do

not find it to persist even for a moment, from which we conclude that it has been destroyed.

Sutra 12 (Siddhanta answer to Sutra 6) *But the fact of being 'seen' is equal in both the cases.*

Bhashya. It has been urged (in Sutra 6) that in as much as the word is seen to appear after human effort, it must be regarded as artificial.

But if, by means of clear reasons, we are able to establish the eternality of the word, then, on the strength of this notion of eternality, the right conclusion would be that the word is 'manifested' (not produced) by human effort; that is to say, if, before being pronounced, the word was not manifest, it becomes manifest by the effort (of pronouncing). Thus it is found that the fact of word being 'seen after effort' is equally compatible with both views.

Sutra 13. (Answer to Sutra 7) *What happens (when the word ceases to be heard) is that there is no perception of the extant (word) on account of the non-reaching of the object (by the manifesting agency).*

Bhashya. Here also, if we are able to clearly establish the eternality of word, we can assume that there must be some cause which brings about the perception of the word (and the absence of which leads to the non-perception of the word).

There is perception of the word only when there are certain conjunctions and disjunctions (in the shape of sound waves). It is these which manifest (render perceptible) the word.

What happens is that the air-particles disturbed by the (sound-provoking) stroke, strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce conjunctions and disjunctions (i.e., ripples) on all sides, which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts. The ripples are not perceived because the air (of which these are ripples) is imperceptible; and as for the sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease, and after they have ceased, the sound is not heard.

Thus there is no incongruity at all. It is for this same reason that the sound is heard at a greater distance when the wind is favourable.

Sutra 18. *In fact (the word) must be eternal as its utterance is for the purpose of another.*

Bhashya. The utterance of the word is 'for the purpose of another' i.e., for the purpose of making known the meaning to another.

If the word ceases to exist as soon as uttered then no one could speak of (make known) anything to others. On the other hand, if the word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the word many times, there is comprehension of its meaning.

Opponent. Each word is new since it disappears as soon as it is uttered.

Further, if a cognition (of the meaning of a word) were based merely upon the similarity (of that word to a previous denotative word), then there would always be a chance of its being mistaken and hence liable to sublation; for instance, the words 'mala' (garland) and 'shala' (house) being similar (in sound) one might derive the notion of the garland from the word 'shala'.

Answer. But this need not be so in all cases; e.g., the notion of the jar may be derived from the word 'ghata' heard by a person today through its similarity to another word 'ghata' which he heard on a previous day as denoting the jar; certainly there would be nothing wrong in this notion and it would not be sublated.

Further, it is not possible that the single act of utterance should bring about the use of the word itself and also create its relation to its denotation.

Sutra 19. There is simultaneity throughout.

Bhashya. Whenever the word 'cow' is uttered there is a notion of all cows simultaneously. From this it follows that the word denotes the 'class'.

It is not possible to create the relation of the word to a class; because in creating the relation, the creator would have to lay down the relation pointing to the class and without actually using the word 'cow' (which he could not use before he has laid down its relation to its denotation) in what manner could he point to the distinct class denoted by the word 'cow', seeing that the body of the cow (which alone could be pointed to is the receptacle of many classes (such as 'earth', 'substance', 'being', 'tail' and so forth).

If, however, the word 'cow' is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also many times, as applied to other individual cows; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular class. For this reason also the word must be eternal.

Sutra 20. Because there is no number (in connection with a word).

Bhashya. People speak of the word cow being pronounced eight times. The use of such an expression shows that people recognize (the same word).

Opponent. Though the words are actually different yet people are deluded by their similarity and hence declare them to be one and the same word.

Answer. The notion that people have is not that 'this is similar', but that 'this is the same as that'.

Opponent. Is recognizability a proof of eternity?

Answer. (*Slokavartika*). We do not accept mere recognizability of the word as the proof of its eternity; all that we mean by citing the fact of recognition is to show that the theory of non-eternity of words is opposed to a fact of sense-perception (recognition), and not that eternity is 'inferred' from recognition).

Opponent. The word pronounced yesterday has ceased to exist; so that the word pronounced today must be a different word.

Answer. The word pronounced yesterday has not ceased to exist; for the simple reason that we perceive it again when people see an object, and failing to see it for a moment, see it again and recognise it to be the same as seen before, they never think that the object has ceased to exist. If they were to think so, then, on seeing their mother or wife a second time, they would not believe them (to be the same). Simply on not perceiving a thing people do not regard it as non-existent and do not assume that it has ceased to exist.

Now in the case in question, the non-existence (of the word) has not been proved. Hence the notion (of the continued existence of the word) not being proved wrong, there can be no non-existence (of the word). Thus it has been established that words, their meanings, and the relation between them are inborn, eternal.

III. (c) Expressiveness of Sentences (*Bhashya* to Sutra 24)

Opponent. It cannot be that the meanings of the (component) words themselves form the meaning of the (composite) group (sentence). According to the *Siddhantin* himself the words denote the universal (class), while the sentence denotes the particular (individual).

Nor would it be right to assert that the meaning of the sentence is deduced from the meaning of the (component) words, because there is no connection between the two.

Hence we conclude that the meaning of the sentence must be distinct (from the meaning of the words).

(It may be said) Even from a sentence that has not been heard before, and (hence) with regard to which no connection with any meaning has been established, the comprehension of a meaning might be obtained by virtue of the nature of the sentence itself.

Opponent. In that case the word would go against its own nature; as it is not in the nature of the word that the meaning is comprehended

even from an unused word; in fact people never comprehend any meaning from the word heard for the first time.

Answer. What is set forth here (that no meaning is comprehended from an unused word) is a characteristic of the word, not of the sentence; because people are actually found to comprehend the meaning of a sentence which they have heard for the first time.

Opponent. This cannot be; if people were to comprehend the meaning of a sentence heard for the first time, then all men would comprehend it, —those knowing the meanings of the component words, as also those not knowing them. As a matter of fact, however, those not knowing the meanings of the component words never comprehend the meaning of the sentence.

Answer. Even when the meaning of the sentence is comprehended by those knowing the meaning of the component words, the relation between the sentence and its meaning must be one that is not artificial. Like the meaning of the word, the meaning of the sentence also could be comprehended only by those who would be conversant with that (inborn) relation; just as the meaning of a word heard a second time is comprehended only by those who had heard and comprehended it before.

Opponent. The knowledge of the meaning of the component words will not help to get the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence cannot be got through the meaning of the component words.

Sūtra 25. (In the sentence) *There is only a predication (or mention) of words with definite denotations along with a word denoting an action; as the meaning (of the sentence) is based upon that (i.e., the meaning of the words).*

Bhashya. In the sentence there is a predication—or mention—of such words as are tied to their denotations—along with a word denoting an action. Hence the sentence can never be said to have any separate meaning independently of the meanings of the words composing it because there is no proof for it; there is no valid means of knowledge whereby we could have any cognition (of the independent meaning of sentence).

People desiring to bring about the notion of the thing possessing the quality make use of only the word denoting the quality, and thereby their desired object is attained. It is this notion of the qualified thing that constitutes the meaning of the sentence.

Whether one thing is separate or not from another is ascertained by positive concomitance. In the case in question, it is found that some-

times, by reason of some mental derangement (loss of memory), the meanings of the words uttered are not comprehended; at such a time the meaning of the sentence (composed of those words) would never be comprehended only if the meaning of the sentence were not entirely separate from the meaning of the words. (It follows that the meaning of the sentence is not entirely separate from the meaning of the component words.)

The conception of the meaning of the sentence, which consists of the conception of the meanings of the words qualifying one another, follows from the conception of the meanings of the words.

Thus the meaning of the sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component words; and it has no connection with (and does not follow from) the group of words (sentence as something distinct from the words).

II. (d) Words Denote Classes

Sutra 30. (Purvapaksha)—(a) (Words do not denote class) as, if they did so, no injunction of actions would be possible; (b) (nor can words denote both class and individual, because) a word can have only one meaning; (c) (as for the notion of class that arises from the word) that is due to the fact that the two (class and individual) are inseparable.

Bhashya. The question arises whether a word denotes the class or the individual.

First of all we have to consider—what is ‘class’ and what is ‘individual’?

Among substances, qualities and actions, that factor which is ‘common’ to several individuals is the ‘class’ and that which possesses certain specific (uncommon) characteristics is the ‘individual’.

Why then should there be a doubt (regarding the meaning of words)?

Because when the word cow is pronounced, there appears the notion of the ‘class’ and yet it is the ‘individual’ that is connected with actions.

Opponent. It is the individual that is denoted by the word, because, if it denoted a class, no injunction would be possible, as none of the actions such as ‘washing’, ‘cutting’ and so forth could be done to the entire class.

How, then, does the notion of ‘class’ appear (when a word is pronounced)?

Answer. The ‘class’ would be the distinguishing feature of the ‘individual’ denoted by the word, the idea being that ‘the animal that has

this class (commonality of generic character) is the cow.' Just as we have the idea that "the man who has the stick is the 'stick-er', and yet the word 'stick-er', does not denote the 'stick', so also in the case in question (though we have the idea that 'the animal that has this class of generic character is the cow', yet the word 'cow' does not denote the said class).

Sūtra 31. (Purvapaksha-continued)—Also because there would be no words expressive of (qualities) as subsisting in substances.

Bhashya. If words denoted the class, then there would be no word expressive of qualities. In the expression 'six cows are to be given', if the word cows denoted the class, no connection with such a class of the number 'six' would be possible. From this it follows that words do not denote the class, they denote the individuals.

Sūtra 33. (Siddhanta)—In reality, it is the class (that is denoted) as it is that which serves the purpose of actions.

Bhashya. It is the class that is denoted by the word, because it is that which serves the purpose of actions.

Opponent. In fact in both the cases, the accomplishment of the action would be impossible. For instance, (a) the class cannot be taken as denoted by the word because, if the class were denoted, then no action would be possible; it would be impossible to sprinkle water on the entire class of corn; (b) the individual also cannot be taken as denoted by the word; if the word denoted the individual no action would be possible.

Answer. It is more reasonable to take the word as denoting the class. If the word denoted an individual, then it could not be used in reference to another individual, because an individual is that which is free from all those characteristics that are common.

Opponent. Not so; that thing is an individual which is the substratum of generic properties as well as of certain specific properties; the word that denotes an individual is not applied either to the generic property or to the specific property; it denotes only the substratum of these two; hence there is nothing incongruous in the word being applied to another individual.

Answer. If the word 'cow' could be applied to another cow also (because it is free from all common characteristics). Then, why is not that same word 'cow' be applied to an individual 'horse' which is also something free from all common characteristics?

Opponent. The word would be applied only to such things to which it has been found to be applied in actual usage.

Answer. If a word is to be applied to only that to which it has been found to have been actually applied in usage, then the word 'cow' could not be applied for the first time to the calf just born, as the word has never before been found to have been applied to that particular calf.

Nor would it be possible to have any such comprehensive (or common) notion as 'this is a cow and that is also a cow'; the notion that we would have would be 'this is a cow or that is a cow'.

From this it follows that it cannot be accepted that the application of the word 'cow' to the individual is dependent upon actual usage.

A word is never understood to be applicable to one individual and not to another (without any determining factor).

Opponent. But the 'cow-ness' (the class cow) would be the determining factor; the word being applicable to only that individual wherein 'cow-ness' subsists.

Answer. If that is so, then, what would be cognized (as denoted by the word) would be a 'qualified individual' (i.e., the individual qualified by the class 'cow'); and if it is the qualified individual that is denoted, then the qualifying factor (class 'cow') should be one that has been already cognised before; because until the qualifying factor has been already cognised, people can never have any notion of the thing qualified by that factor.

Opponent. All right; the word will denote the class as the 'qualifying factor' and the individual as the 'qualified factor'. In that case which of the two, class or individual is the primary factor in the connotation, and which the secondary, will depend upon the intention of the speaker; if one intends to speak of the class as the secondary factor, then he would speak of the individual as the primary factor.

Answer. This cannot be so; between the two (class and individual) there could be a relation of primary and secondary only if both were denoted by the word.

But if class is really comprehended as denoted by the word, then we cannot say that the individual is also denoted by the word, because the class is permanently related to the individual; so that when the class, as one relative, is cognised, the cognition of the other relative (individual) would naturally follow.

That the individual is cognised on the utterance of the word is a fact evident to everyone; but what is not evident is the distinction as to whether the cognition of the individual follows directly from the 'word' itself or from the 'class' (which is first denoted by the word).

This can be ascertained only by induction (by reasoning based upon

affirmative and negative premises), as follows:

(a) Even without the word being uttered, if one cognises the class, he necessarily cognises the individual also (affirmative premise);

(b) Even on the word being uttered, if, by reason of some mental derangement, the man fails to cognise the class, then he fails to cognise the individual also (negative premise)

(The irresistible conclusion from these premises is that it is the class that is denoted by the word, and the cognition of the individual follows only from the cognition of the class).

From all this it follows that the word is the direct cause of the cognition of the class, and that the cognition of the class is the cause of the cognition of the individual.

VEDANTA—GAUDAPADA'S KARIKAS

While Jaimini's *Mimamsa-sūtras* look upon the Veda as a body of ritual injunctions and uphold the teaching contained in the earlier portions of the Veda, particularly the Brahmanas, the *Vedānta-sūtras* of Bādarāyana expound the teaching of the later portions of the Veda, the Upanishads. The Vedānta-sūtras, or the Brahma-sūtras, as they are also called, constitute the first attempt to evolve a consistent philosophy out of the diverse Upanishads. It is generally assumed that this work was composed somewhere between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D. Though all the Vedāntins accept the Brahma-sūtra as the basic work of the Vedānta thought, the sūtras themselves are too cryptic to yield any clear philosophical view. As a result, a very wide range of possible interpretations developed. There are many kinds of Vedānta.

The most influential view is that of Advaita Vedānta. According to this view, Brahman, the ultimate reality is identical with the self as pure consciousness. So the world is not ultimately real. The world is looked upon as the product of avidyā or māyā.

Gaudapada's *Karika* is now regarded as the first systematic treatise on Advaita. Though a commentary on Mandukya Upanishad, it is in fact an independent philosophical work. Sankara has written a commentary on the *Karika*. According to tradition Gaudapada was the teacher of Govinda whose pupil was Sankara (780-820 A.D.). So it is assumed that the *Karika* may have been composed around 750 A.D.

The great importance of the Mandukya Upanishad, as noted above, is its analysis of the three states of experience, namely waking, dream, deep sleep and its recognition that the atman has four quarters, namely,

vaisvanara (waking), taijasa (dream), prajna (deep sleep) and turiya (the fourth). In the fourth state, the self is identical with the Absolute.

In the *Karika*, Gaudapada asserts that in the waking state, the self perceives the objective and in the dream state the subjective phenomena, and in the deep sleep state the non-differentiated bliss. In deep sleep state there is awareness of neither self nor non-self, neither truth nor falsehood. But in the fourth state, the self is all-seeing.

From the point of view of experience, Gaudapada declares, there is no essential difference between the waking state and the dream state.

The one criterion of reality accepted is that of eternal being. Using this criterion, the objective world is declared as being unreal, that is, non-eternal, though it is generally regarded as real. He points out that the objects of waking experience vanish in the dream state and that both the objective experiences and the subjective dreams vanish in the deep-sleep state. But the atman, the cognizer, is there in all the states. This is the last word of Vedanta, he asserts. When the self is free from all attachments, fear and anger, it is pure and unconditioned by the three states. The fourth state constitutes the essence of the self. In that state the self is like the unconditioned space. Just as with the destruction of the pot, the pot-space merges in the space, the jiva is merged in the atman in the fourth state. It is now all-seeing. It transcends the duality of waking and dream states and the causal or the potential form in the deep-sleep state. In the fourth state the self is free from all imaginings. It is all-seeing because it is all effulgence. It is the state of peace, transcending all duality of the experiences and the experienced.

Gaudapada gives the famous analogy of the moving torch. This is reminiscent of the Gestalt experiment of apparent movement perceived when two lights are switched on and off in sequence. Attention, however, must be drawn to the fact that though Gaudapada's views influenced greatly Sankara, the Absolutist, the later theistic Vedantins like Ramanuja of eleventh century and Madhva of thirteenth century, recognized the reality of the self as well as the world. They did not subscribe to the Madhvada of the Advaita Vedanta. The theistic Vedantins look upon God as personal and the soul as being possessed of inalienable individuality.

Gaudapada's Karika on Mandukya Upanishad

I. Agama Pada (of Upanishad)

1. Viswa is he who is all-pervading and cognizant of the objective;

Taijasa is he who is cognizant of the subjective, and Prajna is he who is a mass, all sentiency—it is indeed the one that is thus conditioned into three.

3. Fruition of the Viswa, Taijasa and Prajna, consists severally of the gross, the subtle and the blissful. This is the three-fold fruition.

5. He who knows the object of fruition, as well as the subject thereof, in each of above, is not affected by the fruition.

6. It is quite obvious that all beings become manifest from previous (unmanifest) existence; the purusha, in the form of prakāśa, sends forth all the various centres of consciousness.

10. The fourth is that which is capable of destroying all evils, ever changeless, of all beings the one without a second, effulgent and all-pervading.

12. Prajna knows not self or non-self, nor truth or falsehood, but the fourth is ever all-seeing.

13. Noncognition of duality is common to Prajna and Turiya (the Fourth), but the difference consists in the former being with sleep in the form of cause (i.e. potential) and the latter being entirely free from it.

14. The first two are accompanied by dream and sleep, the third by dreamless sleep, but those who are firm in the fourth experience neither dream nor sleep.

II. Vaitathya Prakarana (of Illusion)

1. The wise declare the unsubstantiality of all that is seen in dream, it being all within the body, on account of its partaking of the subtle.

4. As in dream, so in waking, the object seen are unsubstantial, though the two (conditions) differ by the one being internal and subtle, and the other external and gross.

5. The wise regard the wakeful as well as the dreaming condition as one, in consequence of the similarity of objective experience in either.

6. That which is naught at the beginning and is so also at the end, does necessarily not exist in the middle. Objects are like the illusions we see, still they are regarded as if real.

7. The being used as means to some end, of the objects of waking experience, comes to naught in dream; hence on account of being with beginning and end, they are certainly false and no more.

11. If in both conditions experience reduces itself to illusion, who is the cogniser of experience; who creates it?

12. The atman, all light, imagines himself by himself, through the power of Maya; he alone cognizes the objects so sent forth. This is the

last word of the Vedanta on the subject.

16. The first result of ideation is Jiva, whence the various entities, objective and subjective; for its knowledge must correspond to its memory.

35. As the sages free from attachment, fear, anger and well-versed in the secrets of the Veda, this ever one, the negation of the phenomenal, is regarded as the pure unconditioned (essence).

38. Having realized the nature of essence within and without, one should become the essence, should ever rest in it, and should be firm in it.

III. Advaita Prakarana (of the Non-dual)

3. Atman is likened to akasa, being the totality of all Jivas put together like so many ghatakasas, and being inclusive of the ghata as well. This is the fittest illustration of evolution (from Brahman, if any).

4. As on the dissolution of ghatak the ghatakasas are merged in akasa, so Jiva is merged in atman in the same manner.

7. As akasa portioned off by a jar, is neither of part nor an evolved effect of akasa, so is Jiva never a part or an evolved effect of the atman.

8. As akasa becomes soiled in the eye of the inexperienced, so does atman become soiled in the eye of the ignorant.

29. As in dream the mind acts as if dual in character, through the power of maya, so in the waking condition also it acts in the same manner through the same cause.

30. The mind though appears as dual in dream, so also in the waking condition it, though single, appears dual through illusion.

31. The whole of duality, of whatever form, is simply a phenomenon of the mind, for it is never experienced when the mind is naught.

32. When it ceases from imagining, by a knowledge of the truth of Atman, it becomes naught, and remains at rest for want of things to cognize.

33. Thought is declared ever free from all imaginings, unborn, inseparable from the knowable, and Brahman is the sole object of this thought—the unborn knows the unborn.

31. The condition of mind in trance (the mind that is under perfect control), and therefore free from imaginings, and all light, should be carefully distinguished from sleep, for, it is not like it.

35. In sleep the mind is simply overpowered, nor so in trance (turiya), for then it has become fearless Brahman, all effulgence.

37. It is beyond all kind of expression, free from all conception, all

peace, eternal light, in samadhi, ever immovable, and above fear.

38. In that where no concepts arise there is nothing to apprehend or give up. Then thought is centred in atman—thought, formless and all peace.

47. That happiness is described as centred in itself, all peace, containing liberation within itself, indescribable, the most sublime, the one unborn, (not apart from) the cognized, ever unborn in its turn, and itself that which is all thought (Brahman).

IV. Alataśanti Prakaraṇa (of Quenching the Fire-Brand)

10. All jivas are by nature free from descriptude and decay, the very thought of these in any of the jivas believing themselves subject to them, is equal to an abandonment of their nature (vijñānam).

45. Thought (vijñānam)—all peace and one, the ever unborn, immoveable and immaterial, appears as admitting of creative motion, and material existence.

46. Thus, neither is mind produced, nor are objects; those who know this are never deceived into false knowledge.

47. As motion makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked etc., so motion makes thought appear as perceiver.

49. The appearance of the torch in motion do not come from without, nor do they result in anything other than the torch at rest, though they do not appear to enter it.

50. They do not go out of the torch because they are not of the class of substance. The same applies to thought (vijñāna) in as much as appearance is common to both.

54. Thus objects are not born of the mind, nor the mind born of objects. The wise thus betake themselves to absolute non-evolution, the entire negation of causality.

56. As long as there is faith in causality, the world is eternally present; this faith being destroyed, the world is nowhere.

57. Everything is produced by the power of avidyā and nothing therefore is eternal. Everything again is unborn, being inseparable from *sat* and there is nothing therefore like destruction.

72. The whole experience consisting of perceiver and perceived is merely an imagination of the mind; hence the mind is described as not in relation with objects, eternal and absolute.

79. As belief in the unreal attaches the mind to the unreal, knowledge of absolute non-evolution frees it from relativity and burns it away from the unreal.

80. The immutable condition is reached when the mind frees itself from relativity and self-objectivization. This indeed is the field of the wise. It is the unconditioned, unborn and one.

81. The ever unborn, awake and dreamless, illumines itself of itself; it is the ever-illuminated by its very nature.

87. Duality consisting of object and subject is a creation of the external senses; and the same without object but consisting of subject is also nothing else than another phase of the senses.

That which has neither subject nor object is that which is beyond experience—the wise call these three—knowledge, knowable and the absolute.

94. Those who always rely on separateness never see the light; those who maintain the reality of separateness, are bound to separateness and are therefore called narrow-minded.

99. Thought in the enlightened whose effulgence is everywhere never relates itself to objects, nor do attributes of knowledge relate themselves to anything.

Chapter 9

Buddhist Texts

Buddhism

According to tradition the teachings of the Buddha were compiled and grouped under three major divisions—*Vinaya*, the code of conduct in the monastic order, *Sutta*, the general teaching and *Abhidhamma*, the abstruse metaphysical, ethical and psychological tracts. The *Abhidhamma* tracts are assumed to have been composed during the third century B.C. The *milindapanha*, “The Questions of Milinda” was probably composed in the first century A.D. Buddhaghosa wrote his *Visuddhimagga* “The Path of Purification” in the fourth century A.D. Anuruddha is said to have composed his *Abhidhammattha-sangaha* around 700 A.D.

In the various tracts belonging to the *Abhidhamma* group there is a great amount of material of psychological interest. Attempts have been made in these tracts to analyse, classify and define mental processes. They have an empirical approach since Buddha gave up the concepts of God and Atma, the soul. They looked upon man as a body-and-mind compound and analysed this compound into its component parts.

Thus the outstanding features of early Buddhism are its analytic character, empirical approach and the predominantly psychological basis of its analysis.

At any moment of experience we are aware only of some sensation, perception, feeling or emotion. Buddha admitted the existence of these transient sensations and thoughts and denied the existence of an unchanging entity, the self, to which these sensations and thoughts are said to belong. To him the self is an unwarranted assumption. Thus he admitted only the states of consciousness but not the mind. The sensations and the thoughts, together with the physical frame with which they are associated, constitute the self. It is an aggregate or *samghata*. This aggregate is sometimes described as *nama-rupa*. By *nama* is meant the psychical factors constituting the aggregate and by *rupa* the physical body. This compound signifies the psycho-physical organism.

There is another description of this aggregate based upon a closer analysis of the psychical factors involved. According to this view the self is conceived as five-fold. The five *Kandhas* are *rupa*, the body,

vedana, the object experience, *sanna*, perception, *vinna*, the self-consciousness and *sankhara*, the mental dispositions and the volitional organization. Thus four out of the five *skandhas* stand for the psychological elements of the self.

That the self is only an aggregate, a *samghata*, is well brought out in the conversation between the king Milinda and the Buddhist sage Nagasena. It is shown by Nagasena that word 'chariot' is a mere symbol for the parts assembled together in a particular way. Nagasena shows that the word 'self' is also only a label like the word 'chariot' for the aggregate of certain physical and psychological factors.

This aggregate is constantly changing. It is not the same for even two moments like the stream of water or the "self-producing and self-consuming" flame. It is a ceaseless movement without any underlying constancy. It is a process. Though Buddhism denies unity in the sense of identity, it recognizes continuity.

The five *khandas* always occur together, and the interaction of these *khandas* is designated the person, the *puggala*, something put together and which separate. He is only a form without substance. Personality is a process, without an underlying person. The *puggala* is neither the same as the *khandas* nor different from them. The analogy of two bundle of faggots which stand up when put one against the other is used to indicate that the human constitution has two major aspects—the body along with *Vedana*, *sanna*, *samkhara* and the *vinna*, the self-consciousness. The simile of the flame is used to explain the continuity of this process. There is continuous activity in the flame but there is no underlying substance.

Sensation (*vedana*) is partly physical and partly psychological. So it belongs to the realm of *nama*, but its base is in the *rupa*. *Vedana* is thus not merely physiological; it includes also feelings and emotions; the *Vedana* are classified as being pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent.

Perception (*sanna*) is entirely psychological. It involves 'knowing the object well'. It follows sensation but it goes beyond it. It also includes conceptual processes, and the process of naming the object.

Sankhara is the Pali term for the Sanskrit term *samskara*. It is essentially an activity involving arrangement and formation. It brings together and integrates all the other four *khandas*. It involves effort and volition. These volitional tendencies are grouped under three heads: bodily, vocal and mental.

The awareness of all these processes is *vinna* or *chitta*, the continuous stream of consciousness. It includes both the sensory and

ideational aspects.

Six variable factors occurring in particular experiences are identified: *vitakka*, initial application; *vichara*, sustained application; *adhimokka*, decision; *viriya*, effort; *piti*, interest, and *chanda*, the desire to act, or *sankalpa*, resolve.

Buddhist thinkers, like the Hindu thinkers, place a great emphasis upon the three defects leading a man to peril: *raga* (attachment), *dvesha* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion). Inordinate attachment leads a person to be discontent, unstable, ambitious and proud. Aversion leads to anger, envy and aggression. Delusion leads to idleness, obstinacy, indecision etc. These tendencies can be corrected by faith (*shraddha*) and rational thinking (*buddhi*). Faith promotes in one honesty, generosity, pleasantness etc. Rational thinking makes one tolerant, amiable, moderate, alert and active.

The practical teaching of Buddhism follows the theoretical analysis. If all things in the world are transitory and unsubstantial, our desire to run after them is due to delusion. We should get rid of our craving for things which is based on ignorance. Our ignorance can be dispelled by the "Four Noble Truths"—those concerning suffering, its origin, its removal and the way to remove it. From ignorance proceeds desire: desire leads to activity; activity leads to further desires. This is the vicious circle of *samsara*—the *bhava chakra* or the wheel of existence.

There is a cause for suffering; it follows that suffering can be destroyed if the cause is removed. When ignorance is dispelled by right knowledge, the succeeding links of the chain are snapped. Suffering can be removed by the eight-fold path of self-discipline—right faith, right resolve, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right thought and right concentration, mere understanding of this is not enough. Right knowledge, *prajna*, should be accompanied by conviction and self-reliance. It cannot be attained by the guidance of any external authority, human or divine. Knowledge can become an internal certainty when there are *sila* and *samadhi*. Truth cannot be realised without control of thought and action. *Shila* means right conduct; it includes virtues like veracity, contentment and *ahimsa*, *samadhi* is meditation. It enables one to secure tranquility of mind and gain a clear insight into the truth. *Prajna*, *shila* and *samadhi* are the three requirements to remove suffering.

The goal of self-discipline is the attainment of *nirvana*. When it is reached the constant procession of the five-fold aggregate disappears once for all. Thus, salvation consists in rebuilding ourselves so that the

passions and limited interests of common life are extinguished and we are enabled to lead a life of peace and equanimity.

The extracts are from the following books:

1. *Dhammapada*, translated by S. Radhakrishnan, Oxford University Press, 1950.
2. *Buddhist Sutras*, translated by T.W. Rhys Davids, *Sacred Books of the East*, Oxford University Press, Vol. XI, 1881.
3. *Buddhist Texts through the Ages*, Edward Couze (ed), Oxford, 1954.
4. *Buddhism in Translation* by Henry Clark Warren, Harvard Oriental Series, 1915.
5. *The Questions of King Milinda*, translated by Rhys Davids, *Sacred Books of the East*, Volumes 35 and 36, 1890.

DHAMMAPADA*

I. 1. (The mental natures are the result of what we have thought, or chieftained by our thoughts, or made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, sorrow follows him (as a consequence).

2. ... If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him (in consequence) like a shadow that never leaves him.

5. Not at any time are enmities appeased here through enmity but they are appeased through non-enmity. This is the eternal law.

7. As the wind throws down a tree of little strength so indeed does Mara (the tempter) overthrow him who lives looking for pleasures, uncontrolled in his senses, immoderate in eating, indolent, and of low vitality.

8. As the wind does not throw down a rocky mountain, so Mara indeed does not overthrow him who lives unmindful of pleasures, well controlled in his senses, moderate in eating, full of faith (in the Buddha, the law, and the Samgha or community), and of high vitality.

13. As pain breaks through an ill-thatched house, so passion makes its way into an unreflecting mind.

14. As rain does not break through a well-thatched house, so passion does not make its way through a reflecting mind.

II. 4. If a person is reflective, if he rouses himself, if he is evermind-

* Extracts from Radhakrishnan, S. *Dhammapada*, Oxford University Press, 1950.

ful, if his deeds are pure, if he acts with consideration, if he is self-restrained and lives according to law, his glory will increase.

8. When the wise man drives away sloth by strenuous effort, climbing the high tower of wisdom, he gazes sorrowless on the sorrowing crowd below. The wise person gazes on the fools even as one on the mountain peak gazes upon the dwellers of the plain (below).

9. Earnest among the slothful, awake among the sleepy, the wise man advances as a racehorse does, leaving behind the track.

III. 3. The control of thought, which is difficult to restrain, fickle which wanders at will, is good; a tamed mind is the bearer of happiness.

4. Let the wise man guard his thought, which is difficult to perceive, which is extremely subtle, which wanders at will. Thought which is well guarded is the bearer of happiness.

V. 3. The fool is tormented thinking 'these sons belong to me', 'this wealth belongs to me'. He himself does not belong to himself. How then can sons be his? How can wealth be his?

8. That deed is not well done, which, having been done, brings remorse, whose reward one receives weeping and with a tearful countenance.

9. But that deed is well done, which, having been done, does not bring remorse, whose reward one receives delighted and happy.

XVI. 6. From enjoyment arises grief, from enjoyment arises fear. To one who is free from enjoyment there is no grief. How (then can there be) fear?

7. From desire arises grief, from desire arises fear. To one who is free from desire there is no grief. How (then can there be) fear?

8. From craving arises grief, from craving arises fear. To one who is free from craving there is no grief. How (then can there be) fear?

XXIV. 1. The craving of a thoughtless man grows like a creeper. Like a monkey wishing for fruit in a forest he bounds hither and thither.

3. He who overcomes in this world this fierce craving, difficult to subdue, sorrows fall off from him like water drops from a lotus leaf.

5. As a tree, even though it has been cut down, grows again if its root is firm and uninjured, even as if the adherences of craving are not destroyed, this suffering returns to us again and again.

16. Craving increases more to a creature who is disturbed by thoughts, full of strong passions, yearning for what is pleasant: he indeed makes his fetters strong.

17. He who delights in quieting his thoughts, always reflecting, dwell on what is not pleasant, he will certainly remove, nay, he will cut

the bonds of death.

XXV. 13. There is no meditation for one who is without wisdom, no wisdom for one without meditation; he in whom there are meditation and wisdom, he indeed is close to nirvana.

19. That mendicant is said to be calmed who has a calmed body, a calmed speech, and a calmed mind, who is well-established, who has rejected the baits of the world.

20. Rouse yourself by your self, examine your self by your self. Thus guarded by your self and attentive you, mendicant, will live happy.

21. For self is the lord of self; self is the refuge of self, therefore curb yourself even as a merchant curbs a fine horse.

DHAMA - CHAKKA - PRAVATTANA — SUTTA*

(The foundation of the kingdom of righteousness)

There are two extremes, O Bhikkus, which the man who has given up the world ought not to follow—the habitual practice, on the one hand, of those things whose attraction depends upon the passions and especially of sensuality. . . fit only for the worldly-minded—and the habitual practice, on the other hand, of asceticism (or self-mortification), which is painful, unworthy and unprofitable.

There is a middle path, O Bhikkus, avoiding these two extremes, a path which opens the eyes and bestows understanding, which leads to peace of mind, to the higher wisdom, to full enlightenment, to Nirvana.

It is the noble eight-fold path: that is to say: Right views; Right aspirations; Right speech; Right conduct; Right livelihood; Right effort; Right mindfulness and Right contemplation.

Now this, O Bhikkus, is the noble truth concerning sufferings. Birth is attended with pain, decay is painful, disease is painful, death is painful. Union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is separation from the pleasant. Any craving that is unsatisfied, that too is painful. (Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta, II.2)

It is through not understanding and grasping the four noble truths, O brethren, that we have had to run so long, to wander so long in this weary path of transmigration.

And what are these four?

* Extracts from T.W. Rhys Davids (translator) *Buddhist Suttas, Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XI, 1881.

The noble truth about sorrow; the noble truth about the cause of sorrow; the noble truth about the cessation of sorrow and the noble truth about the path that leads to that cessation.

Now this, O Bhikkus, is the noble truth concerning the origin of suffering—It is the thirst (or craving) causing the renewal of existence, accompanied by sensual delight, seeking a satisfaction now here, now there,—that is to say, the craving for the gratification of the passion or the craving for success.

Now this, O Bhikkus, is the noble truth concerning the destruction of suffering—It is the destruction in which no passion remains, of this very thirst; the laying aside of, the getting rid of, the being free from, the harbouring no longer of this thirst.

Now this, O Bhikkus, is the noble truth concerning the way which leads to the destruction of sorrow. Verily, it is this noble eight-fold path.

HINAYANA*

The Five Mental States Helpful for Enlightenment

1. *Faith*. And what, monks, are the defilements of the mind? Greed and covetousness, malevolence, anger, malice, hypocrisy, spite, envy, stinginess, deceit, treachery, obstinacy, impetuosity, arrogance, pride, conceit, indolence. If a monk thinks and knows that these are defilements of the mind and gets rid of them, he becomes possessed of unwavering confidence. (Majjhima Nikaya, I. 36).

2. *Vigour*. These are the four right efforts : a monk generates desire, endeavours, stirs up vigour, exerts his mind and strives that (i) evil unwholesome mental states that have not arisen should not arise; (ii) evil unwholesome mental states that have arisen should be got rid of; (iii) wholesome mental states that have not arisen should arise; (iv) wholesome mental states that have arisen should be maintained, preserved, increased, matured, developed and brought to completion. Herein many of my disciples have reached full perfection through super knowledge (Digha-Nikaya, III. 22).

3. *Mindfulness*. There is this one way, monks, for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrows and griefs, for the going down of sufferings and miseries, for winning the right path, for realizing Nirvana, that is to say the four applications of mindfulness. What are the

* Extracts from Conze, Edward, (Ed) *Buddhist Texts through the Ages*, Oxford, 1954.

four? Herein, monks, a monk lives contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending it and mindful of it; likewise the feelings in the feelings; likewise mind in the mind; likewise mental states in mental states so as control the coveting and dejection in the world.

And how does a monk live contemplating the body in the body? . . . in mindful he breathes out. Whether he is breathing in a long or a short breath, he comprehends that he is breathing in a long or a short breath. Similarly when he is breathing out. He trains himself thinking: "I shall breathe in. I shall breathe out, clearly perceiving the whole (breath) body; I shall breath in, breathe out, tranquilising the activity of the body."

And how does a monk live contemplating the feelings in the feelings? When he is experiencing a pleasant or a painful feeling or one that is neither painful nor pleasant, either in regard to what is temporal or spiritual, he comprehends that he is doing so.

And how does a monk live contemplating the mind in the mind? He comprehends the mind which has passion and that which has none as such, which has hatred and that which has none as such, which has confusion and that which has none as such; he comprehends the collected mind, the distracted mind as such; the mind which has become great and that which has not as such; the mind which has some other or no other (mental state) superior to it; the mind which is concentrated or that which is not as such; he comprehends the mind which is freed or that which is not freed as such. . . It is thus that a monk lives contemplating the mind in the mind.

And how does a monk live contemplating mental states in mental states? In the first place he does so from the point of view of the five hindrances. He comprehends that he either has or has not an inward desire for sense-pleasures; also any desire that he has not had for them before likewise the getting rid of a desire for them that has arisen; and if there is no future uprising of desire for them, he comprehends that, when ill-will is inwardly present in him, or restlessness and worry, or doubt, he comprehends that (as he comprehended the desire for sense pleasures). (*Majjhima Nikaya*, I. 55 ff).

4. *Concentration*. "Unflinching vigour I have stirred up, clear mindfulness I have aroused. My body impassible, calm, to my mind concentrated and one-pointed. Aloof from pleasure of the senses, aloof from unwholesome states of mind. I entered into and abided in the first jhana which is accompanied by initial thought and discursive thought, is born of aloofness and is rapturous and joyful. By allaying the initial and

discursive thought with the mind inwardly tranquilized and fixed on the point, I entered into and abided in the second jhana which is devoid of initial and discursive thought, is born of concentration and is rapturous and joyful. By the fading out of rapture, I dwelt with even-mindedness, mindful and clearly conscious; and I experienced with the body that joy of which the Ariyans say: 'Joyful lives he who is even-minded and joyful', and I entered into and abided in the third jhana. By getting rid of joy, by getting rid of suffering, by the dying down of my former pleasures and sorrows. I entered into and abided in the fourth jhana which has neither suffering nor joy, and is entirely purified by even-mindedness and mindfulness.

This was the first knowledge attained by me in the first watch of that night; ignorance was dispelled, knowledge arose, darkness was dispelled, light arose even as I abided diligent, ardent, self-resolute. This was my first successful breaking forth, like a chick from the egg.

5. *Wisdom*. As the lion, king of beasts, is reckoned chief among animals, for his strength, speed and bravery, so is the faculty of wisdom reckoned chief among mental states helpful to enlightenment. The faculty of faith, of vigour, of mindfulness, of concentration, of wisdom; each conduces to enlightenment. (Samyutta Nikaya, V. 227)

What is the faculty of wisdom? Whatever is the wisdom that is comprehension, investigation, investigation of mental states, discernment, discrimination, differentiation, cleverness, skill, subtlety, clear understanding, thought, examination breadth, sagacity, leading insight, clear consciousness, which is as a goad, the wisdom that is wisdom as a faculty as power, as sword, as terraced heights, as light, effulgence, splendour, as a jewel; lack of confusion, investigation of mental states, right view—this is the faculty of wisdom (Dhammasangani, 16)

Conditioned by ignorance are the karma-formations; conditioned by the karma-formations is consciousness; conditioned by the consciousness is mind and body; conditioned by mind and body are the six sense-fields; conditioned by the six sense fields is impression; conditioned by impression is feeling; conditioned by feeling is craving; conditioned by craving is grasping; conditioned by grasping is becoming; conditioned by becoming is birth; conditioned by birth there come into being ageing and dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair. Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. (Vinaya pitika I.1)

And what is grasping? There are four **graspings**: after sense-pleasures, after speculative view, after rite and **custom**, after the theory of self.

And what is craving? There are six classes of craving: for material shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, touches and mental objects.

And what is feeling? There are six classes of feelings: feeling due to visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, physical and mental impact.

And what is impression? There are six classes of impression: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, physical and mental.

And what are the six sensory fields? The field of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind.

And what is mind-and-body? Feeling, perception, volition, impression, wise attention: this is called mind. The four great elements and the material shape derived from them. This is called body. Such is mind and such is body. This is called mind-and-body.

And what is consciousness? There are six classes of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, physical and mental consciousness.

And what are the karma-formations? There are three: karma formations of body, of speech, of thought.

And what is ignorance? Whatever is the unknowing in regard to suffering, its arising, its stopping and the course leading to its stopping—this is called ignorance. (Majjhima Nikaya, I. 49-54)

Consciousness. That which we will and that which we intend to do and that with which we are occupied, this is an object for the support of consciousness. If there is an object there is a foothold for consciousness.

But if we neither will nor intend to do and are not occupied with something, there is no object for the support of consciousness; hence no foothold for it.

That which we will and that which we intend to do and that with which we are occupied is an object for the support of consciousness. If there is an object there is a foothold for consciousness.

Conditioned by mind-and-body are the six sense fields. Conditioned by these is impression. . . Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. (Samvutta Nikaya, II. 65-66)

Feeling. If one experiences a feeling that is pleasant, painful or neither painful nor pleasant, he comprehends that it is impermanent, not coveted, not welcomed, and unfettered he experiences these feelings. If it is a feeling limited to the body, or limited to the life-principle, he comprehends that he is feeling such a feeling. And he comprehends that, at the breaking up of the body at the end of his life-time, all that has been felt here, but not delighting him will become cool. (Majjhima

Nikaya, III. 244).

Craving. Impression is one dead-end, its arising the other, its stopping is in the middle, craving is the sempstress, for craving sews one to the production of this or that becoming.

The past is one dead-end, the future the other, the present is in the middle, craving is the sempstress.

Pleasant feeling is one dead-end, painful feeling the other, feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant is in the middle, craving is the sempstress.

Mind is one dead-end, body the other, consciousness is in the middle craving is the sempstress. (Anguttara Nikaya, III. 399).

Grasping. An uninstructed ordinary person is not wisely reflecting if he thinks: "In the past was I, was I not, what was I, what was I like, having been what was I?" Or if he thinks: "In the future will I be, will I not be, what will I be, what will I be like, having been what will I be?" Or if he is subjectively doubtful now is the present and thinks: "Am I, am I not, what am I, what like, whence has this being come, where going will it come to be?"

To one who is thus not wisely reflecting, one of six speculative views may arise as though it were real and true: "There is self for me, there is not self for me; simply by self am I aware of self, simply by self am I aware of not self, simply by not-self am I aware of self" or he may have a speculative view such as this: "What self or mind that speaks and knows, which experiences now here, now there the results of karma that was lovely or evil, that self of mine is permanent, stable, eternal, it will stand fast like unto the eternal". This is called speculative view, holding a speculative view. Fettered by this fetter, the ordinary uninstructed person is not freed. . . from grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair. I say that he is not freed from suffering. (Majjhima Nikaya, I. 8)

When ignorance has been got rid of and knowledge has arisen, one does not grasp after sense-pleasures, speculative views, rites and customs, the theory of self. (Majjhima Nikaya, I. 67)

Nirvana. Now what, your reverence, is Nirvana?"

"Whatever is the extinction of passion, of aversion, of confusion, this is called Nirvana."

"Is there a course for the realization of this Nirvana?"

"This Ariyan eightfold Way itself is for the realisation of Nirvana." (Samyutta Nikaya, IV. 251)

Monks, there are these two elements of Nirvana: the Nirvana-ele-

ment with the groups of existence still remaining, and the Nirvana-element without these groups remaining. Of what kind is the former? As to this, monks, a monk is an Arahant whose outflows are extinguished, who has lived the life, done what was to be done, laid down the burden, attained his own goal, the fetter of becoming utterly extinguished, released by perfect gnosis. In him the five sense-organs still remain; and as they have not yet departed he experiences through them what is pleasing and displeasing and undergoes happiness and suffering. Whatever is his extinction of passion, of aversion, of confusion, this, monks, is called the Nirvana element with the groups of existence still remaining.

And what, monks, is the Nirvana-element without the groups of existence still remaining? As to this, monks, a monk is an Arahant whose outflows are extinguished, who has lived the life, done what was to be done, laid down the burden, attained his own goal, the fetter of becoming utterly extinguished, released by perfect gnosis. Here itself, monks, all that has been felt, but not delighting him, will become cool. This, monks, is called the Nirvana-element that is without the groups of existence still remaining. (Itivuttaka, 38-39)

EGO AND SENSATION*

"In the above case, Ananda, where it is said, "Sensation is my Ego," reply should be made as follows: "Brother, there are three sensations: the pleasant sensation, the unpleasant sensation, and the indifferent sensation. Which of these three sensations do you hold to be the Ego?"

"Whenever, Ananda, a person experiences a pleasant sensation, he does not at the same time experience an unpleasant sensation, nor does he experience an indifferent sensation; only the pleasant sensation does he then feel. (Similarly regarding an unpleasant sensation, and an indifferent sensation.)

"Now pleasant sensations, Ananda, are transitory, are due to causes, originate by dependence, and are subject to decay, disappearance, effacement and cessation; and unpleasant sensations, Ananda, are transitory, are due to causes, originate by dependence, and are subject to decay, disappearance, effacement and cessation. While this person is experiencing a pleasant sensation, he thinks, "This is my Ego." And after the cessation of this same unpleasant sensation, he thinks, "My

* Extracts from *Buddhism in Translations* by Henry Clarke Warren, Harvard Oriental Series, 1915.

Ego has passed away.' While he is experiencing an unpleasant sensation, he thinks, 'This is my Ego'. And after the cessation of this same unpleasant sensation, he thinks, 'My Ego has passed away.' And while he is experiencing an indifferent sensation he thinks, 'This is my Ego'. And while he is after the cessation of this same indifferent sensation, he thinks, 'My Ego has passed away.' So that he who says, 'Sensation is my Ego,' holds the view that it is pleasant, unpleasant or mixed and that it is subject to rise and disappearance.

Accordingly, Ananda, it is not possible to hold the view, "Sensation is my Ego."

"In the above case, Ananda, where it is said, "Verily, neither is sensation my Ego, nor does my Ego have no sensation. My Ego has sensation; my Ego possesses the faculty of sensation." Reply should be made as follows: "Suppose, brother, that utterly and completely, and without remainder, all sensation were to cease—if there were nowhere any sensation, pray would there be anything, after the cessation of sensation, of which it could be said, "This am I"?"

"Nay, verily, Reverend Sir."

Accordingly, Ananda, it is not possible to hold the view. "Verily, neither is sensation my Ego, nor does my Ego have no sensation. My Ego has sensation; My Ego possesses the faculty of sensation."

"From the time, Ananda, a priest no longer holds the view that sensation is the Ego, no longer holds the view that the Ego has no sensation, no longer holds the view that the Ego has sensation, possesses the faculty of sensation, he ceases to attach himself to anything in the world, and being free from attachment, he is never agitated, and being never agitated, he attains to Nirvana in his own person; and he knows that rebirth is exhausted, that he has lived the holy life, that he has done what it behoved him to do and that he is no more for this world." (Digha Nikaya).

This is not my ego

Perceiving "this is not mine; this am I not; this is not my ego" the learned and noble disciple conceives an aversion for form, conceives an aversion for sensation, conceives an aversion for perception, conceives an aversion for the predispositions, conceives an aversion for consciousness. And in conceiving this aversion he becomes divested of passion, and by the absence of passion he becomes free, and when he is free he becomes aware that he is free; and he knows that rebirth is exhausted, that he has lived the holy life, that he has done what it

behaved him to do, and that he is no more for this world. (Samyutta Nikaya)

“Accordingly, O priests, as respects all form whatsoever, past, future, or present, be it subjective or existing outside, gross or subtile, mean or exalted, far or near, the correct view in the light of the highest knowledge is as follows: “This is not mine; this am I not; this is not my Ego”. (Maha Vagga)

“Just as, O priests, heat comes into existence and flame into being from the friction and concussion of two sticks of wood, but on the separation and parting of these two sticks of wood the heat springs from those two sticks of wood ceases and comes to an end: in exactly the same way, O priests, a pleasant sensation originates in dependence on contact with pleasant objects: but when that contact with pleasant objects ceases, the feeling sprung from that contact ceases.

Perceiving this, O priests, the learned and noble disciple conceives an aversion for contact, (sensation, perception, the predispositions and consciousness). (Samyutta Nikaya)

“If consciousness abides, O priests, it is because of a seeking from that it abides, and supported by form, and resting in form and taking delight therein, it attains to growth, increase and development.

If passion form, O priests, is abandoned, then through the abandonment of passion the support is cut off, and there is no resting place for consciousness. If passion for sensation. . . for perception. . . for the predispositions is abandoned, then through the abandonment of passion the support is cut off, and there is no resting place for consciousness.

When that consciousness has no resting place, does not increase and no longer accumulates Karma, it becomes free; and when it is free, it becomes quiet; and when it is quiet, it is blissful. and when it is blissful, it is not agitated, and when it is not agitated, it attains Nirvana in its own person (Samyutta Nikaya)

“O priests, abandon all wish, passion, delight, desire, seeking attachment, mental affirmation, proclivity, and prejudice in respect of form. Thus will form be abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree, and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future.” (Samyutta Nikaya)

Ignorance

What is ignorance? Want of knowledge concerning misery, want of knowledge concerning the origin of misery, want of knowledge concerning the cessation of misery, want of knowledge concerning the path

leading to the cessation of misery.

Respecting this Wheel of Existence it is to be understood that the two factors ignorance and desire are its root; and that this root is two-fold; the root ignorance, deriving from the past and ending with sensation; and the root desire, continuing into the future and ending with old age and death. (Visuddhi-Magga)

Karma

Bodily karma consists of the thoughts of the body, vocal karma of the thoughts of the voice, mental karma of the thoughts of the mind. The object of this triplet is to show the avenues by which meritorious karma etc., show themselves at the moment of the initiation of karma. (Visuddhi-Magga)

Name and Form

By "Name" are meant the three groups beginning with Sensation (i.e., Sensation, Perception, and the Predispositions) by "Form", the four elements and form derivative from the four elements.

Name has no power of its own, nor can it go on of its own impulse, either to eat, or to drink, or to utter sounds, or to make a movement. Form also is without power and cannot go on of its own impulse. It has no desire to eat, or to drink, or to utter sounds, or to make a movement. But Form goes on when supported by Name, and Name when supported by Form. When Name has a desire to eat, or to drink, or to utter sounds, or to make a movement, then Form eats, drinks, utters sounds, makes a movement.

To make this matter clear they give the following illustration:

It is as if two men, the one blind from birth and the other a cripple, were desirous of going travelling. And the man blind from birth were to say to the cripple as follows: "See here! I am able to use my legs but I have no eyes with which to see the rough and the smooth places in the road," and the cripple were to say to the man blind from birth as follows: "See here! I am able to use my eyes, but I have no legs with which to go forward and back." And the man blind from birth, pleased and delighted, were to mount the cripple on his shoulders. And the cripple sitting on the shoulders of the man blind from birth were to direct him, saying, "Leave the left and go to the right; leave the right and go to the left."

Here the man blind from birth is without power of his own, and weak, and cannot go of his own impulse or might. The cripple also is

without power of his own, and weak and cannot go of his own impulse or might. Yet when they mutually support one another it is not impossible for them to go.

In exactly the same way Name is without power of its own, and cannot spring up of its own might, nor perform this or that action. Form also is without power of its own, and cannot spring up of its own might, nor perform this or that action. Yet when they mutually support one another it is not impossible for them to spring up and go on. (Visudhi-Magga)

DISCUSSION OF DEPENDENT ORIGATION

Profound, Ananda, is Dependent Origination, and profound of appearance. It is through not understanding this doctrine, Ananda, through not penetrating it, that thus mankind is like to an entangled warp, or to an ensnarled web, or to munja-grass and pabbaja-grass, and fails to extricate itself from punishment, suffering, perdition, rebirth.

"Ananda, if it be asked, "Do old age and death depend on anything?" The reply should be 'They do.' And if it be asked, "On what do old age and death depend?" The reply should be, "Old age and death depend on birth."

"Ananda, if it be asked, 'Does existence depend on anything?' The reply should be, 'It does.' And if it be asked, 'On what does existence depend?' The reply should be 'Existence depends on attachment.' "

"Ananda, if it be asked, 'Does attachment depend on anything?' The reply should be, 'It does.' And if it be asked, 'On what does attachment depend?' The reply should be, 'Attachment depends on desire.' "

"Ananda, if it be asked, 'Does desire depend on anything?' The reply should be, 'It does.' And if it be asked, 'On what does desire depend?' The reply should be, 'Desire depends on sensation.' "

"Ananda, if it be asked, 'Does sensation depend on anything?' The reply should be, 'It does.' And if it be asked, 'On what does sensation depend?' The reply should be, 'Sensation depends on contact.' "

"Ananda, if it be asked, 'Does contact depend on anything?' The reply should be, 'It does.' And if it be asked, 'On what does contact depend?' The reply should be, 'Contact depends on name and form.' "

"Ananda, if it be asked, 'Do name and form depend on anything?' The reply should be, 'They do.' And if it be asked, 'On what do name and form depend?' The reply should be, 'Name and form depend on consciousness.' "

“I have said that on desire depends attachment, this truth, Ananda, that on desire, depends attachment, is to be understood in this way, suppose, Ananda, there were utterly and completely no desire at all, on the part of anyone for anything, as namely desire for forms, desire for sounds, desire for odours, desire for tastes, desire for things tangible, desire for ideas,—if there were nowhere any desire pray, on the cessation of desire would there be any attachment?”

“Accordingly, Ananda, here we have in desire the cause, the occasion, the origin, and the dependence of attachment.” (Digha Nikaya)

Fruitful and Barren Karma

Fruitful Karma. There are three conditions, O priests, under which deeds are produced. And what are the three? Covetousness is a condition under which deeds are produced; hatred is a condition under which deeds are produced; infatuation is a condition under which deeds are produced.

When a man's deeds, O priests, are performed through covetousness arise from covetousness, are occasioned by covetousness, originate in covetousness, wherever his personality may be there those deeds ripen and wherever they ripen there he experiences the fruition of these deeds, be it in the present life or in some subsequent one. (Similarly with deeds arising through hatred and infatuation).

Barren Karma. There are three conditions, O priests, under which deeds are produced. And what are the three? Freedom from covetousness is a condition under which deeds are produced; freedom from hatred is a condition under which deeds are produced; freedom from infatuation is a condition under which deeds are produced.

When a man's deeds, O priests, are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness, are occasioned without covetousness, originate without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone, those deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra-tree, and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future. (Similarly the deeds performed without hatred and without infatuation.) (Anguttara Nikaya)

Meditation and Nirvana

By conduct is indicated the discipline in elevated conduct; by concentration, the discipline in elevated thoughts; and by wisdom, the discipline in elevated wisdom. By conduct, again, is indicated the avoidance of the extreme called sensual gratification; by concentration,

the avoidance of the extreme called self-torture. By wisdom is indicated the adoption of the middle course of conduct.

By conduct, again, is indicated, the means of escape from the lower states of existence; by concentration, the means of escape from the realm of sensual pleasure; by wisdom, the means of escape from every form of existence. (Visuddhi Magga)

Concentration

What is concentration? Concentration is manifold and various and an answer which attempted to be exhaustive would both fail of its purpose and tend to still greater confusion. Therefore we will confine ourselves to the meaning here intended, and say—Concentration is an intentness of meritorious thoughts. (Visuddhi-Magga)

And what, O priests, is the discipline in elevated concentration?

Whenever, O priests, a priest, having isolated himself from sensual pleasures, having isolated himself from demeritorious traits and still exercising reasoning, still exercising reflection, enters upon the first trance, which is produced by isolation and characterised by joy and happiness; when through the subsidence of reasoning and reflection, and still retaining joy and happiness, he enters upon the second trance, which is an interior tranquilization and intentness of thoughts, and is produced by concentration; when through the paling of joy, indifferent, contemplative, conscious and in the experience of bodily happiness—that state which eminent men describe when they say, “Indifferent, contemplative, and living happily”,—he enters upon the third trance; when through the abandonment of happiness, through the abandonment of misery, through the disappearance of all antecedent gladness and grief, he enters upon the fourth trance, which has neither misery nor happiness, but is contemplation and refined by indifference this, O priests, is called the discipline in elevated concentration.

What advantage, O priests, is gained by training in quiescence? The thoughts are trained. And what advantage is gained by the training of the thoughts? Passion is abandoned. (Anguttara Nikaya)

Wisdom

And what, O priests, is the discipline in elevated wisdom?

Whenever, O priests, a priest knows the truth concerning misery, knows the truth concerning the origin of misery, knows the truth concerning the cessation of misery, knows the truth concerning the path leading to the cessation of misery, this, O priests, is called the disci-

pline in elevated wisdom.

What advantage, O priests, is gained by training in insight? Wisdom is developed. And what advantage is gained by the development of wisdom? Ignorance is abandoned. (Anguttara Nikaya)

The Summum Bonum

“This doctrine to which I have attained is profound, recondite, and difficult of comprehension, good, excellent, and not to be reached by mere reasoning, subtle, and intelligible only to the wise. Mankind, on the other hand, is captivated, entranced, held spell-bound by its lusts; and for as much as mankind is captivated, entranced, and held spell-bound by its lusts, it is hard for them to understand the law of dependence on assignable reasons, the doctrine of Dependent Origination, and it is also hard for them to understand how all the constituents of being may be made to subside, all the substrata of being be relinquished, and desire be made to vanish, and absence of passion, cessation, and Nirvana be attained. If I were to teach the Doctrine, others would fail to understand me, and my vexation and trouble would be great’. (Majjhima Nikaya)

MILINDAPANHA*

Personality

King Milinda. How is your Reverence known, and what, Sir, is your name?

Nagasena. I am known as Nagasena. . . But although parents give such names, yet this is only a generally understood term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality (no self) involved in the matter.

King Milinda. You tell me that your brethren in the order are in the habit of addressing you as Nagasena. Now what is that Nagasena? Is it the hair, the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh etc.?

To each of these Nagasena answered no.

Is it the outward form then (Rupa) that is Nagasena or the sensations (Vedana) or the ideas (Sanna), or the constituent elements (Samkhara) or the consciousness (Vinnana), that is Nagasena?

To each of these also he answered no.

* Extracts from Rhys Davids, T.V *The Questions of King Milinda*, Vols. 35 and 36, *Sacred Books of the East*, 1890.

Nagasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nagasena that we see before us? It is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, an untruth?

Nagasena. How did you come here, on foot or in a chariot? If you came in a carriage, explain to me what it is. Is it the pole that is the chariot or the axle or the wheels or the framework or the ropes, or the yoke etc.?

To all these the king answered no.

Then is it all these parts of it that the chariot? Is there anything outside them that is the chariot?

Still he answered no.

I can discover no chariot. It is a mere empty sound. Is it a falsehood that Your Majesty has spoken, an untruth?

Renunciation

Milinda. What is the object, Sir, of your renunciation and what is the summum bonum at which you aim?

Nagasena. Our renunciation is to the end that this sorrow may perish away and that no further sorrow may arise; the complete passing away, without cleaving to the world, is our highest aim.

Reason and Wisdom

Milinda. What is the characteristic mark of reasoning, and what of wisdom?

Nagasena. Reasoning has always comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off.

How do they reap the barley? With the left hand they grasp the barley into a bunch and taking the sickle into the right hand, they cut it off with that.

Just even so, O King, does the recluse by his thinking grasps his mind, and by his wisdom cut off his failings. In this way is it that comprehension is the characteristic of reasoning, but not cutting off of wisdom.

Good Conduct, Faith etc.

Milinda. What are the good qualities other than reasoning and wisdom?

Nagasena. Good conduct, faith, perseverance, mindfulness and meditation.

Good conduct is the basis of all good qualities, the five moral

powers—faith, perseverance, mindfulness, meditation and wisdom—the seven conditions of Arhatship—self-possession, investigation of the Dhamma, perseverance, joy, calm, meditation and equanimity. . . have each and all of them good conduct (the observance of morality) as their basis. And to him who builds upon that foundation, O King, all these good conditions will not decrease.

Milinda. Venerable Nagasena, what is the characteristic mark of faith?

Nagasena. As faith, O King, springs up in the heart, it breaks through the five hindrances—lust, malice, mental sloth, spiritual pride and doubt and the heart free from the hindrances, becomes clear, serene, untroubled.

Identity

Milinda. He who is born, does he remain the same or become another?

Nagasena. Neither the same nor another. You were once a baby, O King, a tender thing and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?

Is the person who goes to school one, and the same, when he has finished his schooling another?

Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished?

Milinda. Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that?

Nagasena. I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender, tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.

Suppose a man, O King, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through? Is it the same flame that burns? No. Then is there one lamp in the first watch and another in the second? No! Just so, O King, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away: and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same, nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.

Pleasures and Pains

Milinda. Is a pleasant sensation good or evil or indifferent?

Nagasena. It may be anyone of the three.

Milinda. But surely, Sir, if good conditions are not painful and painful one's not good, then there can arise no good conditions that is at the same time painful.

Nagasena. Suppose a man were to hold in one hand a red-hot ball of iron and in the other a lump of icy snow, would they both burn him?

If the heat burns him, since both are not hot, the pain cannot come from the heat. If the cold hurts, since they are not both cold, the pain cannot come from the cold. . . . Thus the pain comes neither from the hot nor from the cold.

The Self

Milinda. Is there, Nagasena, such a thing as the soul—the living principle within which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear. . . . and discerns things through the mind?

Nagasena. I will tell you about the five doors. . . . If the living principle within sees forms through the eye, can it not then see forms not only through the eye but also through each of the other five organs of sense?

If that is not so, then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately.

With windows thrown open and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, (we can) see all kinds of objects passively. Can the living principle do the same where the doors of the eyes are thrown open? Can it hear sounds, experience tastes. . . . and discern things?

If not, then these powers are not united to one another indiscriminately.

Sensation and Thought

Milinda. Does thought-perception (*mano-vinnanam*) arise wherever sight arises?

Nagasena. Yes, where the one arises is there the other. First sight, then thought. But there is no intercourse between the one and the other.

Milinda. Then how is it that thought arises wherever sight does?

Nagasena. Because of there being a habit, because of there being an association. . . . where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.

Milinda. What is the characteristic mark of sensation (*vedana*)?

Nagasena. The being experienced and enjoyed.

Milinda. What is the distinguishing characteristic of idea (*sanna*)?

Nagasena. Recognition. And what does he recognize?—blueness, yellowness, redness, whiteness and brownness. . . . Recognition is the mark of idea.

Milinda. What is the distinguishing characteristic of the conceived

purpose (chetana).

Nagasena. The being conceived and the being prepared.

Milinda. What is the distinguishing characteristic of reflection (Vitakka)?

Nagasena. The effecting of an aim. It is like the case of a carpenter who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of wood. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection.

Milinda. What is the distinguishing characteristic of investigation (Vichara)?

Nagasena. Thrashing out again and again. It is like the beating into shape of a copper vessel.

Individual Differences

Milinda. Why is it that all men are not alike, but some are short-lived and some long-lived, some sickly and some healthy, some ugly and some beautiful, some without influence and some of great power, some poor and some wealthy, some low born and some high born, some stupid and some wise?

Nagasena. Why is it that all vegetables are not alike, but some sour, and some salt and some pungent and some acid, and some astringent and some sweet?

Because they come from different seeds. Just so are the differences among men. . . . It is karma that divides them up into low and high and the like divisions.

Nirvana

Milinda. Is cessation Nirvana?

Nagasena. Yes. All foolish individuals take pleasure in the senses and in the objects of sense, find delight in them, continue to cleave to them. Hence are they carried down by that flood (of human passions), they are not set free. . . . from grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow and despair. But the wise, the disciple of the noble ones, neither takes pleasure in those things, nor finds delight in them, nor continues cleaving to them. His craving ceases, and by the cessation of craving grasping ceases, and by the cessation of grasping becoming ceases, and when becoming ceases. . . . grief, lamentation etc., cease to exist. . . . Thus is it that cessation is Nirvana.

Passion

Milinda. What is the distinction between him who is full of passion

and him who is void of passion?

Nagasena. The one is overpowered by craving and the other not. The one is in want, and the other not. . . . Both of them alike desire what is good to eat. . . . The lustful man, in eating his food enjoys both the taste and the lust that arises from the taste, but the man free from lusts experiences the taste only and not the lust arising therefrom.

Memory

Milinda. By what does one recollect what is past and done long ago?

Nagasena. By memory.

Milinda. Is it not by the mind that we recollect?

Nagasena. Do you recollect any business that you have done and forgotten? Yes. What then? Were you then without a mind? It is the memory that has failed. Then why do you say that it is by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?

Milinda. Does memory always arise subjectively or is it stirred up by suggestion from outside?

Nagasena. Both the one and the other.

Milinda. But does not that amount to all memory being subjective in origin and never artificial?

Nagasena. If there were no artificial (imparted) memory, then artisans would have no need of practice or art or schooling and teachers would be useless. But the contrary is the case.

Milinda. In how many ways does memory spring up?

Nagasena. In sixteen ways — by personal experience or by outward aid or by the impression made by the greatness of some occasion, or by the impression made by joy or by the impression made by sorrow or from similarity of appearance or by difference of appearance, or by the knowledge of speech or by a sign or by the effort to recollect or by calculation or by learning by heart or by meditation or by reference to a book or by a pledge or by association, as when one remembers a thing because one has seen it etc.

The Ripening of Insight

Milinda. There are eight causes of the advance, the ripening of insight. And what are the eight?

Nagasena. The advance of years, the growth of reputation, frequent questioning, association with teachers, one's own reflection, converse with the wise, cultivation of the loveable and dwelling in a pleasant land.

Meditation

Nagasena. Meditation preserves him who meditates, it gives him long life and endows him with power; it cleanses him from faults and removes bad reputation: it destroys discontent: it releases him from all fear endowing him with confidence; it removes sloth and fills him with zeal; it takes away lust, ill-will and dullness; it puts an end to pride; it breaks down all doubt; it makes his heart to be at peace; it softens his mind; it makes him glad; it fills him with delight.

A Loving Disposition

Nagasena. A man who has a feeling of love (towards all beings) sleeps in peace and in peace does he awake. He dreams no sinful dreams. He becomes dear to men and to all beings. Quickly and easily does he become tranquillized.

Dreams

Milinda. Venerable Nagasena, men and women in this world see dreams pleasant and evil, things they have seen before and things they have not, things they have done before and things they have not, dreams peaceful and terrible, dreams of matters near to them and distant from them, full of many shapes and innumerable colours. What is this that men call a dream and who is it who dreams it?

Nagasena. It is a suggestion, O King, coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream.

There are six kinds of people who see dreams—the man who is of a windy humor or of a bilious one, or of a phlegmatic one, or one who dreams by the influence of a goal or by the influence of his own habits or one who does so in the way of prognostication.

Milinda. When a man dreams, is he awake or asleep?

Nagasena. Neither the one nor yet the other. But when his sleep has become light and he is not yet fully conscious, in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, the mind thus shut in does not act, he saw no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.

THE MAHAYANA*

The Perfection of Meditation

His mental activities are associated with the knowledge of all modes

* Extracts from Conze, Edward (Ed.) *Buddhist Texts through the Ages*, Oxford, 1954.

when he enters into meditation. When he has seen forms with his eye, he does not seize upon them as signs of realities which concern him, nor is he interested in the accessory details. He sets himself to restrain that which, if he does not restrain his organ of sight, might give occasion for covetousness, sadness or other evil and unwholesome dharmas to reach his heart. He watches over the organ of sight. And the same with the other five sense-organs,—ear, nose, tongue, body, mind.

Whether he walks or stands, sits or lies down, talks or remains silent, his concentration does not leave him. He does not fidget with his hands or feet, or twitch his face; he is not incoherent in his speech, confused in his senses, exalted or uplifted, fickle or idle, agitated in body or mind. Calm is his body, calm is his voice, calm is his mind. His demeanour shows contentment, both in private and public. . . . He is frugal, easy to feed, easy to serve, of good life and habits; though in a crowd he dwells apart; even and unchanged, in gain and loss; not elated, not cast down. Thus in happiness and suffering, in praise and blame, in fame and disrepute, in life or death, he is the same, unchanged, neither elated nor cast down. And so with foe or friend, with what is pleasant or unpleasant, with holy or unholy men, with voices or music, with forms that are dear or undear, he remains the same unchanged, neither elated nor cast down, neither gratified nor thwarted. And why? Because he sees all dharmas as empty of marks of their own without true reality, incomplete and uncreated. (Sikṣasamuccaya, 202-03, Prajnaparamita)

The Doctrine of Perfect Wisdom

Therefore, O Sariputra, owing to a Bodhisattva's indifference to any kind of personal attainment, and through his having relied on the perfection of wisdom, he dwells, without thought-coverings. In the absence of thought coverings he has not been made to tremble, he has overcome what can upset, in the end sustained by Nirvana. All those who appear as Buddhas in the three periods of time, fully awake to the utmost, right and perfect enlightenment because they have relied on the perfection of wisdom. Therefore one should know the Prajnaparamita as the great spell, the spell of great knowledge, the utmost spell, the unequalled spell, allayer of all suffering, in truth,—for what could go wrong? By the Prajnaparamita has this spell been delivered. (Prajnaparamitahrdaya)

Contemplation of Thought

He searches all around for his thought. But what thought? It is either passionate, or hateful, or confused. What about the past, future or present? What is past that is extinct, what is future that has not yet arrived, and the present has no stability; For thought Kasyapa, cannot be apprehended, inside or outside, or in between both. For thought is immaterial, invisible, non-resisting, inconceivable,

Searching for thought all round, he does not see it within or without. He does not see it in the skandhas, or in the elements, or in the sense-fields. Unable to see thought, he seeks to find the trend of thought and asks himself: Whence is the genesis of thought? And it occurs to him that "where there is an object, there thought arises". Is then the thought one thing, and the object another? No, what is the object, just that is the thought. If the object were one thing, and the thought another, then there would be a double state of thought. So the object itself is just thought. Can then thought review thought? No, thought cannot review thought. As the blade of a sword cannot cut itself, as a finger-tip cannot touch itself, so a thought cannot see itself. Moreover, pressed hard on all sides, thought proceeds, without any staying power, like a monkey or like the wind. It ranges far, bodiless, easily changing, agitated by the objects of sense, with the six sense-fields for its sphere, connected with one thing after another. The stability of thought, its one pointedness, its immobility, its undistraughtness, its one-pointed calm, its non-distractation, that is, on the other hand, called mindfulness as to thought. (Sikshasamuccaya, 233-34)

Not-self, Emptiness and Reality

One may object that the heretics believe in a self which is distinct from the skandhas, and speak of its separate character. But how the heretics (the Sankhya) speak about the separate character of the self, that the Madhyamakavatara (VI, 142) explains as follows:

"The self is imagined by the heretics as essentially permanent. Not a doer, but an enjoyer, without qualities, without activity. And according to which of these characteristics of the self is stressed. According to that do the systems of the heretics differ."

One realizes: it is true that the heretics speak of a self which is distinct from the skandhas. But they describe its mark without having apprehended the true status of the self. They have not understood that it is a merely metaphorical designation, and from fear they do not progress to the insight that the self is nothing but a mere word. In

consequence they fail to see that they deal with what is conventionally true, and, through a wrong thought-construction, deceived by what is a mere semblance of reasoning, in their delusion they falsely imagine a self, and speak of its character.

Not dependent on anything else, which means that with regard to it one does not depend on anything else, that one cannot come to it through someone else's instruction, but that one must discover it for oneself. Those who suffer from an eye disease falsely see things which look like hairs, gnats, flies, etc. Even when instructed by those with healthy eyes, they cannot be brought to see that they can discover the true nature of the hairs, as it actually is, by not seeing them, as those without eye-disease do. They can by instruction only progress far enough to understand that what they see is wrong. It is only when an ointment has taken away the disease from their eyes, and when they have become like people with healthy eyes, that they can discover the true nature of those hairs by not seeing them. Similarly the saints can explain reality by superimposition; but that is not sufficient to allow the unconverted to discover its own-being. But when the eyes of their intelligence are anointed with the ointment of the unperturbed vision of emptiness, which dispels the eye-disease, and when thereby they become people who can cognize true reality, then they can discover for themselves that true reality by not seeing (the multiplicity of things). In this way that true nature of existents, which is not dependent on anything else, is the true reality.

And this is calm in its own-being, which means that it is devoid of own-being. It is like the hairs which are not seen by those with healthy eyes.

In consequence it is unimpeded by discursive ideas. "Discursive ideas" are words which develop meanings. This means 'not expressed by words'.

And that is indiscriminate. Discrimination is the function of thought. Because this is suppressed, the true reality is indiscriminate. As it is said in the Sutra: "What is ultimate truth? Where even cognition no longer functions, how much less verbal expressions". In that sense is it indiscriminate.

'Differentiated' is that which has differentiations, which is multiple. Undifferentiated is that which has no differentiations, is not multiple. (Candrakirti, Prasannapada XVIII).

Chapter 10

Jaina Texts

Jainism

The word Jainism is derived from the Sanskrit root *ji* which means to conquer. The *Jina* is one who has successfully subdued his passions and has obtained mastery over himself. Like Buddhism, Jainism also refuses to believe in a supreme God; but unlike Buddhism, Jainism recognises permanent entities like the self and matter.

The several original works of Jainism were composed around the third century B.C., but according to tradition, it was Devardhi who arranged the texts in Prakrt in the sixth century A.D. One of the greatest Jaina scholars is Umasvati who lived between 135 and 219 A.D. His work *Tattvarthdhigama Sutra* is encyclopedic. He is the first Jaina author in Sanskrit.

The Jainas bring the whole universe under one or the other of two categories: *jiva* and *ajiva*, that is, the conscious and the non-conscious which included not only matter but time and space also. The notion of *jiva* generally corresponds to the *atman* of the other schools of Indian thought. The term shows that it is more biological than metaphysical. The Jainas believe not only that *jiva* exists, but also that it is an experient (*bhokta*) and an agent (*karta*). Its intrinsic nature is one of perfection; it is characterized by infinite intelligence, infinite peace, infinite faith and infinite power. However, during the period of its union with matter, *samsara*, all these features are obscured. The aim of life is to subdue the material constituent in oneself so that the *jiva* is enabled to reveal all its inherent excellences.

The living beings are distinguished by the presence of sense-organs (*Indriyas*), by means of which they interact with the world. The various organisms are classified into different orders; those with only two sense-organs, the tactile and the gustatory, like the worms, shells etc., those with three sense-organs including the olfactory besides the two above, like the ants, bugs etc., those with the fourth sense-organ, namely, the visual; this includes all the higher animals and human beings. Thus the number and nature of the sense organs form the basis of the classification of the organisms, indicating the naturalist point of

view of the system.

It is further recognised that the higher animals and human beings have the faculty of thinking and are termed rational (*samjnin*) in contrast to the lower animals which are described as non-rational (*asamjnin*). The rational animals are equipped with mind (*manas*), the ability to move about and manipulate (*kayabala*), the ability to express themselves with sounds (*vachanabala*) and an elaborate respiratory mechanism (*svasocchvasa*).

The *jiva* is characterized by the presence of consciousness (*chetana*). It is stated that we know this both by introspection (*ahampratya*) and by inference. Doubt presupposes a doubter. Thus this personal experience of doubt is the basis for the attribute of consciousness. All the various psychological processes like cognition, recognition, memory, desire etc., do not belong to the body; they are not present when one is asleep. Thus in the Jaina system the principles of life and consciousness are identical.

According to Umasvati, the essential characteristic of the *jiva* is *Upayoga*, the psychological mode that arises in consciousness for the purpose of apprehending a presented object. It is also interpreted as attention.

Since knowledge is the very essence of the *jiva*, the senses and the *manas*, though they are aids from one standpoint, they are merely limitations from another standpoint. As noted above enlightenment comes when these obstacles are removed. According to this system no self is conceivable without *jnana*, nor *jnana* without a self. When the obstacles are removed the *jiva* becomes omniscient and knows all objects as they are. This is called *kevala-jnana* or absolute apprehension without media or doubt.

Knowledge is of five kinds: perceptual (*matijnana*), verbal (*srtajnana*), clairvoyant (*avadhijnana*), telepathic (*manahpariyaya*) and omniscient (*kevalajnana*). Perceptual cognition involves the operation of the senses and the mind, and is confined to the present. Umasvati makes a distinction between sensory cognition and ideational cognition. Clairvoyance and telepathy give direct and supernormal knowledge without the mediation of sense-organs.

Manas is closely associated with but quite distinct from the sense organs; it is designated *anindriya*, non-indriya. While the sense organs are specific and can grasp only one set of objects, the *manas* can grasp all objects. But it cannot hold objects for a long time. It is unstable.

There is a very interesting discussion regarding the impossibility of

experiencing two sensations simultaneously.

As far as the practical teaching is concerned it places great emphasis on conduct. The three gems of life (tri-ratna) are right faith (samyagdar-sana), right knowledge (samyagnana) and right conduct (samyag-char-ita). The last is the most important, to reach the goal of life. It involves the five vows (vrata), namely, not to injure any living being (ahimsa), not to utter falsehood (satya), not to steal (asatya), to lead a celibate life (brahmacharya) and to renounce the world (aparigraha). The last two refer to the ascetic. . . . For the layman the last two vows are chastity and contentment or strict limitation of one's wants.

The selections are from the following books:

1. *Jaina Sutras*, translated by Hermann Jacobi, *Sacred Books of the East*, Volumes 22 and 45, Oxford University Press, 1884.

2. *Ganadhara Vada* translated by Muni Ratna Prabha Vijaya, Volumes 3 and 4, Sri Jaina Grantha Prakasaka Sabha, Ahmedabad, 1942.

3. Deva Suri's *Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara*, translated by H.S. Bhattacharya, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1967.

4. Umasvati Acarya's *Tattvarthadhigama Sutra*, translated by J.L. Jaini, *Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. II, The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, 1920.

JAINA SUTRAS*

The Acharanga Sutra

I. 2. The (living) world is afflicted, miserable, difficult to instruct, and without discrimination. In this world full of pain, suffering by their different acts, see the benighted ones cause great pain.

For the sake of the splendour, honour, and glory of this life, for the sake of birth, death and final liberation, for the removal of pain, man acts sinfully towards earth or causes others to act so, or allows others to act so. This deprives him of happiness and perfect wisdom.

There are some who, of a truth, know this (i.e., injuring) to be the bondage, the delusion, the death, the hell. For this a man is longing when he destroys this (earth body) by bad, injurious doings and many other beings besides, which he hurts by means of earth, through his doing acts relating to earth.

He who injures these (earth-bodies) does not comprehend and re-

*Extracts from *Jaina Sutras* by Hermann Jacobi, *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol 22, 1884.

nounce the sinful acts; he who does not injure these, comprehends and renounces the sinful acts. Knowing them, a wise man should not act sinfully towards earth, nor cause others to act so, nor allow others to act so. He who knows these causes of sin relating to earth, is called a reward-knowing sage.

3. All beings, those with two, three, four senses, plants, those with five senses, and the rest of creation, (experience) individually pleasure or displeasure, pain, great terror, and unhappiness. Beings are filled with alarm from all directions and in all directions.

II. 1. I have to provide for a mother, for a father, for a sister, for a wife, for sons, for daughters, for a daughter-in-law, for my friends, for near and remote relations, for my acquaintances, for different kinds of property, profit, meals, and clothes. Longing for these objects, people are careless, suffer day and night, work in the right and the wrong time, desire wealth and treasures, commit injuries and violent acts, direct the mind, again and again, upon these injurious doings.

2. A wise man should remove any aversion (to control); he will be liberated in the proper time. Some, following wrong instruction, turn away (from control). They are dull, wrapped in delusion. While they imitate the life of monks, (saying), "We shall be free from attachment", they enjoy the pleasures that offer themselves. Through wrong instructions the (would-be) sages trouble themselves (for pleasures); thus they sink deeper and deeper in delusion, (and cannot get) to this, nor to the opposite shore. Subduing desire by desirelessness, he does not enjoy the pleasures that offer themselves. Desireless, giving up the world, and ceasing to act, he knows, and sees, and has no wishes because of his discernment; he is called houseless.

3. Therefore a wise man should neither be glad nor angry (about his lot): thou shouldst know and consider the happiness of living creatures.

III. 4. That man (i.e., the liberated) conquers wrath, pride, deceit, and greed. This is the doctrine of the Seer who does not injure living beings and has put an end (to acts and to samsara).

He who knows wrath, knows pride; he who knows pride, knows deceit; he who knows deceit, knows greed; he who knows greed, knows love; he who knows love, knows hate; he who knows hate, knows delusion; he who knows delusion, knows conception; he who knows conception, knows birth; he who knows birth, knows death; he who knows death, knows hell; he who knows hell, knows animal existence; he who knows animal existence, knows pain.

Therefore, a wise man should avoid wrath, pride, deceit, greed, love,

hate, delusion, conception, birth, death, hell, animal existence, and pain.

There are five causes which render wholesome discipline impossible; egoism, delusion, carelessness, illness and idleness.

JAINA SUTRAS* (Lecture XIV)

“Pleasures bring only a moment’s happiness, but suffering for a long time, intense suffering, but slight happiness; they are an obstacle to the liberation from existence, and are a very mine of evils.”

“I have this, and I have not that; I must do this, and I should not do that: while he talks in this strain, the robbers (viz., time) drag him away. What foolishness is this!”

“As fire is produced in the Arani-wood, as butter in milk and oil in sesamum seed, so, my sons, is the self produced in the body; (all these things) did not exist before, they came into existence, and then they perish; but they are not permanent.”

“(The self) cannot be apprehended by the senses, because it possesses no corporeal form, and since it possesses no corporeal form it is eternal. The fetter of the soul has been ascertained to be caused by its bad qualities, and this fetter is called the cause of worldly existence”.

“Those who have enjoyed pleasures, and have renounced them, move about like the wind, and go wherever they please, like the birds unchecked in their flight.”

XXI. One should keep the five great vows viz., not to kill, to speak the truth, not to steal, to be chaste, to have no property whatever; a wise man should follow the law taught by the Jinas.

A monk should have compassion on all beings, should be of a forbearing character, should be restrained and chaste, and abstaining from everything sinful; he should live with his senses under control.

In utter indifference he should walk about, and bear everything, be it pleasant or unpleasant; he should not approve of everything everywhere, nor care for respectful treatment or blame.

A great sage should be neither too elevated by pride nor too humble, he should not care for respectful treatment nor blame: an ascetic who has ceased (to act), will by means of his simplicity enter the path of Nirvana.

* Extracts from *Jaina Sutras* Tr. Hermann. Jacobi, *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. 45, 1884.

He is neither grieved nor pleased (by anything) he abandons his relation with men, he ceases (to act), is intent on the benefit of his soul, he strives for the highest good (viz., mukti) and uses the means to reach it, free from sorrow, egoism, and any kind of property.

XXIII. "By vanquishing one, five are vanquished; by vanquishing five, ten are vanquished; by this tenfold victory I vanquish all foes."

Kesi said to Gautama: "Whom do you call a foe?" To these words of Kesi, Gautama made the following reply:

"Self is the one invincible foe, (together with the four) cardinal passions (viz., anger, pride, deceit, and greed, they are five) senses (make ten) These (foes), O great sage I have regularly vanquished."

Kesi said to Gautama: 'What do you call fetters?'

To these words of Kesi, Gautama made the following reply:

"Love, hatred, etc., are heavy fetters, attachment is a dangerous one; having regularly destroyed them, I live up to the rules of conduct".

XXVIII. Learn the true road leading to final deliverance, which the Jinas have taught; it depends on four causes and is characterised by right knowledge and faith.

1. Right knowledge; 2. Faith; 3. Conduct; and 4. Austerities; this is the road taught by the Jinas who possess the best knowledge.

I. Knowledge is fivefold: 1. Sruta, knowledge derived from the sacred books; 2. Abhinibodhika, perception; 3. Avadhi, supernatural knowledge; 4. Manahparyaya, knowledge of the thoughts of other people; 5. Kevala, the highest, unlimited knowledge.

1. Jiva, Soul; 2. Ajiva, the inanimate things; 3. Bandha, the binding of the soul by Karman; 4. Punya, merit; 5. Papa, demerit; 6. Asrava, that which causes the soul to be affected by sins; 7. Samvara, the prevention of asrava by watchfulness; 8. The annihilation of Karman; 9. Final deliverance; these are the nine truths (or categories).

He who verily believes the true teaching of the (above nine) fundamental truths, possesses righteousness.

XXXII. Love and hatred are caused by Karman, and they say that Karman has its origin in delusion; Karman is the root of birth and death, and birth and death they call misery.

Misery ceases on the absence of delusion, delusion ceases on the absence of desire, desire ceases on the absence of greed, greed ceases on the absence of property.

Pleasant things (by themselves) do not cause indifference nor emotions (as anger, etc.); but by neither hating or loving them, a man undergoes such a change through delusion.

Anger, pride, deceit, greed, disgust, aversion to self-control and delight in sensual things, mirth, fear, sorrow, carnal desire for women, men or both; all these manifold passions arise in him who is attached to pleasures: and so do other emotions produced by those (before mentioned) arise in him who is to be pitied, who (ought to be) ashamed of himself, and who is hateful.

GANADHARA VADA*

The Self

(O Indrabhuti of Gautama race!) You have a doubt about (the existence of) Jiva (the soul) since it is not directly perceived (by senses) as in the case of *ghata* (a water-jar). Whatever is absolutely imperceptible does not exist in the world, e.g., a flower in the sky.

If (the soul) is not an object of 'anumana' (inference); for, this ('anumana') too, is preceded by 'pratyaksha' and is the outcome of the recollection of the (inseparable) connection previously observed in the case of a 'linga' (a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a 'lingin' (one having such a linga).

O Gautama! The soul is indeed pratyaksha to you also; for, (your) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc. is itself the soul. What is 'pratyaksha', should not be proved, e.g., weal and woe in one's body.

Or, this soul is 'pratyaksha' owing to this 'ahampratyaya' (realization as 'I' in 'I did, I do, and I shall do' the 'pratyaya' which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses.

When there is no soul, how do you admit 'aham' (the realization as 'I')? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this 'aham-pratyaya' justifiable?

The soul which is 'gunin,' is self-evident owing to its 'gunas' being so (self evident) as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the 'gunas' only, the 'gunin' e.g., the pitcher, too, is realized.

The 'gunin' viz., the soul is certainly 'pratyaksha', because its 'gunas' such as 'smriti' (remembrance) 'jijnasa' (desire for knowledge) 'cikirasha' (desire for action) 'jigamisa' (desire for movements), and doubt, etc., which are different kinds of knowledge are self evident, as they are experienced by oneself.

Objection. You may believe that there is the 'gunin' but that it is not

*Extracts from Muni Ratna Prabha Vijaya, *Ganadhara Vada*, Vols. III & IV, Sri Jaina Grantha Prakasaka Sabha, Ahmedabad, 1942.

distinct from a body. The 'gunas' like knowledge etc., are observed in a body; so that (body) alone is fit to be their 'gunin'.

Answer. Knowledge etc., are not the 'gunas' of a body, as it is 'murta' (corporeal) etc., like a 'ghata'. Therefore, that (object) which has knowledge etc., as its 'gunas', is the soul which is separate from the body.

Thus this (soul) is partially 'pratyaksha' to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to (my) knowledge being unobstructed (infinite). (So) accept (the existence of the soul).

The soul exists in another's body, too; for, he too, like your self, performs desirable activities and refrains from the undesirable ones, and you, who act accordingly, have a soul. To put it explicitly, one in whom are seen indulgence in desirable acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds, has a soul, as is the case with one's (your) body.

Just as, in this world a blacksmith is the 'adatr' (grasper).

Thus Gautama! know the soul as one having 'upayoga' (attention) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs.

That 'upayoga' (attention) by means of which the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body. The 'upayoga' has maximum and minimum scales. Therefore they (souls) are infinite in number.

On oneness (being accepted in the case of souls) there will not be liberation, etc., owing to (the soul) being all-pervading, as is the case with the space. Moreover, like space, the soul will not be a 'kartru' (a doer), a 'bhoktaru' (an enjoyer), a 'mantru' (thinker) and a 'samsarin' (a mundane being).

Therefore, a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liberation, happiness, misery, mundane existence, and metemorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all pervading.

Just as a sprout has a seed for its 'hetu' (because it is a 'karya') So, there is 'hetu' for happiness and misery owing to their being a 'karya' (an action).

How could the 'amurta' (soul) be supported or damaged by the 'murta' (Karman)? (the answer is—) In the way as 'vijnana' etc., (damaged or supported) by a drink of wine, medicine etc.

Agnibhuti. In fact, the 'amurta atman' cannot feel joy or sorrow as an 'anugrah' (favour) or 'upaghata' (offence) by virtue of a 'murta karman'. Just as the 'amurta akasa' is neither supported nor damaged by the 'murta' sandalwood or fire flame.

Acarya. Desire for discussion of 'vijnana', moral courage, remem-

brance etc., are the 'amurta' qualities of soul. These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison, etc., and are nourished by taking the 'murta' drugs which contain milk, ghee, sugar candy etc. So the 'amurta jiva' is also nourished or weakened by the 'murta Karman'.

Consciousness (Chetana)

Your presumption is that consciousness (chetana) is produced from the collection ('samudaya') of 'bhutas' like 'prithivi' etc., because like intoxication ('mada') though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection (of those constituents) just as intoxication though not present in each separate constituent of wine ('madya'), is produced in the collection of these constituents, and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness ('chaitanya') is also produced in the collection of 'bhutas' and perishes as time passes.

Consciousness (chetana) can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sands if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication (mada) is not absolutely absent even in an individual constituent of wine. (For), every constituent of wine possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing insanity, producing satiety and quenching thirst etc., in its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the bhutas separately), it could be (found) in the collection (also).

Consciousness and Sense Organs

Like a man who perceives (an object) from five windows and recalls (it) to his mind, 'chetana' being itself (the quality) of an object different from them (i.e., bhutas) perceives (an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form of bhutas) and recalls (the object) to his mind.

Cognition (mati) which constitutes the knowledge of 'ghata' etc., belongs to something which is distinct from sense organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness etc., the object perceived by the 'indriyas' is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognised.

Desire and Self

The first desire (of the child) to suck the breasts (of the mother) is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same) experience. And that desire is distinct from body.

Vayubhuti. The 'hetu' stated in the above named 'anumana', involves the fault of uncertainty as all 'abhilasas' are not the same, e.g., an 'abhilasa' for 'moksha' does not resemble another 'abhilasa' for 'moksha'. So why not believe the same in the case of this 'abhilasa' also?

The Acarya. You have not understood the point, O Gautam! The point is that we have compared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly in the case of 'mokshabhilasa' also, the 'mokshabhilasa' should not be compared with other 'mokshabhilasas' but only with other 'abhilasas' in general.

Feelings and Emotions

Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present day happiness, because of its 'anubhutimayatva'. Now, the happiness to which this 'balasukha' resembles, is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished. Moreover, sukha is a 'guna', which cannot exist without the support of 'gunin' which, too, is distinct from body. This proves that the soul is possessed of 'anubhuti' of happiness. According to the same argument, we can prove that 'atman' possesses the 'anubhuti' of 'dukha', 'raga', 'dvesha', 'bhaya', 'soka' etc. Now, the 'anumanas' that have already been laid down to establish the existence of 'jiva' and 'kaman' are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory.

Self not Perceivable

An argument may here be advanced that 'If you take 'Atman' to be existent, how do you apprehend its existence?' The reply is:

The existence of Atman is established by means of 'anumana'. And hence, its 'anupalabdhi' is not the 'anupalabdhi' of a non-existent object like a 'kharasruna' but it is the 'anupalabdhi' of an existent object like 'nabhas' and 'paramanu'. Then, the distinction of soul from body is established by the help of 'Vedavachana'.

Perception of Objects Compared to Dream Perception

Just as, in a dream, a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants, and horses, or treasures of jewellery and gold, but actually he does not possess them and just, as, under the illusion of the Indra-jala, precious things e.g., dishes (made) of gold, silver, jewels etc., or

beautiful objects, e.g., parks, flowers, fruits etc., are perceived by us; but as a matter of fact, they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an *Indrajala*.

Causes of Dreams

(Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing (of an object), ill-health (*prakrutivikara*) a deity, watery place, meritorious act, and sin—these are the prominent causes (*nimittas*) of dream. So it is not non-existent.

Thus, it is clear that a 'svapna' is brought about by one of the above mentioned 'nimittas'. And hence, 'svapna' is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of one or more 'nimittas'. In this way, when the dream itself is existent, how can you call the world to be non-existent like 'svapna'?

The existence of dream is (apprehended) either because dream is *vijnanmaya*' (i.e., full of knowledge) like the knowledge of 'ghata', or because it is 'naimittika' (i.e., caused by 'nimitta') like 'ghata' as mentioned before.

Existence of dream can be proved in either of these two ways:

1. Dream is full of cognizance as 'ghata' is. So, like 'ghata' dream can also be perceived on account of its being existent.

2. As 'ghata' is caused by various 'nimittas', dream is also caused by 'nimittas', like 'anubhava', 'smarana', 'chintana' etc., that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a 'murta karya', and hence existent like 'ghata'.

Self and Sense-Organs

Sense-organs have no power of perception on account of (their being) 'murta' etc., like 'ghata'. They are mere mediums of perception. 'Jiva' is their (real) agent of perception.

Since 'indriyas' are 'murta' and 'a-chetana' like 'ghata', they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is 'Atma' which is altogether different from 'indriya' in this way.

By virtue of recollection, even when the sense-organs are pacified, and an account of non-perception, even (when the sense organs) are at work, the agent of perception is (recognized) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows.

Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the self which is the agent of perception, is

different from the sense-organs. Because, even when 'indriyas' are not at work, the self is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the self is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived in spite of 'indriyas' being at work.

Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, an account of the recollection by means of (its) relations of the past or on account of any (other) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the self.

Simultaneous Experience of Two Sensations Not Possible

It was autumn and the water of the river was cold. So, while crossing the river his bald head felt heat from sunshine, and his feet felt cold due to the river-water being cold.

At this time, under the influence of *nithyatva nohaniya* (wrong belief caused by delusion), Gangacharya disbelieved the principle of Agamas that two processes of sensation could never take place simultaneously and thought that he felt the sensations of heat and cold at the same time. He reported the viewpoint to his preceptor and declared that the principle of the Agamas (that two processes of sensation could never take place simultaneously) was false on the ground that it was contrary to the actual experience which he had undergone.

In support of his theory, (which is really speaking nothing but misapprehension) Gangacharya argues as follows:

"Since my head felt hot due to sunshine, and my feet felt cold at the same time due to cold waters running beneath, I felt both the sensations simultaneously. It is clear, therefore, that the process of undergoing both the feelings are working simultaneously. This is supported by my practical experience."

Acarya Dhanagupta: Feeling of two sensations does not actually take place simultaneously as you represent, but both the sensations are felt one after the other. You are not able to mark such a process, because the period of interval between the two different experiences is extremely short, and the mind, which feels the two sensations one after the other, is fickle and subtle by its very nature. Your apprehension of the practical experience undergone by your own self, is therefore wrong and hence your theory is baseless.

Mind, subtle and quick (as it is) becomes the cause of perception, only with regard to those sense-organs with which it is connected and that (period of) time (only) during which (the perception takes place). So, two processes in the form of feeling heat and cold at head and feet

respectively, could not take place simultaneously, owing to the two places being extremely remote.

Perception

Acarya Ganga. Since there is a wide difference between 'samanya jnana' or general knowledge, which apprehends a definite sensation like that of heat or cold, they may not be taken to have been attained simultaneously. But since there is no difference in various 'visesa jnanas,' what harm is there in accepting a number of 'visesa jnanas' to have been attained simultaneously.

Since 'Samanya' or general apprehension (constitutes) a number of subjects on account of various distinct characteristics, (there is) no (possibility of) 'visesa jnanas' or definite cognitions being attained at the same time without attaining it. Then, definite apprehension attained after general apprehension, recognizes their distinction. Such an interdependence of 'samanya' and 'visesa' continues till final distinction.

A number of 'visesa jnanas' could never be attained simultaneously. There are various reasons for this.

Firstly, because there is a clear distinction between various characteristics such as those of heat, cold etc., their respective 'jnanas' could not be attained simultaneously.

Secondly, general apprehension contains a number of subjects. So, without its apprehension, the 'visesa-jnana' or cognition in particular, could never be attained. On account of this reason also, many 'visesa jnanas' are not attained at the same time. After apprehending a general sensation, one ascertains it as particular by saying that "there is a sensation of cold on my feet." Even in (case of) head, after apprehending a general sensation, one ascertains it in particular by saying that "Here I feel the sensation of heat."

DEVA SURI PRAMANA-NAYA-TATTVALOKALAMKARA*

Relation between a Word and Its Object

7. *Commentary.* What is the relation between the word and the object signified by it?

It cannot be one of Identity (tadatmya). A word is a sound, so that if a word and an object were essentially the same, all objects would have consisted only in sounds or all sounds would have been embodied in

*Extracts from the translation by H.S. Bhattacharya, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1967

concrete objects; in other words, the world would have been full of sounds only. . . .

Is the relation between a word and its object one of production (*tadutpatti*)? This is obviously an absurd view. If a word were sufficient to produce its corresponding object, no one in the world would ever have been in want of anything.

Next, the relation between a word and an object cannot be said to be one between the signifier and the signified (*vachya-vachaka*). For, it may be questioned; What is the relationship? Is it identical with the nature of the signifier and the signified? If so, we have signifier and the signified and not the alleged relationship.

9. Does the relationship arise from the word and the object? If it does, then a man who is unacquainted with the significance of meaning of a word would nevertheless understand the object on hearing the word.

10. It may be contended that the general nature (*samanya*) of a thing, i.e., its class-essence, and not the particular aspect of the thing, is what is signified by a name. . . . In our perception, what we come across is the particular and never the class-essence. Further, a word leads us to make effort. A class-essence is only an idea. One wants to have the particular which is above the real. A thirsty man goes to have not the class-essence but a particular quantity of water.

If you say that a word signifies neither the general nature nor the particular aspect alone but both the '*samanya*' (class-essence) and the *visesa* (the particular mode), our objection still remains valid; the *samanya* is neither real nor an object of perception.

A word is the naming of a concept and conception is ideation and does not touch the real; the ideation in conception also involves naming. Words and conceptions are thus mutually dependent on each other and words never touch the real object.

2. *Commentary*. Knowledge from a word is direct without any mediation. There is direct knowledge of object from the word as in the case of a perception of a coin whether it is real or counterfeit.

Objection. In that case a foreigner who does not understand the language of a particular country would be able to understand the object signified by a word, simply by hearing the word.

Answer. In order to understand an object signified by a word, mere hearing of the word is not enough. That presupposes an understanding of the meaning of a word, obviously the foreigner does not know the meaning of the word and this accounts for his failure to understand the

object signified by the word. But this does not mean that the knowledge of things derived from words is obtained by inference. The perception about a coin is also dependent on previous instructions from others. He does not consciously take the aid of the previous instructions.

So the knowledge from the word is always direct and immediate. It is only when he forgets the previous instruction that he has to use inference.

8. *A statement consists in letter-sounds, words and sentences.*

9. *Letter-sounds, e.g., 'A' etc., are atomic.*

Commentary. The Jainas hold that sounds are atomic i.e., modes or products of matter. So they are impermanent.

Objection. A word (sound) is related to the object it signifies. When the word is used it must be understood to signify that object. Now, if the word (sound) be held to be impermanent, its use for others becomes impossible; for, the word with its relation to the object has already vanished, when it is being used for others.

Answer. This argument is utterly unsound. A similar argument would lead to the doctrine of the eternity and one-ness of the objects also.

If the word cow, for instance, is applied to a particular cow and is thereby related to it, it cannot be applied to any other cow, you cannot avoid the difficulty by saying that a word means, not a particular thing, but the general essence (samanya) underlying that thing and the objects of the same class. The object signified by a word cannot be an unsubstantial something like 'class-essence'; it is always the 'class-essence-as-particularized-in-an-individual' (samanyavisesatmaka).

Accordingly a word is not an eternal self-existent sound.

A word is the class-essence (samanya) underlying it and expressing itself in and through its similar modes (though different in each case), embodying itself in the particular and thus signifying the corresponding object.

11. *A word signifies its object by means of both its natural force (svabhavika samarthya) and applied meaning (samabhyam).*

Commentary. The 'samaya' or the conventional meaning is the meaning applied to a word by man. It is thus subject to the will of man. The will of man, however, cannot be allowed to determine the nature of the relationship of things and phenomena.

Each word has its natural (svabhavika) power to express a meaning; this power is otherwise called 'yogyata'.

A word signifies, its corresponding object because it has both a 'yogyata' and a 'samaya' or 'samketa'.

12. *Its natural function is, like light, to reveal objects; but whether the revelation is correct or not, depends on the competency or the incompetency of man.*

Commentary. Just as light reveals all objects near it, a word when uttered by a speaker produces in the minds of the hearer, an idea of an object, no matter whether it is real or false, consistent or inconsistent. This is the natural force or function of a word.

Whether a word correctly represents reality or not depends on the fact whether the speaker is truthful and pure in character or a false and deceitful person. If a speaker is possessed of right faith and is pure in character and conduct, his hearer would get from his words ideas of reality exactly as it is.

The Nature of Sense-Organs (Indriyas)

Commentary. An indriya has two aspects: (i) Dravyendriya, the material sense-organ and (ii) Bhavendriya, the psychical functioning. The Bhavendriya, again, is either 'labdhi', which consists in the annihilation etc., of the knowledge-obscuring obstacles and thus makes the soul fit to have knowledge, or 'upayoga' which is an active tendency on the part of the self to attend to the object of its knowledge.

As knowledge is impossible without the 'upayoga', cognition arises only when the self actually operates towards it. If the 'indriya' is to be regarded as a valid means of knowledge, it must be understood to be in its aspects of 'upayoga', a physical operation and not the gross material sense-organ.

At the time of deep sleep there is no perception, although the material sense-organs are there. Why? Because the self is inactive then.

Direct Knowledge of the Self

I. 16. *The certain knowledge of the self consists in the clear illumination of the self, just as that of the outside thing. I know the young elephant along with myself.*

Commentary. This sutra indicates that the self is knowable just as any outside object. The knowing process also is as much knowable as any outside object.

I. 17. *Admitting that the outside (object) as the object of knowledge is knowable, who will not admit that like the sun-light, knowledge itself is knowable too?*

Commentary. The sun-light which reveals mountains, cities and forests etc., is admittedly self-revealing. In the same manner it is to be

admitted that knowledge which reveals all objects is itself self-revealing. The knowing process is an operation, of which the knower is conscious. Knowledge is self-conscious.

Just as the light in a lamp when generated is generated with the characteristic of illumination, knowledge also, when generated, is generated along with its nature of self-consciousness.

Nature of Perception

Commentary. The sensuous perception is so called because in its production the peripheral sense organs like the eye etc., are operative. The mind functions in the production of 'sensuous' perceptions as well as of the 'internal' perception. In the production of the sense-perception the operation of the peripheral sense-organs is the additional and distinguishing factor Internal or mental perceptions are independent of sense-operations and are due to the functioning of the 'anindriya' or the 'manas'.

The sense-organs, except the sense of vision, come into contact with the objects in producing perceptions of those objects (prapyakari). Admittedly the three peripheral sense-organs, of smell, touch and taste come in contact with the objects of perception. The perception of a sound is also due to the sense of hearing coming in actual contact with the basis of sound which is too subtle to be obstructed by such gross things as doors, just as the perception of a smell is due to the sense of smelling coming in actual contact with the basis of smell which is too subtle to be obstructed by such gross things as doors. Accordingly the sense-organ of hearing is 'prapyakari' like that of smell. It is pointed out that the intensity of a sound varies according to the distance between the source of sound and our organ by hearing. This also proves that our perception of a sound is dependent on a contact of the sound waves with the organ of hearing.

The visual sense-organ, however, is not 'prapyakari', there is no contact between the eyes and their objects. The organ of vision generates vision without coming in contact with its object. A thing may not be visible when substances like a tree screen it off from our view; but it is well-known how a thing can be seen through such gross and compact substances as glass and water. This shows that the vision is effected not by an actual contact between the seeing organ and the object seen but by that it is due to a peculiar capacity (sva-yogyata) inherent in the eye. It is this which enables the eyes to see objects even in darkness.

II. 6. *Each of these two (perceptions, sensuous and nonsensuous) has four modes, viz., 'grasp', 'attention', 'determination' and 'retention'.*

II. 7. Grasp (avagraha) consists in the perception of a thing in its lesser general aspect, which immediately follows or arises from the apprehension of the thing in its aspect of mere existence, which apprehension again results as soon as the object of knowledge and the organ perceiving are placed in fit positions.

Commentary. Visaya or an object of perception has two aspects, viz., general and particular. 'Avagraha' or grasp is the first stage of perception. It arises when an object and a sense-organ are so placed that a correct perception is possible, the very first impression that we get is that something exists outside us. . . . The impression is that 'something is'. 'Avagraha' is the next stage to this crudest impression and helps us to perceive some details like 'it is a man, a beast or some other object'.

II. 8. *Attention or inquisitiveness (iha) consists in the impulse to enquire into the details of the object grasped.*

Commentary. Attention helps in finding out further details like who the man is or what the animal is.

II. 9. *Determination (avaya) is determining the details attended to.*

II. 10. *That being firm-fixed is 'retention' (dharana).*

Commentary. When one, instead of forgetting the details determined in the above manner, persists in keeping them before the mind's eye for some time, he is said to 'retain' them.

Perception is complete when the stage of retention is reached. Retention generates what is called 'samskara', a stable impression, whereby a recollection of what is perceived is made possible.

II. 18. *The transcendental (paramarthika) perception, on the other hand is dependent on the self alone for its genesis.*

II. 19. *That is either partial (vikalam) or complete (sakalam).*

II. 20. *The partial is of two kinds, clairvoyance (avadhi) and telepathy (manahparyaya)*

Commentary. Clairvoyance consists in a clear perception of the form of material objects.

II. 22. *Telepathy has for its object the mental substance and its modes.*

II. 23. *The complete (sakalam) is pure knowledge consisting in a direct cognition of all substances and their modes.*

Commentary. The complete or pure knowledge is omniscience, kevalajnanam.

II. 24. *Arhat is possessed of that as he has no faults*

Commentary. The Arhat is possessed of omniscience as he is devoid of the 'faults' of attachment, hatred and ignorance.

Other Cognitive Processes

III. 1. *Paroksa (non-perceptive knowledge) is not clear (aspastam).*

Commentary. The paroksa pramana or indirect knowledge is wanting in clearness.

2. *It is of five kinds: Recognition (smarana), Conception (pratyabhijnana), Induction (tarka), Deduction (anumana) and Authoritative knowledge (agama).*

3. *Recognition (smaranam) is the recollection of an object cognized before, in the form, 'it is that' and is due to the waking up of an impression.*

Commentary. The self has the characteristic to have or retain a samskara or impression. When this samskara wakes up (probodha) or comes up before it once more for yielding the fruit, we have recognition. . . . The object of recognition is an object cognized before.

5. *Conception (pratyabhijna) is due to apprehension and recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge (of the thing) with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics.*

Commentary. The characteristics may be either 'samanya' or generalities which make a thing similar to others, or features which distinguish it from others.

The 'samanya' again may be either 'tiryak-samanya' or 'urdhvata-samanya'. The former is the group of characteristics which make a thing similar to the other members of its species, like 'cow-ness'. The latter is the immutable substratum which persists in and through varied modifications of a thing like the clay in a cup, a doll etc.

All these three classes, the two general and the unique characteristics are the subject matter of the 'pramana pratyabhijna' or assimilation.

7. *Knowledge of the form—'this being, this is etc.,'—arising from a critical examination of the facts observed and non-observed and consisting in the establishment of relationship, which subsists in all the three times, such as the relationship between the 'proven' and the 'mark', 'tarka' or induction, otherwise known as 'uha'.*

9. *Commentary.* 'Anumana', inference or deduction is so called because it is knowledge which is based on a previous (anu) cognition of

the 'mark' and a recollection of the relation between the 'mark' and the 'proven' and which consists in a determination (mana) of the object, subsequent to that previous cognition.

Attributes and Modes of Self

IV. 7. *An attribute (guna) is co-existent with the nature (of a thing) as, for instance, the actual and the potential knowledge etc., in a self.*

8. *A Mode (paryaya) is the evolute, as, for instance, the feelings of pleasure, of pain etc*

Commentary. Attributes are what co-exist with, i.e., are always present in the object. Consciousness, cognition, happiness, power etc., are the attributes of a self, because no self is ever without them. Modes, on the contrary, are the evolving and as such, transient and temporary aspects of the object. Pleasure, pain, glee, sorrow etc., which come and go are the modes in a self.

The Nature of the Self

VII. 55. *The subject of all forms of valid cognition is the self, as known by direct perception etc.*

Commentary. The subject of all knowledge is the self (atma). It is so called because it always goes through one or other of its various modes (paryayas). The existence of the self is proved by the pramanas both pratyaksa (direct) and paroksa (indirect) according to the Jaina school.

Objection. The Charvaka philosophers deny the existence of a permanent conscious soul. Only earth, water, fire and air are the four primordial principles; when these principles combine in a peculiar way, so as to form a body, they produce consciousness; there is no permanent soul which persists through the various births and re-births. In the said material elements taken individually no consciousness is found but they reveal or make explicit consciousness in their combination. Rice etc., do not show any intoxicating power in them at first; but when they ferment they have an intoxicating power; in the same way the above mentioned elements reveal consciousness.

Answer. That which is existent before can alone be revealed or made explicit. If the material elements when they form a body reveal or make explicit consciousness, consciousness must be supposed to be existent in the material elements from the beginning.

Opponent. Then you admit that the intoxicating power becomes explicit when rice, water etc., are combined.

Answer. What is implied is that the intoxicating power is something

generated by rice etc., at the time of their combination. . . . It is not admitted that intoxicating power becomes explicit. To become explicit means to become perceptible; a thing which becomes explicit is accordingly supposed to be existent even before it becomes explicit. But there is no evidence to show that this intoxicating power is existent in rice etc., before they are combined. Intoxicating power cannot thus be said to be explicit or revealed. Hence the example of intoxicating power is incompetent to show how consciousness becomes explicit.

Consciousness cannot be said to be the essential characteristic of body or of a sense organ. . . . Units of consciousness are effects as they emerge from time to time. All effects must have a substratum. What then is the substratum of consciousness? Material elements or bodies cannot be the substratum. . . . Accordingly we are compelled to point something else, i.e., the soul as the substratum.

The Buddhist theory that the soul is nothing but the series (parampara) of successive moments of consciousness cannot be accepted since it makes recollection (smarana) and conception (pratyabhijna) impossible.

56. The soul is essentially consciousness: undergoes modifications, is a doer (of acts): is the direct enjoyer (of the fruits of its acts); is of the same extent as the body; is different in each individual and being attached to material elements has births and deaths.

Commentary. The above are the characteristics of the soul. It consists in consciousness and consciousness is cognition of old, things having form or no form. It undergoes modification every moment. It is active and always does acts which determine its future; it enjoys pleasure etc., directly.

UMASVATI ACHARYA'S TATTVATHADHIGAMA SUTRAS*

- VI. 1. Yoga is the activity of body, speech and mind.
2. Yoga is the inflow of karmic matter into the soul.
3. Inflow (is of two kinds): good, of virtue or meritorious karma; bad, of vice or demeritorious karmas.
4. (Souls) affected with the passions have mundane (inflow). (Those) without the passions have only transient (inflow).
6. The differences in inflow arise from differences in: intensity (of

*Extracts from the translation by J L. Jaini, *Sacred Books of the Jainas*, Vol II, The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, 1920

desire), mildness, intentional character of the act, unintentional character of the act, dependence, and power to do the act.

12. Compassion for all living beings, compassion for those who have taken vows charity, self-control with attachment, etc., contemplation, forgiveness, and contentment — these are the causes of the inflow of pleasure-bearing karmic matter.

VII. 1. The vow is to be free from violence (himsa), falsehood, theft, unchastity and worldly attachment.

3. For the fixing of these five vows in the mind, there are five meditations for each.

4. The five meditations (for the vow against violence) are carefulness of speech, carefulness of mind, care in walking, care in lifting and laying down things, and thoroughly seeing to one's food and drink.

5. The five meditations (for the vow against falsehood) are giving up anger, greed, cowardice and frivolity, and speaking in accordance with the scriptural injunctions.

6. The five meditations (for the vow against theft) are residence in a solitary place, residence in a deserted place, residence in a place where one is not likely to be interfered with by other, purity of alms, and not disputing with disciples of the same faith as to "mine" and "thine".

7. The five meditation (for the vow against unchastity) are renunciation of hearing stories inciting attachment for women, renunciation of seeing their beautiful bodies, renunciation of remembrance of past enjoyment of women, renunciation of aphrodisiacs, and renunciation of beautifying one's own body.

8. The five meditation (for the vow against worldly attachment) are giving up of love and hatred for the pleasing and displeasing object of the senses.

11. One must meditate upon compassion for all living beings, delight at the sight of beings more advanced than ourselves (on the path of liberation), pity for the afflicted, and indifference toward those who mistreat you.

12. For the apprehension of the miseries of the world and renunciation of sense-pleasures, we should meditate upon the nature of the world and our physical bodies.

VIII..1. The causes of bondage are wrong belief, non-renunciation, carelessness, passions and union (yoga) of the self with the mind, body and speech.

2. The self, owing to its being with passion, assimilates matter, which is fit to form karmas. This is bondage.

PART III

SOCIAL, MEDICAL AND AESTHETIC SOURCES

Chapter 11

Mahabharata Shantiparva

The Mahabharata is a national epic which has appealed to people in all parts of the country and at all levels of education and culture. It conserves in a collected form all the ancient beliefs and traditions. It is so comprehensive in its scope that it is called the fifth Veda. It describes the great war waged between two branches of one royal family in ancient times. The persons and incidents portrayed in the epic have greatly influenced the national character. Children learn the stories of these heroic deeds from their mothers and grandmothers.

It is generally agreed that Vyasa composed this epic around 500 B.C. The Bhagavad Gita forms part of this great epic, as also the Shantiparva.

While the Bhagavad Gita describes the conflict in Arjuna just before the great war started, Shantiparva describes the conflict in Yudhishthira after the war was fought and victory won. Just as Krishna consoles and helps Arjuna to regain his equanimity, Bhishma consoles and helps Yudhishthira, to regain his equanimity. Thus both the Gita and the Shantiparva are exercises in analysis of conflicts and in restoration of mental health.

Shantiparva asserts that all beings desire pleasure (sukham) and avoid pain (dukham). But both pleasure and pain are ephemeral (anitya). The goal of human endeavour is to attain a state in which man accepts pleasure or pain with calm and composure. It is Dharma or righteousness which helps a man to attain such a stable condition and obtain perfect satisfaction. It also helps him to get liberation. Dharma is the means to attain Moksha. Dharma also helps to promote and preserve social solidarity. "Whatever is not conducive to social welfare or what you are likely to be ashamed of doing, never do." Bhishma enumerates nine duties common to all men (sadharana dharma).

Dharma consists of the fulfilment of ethical and ideal needs, Artha of the material needs and Kama of the sensual needs of man. These

three are identified as the principal motivating forces around which the whole life and conduct of man revolves. Therefore the management and conduct of his social and individual life is formulated in terms of these three kinds of urges and they are linked up with the attainment of liberation, Moksha.

Arjuna is pained when he learns that his brother Yudhishthira desires to renounce his emperorship and retire to the forest to lead the life of a mendicant. Arjuna stresses the value of wealth to secure happiness for oneself and prestige in society. Vyasa shows that idleness ends in misery while labour and skill lead to affluence and prosperity. Success springs from work. No one is competent to avoid work. The causes of all mental sorrows are two: delusion of mind and accession of distress.

Bhishma asserts that in the beginning there was no King nor any Chastiser. At that time all men used to protect one another. It is when men became covetous, and sought to obtain the possessions of others, when they became unrestrained in their sexual indulgence, when rajas and tamas gained control over sattva, that government and kingship came to be established. The task of the leader is to see that righteousness prevails in society through rewards and punishments. People will obey rules and regulations when all men are looked upon "with an equal eye".

Destiny as well as exertion both determine achievement in life. But the man who depends upon destiny achieves nothing while he who exerts himself can achieve great feats. It is the man who possesses presence of mind and who provides for the future that enjoys happiness.

No one is a foe nor anyone a friend. It is the force of circumstances that creates friends and foes. There is nothing like a permanent state of friendship or permanent state of hostility. A friend may become a foe and a foe a friend. This is true in individual relations and also in relations between nations. "He who reposes blind trust on friends and always behaves with mistrust towards foes without paying any regard to considerations of policy, finds his life to be unsafe".

The selections in this Chapter are from the translation of Pratap Chandra Roy (Calcutta, Bharata Press, 1890).

I. Renunciation

(After the great Mahabharata War, Yudhishthira was greatly overpowered by grief in having caused to be killed relatives on both sides. He addressed Arjuna and said that he would like to renounce his kingdom and lead the life of a mendicant as atonement.)

Yudhishtira. Full of pride and arrogance, through covetousness and folly and from the desire of enjoying the sweets of sovereignty we have fallen into this plight.

This race of ours has been exterminated. Having slain those whom we should never have slain, we have incurred the censures of the world Having slain them, our wrath has been pacified. But the grief is stupefying me! O Dhananjaya, a perpetrated sin is expiated by auspicious acts, by repentance, by penances, by sojourn to 'tirthas' after renunciation of everything, by constant meditation. (Sec. 7)

Arjuna. I grieve to see this great agitation of thy heart, since having achieved such a superhuman feat, thou art bent upon forsaking this great prosperity!

He that would live by mendicancy, cannot, by any act of his, enjoy the good things of earth. Divested of prosperity and without resources, he can never win fame on earth. If, O King, abandoning this swelling kingdom, thou livest in the observance of the wretched mode of life led by a mendicant, what will the world say of thee? . . . Thou art born in this race of kings. Having won by conquest the whole earth, wishest thou from folly to live in the woods after abandoning everything of virtue and profit.

It is seen that a poor man, even when he stands near, is accused falsely. Poverty is a state of sinfulness. . . . All kinds of meritorious acts flow from the possession of great wealth. From wealth springs all religious acts, all pleasures. Without wealth, a man cannot find the very means of sustaining his life. (Sec. 8)

Yudhishtira (said to Bhima). Discontent, heedlessness, attachment to earthly goods, the absence of tranquillity, might, folly, vanity and anxiety,—affected by these sins, thou covetest sovereignty. Freed from desire, prevailing over joy and grief and attaining to tranquillity, strive to be happy. . . . One's desires are incapable of being filled in a day, or in many months. Desire, which is incapable of gratification, cannot, indeed, be filled in the course of one's whole life. (Sec. 17)

Vyasa. There is only sorrow in this world but not happiness. . . . Indeed sorrow springs from that affliction called desire, and happiness springs from the affliction called sorrow. Sorrow comes after happiness and happiness after sorrow. One does not always suffer sorrow or always enjoy happiness. Happiness always ends in sorrow and sometimes from sorrow itself. He, therefore, that desires eternal happiness must abandon both. . . . Be it happiness or sorrow, be it agreeable or disagreeable, whatever come should be borne with an unaffected heart. (Sec. 25)

Yudhishtira. Thou thinkest, O Partha, that there is nothing superior to wealth and that the poor man can neither have heaven, nor happiness, nor the fulfilment of his wishes.

Thou shouldst know that one acquires heaven through contentment. From contentment springs great happiness. There is nothing higher than contentment. Unto the 'yogi' who has controlled wrath and joy, contentment is his high praise and success.

The wise think that wealth does not belong to anyone. . . . one should spend (in gift) what one has acquired and not waste or spend it in gratifying one's desire. What use is there in amassing wealth when such proper objects exist on which to spend it? (Sec. 26)

Vyasa. Idleness, though temporarily agreeable, ends in misery, and labour with skill, though temporarily painful, ends in happiness. Affluence, prosperity, modesty, contentment and fame dwell in labour and skill, though temporarily painful, ends in happiness.

Friends are not competent to bestow happiness nor foe competent to inflict misery. Similarly, wisdom does not bring wealth, nor does wealth bring happiness.

Success springs from work. Thou art not competent, O King, to avoid work. (Sec. 27)

(In times of prosperity) one thinks in this strain: 'I am of high birth', 'I can do whatever I like', 'I am not an ordinary man'. His mind becomes soaked with such triple vanity. Addicted to all earthly enjoyments, he begins to waste the wealth hoarded by his ancestors. Impoverished in course of time, he regards the appropriation of what belongs to others as even laudable.

The causes of all mental sorrows are two, delusion of the mind and the accession of distress. No third cause exists.

Decrepitude and death, like a pack of wolves, devour all creatures. Be it happiness or be it sorrow that comes upon one should be endured or borne without elation or depression. There is no method of escape from them. (Sec. 28)

II. The Problem of Leadership

Yudhishtira asked Bhishma: Possessed of hands and arms like others, having an understanding and senses like those of others, subject like others to the same kind of joy and grief. . . . in fact, similar to others in respect of all attributes of humanity, for what reason does one man, viz., the king, govern the rest of the world? . . . why do all men seek to obtain his favour?

Bhishma. At first there was no sovereignty, no king, no chastisement and no chastiser. All men used to protect one another righteously.

Error then began to assail their hearts. Having become subject to error the perceptions of men came to be clouded and then their virtue began to decline. When their perceptions were dimmed and when men became subject to error, all of them became covetous. And because men sought to obtain objects which they did not possess, another passion called lust (of acquisition) got hold of them. When they became subject to lust, another named wrath, soon soiled them. Once subject to wrath, they lost all consideration of what should be done and what should not. Unrestrained sexual indulgence set in. Men began to utter what they chose. All distinctions between virtue and vice disappeared.

Overcome with fear, they sought the protection of Brahma. (They requested him to) think of that which would benefit them.

The Grandsire then composed by his own intelligence a treatise consisting of a hundred lessons. In it were treated the subjects of virtue (dharma), profit (artha), and pleasure (kama), the triple aggregate. He treated of a fourth subject called emancipation (moksha) whose meaning and attributes are different. The triple aggregate in respect of emancipation also, according to the attributes of goodness (sattva), passion (rajas) and darkness (tamas) and another, (fourth viz., the practice of duty without hope of bliss or reward), were treated in it. Another triple aggregate connected with chastisement, viz., conservation of wealth, growth, character and destruction of deceit and theft was treated in it. . . . Also the very extensive branch of learning called punitive legislation was laid down in it.

The fierce vices born of wrath and those born of lust, in all ten kinds, were mentioned in that treatise. The four kind of vices are hunting, gambling, drinking and sexual indulgence. Rudeness of speech, fierceness, severity of chastisement, infliction of pain on the body, suicide and frustrating one's own objects, these are the six kinds of faults born of wrath

Because he gratified all people, therefore he was called 'Rajan' (King)

The conduct of a king should be regulated by his own intelligence as also by the opportunities and the means that may offer themselves

It is for this that the multitude obey his words of command. Though he belongs to the same world and is possessed of similar limits. (Sec 59)

III. Exertion

Destiny and exertion exist, depending upon each other. Those who exert achieve great feats. Those that depend upon destiny achieve nothing. . . . The unfortunate man of inaction is always overwhelmed by all sorts of calamity. Therefore, abandoning everything else, one should put forth his energy. Indeed, disregarding everything, men should do what is productive of good to themselves.

Knowledge, courage, cleverness, strength, and patience are said to be one's natural friends. They that are possessed of wisdom live with the aid of these five.

A person possessed of wisdom may be delighted everywhere. Such a man shines everywhere. He never inspires anybody with fear. If sought to be frightened, he never yields to fear himself. The wealth, however little, that is possessed at any time by an intelligent man is certain to increase. Such a man does every act with cleverness. (Sec. 139)

IV. Art of Governing

The king should always stay with the rod of chastisement uplifted in his hand. He should always display his prowess.

The four requisites of rule are conciliation, gift, disunion and chastisement; chastisement is said to be the foremost.

A king possessed of wisdom should cut away the very roots of his foe. He should then win over and bring under his sway the allies and partisans of that foe.

When calamities overtake the king, he should without losing time, counsel wisely, display his prowess properly, fight with ability, and even retreat with wisdom.

In speech only should the king exhibit his humility, but at heart he should be as sharp as a razor. He should cast off lust and wrath, and speak sweetly and mildly.

If the king becomes mild, the people disregard him. If he becomes stern, the people feel it as an affliction. The rule is that he should be stern when the occasion requires sternness, and mild when the occasion requires mildness.

By mildness one may destroy that which is fierce. There is nothing that mildness cannot effect. For this reason, mildness is said to be sharper than fierceness. (Sec. 140)

V. Human Relations

(a) *Characteristics of Virtuous Behaviour.* Dhritarashtra said to his son Duryodhana: If thou wishest to win prosperity like that of Yudhishtira, do thou endeavour to be of virtuous behaviour.

Duryodhana. I desire to hear how that behaviour may be acquired.

Dhritarashtra. When Indra asked the very same question of Prahalda, who by merit of his behaviour acquired sovereignty over the three worlds, Prahalda said:

“I do not feel any pride in consequence of my being a king, nor do I cherish any hostile feelings towards the Brahmanas whose counsels of policy I follow, I bear no malice. I have conquered wrath. I am self-restrained and all my senses are under my control.”

Duryodhana. I wish to know the truth about behaviour.

Dhritarashtra. Listen as to how behaviour may be acquired. Abstinence from injury (ahimsa), by act, word and thought in respect of all creatures, compassion and gift, constitute behaviour that is worthy of praise. That act or exertion by which one has to feel shame, should never be done. That act, on the other hand, should be done in consequence of which one may win praise in society. If persons of wicked behaviour do even win prosperity, they do not enjoy it long and we see them being exterminated by the root. (Sec. 124)

Yudhishtira. Thou hast said, O grandsire, that behaviour is the first (of requisites for a man). Whence, however, does hope arise? . . . In every man hope is great. When that hope is destroyed, great is the grief that follows, and which, without doubt, is equal almost to death itself. . . . Hope is exceedingly difficult of being understood and equally different of being subdued. (Sec. 125)

Bhishma. Hope agitates every man of foolish understanding. . . . A contented applicant is exceedingly difficult to meet with. Perhaps, there is none such in the world. . . . The hope, that rests upon an ungrateful man, or upon one that is cruel, or one that is idle, or one that injures others, is very slender. (Sec. 128)

Bhishma. These two, viz., one who provides for the future and one possessed by presence of mind, always enjoys happiness. The man of procrastination, however, is lost. (Sec. 137)

(b) *Friend and Foe.* There is no such thing as a foe. There is no such thing in existence as a friend. It is force of circumstances that creates friends and foes. . . . There is no condition that deserves permanently the name either of friendship or hostility. Both friends and foes arise from considerations of interest and gain. Friendship becomes changed

into enmity in the course of time. A foe also becomes a friend. Self-interest is very powerful. He who reposes blind trust on friends and always behaves with mistrust towards foes, without paying any regard to considerations of policy, finds his life to be unsafe. . . . the mother, the son and other relatives are all guided by considerations of interest and profit. Father and mother may be seen to discard the dear son if fallen. . . . One becomes dear from an adequate cause. One becomes a foe from an adequate cause. The whole world of creatures is moved by the desire for gain (in some form or other). One never becomes dear to another (without cause). The friendship between two uterine brothers, the love between husband and wife depends upon interest. I do not know any kind of affection between any persons that does not rest upon some motive of self-interest. . . . Generally a person becomes dear for the purpose he serves. When that cause exists no longer, that affection comes to an end. (Sec. 138)

Hostility springs from five causes: woman, land, harsh words, natural incompatibility and injury. . . . When hostility has arisen even with a friend, no further confidence should be reposed upon him. Feelings of animosity lie hid like fire in wood. The fire of animosity can never be extinguished by gifts of wealth, by display of prowess, by conciliation.

All creatures are made miserable by grief and pain. All creatures wish for happiness. Misery arises from various sources: decrepitude, loss of wealth, adjacence of anything disagreeable, separation from friends and agreeable objects. . . . Misery arises from causes connected with women. The misery that arises from the death of children alters and afflicts all creatures very greatly.

If a person after avenging an injury, desires to make peace with the injured, the parties cannot be properly united even like the fragments of an earthen vessel.

(c) *Covetousness*. Covetousness is the great destroyer (of merit and goodness). From covetousness proceeds sin. . . . From covetousness proceeds wrath; from covetousness flows lust; and it is from covetousness that loss of judgement, deception, pride, arrogance, malice, vindictiveness, shamelessness, loss of prosperity, loss of virtue, anxiety and infamy spring. . . . Covetousness is incapable of being ratified by acquisitions to any extent. . . . It should be conquered.

(d) *Righteous men*. They are perfectly fearless; they are tranquil; they are mild; full of compassion, free from lust and wrath, they have no pride. They never acquire virtue for the sake of wealth or of fame. They are perfectly contented. There is no error of judgement arising

from covetousness. **They** are never delighted at any acquisition or pained at any loss. Without attachment to any thing, and freed from pride, they look on all with an equal eye. (Sec. 158)

(e) *Self-restraint*. Self-restraint enhances (a man's) energy. No duty is higher than self-restraint. It is the highest virtue. Through self-restraint a person acquires the highest happiness; he sleeps in felicity and awakes in felicity and moves through the world in felicity. His mind is always cheerful. The man without self-restraint always suffers misery; he brings upon himself many calamities all born of his faults.

The indications of self-restraint are forgiveness, patience, abstention from violence, impartiality, truth, sincerity, conquest of senses, mildness, modesty, steadiness, liberality, freedom from wrath, contentment, sweetness of speech, benevolence, freedom from malice.

Depravity, infamy, false speech, lust, covetousness, pride, arrogance, self-glorification, fear, envy and disrespect are all avoided by the self-restrained man. (Sec. 160)

(f) *The thirteen vices*. They are the powerful foes of all creatures. They approach and tempt men from every side. They goad and afflict a heedless man or one that is insensate. From them proceed all kinds of grief.

I shall now speak of their origin, of the objects upon which they rest and of the means of their destruction.

Wrath springs from covetousness. It is strengthened by the faults of others. Through forgiveness it remains dormant and through forgiveness it disappears.

Lust springs from resolution. Indulgence strengthens it. When a man of wisdom resolutely turns away from it, it disappears.

Envy of others proceeds out of covetousness and wrath. It disappears in consequence of compassion and knowledge of self. In consequence of compassion for all creatures and of disregard for all worldly objects (that knowledge brings in its train), it disappears.

Loss of judgement has its origin in ignorance and proceeds from habit. When the man begins to take delight in (the company and counsels of) wise men, this vice at once hides its head.

Grief proceeds from affection which is awakened by separation. It subsides when one realises that grief does not enable one to get the separated person.

Incapacity to bear other people's good proceeds from wrath and covetousness. Through compassion for every creature and in consequence of a disregard for all earthly objects, it is extinguished.

Malice proceeds from the abandonment of truth and indulgence in wickedness. It disappears in consequence of one's waiting upon the wise and good.

Pride springs from birth, learning and prosperity. When these three, however, are truly known, it instantly disappears.

Jealousy springs from lust and delight in low and vulgar people. In consequence of wisdom it is destroyed.

Slander arises from errors (of conduct) inconsistent with the ordinary course of men and through disagreeable speeches expressive of aversion. It disappears upon a survey of the world.

Hate shows itself when the person that injures is powerful, and the injured one is unable to avenge the injury. It subsides through kindness.

Compassion proceeds from a sight of the helpless and miserable persons with whom the world abounds. It disappears when one understands the strength of virtue.

Covetousness springs from ignorance. Beholding the instability of all objects of enjoyment, it suffers destruction.

It has been said that tranquillity of self can alone subdue all these thirteen vices. (Sec. 163)

(g) *Duties common to all human beings. Bhishma*: The suppression of wrath, truthfulness of speech, justice, forgiveness, begetting children upon one's own wedded wives, purity of conduct, avoidance of quarrel, simplicity and maintenance of dependents,—these nine duties belong to all the four orders (equally). (Sec. 60)

Chapter 12

Manu Smriti

It is assumed that this law book was composed around 200 B.C. With the rise of Upanishads and the heterodox schools of Jainism, Buddhism, Charaka etc., there was a loosening of the hold of tradition and authority. It is at this time that the epics, like Ramayana and Mahabharata and the Dharmasastras like Manu Smriti were composed. As a result, the code of Manu glorifies custom and convention. Manu admits Vedic sacrifices and regards caste system as divinely ordained. He emphasises the need to fulfil one's social duties based on caste.

The goal of Manu is to produce a personality that is dedicated to self-integration and to evolve a social order that is free from conflict and discord and in which there is a harmonious blend of the interests of both the individual and the group.

As a result, the term Dharma (which comes from the root *dhru*, to hold together) describes the two processes: (a) the social interaction between individuals and between the individual and the group, and (b) the social organization. Manu Dharma Sastra states the laws of integral unfoldment of the individual and of a harmonious social life. As noted above, the laws of social order are limited by the outlook of the age which divided human beings into four rigid groups, the Brahmana, the Kshatriya, the Vaishya and the Sudra, based on birth.

Manu recognizes that all actions of man are based on impulses and desires, particularly the desire for reward.

Manu holds that man has two births. The birth from the womb of the mother is mere animal existence; the child receives only affection and care from the parents. He becomes a real human being on his second birth when the teacher helps the child or the youth to acquire knowledge.

Sex is the most powerful impulse. So one must be ever on guard. One should not sit in lonely places even with one's mother, sister or daughter.

Manu describes the eight forms of marriage. The best form of marriage is that in which a father gifts his daughter to a worthy young

man (Kanyadana).

He emphasises the need for the study of behaviour. It is through the external signs that one can discover the internal dispositions. One must study carefully the movements, the gestures and the speech.

A man should control his thoughts, speech and action. It is the man who has this threefold control over himself who respects all created beings, who subdues desire and wrath that can gain success.

As regards the influence of heredity and environment on man's behavior he says: "Seed sown on barren ground perishes in it; a fertile field also, in which no (good) seed (is sown), will remain barren". So both are necessary.

[The extracts have been taken from the translation by Buhler *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. 25, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1886.]

THE LAWS OF MANU

II. Motive for Action

2. To act solely from a desire for rewards is not laudable, yet an exemption from that desire is not (to be found) in this (world); for on (that) desire is grounded the study of the Veda and the performance of the actions, prescribed by the Veda.

3. Not a single act here (below) appears ever to be done by a man free from desire; for whatever (man) does, it is (the result of) the impulse of desire.

The Eleven Organs and Their Control

88. A wise man should strive to restrain his organs which run wild among alluring sensual objects, like a charioteer his horses.

89. Those eleven organs which former sages have named, I will properly (and) precisely enumerate in due order.

90. (Viz) the ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose as the fifth, the organs of excretion, the organ of generation, hands and feet, and the (organ of) speech, named as the tenth.

91. Know that the internal organ (manas) is the eleventh, which by its quality belongs to both (sets); when that has been subdued, both those sets of five have been conquered.

92. Through the attachment of his organs (to sensual pleasure) a man doubtlessly will incur guilt; but if he keeps them under complete control, he will obtain success (in gaining all his aims).

93. Desire is never extinguished by the enjoyment of desired objects; it only grows stronger like a fire (fed) with clarified butter.

94. If one man should obtain all those (sensual enjoyments) and another should renounce them all, the renunciation of all pleasure is far better than the attainment of them.

95. Those (organs) which are strongly attached to sensual pleasures, cannot so effectually be restrained by abstinence (from enjoyments) as by a constant (pursuit of true) knowledge.

96. That man may be considered to have (really) subdued his organs, who on hearing and touching and seeing, on tasting and smelling (anything) neither rejoices nor repines.

97. If he keeps all the (ten) organs as well as the mind in subjection, he may gain all his aims, without reducing his body by (the practice) of Yoga.

The Two Births

147. Let him consider that (he received) a (mere animal) existence, when his parents begat him through mutual affection, and when he was born from the womb (of his mother).

148. But that birth which a teacher acquainted with the whole Veda, in accordance with the law, procures for him through the Savitri, is real, exempt from age and death.

153. 'For (a man) destitute of (sacred) knowledge is indeed a child, and he who teaches him the Veda is his father; for (the sages) have always said "child" to an ignorant man, and "father" to a teacher of the Veda'.

159. Human beings must be instructed in (what concerns) their welfare without giving them pain, and sweet and gentle speech must be used by (a teacher) who desires (to abide by) the sacred law.

160. He forsooth, whose speech and thoughts are pure and ever perfectly guarded, gains the whole reward which is conferred by the Vedanta.

161. Let him not, even though in pain, (speak words) cutting (others) to the quick; let him not injure others in thought or deed; let him not utter speeches which make (others) afraid of him. Since that will prevent him from gaining heaven.

Control of Sex

212. (A pupil) who is full twenty years old, and knows what is becoming and unbecoming, shall not salute a young wife of his teacher

(by clasping) her feet.

213. It is the nature of women to seduce men in **this** (world); for that reason the wise are never unguarded in (the company of) females.

214. For women are able to lead astray in (this) world not only a fool, but even a learned man, and (to make) him a slave of desire and anger.

215. One should not sit in a lonely place with one's mother, sister, or daughter; for senses are powerful, and master even a learned man.

IV. Means to Happiness

12. He who desires happiness must strive after a perfectly contented disposition and control himself; for happiness has contentment for its root, the root of unhappiness is the contrary (disposition).

13. Let him walk here (on earth), bringing his dress, speech, and thoughts to a conformity with his age, his occupation, his wealth, his sacred learning, and his race.

137. Let him not despise himself on account of former failures; until death let him seek fortune, nor despair of gaining it.

138. Let him say what is true, let him say what is pleasing, let him utter no disagreeable truth, and let him utter no agreeable falsehood; that is the eternal law.

139. (What is) well, let him call well, or let him say 'well' only; let him not engage in a useless enmity or dispute with anybody.

141. Let him not insult those who have redundant limbs or are deficient in limbs, nor those destitute of knowledge, nor very aged men, nor those who have no beauty or wealth, nor those who are of low birth.

158. A man who follows the conduct of the virtuous, has faith and is free from envy, lives a hundred years, though he be entirely destitute of auspicious marks.

159. Let him carefully avoid all undertakings (the success of) which depends on others; but let him eagerly pursue that (the accomplishment of) which depends on himself.

160. Everything that depends on others (gives) pain, everything that depends on oneself (gives) pleasure; know that this is the short definition of pleasure and pain.

161. When the performance of an act gladdens his heart, let him perform it with diligence; but let him avoid the opposite.

177. Let him not be uselessly active with his hands and feet, or with his eyes, nor crooked (in his ways), nor talk idly, nor injure others by

deeds or even think of it.

Human Relations

180. With his father and his mother, with female relatives, with a brother, with his son and his wife, with his daughter and with his slaves, let him not have quarrels.

181. If he avoids quarrels with these persons, he will be freed from all sins, and by suppressing (all) such (quarrels) a householder conquers all the following worlds.

246. He who is persevering, gentle, (and) patient, shuns the company of man of cruel conduct, and does no injury (to living creatures). gains, if he constantly lives in that manner, by controlling his organs and by liberality, heavenly bliss.

258. Alone let him constantly meditate in solitude on that which is salutary for his soul; for he who meditates in solitude attains supreme bliss.

VI. 45. Let him not desire to die, let him not desire to live; let him wait for (his appointed) time, as a servant (waits) for the payment of his wages.

47. Let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, and let him not become anybody's enemy for the sake of this (perishable) body.

48. Against an angry man let him not in return show anger, let him bless when he is cursed, and let him not utter speech, devoid of truth scattered at the seven gates.

57. Let him not be sorry when he obtains nothing, nor rejoice when he obtains (something), let him (accept) so much only as will sustain life, let him not care about the (quality of his) utensils.

60. By the restraint of his senses, by the destruction of love and hatred, and by the abstention from injuring the creatures, he becomes fit for immortality.

81. He who has in this manner gradually given up all attachments and is freed from all the pairs (of opposites), reposes in Brahman alone.

92. Contentment, forgiveness, self-control, abstention from unrighteously appropriating anything, (obedience to the rules of) purification, coercion of the organs, wisdom, knowledge (of the supreme soul), truthfulness, and abstention from anger, (form) the tenfold law.

VII. Leadership

3. For, when these persons, being without a king, through fear

dispersed in all directions, the Lord created a king for the protection of this whole (creation).

14. For the (King's) sake the Lord formerly created his own son, Punishment, the protector of all creatures, (an incarnation of) the law, formed of Brahman's glory.

17. Punishment is (in reality) the king (and) the male, that the manager of affairs, that the ruler, and that is called the surety for the four orders' obedience to the law.

20. If the king did not, without tiring, inflict punishment on those worthy to be punished, the stronger would roast the weaker, like fish on a spit.

22. The whole world is kept in order by punishment, for a guiltless man is hard to find; through fear of punishment the whole world yields the enjoyments (which it owes).

26. They declare that king to be a just inflicter of punishment, who is truthful, who acts after due consideration, who is wise, and who knows (the respective value of) virtue, pleasure, and wealth.

45. Let him carefully shun the ten vices, springing from love of pleasure, and the eight, proceeding from wrath, which (all) end in misery.

46. For a king who is attached to the vices, springing from love of pleasure, loses his wealth and his virtue, but (he who is given) to those arising from anger, (loses) even his life.

47. Hunting, gambling, sleeping by day, censoriousness, (excess with) women, drunkenness, (an inordinate love for) dancing, singing, and music, and useless travel are the tenfold set (of vices) springing from love of pleasure.

48. Tale-bearing, violence, treachery, envy, slandering, (unjust) seizure of property, reviling, and assault are the eightfold set (of vices) produced by wrath.

49. That greediness which all wise men declare to be the root even of both these (sets), let him carefully conquer; both sets (of vices) are produced by that.

57. Having (first) ascertained the opinion of each (minister) separately and (then the views) of all together, let him do what is (most) beneficial for him in his affairs.

59. Let him, full of confidence, always entrust to that (official) all business; having taken his final resolution with him, let him afterwards begin to act.

99. Let him strive to gain what he has not yet gained; what he has

gained let him carefully preserve; let him augment what he preserves, and what he has augmented let him bestow on worthy men.

100. Let him know that these are the four means for securing the aims of human (existence); let him, without ever tiring, properly employ them.

Fate and Exertion

205. All undertakings (in) this (world) depend both on the ordering of fate and on human exertion; but among these two (the ways of) fate are unfathomable; in the case of man's work action is possible.

VIII. Study of Behaviour

25. By external signs let him discover the internal disposition of men, by their voice, their colour, their motions, their aspect, their eyes, and their gestures.

26. The internal (working of the) mind is perceived through the aspect, the motions, the gait, the gestures, the speech, and the changes in the eye and of the face.

Testimony

64. Those must not be made (witnesses) who have an interest in the suit, nor familiar (friends), companions, and enemies (of the parties), nor (men) formerly convicted (of perjury), nor (persons) suffering under (severe) illness, nor (those) tainted (by mortal sin).

67. Nor one extremely grieved, nor one intoxicated, nor a madman, nor one tormented by hunger or thirst, nor one oppressed by fatigue, nor one tormented by desire, nor a wrathful man, nor thief.

Punishment

129. Let him punish first by (gentle) admonition, afterwards by (harsh) reproof, thirdly by a fine, after that by corporal chastisement.

130. But when he cannot restrain such (offenders) even by corporal punishment, then let him apply to them even all the four (modes conjointly).

IX. On Women

13. Drinking (spirituous liquor), associating with wicked people, separation from the husband, rambling abroad, sleeping (at unreasonable hours), and dwelling in other men's houses, are the six causes of the ruin of women.

15. Through their passion for men, through their mutable temper, through their natural heartlessness, they become disloyal towards their husbands, however carefully they may be guarded in this (world).

27. The production of children, the nurture of those born, and the daily life of men, (of these matters) woman is visibly the cause.

28. Offspring, (the due performance of) religious rites, faithful service, highest conjugal happiness and heavenly bliss for the ancestors and oneself, depend on one's wife alone.

29. She who, controlling her thoughts, speech, and acts, violates not her duty towards her lord, dwells with him (after death) in heaven, and in this world is called by the virtuous a faithful (wife, *sadhvi*).

33. By the sacred tradition the woman is declared to be the soil, the man is declared to be the seed: the production of all corporeal beings (takes place) through the union of the soil with the seed.

45. He only is a perfect man who consists (of three persons united), his wife, himself, and his offspring: thus (says the Veda), and (learned) Brahmanas propound this (maxim) likewise; 'The husband is declared to be one with the wife'.

96. To be mothers women were created, and to be fathers men; religious rites, therefore, are ordained in the Veda to be performed (by the husband) together with the wife.

101. 'Let mutual fidelity continue until death', this may be considered as the summary of the highest law for husband and wife.

102. Let man and woman, united in marriage, constantly exert themselves, that (they may not be) disunited (and) may not violate their mutual fidelity.

X. Universal Human Duties

63. Abstention from injuring (creatures), veracity, abstention from unlawfully appropriating (the goods of others), purity, and control of the organs, Manu has declared to be the summary of the law for the four castes.

Heredity and Environment

70. Some sages declare the seed to be more important, and others the field; again others (assert that) the seed and the field (are equally important); but the legal decision on this point is as follows:

71. Seed, sown on barren ground, perishes in it; a (fertile) field also, in which no (good) seed (is sown), will remain barren.

XII. Thought, Speech and Action

3. Action, which springs from the mind, from speech, and from the body, produces either good or evil results; by action are caused the (various) conditions of men, the highest, the middling, and the lowest.

4. Know that the mind is the instigator here below, even to that (action) which is connected with the body, (and) which is of three kinds, has three locations, and falls under ten heads.

5. Coveting the property of others, thinking in one's heart of what is undesirable, and adherence to false (doctrines), are the three kinds of (sinful) mental action.

6. Abusing (others, speaking) untruth, detracting from the merits of all men, and talking idly, shall be the four kinds of (evil) verbal action.

7. Taking what has not been given, injuring (creatures) without the sanction of the law, and holding criminal intercourse with another man's wife, are declared to be the three kinds of (wicked) bodily action.

8. (A man) obtains (the result of) a good or evil mental (act) in his mind, (that of) a verbal (act) in his speech, (that of) a bodily (act) in his body.

10. That man is called a (true) *tridandi* in whose mind these three, the control over his speech (*vagdanda*), the control over his thoughts (*manodanda*), and the control over his body (*kayadanda*), are firmly fixed.

11. That man who keeps this threefold control (over himself) with respect to all created beings and wholly subdues desire and wrath, thereby assuredly gains complete success.

12. Him who impels this (corporal) Self to action, they call the *Kshetragna* (the knower of the field): but him who does acts, the wise name the *Bhutatman* (the Self consisting of the elements).

13. Another internal Self that is generated with all embodied (*Kshetrag-nas*) is called *Jiva*, through which (the *Kshetragna*) becomes sensible of all pleasure and pain in (successive) births.

The Three 'Gunas'

24. Know Goodness (*sattva*), Activity (*rajas*), and Darkness (*tamas*) to be the three qualities of the Self, with which the Great One always completely pervades all existences.

25. When one of these qualities wholly predominates in a body, then it makes the embodied (soul) eminently distinguished for that quality.

26. Goodness is declared (to have the form of) knowledge, Darkness

(of) ignorance, Activity (of) love and hatred; such is the nature of these (three) which is (all-) pervading and clings to everything created.

27. When (man) experiences in his self a (feeling) full of bliss, a deep calm, as it were, and a pure light, then let him know (that it is) among those three (the quality called) Goodness.

28. What is mixed with pain and does not give satisfaction to the self one may know (to be the quality of) Activity, which is difficult to conquer, and which ever draws embodied (selves towards sensual objects).

29. What is coupled with delusion, what has the character of an undiscernible mass, what cannot be fathomed by reasoning, what cannot be fully known, one must consider (as the quality of) Darkness.

30. I will, moreover, fully describe the results which arise from these three qualities, the excellent ones, the middling ones, and the lowest.

31. The study of the Vedas, austerity, (the pursuit of) knowledge, purity, control over the organs, the performance of meritorious acts and meditation on the self, (are) the marks of the quality of Goodness.

32. Delighting in undertakings, want of firmness, commission of sinful acts, and continual indulgence in sensual pleasures, (are) the marks of the quality of Activity.

33. Covetousness, sleepiness, pusillanimity, cruelty, atheism, leading an evil life, a habit of soliciting favours, and inattentiveness, are the marks of the quality of Darkness.

34. Know, moreover, the following to be a brief description of the three qualities, each in its order, as they appear in the three (times, the present, past, and future).

35. When a (man), having done, doing, or being about to do any act, feels ashamed, the learned may know that all (such acts bear) the mark of the quality of Darkness.

36. But, when (a man) desires (to gain) by an act much fame in this world and feels no sorrow on failing, know that it (bears the mark of the quality of) Activity.

37. But that (bears) the mark of the quality of Goodness which with his whole (heart) he desires to know, which he is not ashamed to perform, and at which his self rejoices.

38. The craving after sensual pleasures is declared to be the mark of Darkness, (the pursuit of) wealth (the mark) of Activity, (the desire to gain) spiritual merit the mark of Goodness; each later (named quality

is) better than the preceding one.

82. All the results, proceeding from actions, have been thus pointed out; learn (next) those acts which secure supreme bliss to a Brahmana.

Acts Leading to Liberation

83. Studying the Veda, (practising) austerities, (the acquisition of true) knowledge, the subjugation of the organs, abstention from doing injury, and serving the Guru are the best means for attaining supreme bliss.

84. (If you ask) whether among all these virtuous actions, (performed) here below, (there be) one which has been declared more efficacious (than the rest) for securing supreme happiness to man.

85. (The answer is that) the knowledge of the self is stated to be the most excellent among all of them; for that is the first of all sciences, because immortality is gained through that.

88. The acts prescribed by the Veda are of two kinds, such as procure an increase of happiness and cause a continuation (of mundane existence, *pravṛtta*), and such as ensure supreme bliss and cause a cessation (of mundane existence, *nivṛtta*).

89. Acts which secure (the fulfilment of) wishes in this world or in the next are called *pravṛtta* (such as cause a continuation of mundane existence); but acts performed without any desire (for a reward), preceded by (the acquisition) of (true) knowledge, are declared to be *nivṛtta* (such as cause the cessation of mundane existence).

91. He who sacrifices to the Self (alone), equally recognising the Self in all created beings and all created beings in the Self, becomes (independent like) an autocrat and self-luminous.

Chapter 13

Kautilya's Arthashastra

While Dharma Shastra placed emphasis on righteous behaviour, Arthashastra placed emphasis on acquisition of power and wealth. Kautilya was the minister of Chandragupta Maurya who was a contemporary of Alexander the Great. His Arthashastra, treatise on material gain, reflects in a striking manner the social and political forces in India during the fourth century B.C. Kautilya defines Arthashastra as the science which treats the means of acquiring and maintaining the empire; it also deals with the practical administration of the state. He counteracted the renunciatory tendencies of the Upanishads and Buddhism. Asoka (273-232 B.C.), the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya and the third Mauryan emperor turned away from the path of power of Arthashastra to the way of renunciation. But the Mauryan empire collapsed soon after him.

“Kautilya holds that wealth and wealth alone is important, in as much as Dharma and Kama depend upon wealth (Artha) for their realization.” He also stresses that the three pursuits of life are interdependent and the pursuit of anyone of these three to an excess hurts the other two.

Regarding the appointment of ministers, the King should appoint neither those who were his childhood friends, nor those who are the sons and grandsons of former ministers. But he should appoint those who are well qualified and have had experience. A man's ability can be inferred from his capacity shown in work. He describes the necessary qualities for office and the methods of ascertaining them.

The citizens who are angry, greedy, or alarmed or who despise the King become the instruments of the enemies. The King should bring them round by conciliation, gifts, or by punishment.

Kautilya emphasises the need to watch the behaviour of the ministers, envoys and others. A change in their conduct will reveal a change in their attitude.

He describes the way in which the morale of the subjects of the enemy state can be reduced. When the subjects in the enemy state are

being oppressed, ill-treated, impoverished and disunited, attempts must be made to get them to revolt against the authority in their state. He should frighten the people in the enemy state by giving publicity to his own strength and power. He should send messengers to the enemy state who will pretend that they are friends and try and win over the people in the enemy state. Those in the enemy state should be supplied with money, foodgrains and other necessities. One must march against the strong enemy first so that the weaker enemy will voluntarily surrender, after the fall of the strong enemy.

Ignorance and absence of discipline are the causes of a man's troubles. Vices arise from anger (krodha) and desire (kama). Addiction to pleasure leads to the company of undesirable persons and loss of wealth. The fourfold vices are due to desire for hunting, gambling, sex and alcohol.

The King should therefore be well educated and trained to control his senses.

Since his duties are very varied including promotion of agriculture, commerce, construction of buildings and roads, maintenance of the orphans, the old, the infirm and the afflicted, provision of food, clothing and housing for the weak, the needy and the indigent, the King should be in touch with aged and learned men and seek their advice in all matters of difficulty.

[The extracts are from the translation by R. Shama Sastry, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1915.]

1. Punishment

Whoever imposes severe punishment becomes repulsive to the people; while he who awards mild punishment becomes contemptible. But whoever imposes punishment as deserved becomes respectable. For punishment (danda), when awarded with due consideration, makes the people devoted to righteousness and to work for production of wealth; while punishment, when ill-awarded under the influence of greed and anger or owing to ignorance, excites fury even among hermits and ascetics dwelling in forests, not to speak of householders.

But when the law of punishment is kept in abeyance, it gives rise to such disorder as is implied in the proverb of fishes, for in the absence of a magistrate, the strong will swallow the weak; but under his protection the weak resists the strong.

Danda, (punishment), which alone can procure safety and security

of life is, in its turn, dependent on discipline (vinaya).

Discipline is of two kinds: artificial and natural; for, instruction (kriya) can render only a docile being conformable to the rules of discipline, and not an undocile being. The study of sciences can tame only those who are possessed of such mental faculties as obedience, hearing, grasping, retentive memory, discrimination, inference, and deliberation, but not others devoid of such faculties. (Book I. 4 and 5)

2. Restraint of the Organs of Sense

Restraint of the organs of sense, on which success in study and discipline depends, can be enforced by abandoning lust, anger, greed, vanity, haughtiness, and overjoy.

Absence of discrepancy in the perception of sound, touch, colour, flavour, and scent by means of the ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose, is what is meant by the restraint of the organs of sense. Strict observance of the precepts of sciences also means the same; for the sole aim of all the sciences is nothing but restraint of the organs of sense.

Whosoever is of reverse character, whoever has not his organs of sense under his control, will soon perish, though possessed of the whole earth bounded by the four quarters.

Several kings, falling a prey to the aggregate of the six enemies, and having failed to restrain their organs of sense, perished together with their kingdom and relations.

Hence by overthrowing the aggregate of the six enemies, he shall restrain the organs of sense; acquire wisdom by keeping company with the aged; see through his spies; establish safety and security by being ever active; maintain his subjects in the observance of their respective duties by exercising authority; keep up his personal discipline by receiving lessons in the sciences; and endear himself to the people by bringing them in contact with wealth and doing good to them.

Thus with his organs of sense under his control, he shall keep away from hurting the women and property of others; avoid not only lustfulness, even in dream, but also falsehood, haughtiness, and evil proclivities; and keep away from unrighteous and uneconomical transactions.

Not violating righteousness and economy, he shall enjoy his desires. He shall never be devoid of happiness. He may enjoy in an equal degree the three pursuits of life, (dharma), wealth (artha), and desire (kama), which are inter-dependent upon each other. Anyone of these three, when enjoyed to an excess, hurts not only the other two, but also

itself.

Kautilya holds that wealth, and wealth alone, is important, inasmuch as (Dharma) and desire depend upon wealth for their realisation. (Book I. 6 and 7)

3. Appointment of Ministers etc.

"The King," says Bharadvaja, "shall employ his classmates as his ministers; for they can be trusted by him inasmuch as he has personal knowledge of their honesty and capacity."

"No," says Visalaksha, "for, as they have been his playmates as well, they would despise him. But he shall employ as ministers those whose secrets, possessed of in common, are well known to him. Possessed of habits and defects in common with the king, they would never hurt him lest he would betray their secrets."

"No" says the son of Bahudanti, "for a man possessed of only theoretical knowledge, and having no experience of practical politics, is likely to commit serious blunders when engaged in actual works. Hence he shall employ as ministers such as are born of high family and possessed of wisdom, purity of purpose, bravery and loyal feelings, in as much as ministerial appointments shall purely depend on qualifications".

"This," says Kautilya, "is satisfactory in all respects; for a man's ability is inferred from his capacity shown in work. And in accordance with the difference in the working capacity. Having divided the spheres of their powers and having definitely taken into consideration the place and time where and when they have to work, such persons shall be employed not as councillors (mantrinah), but as ministerial officers (amatyah).

Native, born of high family, influential, well trained in arts, possessed of foresight, wise, of strong memory, bold, eloquent, skilful, intelligent, possessed of enthusiasm, dignity and endurance, pure in character, affable, firm in loyal devotion, endowed with excellent conduct, strength, health and bravery, free from procrastination and ficklemindedness, affectionate and free from such qualities as excite hatred and enmity—these are the qualifications of a ministerial officer.

Of these qualifications, native birth and influential position shall be ascertained from reliable persons; educational qualifications from professors of equal learning; theoretical and practical knowledge, foresight, retentive memory, and affability shall be tested from successful application in works; eloquence, skilfulness and flashing intelligence

from power shown in narrating stories (i.e., in conversation); endurance, enthusiasm, and bravery in troubles; purity of life, friendly disposition, and loyal devotion by frequent association; conduct, strength, health, dignity, and freedom from indolence and fickle-mindedness shall be ascertained from their intimate friends; and affectionate and philanthropic nature by personal experience. (Book I. 8, 9)

4. Fifth Column

It is the king in whom the duties of both Indra (the rewarder) and Yama (the punisher) are blended, and he is visible dispenser of punishments and rewards.

Those that are angry, those that are greedy, those that are alarmed, as well as those that despise the king are the instruments of enemies.

Honours and rewards shall be conferred upon those that are contented, while those that are disaffected shall be brought round by conciliation, by gifts, or by sowing dissension, or by punishment.

5. Council Meeting

The disclosure of counsels may be detected by observing changes in the attitude and countenance of envoys, ministers, and masters. Change in conduct is change in attitude; and observation of physical appearance is countenance.

Carelessness, intoxication, talking in sleep, love and other evil habits of councillors, are the causes of the betrayal of counsels.

"No deliberation," says Visalaksha, "made by a single person will be successful; the nature of the work, which a sovereign has to do is to be inferred from the consideration of both the visible and invisible causes. The perception of what is not, or cannot be seen, the conclusive decision of whatever is seen, the clearance of doubts as to whatever is susceptible of two opinions, and the inference of the whole when only a part is seen—all this is possible of decision only by ministers. Hence he shall sit at deliberation with persons of wide intellect. (Book I. 15)

6. The Mission of Envoys

Brightness in the tone, face, eyes of the enemy; respectful reception of the mission; enquiry about the health of friends; taking part in the narration of virtues; giving a seat close to the throne; respectful treatment of the envoy; remembrance of friends; closing the mission with satisfaction—all these shall be noted as indicating the good graces of the enemy, and the reverse his displeasure.

Not puffed up with the respect shown to him, he shall stay there till he is allowed to depart. He shall not care for the mightiness of the enemy; shall strictly avoid women and liquor; shall take bed single; for it is well known that the intentions of envoys are ascertained while they are asleep or under the influence of liquor.

He shall, through the agency of ascetic and merchant spies or through their disciples, or through spies under the disguise of physicians, and heretics, or through recipients of salaries from two states, ascertain the nature of the intrigue prevalent among parties favourably disposed to his own master, as well as the conspiracy of hostile factions, and understand the loyalty or disloyalty of the people to the enemy, besides any assailable points. (Book I. 16)

7. Writs etc.

Calumniation, commendation, inquiry, narration, request, refusal, censure, prohibition, command, conciliation, promise of help, threat, and persuasion are the thirteen purposes for which writs are issued.

Persuasion is of three kinds; that made for the purpose of money, that made in case of one's failure to fulfil a promise, and that made on occasion of any trouble.

Negotiation, bribery causing dissension, and open attack are forms of stratagem.

Negotiation is of five kinds: Praising the qualities (of an enemy), narrating the mutual relationship, pointing out mutual benefit, showing vast future prospects, and identity of interests.

When the family, person, occupation, conduct, learning, properties, etc. (of an enemy), are commended with due attention to their worth, it is termed praising the qualities.

When the fact of having agnates, blood-relations, teachers, priestly hierarchy, family, and friends in common is pointed out, it is known as narration of mutual relationship.

When both parties, the party of a king and that of his enemy, are shown to be helpful to each other, it is known as pointing out mutual benefit.

Inducement, such as "This being done thus, such result will accrue to both of us," is showing vast future prospects.

To say, "What I am, that thou art; thou mayest utilize in thy works whatever is mine," is identity of interests.

Offering money is bribery.

Causing fears and suspicion as well as threatening is known as

sowing dissension.

Killing, harassing, and plundering is attack. (Book II. 10).

8. Behavioural Signs of Pleasure and Displeasure

By way of collecting his wandering thoughts into a resolve, the king exhibits in his appearance and movements his inclination, anger, pleasure, sorrow, determination, fear, and change in the pairs of opposite feelings.

By cognising wisdom in others, he is pleased; he attends to the speech of others; he gives a seat; allows himself to be seen in private; does not suspect in places of suspicion; takes delight in conversation; spontaneously looks to things without being reminded; tolerates what is said agreeably to reason; orders with smiling face; touches with the hand; does not laugh at what is commendable; commends the qualities of another behind him; remembers (the courtier) while taking luncheon; engages himself in sports accompanied by (the courtier); consults (the courtier) when in trouble; honours the followers of the courtier; reveals the secret; honours the courtier more and more; gives him wealth; and averts his troubles;—these are the signs of the king's satisfaction (with the courtier).

The reverse of the above indicates his (the king's) displeasure. Still, we shall describe them in plain terms:

Angry appearance when the courtier is in sight; evading or refusal to hear his speech; no inclination to give him a seat or to see him; change in syllables and accents while talking to him; seeing with one eye; brow-beating; biting the lips; rise of sweat; hard breathing and smiling with no palpable cause; talking to himself; sudden bending, or raising of the body; touching the body or the seat of another; contempt of learning, caste, and country (of the courtier); condemnation of a colleague of equal defects; condemnation of a man of opposite defects; condemnation of his opponent: failure to acknowledge his good deeds; enumeration of his bad deeds; attention to whoever enters into the chamber; too much gift; uttering falsehood; change in the conduct and attitude of visitors to the king. (Book V. 5)

9. Qualities of the King (Leader)

The best qualities of the king are:

Born of a high family, godly, possessed of valour, seeing through the medium of aged persons, virtuous, truthful, not of a contradictory nature, grateful, having large aims, highly enthusiastic, not addicted to

procrastination, powerful to control his neighbouring kings, of resolute mind, having an assembly of ministers of no mean quality, and possessed of a taste for discipline—these are the qualities of an inviting nature.

Inquiry, hearing, perception, retention in memory, reflection, deliberation, inference and steadfast adherence to conclusions are the qualities of the intellect.

Valour, determination of purpose, quickness, and probity are the aspects of enthusiasm.

Possessed of a sharp intellect, strong memory, and keen mind, energetic, powerful, trained in all kinds of arts, free from vice, capable of paying in the same coin by way of awarding punishments or rewards, possessed of dignity, capable of taking remedial measures against dangers, possessed of foresight, ready to avail himself of opportunities when afforded in respect of place, time, and manly efforts, clever enough to discern the causes necessitating the cessation of treaties, obligations and pledges, or to avail himself of his enemy's weak points, making jokes with no loss of dignity or secrecy, never brow-beating and casting haughty and stern looks, free from passion, anger, greed, obstinacy, fickleness, haste and back-biting habits, talking to others with a smiling face, and observing customs as taught by aged persons—such is the nature of self-possession. (Book VI. 1)

10. Morale

When a king finds that his enemy has fallen into troubles; that the troubles of his enemy's subjects can by no means be remedied; that as his enemy's subjects are oppressed, ill-treated, disaffected, impoverished, become effeminate and disunited among themselves, they can be prevailed upon to desert their master; that his enemy's country has fallen a victim to the inroads of such calamities as fire, floods, pestilence, epidemics and famine and is therefore losing the flower of its youth and its defensive power—then he should march after proclaiming war.

When two enemies, one an assailable enemy and another a strong enemy, are equally involved in troubles, which of them is to be marched against first?

The strong enemy is to be marched against first; after vanquishing him, the assailable enemy is to be attacked, for, when a strong enemy has been vanquished, an assailable enemy will volunteer of his own accord to help the conqueror; but not so, a strong enemy.

Which is to be marched against—an enemy whose subjects are impoverished and greedy or an enemy whose subjects are being oppressed?

My teacher says that the conqueror should march against that enemy whose subjects are impoverished and greedy, for impoverished and greedy subjects suffer themselves to be won over to the other side by intrigue, and are easily excited. But not so the oppressed subjects whose wrath can be pacified by punishing the chief men (of the state).

Not so, says Kautilya: for though impoverished and greedy they are loyal to their master and are ready to stand for his cause and so defeat any intrigue against him; for it is in loyalty that all other good qualities have their strength. Hence the conqueror should march against the enemy whose subjects are oppressed.

When people are impoverished, they become greedy; when they are greedy, they become disaffected: when disaffected, they voluntarily go to the side of the enemy or destroy their own master.

Hence, no king should give room to such causes as would bring about impoverishment, greed or disaffection among his people. If, however, they appear, he should at once take remedial measures against them.

Which (of the three) is the worst—an impoverished people? greedy people? or disaffected people?

An impoverished people are ever apprehensive of oppression and destruction (by over-taxation, etc.), and are therefore desirous of getting rid of their impoverishment, or of waging war or of migrating elsewhere.

A greedy people are ever discontented and they yield themselves to the intrigues of an enemy.

A disaffected people rise against their master along with his enemy.

Having well considered the causes which bring about peace or war, one should combine with kings of considerable power and righteous character and march against one's enemy.

"A king of considerable power" means one who is strong enough to put down or capture an enemy in the rear of his friend or to give sufficient help to his friend in his march.

"A king of righteous character" means one who does what one has promised to do, irrespective of good or bad results.

Having combined with one of superior power or with two of equal power among such kings, should the conqueror march against his enemy? (Book VII. 4 and 5)

When the conqueror is desirous of seizing an enemy's village, he should infuse enthusiastic spirit among his own men and frighten his enemy's people by giving publicity to his power of omniscience and close association with gods.

The conqueror's chief messengers, pretending to be friendly towards the enemy, should highly speak of the conqueror's respectful treatment of visitors, of the strength of his army, and of the likelihood of impending destruction of his enemy's men. They should also make it known to the enemy that, under their master, both ministers and soldiers are equally safe and happy, and that their master treats his servants with parental care in their weal or woe. By these and other means they should win over the enemy's men.

When the people of the enemy are convinced of this, they may be sent to the conqueror to receive wealth and honour. Those of the enemy who are in need of money and food should be supplied with an abundance of those things. Those who do not like to receive such things may be presented with ornaments for their wives and children.

When the people of the enemy are suffering from famine and the oppression of thieves and wild tribes, the conqueror's spies should sow the seeds of dissension among them, saying: "Let us request the king for favour, and go elsewhere if not favoured."

When they agree to such proposals, they should be supplied with money, grains, and other necessary help: thus, much can be done by sowing the seeds of dissension. (Book XIII. 1)

11. The Four Techniques

By means of conciliation and gifts, he should subdue weak kings; and by means of sowing the seeds of dissension and by threats, strong kings. By adopting a particular, or an alternative, or all of the strategic means, he should subdue his immediate and distant enemies. (Book VII. 16)

12. Vices due to Anger and Pleasure

Ignorance and absence of discipline are the causes of a man's troubles. An untrained man does not perceive the injuries arising from vices.

Vices due to anger form a triad; and those due to desire are fourfold. Of these two, anger is worse, for anger proceeds against all. In a majority of cases, kings given to anger are said to have fallen a prey to popular fury. But kings addicted to pleasures have perished in conse-

quence of serious diseases brought about by deterioration and impoverishment.

No, says Bharadvaja, anger is the characteristic of a righteous man. It is the foundation of bravery; it puts an end to despicable (persons); and it keeps the people under fear. Anger is always a necessary quality for the prevention of sin. But desire (accompanies) the enjoyment of results, reconciliation, generosity, and the act of endearing oneself to all. Possession of desire is always necessary for him who is inclined to enjoy the fruits of what he has accomplished.

No, says Kautilya, anger brings about enmity with, and troubles from, an enemy, and is always associated with pain. Addiction to pleasure (kama) occasions contempt and loss of wealth, and throws the addicted person into the company of thieves, gamblers, hunters, singers, players on musical instruments, and other undesirable persons. Of these, enmity is more serious than contempt, for a despised person is caught hold of by his own people and by his enemies, whereas a hated person is destroyed. Troubles from an enemy are more serious than loss of wealth, for loss of wealth causes financial troubles, whereas troubles from an enemy are injurious to life. Suffering on account of vices is more serious than keeping company with undesirable persons, for the company of undesirable persons can be got rid of in a moment, whereas suffering from vices causes injury for a long time. Hence, anger is a more serious evil.

Abuse of Language, or of Money, or Oppressive Punishment

Visalaksha says that, of abuse of language and of money, abuse of language is worse; for when harshly spoken to, a brave man retaliates; and bad language, like a nail piercing the heart, excites anger and gives pain to the senses.

No, says Kautilya, gift of money palliates the fury occasioned by abusive language, whereas abuse of money causes the loss of livelihood itself. Abuse of money means gifts, exaction, loss or abandonment of money.

The school of Parasara say, that of abuse of money and oppressive punishment, abuse of money is worse; for good deeds and enjoyments depend upon wealth; the world itself is bound by wealth. Hence, its abuse is a more serious evil.

No, says Kautilya, in preference to a large amount of wealth no man desires the loss of his own life. Owing to oppressive punishment, one is liable to the same punishment at the hands of one's enemies.

Such is the nature of the triad of evils due to anger.

The fourfold vices due to desire are hunting, gambling, women and drinking. (Book VIII. 3)

Chapter 14

Vatsyayana's Kama Sutra

While Shantiparva and Manu Smriti deal with dharma or the pursuit of righteousness, Arthashastra, deals with the pursuit of wealth and power. Kama Sutra deals with the pursuit of love and pleasure. Pursuit of artha and kama is necessary in the householder's (grhastha) life. Facing the strains and trials of household management, family life, occupational and social obligations are a useful discipline contributing to the preparation of man for the final stages of life of retirement and spiritual endeavour. Acquisition of wealth and enjoyment of pleasure must be regulated by righteousness rather than being suppressed so that a man can develop a well-rounded personality.

It is assumed that Vatsyayana composed the Kama Sutra in the fifth century A.D. A cultured person was expected to study the Kama Sutra. One should engage himself in acquiring knowledge in childhood and youth, engage himself in work and family life and enjoyment of worldly pleasures in middle age and devote his old age for the pursuit of liberation (Moksha).

Vatsyayana defines Kama as the enjoyment of objects with the help of the senses according to the dictates of his mind and in consonance with his self. The question is raised whether a learned text on the subject is necessary when Kama is instinctively practised in the animal world. It is shown that it is necessary since men and women differ from the lower animals. It is pointed out that a maiden should prepare herself for marriage by studying this science and also after marriage with her husband.

It is shown that passion in a woman is roused slowly while that in a man is roused quickly. It is pointed out that these differences may be due to differences in attitudes and feelings.

The lovers must learn to reciprocate the gestures of the other with equal intensity. If there is no reciprocity, the beloved will feel dejected and look upon the other as cold. This will result in a highly unsatisfactory union. Reciprocity is absolutely essential to keep the passion alive. Love will be enhanced if the couple engage each other in pleasant

conversation at the commencement and at the end of the congress. Such behaviour will please each other, dispel fear and enhance love.

A description is given of the behavior of men and women who are in love, how there is loss of sleep, indifference to routine activities, absence of a sense of shame, mental imbalance and finally physical debility when a person is in love.

Vatsyayana's Kama Sutra has been translated into many languages of Europe and Asia because he describes and classifies the various forms of embracing and kissing and gives detailed instructions regarding the creation of confidence in the bride.

[The selections are made from the translation by S.C. Upadhyaya, Taraporevala, Bombay, 1962.]

I.2.1. Man is said to be granted a life-span of a hundred years. He should pursue the three attainments of *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kama* at different periods of life, either one or more at a time but in such a way as to harmonize with each other and not clash in any way.

2-4. In childhood, he should devote himself to acquiring knowledge; in youth, he should engage in worldly pleasures, and in his old age, he should aspire to salvation through the practice of Dharma.

11-13. *Kama* is the enjoyment of objects with the help of the five senses—of hearing, of speech, of sight, of taste and of smell, according to the dictates of his mind in consonance with his self. Actually *Kama* is that special pleasure experienced when the sense of touch operates, and when it is in contact with the object that generates pleasure.

21. . . . since *Kama* is instinctively practised even by the animal world a learned text on the subject becomes redundant.

22-24. This is not true. The ways of men and women differ from those of the lower animals, and there are other important considerations relating to their intermingling. A clear enunciation of these therefore becomes essential and this can be seen in the *Kama Sutra* of Vatsyayana. Among the lower animals, however, the females are free to do what they like: moreover, they have congress purely by instinct and only during certain periods, hence instructions for them, it is true, are rendered rather superfluous.

40. The champions of *Artha* argue that the pursuit of *Kama*, of life's pleasures, is detrimental to the other two attainments of Life—*Dharma* and *Artha*. It leads him into the company of wicked persons; undesirable occupations, unclean habits and impure deeds; it also deprives him

of future prospects. It engenders rashness and undue haste, and makes him unacceptable and untrustworthy in the eyes of all.

46-48. To this Vatsyayana's reply is that the pleasures of *Kama* are as essential for the proper maintenance of the human body as is good. Moreover, they take their very roots in *Dharma* and *Artha*. Granted, one must, however, be beware of the dangers. Do people refrain from cooking food simply because there are beggars? Do they not sow the seeds of barley in spite of the deer eating their sprouts?

3. 1-4. Man should study *Kama Sutra* and its subsidiary arts alongside the arts and the sciences contained in *Dharma* and *Artha*. A maiden should study the *Kama Sutra* and the subsidiary arts before marriage and in the event of her marriage, should study the same with her husband's consent.

5. 40. Desirable qualities in a messenger are: Eloquence, pushing and courageous nature, insight into men's behaviour and motives, cool-headedness, knowledge of other people's inner thoughts, reliability, ability to give evasive answers, knowledge of the neighbourhood, awareness of the propriety of time, capacity to decide quickly in case of doubt, resourcefulness shown by using trivial means for solving difficult problems, quick and ready application of remedies.

II.1. 1-2 (The Sutras) describe the sex organs of men and women according to size—small, medium and large.

12-14. Intensity of desire is also divided into three—small or middling or intense passion giving rise to nine combinations in the pair.

17-18. Men and women are also classified into three types according to the duration of their passion—short-timed, the medium-timed and the long-timed (and similarly they give nine different combinations).

19 ff. Discuss the difference between man and woman with respect to duration. While the man is able to fulfil his passion by merely uniting with the woman, the woman is only pleased with the man who can perform protracted unions.

37-40. The answer to this is that just as the potter's wheel or the spinning top at first starts rotating slowly and only gradually gathers speed, so the woman's passion has perforce to start slowly before it culminates in the final intensity of pleasure.

44. The difference may arise from the difference between their respective attitudes and feelings.

46-48. The difference between their respective attitudes is purely nature's work. The man takes the active part whereas the woman's is the passive role. In the result, therefore, the man's pleasure differs from

the woman's.

Experts learned in this science have detailed four kinds of love:

1. Love born of continual habit.
2. Love arising from the imagination.
3. Love resulting from self-belief and belief of others.
4. Love resulting from perception of external objects.

II. 2. *On Embracing*. After classifying different kinds.

30. Even those who merely question and hear and those who narrate the details of the embrace, feel the urge for enjoyment within them.

II. 3. After describing the various kinds of kisses.

34. Every lover must reciprocate the beloved's gesture with equal intensity, kiss by kiss and embrace by embrace. (If there is no reciprocity, the beloved will feel dejected and consider the lover cold as a stone-pillar. It will result in a highly unsatisfactory union. To keep the passion alive and inflamed, reciprocity is absolutely essential.)

II. 10. 23-27. Lovers will find that if they dally with each other in pleasing ways and so create confidence in each other, both at the commencement and at the end of congress, they will heighten the love between them. These acts please both their tastes, dispel anger and enhance love. . . . If the lovers are reminiscent of the pleasure of their first meeting, the pain of separation, they find they become passionate and express their passion through embraces and kisses.

40-46. Deal with love-quarrels.

The offended woman usually displays her anger by crying, forcing physical discomfort and pain on herself. The woman may strike the man and not herself.

Remaining cool and unperturbed the man (who has offended her by speaking of other women or by continued attention to another) must placate her.

She may give in then, though she may continue her taunting; otherwise her lover will be annoyed if her anger remains unabated.

III. 1. *Selection and acceptance of the bride*. 1. When a marriage, with a maiden of one's own caste, who is also a virgin, is arranged in compliance with the holy texts, it is conducive to the attainment of *Dharma* and *Artha*, progeny, relatives, more friends, and a pure and natural love between the married partners.

2. When a man, therefore, on completing his studies, selects a bride, he should see to it that she is a virgin, at least three years younger than himself, born in a well-to-do family, whose parents are experienced guardians, still alive, and whose way of life is praiseworthy. She should

have and cherish many relatives, both on the paternal and maternal side. She must possess beauty and character, good health, and proportionate limbs, and have good teeth, nails, ears, hair, eyes, and breasts, and suffer from no ailment. Of course, the man must also possess the same qualities which he expects in his bride.

4. In selecting the bride, parents and relatives and mutual friends of the two partners should exert themselves (usually at the instance of the man himself).

14. In the opinion of some sages, marriage with a maiden who at first sight pleases the mind and delights the eye always results in the fulfilment of the three attainments of life, it is not so with those who don't, and they must therefore be avoided.

15. The functionaries on the maiden's side should dress her in attractive and decent clothes at the time of the '*Varana*' (i.e., on the occasion of choosing a bride) and carry on the ceremony till the afternoon.

17-19. During the '*Varana*' ceremony, the bridal party should welcome the bridegroom's party who should conduct themselves with dignity and conformity, with offerings of auspicious rice and curds. Then the maiden, who has been decked out in all finery, on some pretext or the other, is shown to them.

III.2. *On creating confidence in the bride.* 1. The newly-wedded couple should sleep on the floor for the first three nights, observing celibacy (until the fourth day, when proper oblations are offered), partaking of food (at night) which is free from jaggery and rock-salt. For the next seven days they should continue their celibacy as before, but should indulge in ceremonial baths to the accompaniment of pipe-music, bedeck themselves with ornaments and suitable clothes, eat together, attend dramatic festivals and honour their relatives (with perfumes and garlands). (This is termed 'the vow of ten nights'.)

2-6 After this period, the bridegroom may commence his amorous advances to his wife in a delicate manner, in a secluded chamber at night.

(Earlier) the bridegroom should make advances to induce confidence in his bride: he should, however, abstain from the actual union, and not transgress the vow of celibacy.

During his advances, he must avoid doing anything rashly, for women are like flowers, and can only bear a delicate approach.

Rashness in advances not only fails to create confidence, but engenders a disgust towards the ultimate union in the mind of the bride. At all

times, therefore, the bridegroom must be gentle and considerate.

39. The man acting according to his bride's inclination, should so win her confidence that she grows more and more attached to him and becomes his trusted companion.

43. The man who approaches a maiden suddenly, precipitately, without regard to her feelings, engenders fear, disgust, dejection and detestation in her mind.

44. When the maiden is not roused properly, she harbours resentment against her husband whom she hates, and resorts to other men.

III.3. *Ways of courting and winning the heart of the bride.* 5-7. In wooing a girl, the man should collect flowers and make garlands in her company and indulge in games, cooking etc. . . . he may play these games either alone with her or in the company of her relatives and attendants.

8. The suitor should find out if the girl is curious about anything in particular; if she is, he should enlighten himself on the subject and then satisfy her curiosity.

Whenever she requires anything at any particular moment, he should give it to her either secretly or openly, according to the circumstances. In short, he should act in such a way as to make the girl feel that he is able to fulfil all her wants.

21-23. He should attire himself in attractive clothes and often be seen by her without any obstruction. His growing attraction for her will become apparent to her, for young women usually love the first man with whom they become acquainted and whom they see very often; but though they feel attracted to that man, they will not proceed further themselves and become united with him. This is the general rule, and therefore these advances to a young maiden have been recounted above.

24-42. We will now describe the gestures mentioned above (which reveal the attraction the girl feels for the man); she does not look straight in the face. If seen, she becomes bashful. She will expose one or the other of her beautiful limbs on some pretext or the other (while actually making a show of covering that part). . . . She embraces and kisses a child sitting in her lap. . . .

44. A young girl is won over by dolls and toys; a young maiden by a show of artistic talents, and a fully mature woman, by winning over her own confidence.

III. 4. *How a man must behave.* 1. When a man observes through the various expressions and gestures mentioned in the earlier chapter that

the maiden loves him, he should endeavour to secure physical union with her thus:

2 ff. First, regarding superficial advances. While engaged in games, he should hold her hand. . . . be seated beside her in a lonely place or lying down beside her on a bed in the dark, he should observe her reactions (to the advances described above).

In conclusion, a man should first ascertain his beloved's inclinations from her gestures and general behaviour, and when he attends various functions with her, like sacrificial rites, marriages, excursions, festivals etc.

Vatsyayana contends that if a woman is well-inclined towards a man and reveals that to him through her gestures, she will not resist his advances if properly timed and placed.

V.1. *The characteristics of men and women in love.* 3. When a man finds that his love for another woman becomes stronger and stronger in intensity, he should proceed to win her over for the sake of saving himself from further harm.

4-5. The intensity of love grows with each of the following ten stages:

- Love at first sight.
- Mental attachment.
- Lingering thoughts.
- Loss of sleep.
- Physical emaciation.
- Indifference to other affairs.
- Absence of a sense of shame.
- Mental imbalance.
- Physical debility leading to fainting etc.
- Death.

V.3. *Testing the woman's inclinations.* 1. When a man makes overtures to a woman, he should put her behaviour to the test and thereby gauge her sentiments.

2. If, at the first approach, she fails to respond, but at the second approach, is at least accessible, he should consider her hesitation as a favourable sign and attempt to win her over gradually.

5-6. A woman who passes over many approaches and fails to respond to them even after a long time. . . . can be won over by the man keeping constantly in touch with her.

V. 4. 13. (He should) try to find out through her manner, speech, expression, and sympathetic hearing, whether she finds this agreeable.

IV. 1. *About Courtesans*. 1 ff. The courtesans court their paramours partly for physical pleasure but basically for their own livelihood. The first of these is a natural instinct, but the second is certainly not natural, yet they have to make it appear natural. Men become attached to these courtesans who are attractive towards them physically since they inspire a feeling of confidence in them.

12. Qualities which make a man approachable: Being of noble family, learned, familiar with the different faiths, endowed with a poetic nature, expert narrator, eloquent speaker, dignitary, expert in the various Arts, respecting sages and learned men, ambitious and aspiring to greater things, zealous faithful, free from jealousy, generous-hearted, devoted to friends, religious and social enthusiast, theatre-goer, actor and player of games, healthy, unblemished, physically strong, manly, virile, kind, gallant to the ladies, not enslaved by women, independent, broad-minded, and so forth.

17. The motives for courting are as follows: The sages say that a person is motivated by passion, fear, desire for money, rivalry, revenge, sheer curiosity, partiality, sorrow, religious duty, fame, compassion, friendly advice, shyness, familiarity with a friend, good connections, inevitable decrease of passion, proximity of birth and caste and neighbourhood, continued intimacy and dignity.

21. Even if invited, the courtesan should not immediately proceed to the person concerned nor accede to his request too quickly, since men dislike women who are too easily gained over.

IV. 3. 27. A courtesan should always find out and keep herself informed about the state of her lover's mind whether he has lost interest in her or not. She should gauge this from his behaviour, change in his temper, and expressions on his face.

Chapter 15

Charaka Samhita and Sushruta Samhita

The systematic development of Indian medicine proceeded primarily along two principal lines, viz., that of Charaka which is purely medical and that of Sushruta which is primarily surgical. We have to see only the treatises of Charaka and Sushruta as modified and supplemented by later revisers.

One of the outstanding features of the history of literature in India is that there is no adequate material to fix the dates of the various works and their authors. This is due to the fact that knowledge was transmitted orally by the teacher to his pupils. Writing was used rather late in India and even then books were written on palm leaves which perished soon. This difficulty of fixing dates is very great in the field of Indian medicine. Further, Ayurveda is looked upon as a part of Atharva Veda. So there is considerable difference of opinion in the determination of the dates of Charaka and Sushruta. It is only further research that will help to clarify the dates. It may be surmised that they composed their samhitas around the third or the second century B.C.

Ayurveda is largely indebted to the Samkhya and Vaiseshika systems for their philosophical ideas. Charaka asserts that manas is the direct cause of pleasure and pain; it is also the superintendent of all the senses. Manas is also called 'sattva' and 'chetas'. The self, however, is the permanent subject of all acts of consciousness. When the self makes an effort and the objects of pleasure and pain or thought are present, then the manas turns to these as its objects and moves the senses and the senses, guided by it, grasp their respective objects and produce their cognition. Thus consciousness does not belong to the self in itself. It is attained only by its connection with the senses through manas. When the self is in association with manas, it has the following qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, breathing, movement of eyelids, the action of the intellect as decision making or buddhi (nischaya), imagination (sankalpa), thought (vicharana), memory (smriti), scientific knowledge (vijnana), energy (adhyavasaya) and sense-cogni-

tions (vishayopalabdhi).

The qualities of manas are divided into three classes; viz., sattvika, rajas, and tamas. The sattvika is characterised by kind actions, gradual enjoyment, mercy, truthfulness, virtue, faith, self-knowledge, intelligence (buddhi), self-control (dhruti) and sense of duty. The rajas qualities are suffering, impatience, pride, untruthfulness, cruelty, boastfulness, conceit, joy, passion and anger. The tamas qualities are dullness, viciousness, want of retentive power, idleness and sleepiness.

According to Charaka, the three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation (pranaishana), our desire for materials of comfort (dhanaishana) and our desire for a happy state of existence in future life (paralokaishana). Right conduct is neither conduct in accordance with Vedic injunctions, nor conduct leading to cessation of all sorrows, but that which leads to the fulfilment of the above three ultimate desires. Thus the foremost is our desire for life, that is, health and prolongation of life, since life is the precondition of all other good things. Next comes our desire for wealth, work and comforts.

Sorrows are said to proceed from four causes: (1) wrong notion that sense-objects are eternal (buddhi-vibhramsa), (2) the lack of control over the mind (dhruti-vibhramsa), (3) forgetfulness of the nature of right knowledge (smriti-vibhramsa) and (4) adoption of unhygienic courses. All these wrong actions are termed prajnaparadha. They arise through the confusion of intelligence, want of self-control and want of right-knowledge. Wrong actions arise through the passions of jealousy, vanity, fear, anger, greed, ignorance, errors, egoism. They are promoted by delusion (moha) and self-ostentation (rajas). Charaka takes prajnaparadha in the very wide sense of error of judgement leading to all kinds of transgression of laws of health and the laws of society and custom. In other words, according to Charaka, all proper actions are undertaken through the promptings of the three fundamental desires, namely, the desire for life, desire for wealth and enjoyment and desire for spiritual good. All improper actions are due to improper understanding, confusion of thought, and misdirected intelligence. As a result, Charaka does not preach the ideal of leaving off desires and attachments; nor does he advocate the Gita ideal of the performance of duties without attachment. He promotes the ideal of living one's life in a manner conducive to health, long life and proper enjoyment. We should not commit mistakes in eating, drinking and other activities

which may lead to disease and suffering.*

Charaka attributes diseases to the three vitiating elements of the body, namely vata, pitta and kapha, and to the two vitiating elements of the mind, namely passion (raga) and delusion (moha). All diseases arise because of the vitiation of these bodily and mental elements.

He attributes individual differences to the three gunas—sattva, rajas and tamas—and describes various types of personalities arising out of their interaction.

Diseases are classified into three groups, those caused by discordance of the vata, pitta and kapha; those caused by exogenous factors like poison, fire, injury etc., and those caused by psychical factors arising from wrong judgments, unfulfilled desires etc. In the same way Charaka describes three therapies, namely, divine therapy based on fasting, pilgrimages, propitiatory rites etc., the scientific therapy based on diet and medicines and psychic therapy based on mental control, restraining the mind from the desire for unwholesome objects. He, therefore, recommends the need for the examination of the psychical make-up of the patient.

There are long sections describing the various kinds of insanity, their causes and their treatment and kinds of epilepsy, their causes and their treatment.

Finally, a section is devoted to the problem of intoxication. Charaka describes the three stages in the consumption of alcohol. In the first stage there is stimulation of behaviour; in the second stage there is unsteady gait, indiscriminate talk and improper behaviour; in the third stage the individual loses consciousness.

Sushruta gives an excellent analysis of taste sensation. He describes the six tastes—sweet, acid, saline, pungent, bitter and astringent. He also asserts that by combinations these six tastes give rise to sixty three different kinds.

Sushruta also describes different temperamental types which arise as a result of the preponderance of the three doshas—vata, pitta and kapha and by the interaction of the three gunas—sattva, rajas and tamas. In another section he shows how temperament affects the dreams. He also describes some dream symbols. Finally there is a description of intoxication and how temperament affects behavior under the influence of alcohol.

*The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Surendranath Dasgupta's Chapter on Medical Schools in the second volume of his *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 1932.

CHARAKA SAMHITA*

I. Body and Mind

The body and that which is called the mind are both considered to be the abodes of disease, likewise of well-being; their concordance is the cause of well-being. (p. 5)

The wise man who seeks happiness. . . . should exercise the highest care in selecting what is wholesome in the matter of food, conduct and behaviour. (p. 47)

Those in whom the psychic element is in perfect tone are possessed of memory, devotion, gratitude, wisdom, purity, great energy, skill, courage, prowess in battle, freedom from sorrow, firmness of tread, deep intelligence and character and are given to good pursuits. (p. 348)

Man is said to be the sum of six elements, namely, ether and the four other proto-elements (earth, air, water and fire), the sixth being the element of consciousness.

Again, in consequence of the elemental modifications, man is said to be composed of twenty-four elements, viz., the mind, the ten organs (five cognitive and five conative), the five sense-objects and the eight-fold prakruti or evolutes of nature. (p. 363)

The five cognitive senses, each succeeding one of which has one more of the elements beginning with ether, are to be inferred from their respective functions from which proceeds understanding.

The conative organs are five—the hands, the feet, the anus, the genitals and speech. (p. 364)

The Sense Organs

According to this science, there are five sense-faculties, five sense-materials, five sense-organs, five sense-objects and five sense-perceptions. (p. 47)

The sense organs when led by the mind, are capable of contacting the sense-objects.

Sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are the five sense-faculties. The five sense-materials are ether, air, light, water and earth. The five sense organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue and the skin. The five sense objects are sound, touch, shape, taste and smell. The five perceptions are the visual perception etc. These perceptions are the results of the co-ordination of the senses, sense-objects, mind and the

*Extracts from *Charaka Samhita*, translated and published by Shri Gulabkunverba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar, 1949,. Vol. V.

self.

Although the senses, which are recognized by means of inference, are in general aggregates of all the five proto-elements, yet light in the eye, ether in the ear, earth in the smell, water in the taste, and air in the touch are found to predominate. (p. 48)

The Mind

The mind which is super-sensual is designated "sattva" or psyche; some call it "chetah" (consciousness). Its function is dependent on the presence of the mental object and the self (spirit). It is the cause of the activity of sense organs.

On account of the multiplicity of mental objects, sense-objects and impulses, as also of the combinations of the qualities of 'rajas', 'tamas' and 'sattva', the mind appears as multifaceted in one and the same person. There is no multiplicity of minds, because a single mind cannot have contact with many sense-objects simultaneously. Hence all sense-organs do not function at one and the same moment.

The mind, the mind-objects, the understanding (buddhi) and the self (atma) constitute the aggregate of spiritual elements and qualities.

For preserving the normality of the sense-organs and the mind, and for protecting them from abnormality, effort should be made by the following means:

The wholesome contact of the sense-organs and their objects, the proper performance of actions after intelligent and repeated scrutiny, and resorting to the habitual use of agents that counteract the prevailing traits of climate, season and one's own constitution. (pp. 48-49)

The presence of cognition as well as the absence of cognition constitute an indication of the presence of mind. Thus if the self, the senses and sense-objects are apposite but the mind is elsewhere there is no cognition, but with the mind present, there is cognition. The mind is said to have two properties—atomic dimension and indivisible unity.

Whatever admits of being thought about, considered, speculated about, meditated upon, imagined—in fact, whatever can be known by the mind—all that goes by the name of the "objects of mind".

The functions of the mind are—direction of the senses, control of itself, reasoning and deliberations. (p. 363)

The Intellect

Beyond this is the field of intellect. The sense-object is cognised by the sense which is in contact with the mind. Thereafter, it (the sense

object) is interpreted or understood by the mind with reference to its merits and demerits. Guided by whatever conclusive judgement thus formed regarding the matter in hand, one endeavours to speak or act fully aware of the nature of one's action. (p. 364)

Perception

A person's perception is qualified by the name of that particular sense-organ through whose agency that perception is born. And a perception born of the mind is styled a mental conception.

Each perception arises from the fusion of the self, sense, mind and sense-object with each other. . . . perception is born of conjunction. (p. 365)

The Self (Purusha)

In Purusha is established action and the fruit of action; in him likewise are delusion, pleasure, pain and self-love established.

The instruments of the doer are many and varied but the agent is always the same. The agent with his instruments is the cause of all activity.

The self is the knower. Its knowledge proceeds from its contact with the instruments of knowledge viz., the senses, mind and understanding. But in the absence of the contact of organs or in case they are defective, there is no cognition.

The instruments are the mind, the understanding, the five cognitive and the conative organs, when these associate with the doer or the self, then action, sensation and understanding result.

By itself the self can neither act nor enjoy the fruits of action. Everything proceeds from the union of the several factors; in its absence there is nothing whatever.

The signs of the self are: respiration, winking etc., mental activity, inter-communication of sense-perceptions, dreams, desire, hate, pleasure, pain, effort, awareness, resolution, understanding, recollection and the sense of ego.

The mind is unconscious but active. The impeller, however, is the self, of which when yoked to the mind, all activity is predicated.

Because the self is the conscious element, therefore it is called the agent or the doer, while the mind, though actually performing is not called the doer, because it is devoid of consciousness.

Being its own master, the self performs those actions, whereof it subsequently enjoys the fruits; of its own accord, too, the self composes

the mind; of its own accord also, it withdraws from everything. (pp. 365ff)

Pleasure and Pain

Without the self, the senses, the mind, the intellect, the object and the action, there can be no pleasure or pain.

Passion, which is of the nature of both desire and hate, proceeds from pleasure and pain; again, passion is said to be the originator of pleasure and pain.

Desire it is, that acquires the apparatus of sensation; if there is no apparatus, there is no contact; and if unaffected by contact one does not experience sensations.

The apparatus of sensation is the mind and the body together with the sense-organs. (p. 373)

Passions are the cause of suffering and are the producers of pain. The renunciation of all passions is the means of removing all the miseries. (p. 370)

Sleep

When the mind and the senses being tired, retire from their sense objects, then the man falls into sleep.

Happiness and sorrow, growth and wasting, strength and weakness, virility and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, as well as life and its cessation depend on sleep.

Sleep indulged in either out of time or over-much or not at all, swallows up life and happiness.

That very sleep, when indulged in rightly, makes a man's life happy and long even as the knowledge of truth, as it dawns, brings wonderful powers to the yogi.

From the point of view of personal hygiene, the body is known to depend on sleep as much as on food for its happiness. Especially do corpulence and emaciation arise from food and sleep.

The following too, are to be known as dispellers of sleep—absorption in work, old age, disease. . . . (p. 134)

Dreams

When a man is not in profound sleep, he perceives with the mind which is the lord of the senses, many kinds of dreams, of which some become fruitful and some not.

As the channels of the mind are filled with the highly vitiated triad of humors, man sees fearful dreams.

Dreams are known to be of seven kinds: those pertaining to things that are seen, heard, experienced, pictured from inner desires, created by the fancy and things that presage the coming good or evil and lastly dreams that are born of morbid humors.

The wise physician should regard the first five of them as fruitless as also those born of day-sleep, and those that are either too short or too long.

The dream that is dreamt in the first part of the night has only a small degree of fulfilment. But having dreamt, if a man does not sleep again, it gets immediately fulfilled with great consequence.

But if a man, having seen in his dreams inauspicious things, sees in it again good and auspicious things, its fruits are to be regarded as good. (p. 451)

Developmental Stages

The conception arises from the sum of causative factors emanating from the mother, the father, the soul, the mind, the concordance, and the nourishment.

The appellation of conception is given to that union of semen, ovum and the soul which takes place in the womb.

The embryo is a compound product of the ether, air, fire, water and earth and is the dwelling place of the soul.

The soul having now become the embryo. . . . in the third month, all the sense-organs and all the limbs emerge together. (p. 300)

(During) childhood the body elements are immature and indications of youth are not manifest, when the person is delicate, intolerant of troubles, incomplete in strength and mostly of (kapha) element and until sixteen years of age.

The person is said to be yet developing his body-elements and is generally of undetermined psychic disposition (character) till he is of thirty years of age.

That is the middle age wherein has been attained the balance of strength, energy, manhood, valour, understanding, retenuon, memory, speech, discernment. . . . of predominance of 'pitta' element and which lasts till sixty years of age.

That is said to be old age wherein (after sixty) the body elements, sense-organs, strength, energy etc., begin to decay, the body elements disintegrate and the 'vata' element predominates and there is gradual wearing down of the body till the age of hundred years. (p. 351)

The Vitiating Elements the Cause of Disease

The soul is ever defectless and is the same in all living beings; but on account of differences in mind and body, it appears to be different.

Now there are three vitiating elements in the body, namely, 'vata', 'pitta', and 'kapha', these vitiate the body. As regards the mind, there are two vitiating elements, namely passion and ignorance.

Disease takes its rise as the result of the vitiation of the two—the body and the mind, it cannot manifest if they remain unvitiating. (pp. 394-5)

(1) *Vata*. The characteristics of vata are six, viz., dryness, lightness, coldness, hardness, roughness and clearness.

It is the upholder of both structure and function of the body. It is the very self of the five forms of vata in the body viz., prana, udana, samana, vyana and apana. It is the impeller of upward and downward movements, the controller and conductor of the mind, the inspirator of all the senses. . . the impeller of speech, the cause of feeling, the origin of all excitement.

(2) *Pitta*. It is responsible for digestion, vision, temperature; intrepidity and fear, anger and delight, confusion and lucidity and such other pairs of opposite qualities are consequences of pitta.

(3) *Kapha* is the water element and gives rise to plumpness and emaciation, zest and lassitude, virility and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, understanding and stupefaction and such other pairs of opposite qualities. (pp. 72ff)

The Varieties of the Psyche

The mind is of three kinds—pure (sattva), passionate (rajas) and ignorant (tamas). The pure mind is considered to be without any taint as it represents the beneficent aspect of the intelligence; the passionate mind is tainted as it represents the violent aspect; the ignorant mind is also tainted on account of its representing the deluded aspect.

Sattvic Types

One who is pure, devoted to truth, self-controlled, of right discrimination endowed with knowledge, understanding and power of exposition and reply, possessed of memory, free from desire, anger, greed, conceit, infatuation, envy, dejection and intolerance and equally well disposed to all creatures is to be known as belonging to the Brahma type.

One who is devoted to sacrifice, study, vows, burnt-offerings, celi-

bacy, who is hospitable, devoid of pride, conceit, attachment, hate, infatuation, greed and anger, and is endowed with genius, eloquence, understanding and retentive power is to be known as belonging to the Rishi type.

One who is endowed with lordship, is of authoritative speech, given to the performance of sacrifices, brave, energetic, endowed with splendour given to blameless actions, possessed of foresight and devoted to the pursuits of virtue, wealth and sense-pleasures, is to be known as belonging to the Indra type.

One whose conduct is governed by considerations of propriety, who does the right thing, is unassailable, who is constantly up and about, who is endowed with good memory, who sets store by authority and power, and who is free from the passions of attachment, envy, hate and infatuation is to be known as belonging to the Yama type.

One who is valiant, courageous, clean, intolerant of uncleanness, devoted to the performance of sacrifices, fond of aquatic sports and given to pursuits which are not blameworthy, and whose anger and favour are well placed, is to be known as belonging to the Varuna type.

One who commands status, honour, luxuries and attendants, who is devoted to the constant pursuit of virtue, wealth and pleasure who is clean, and given to the pleasures of recreation and whose modes of anger and favour are potent, is to be known as belonging to the Kubera type.

One who is fond of dancing, song, music, and praise, and is well versed in poetry, stories, history and legends, who is constantly addicted to the pleasures of fragrant unguents, garlands, ointments, women and recreation and is free from envy, is to be known as belonging to the Gandharva type.

Thus the Sattvic type is of seven varieties, they are all of the beneficent kind. The first variety—the Brahma, is to be considered the purest, for the beneficent aspect of the mind is perfectly represented in it.

Rajas Types

One who is valiant, despotic, of an envious disposition, possessed of authority, given to poses, terrifying, pitiless, and fond of self-adulation is to be known as representing the Asura type.

One who is intolerant of implacable hate, bides his time and then strikes, is cruel, gluttonous, of an excessively somnolent and indolent disposition and envious, should be known as representing the Rakshasa

type.

One who is a great eater, luxurious, fond of keeping company of women in secret, unclean, a hater of cleanliness, a coward, a bully, given to abnormal recreations and diet is to be known as representing the Pisacha type.

One who is brave when excited, touchy, of an indolent disposition who arouses fear in the beholder and is devoted to food and pleasures of recreation is to be known as representing the Sarpa (serpent) type.

One who is fond of food, whose character, conduct and pastimes are of a very painful description, who is envious, who is without discrimination, who is covetous and who is disinclined to work should be known as representing the Preta (ghost) type.

One who is of strong attachments, who is constantly devoted to the delights of eating and recreation, is fickle, intolerant and unacquisitive is to be known as representing the Sakuna (bird) type.

Thus the rajas type is to be known as comprising six varieties, they are all tinged with passion.

Tamas types

One who is of a forbidding disposition, unintellectual, disgusting in his behaviour and dietetic habits, abandoned to sex pleasures and given to somnolent habits is to be known as belonging to the Animal type.

One who is pussilanimous, unintelligent, greedy for food, unstable, of persistent likes and dislikes, of itinerant habits and fond of water is to be known as belonging to the Fish type.

One who is lazy, exclusively devoted to the business of eating and devoid of mental faculties is to be known as belonging to the Vegetable (plant) type.

Thus, the tamas type should be known to comprise three varieties, they represent the inert aspect of mind.

In this manner, we have described a few of the innumerable varieties to be met with in the three types of mind with a view to indicating the general nature of the treatment to be given in each type. (pp. 395-397)

II. Origin of Disease

The real cause of the origin, both of the body and its afflictions, is the mind, known as 'Sattva', when it is enveloped by passion and ignorance.

Objection. No, (this too, is not right). For the mind by itself cannot be the cause (of anything). Thus without the body there cannot (of

course) be any disease of the body, nor (for that matter) the mind's very existence.

Answer. Man, then, is the result of the six elements. The diseases, too, arise from six elements. Thus the individual was declared by the numerical philosophers to be the aggregate resulting from (the union of) the six elements (the five proto-elements and consciousness).

Objection. "No, that is not so. How can the individual spring from the six elements without the agency of the father and mother?"

Answer. Thus man is born of man. Thus diseases such as the urinary one and others have been said to be hereditary. Therefore, the parents are the origin (both of the individual and his disease)."

Objection. "No. For the blind are not born of the blind. Nor can you account (on your thesis) for the origin of the first parents.

Answer. Therefore a creature is said to be born of the merits of action and from merits of action also arise the diseases afflicting him. In the absence of action, there is no rise either of man or of disease."

Objection. "No, for the doer always precedes the deed. Nor have we any valid knowledge of action that has not been performed, whereof it may be said that an individual is the result.

Answer. Nature alone is the cause, then, of both man and his diseases just as roughness, fluidity, mobility and heat are respectively the nature of earth, water, air and fire."

To this (the physician) Kankayana said: "No. For, then, effort would be fruitless; and things would either be accomplished or not accomplished simply by the course of nature." (pp. 149-150).

Rajas (passion) and tamas (ignorance) are the morbid factors affecting the mind. Among the disorders brought about by these two are—desire, anger, greed, infatuation, envy, conceit, arrogance, anxiety, remorse, fear, exhilaration etc.

Vata, pitta and kapha are the morbid factors affecting the body. Among the disorders engendered by these three morbid humors are fever, diarrhoea, odema, consumption, dyspepsia, urinary anomalies and dermatosis etc.

Of both kinds of morbid factors (psychic and somatic) the exciting factors are three. They are—nonhomologatory contact of the senses with their sense-objects, volitional transgression and time-effects.

These morbid factors when excited, generate by virtue of the diversity of exciting factors and the diversity of susceptible factors, innumerable varieties of disorders.

These disorders both psychic such as desire etc., and somatic such as

fever etc., following one another, occasionally occur together.

The natural concurrence between passion and ignorance is invariable. For ignorance cannot act in the absence of passion. (p. 310)

Three Types of Diseases

Regarding the three types of disease, they are endogenous, exogenous and psychic. Among these the endogeneous disease is that arising from the discordance of the bodily humors, and the exogenous from poisonous winds, fire, injuries etc., while the psychic disorders arise from the gain of undesired as well as desired things.

Now the intelligent man when he finds himself afflicted with even psychic diseases, should, with right understanding, examine over and over again as to what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. He should then endeavour to abstain from whatever is not conducive to virtue, wealth and pleasure, and devote himself to such action as is conducive to the use of these three objectives. For outside these three objectives of life there is nothing in the world which is capable of giving pleasure or pain to the mind.

Hence one should conduct oneself in the above manner. One should strive to court the association of those learned in the knowledge of good and evil and also do one's best to acquire the knowledge about one's own self, country, family, age, vitality and ability.

The Three Therapies

Regarding the three kinds of therapy, they are divine therapy, scientific therapy and mental control.

Amongst these, divine therapy consists of incantations, herbs, gems, propitiatory rites, oblations and offerings, sacrifice, vows, ceremonial penitence, fasting, auspicious rites, prostrations, pilgrimages and such other things.

Scientific therapy consists of the prescription of the line of dietetic regimen and medication.

Mental control consists of restraining the mind from the desire for unwholesome objects.

The stupid man fails to recognise the seriousness of a disease till he is tormented by it; only after he is fairly in the grip of suffering, does he make up the mind to get the disease under control.

Therefore, before ever diseases show themselves or while yet they are in the incipient stage, one who cares for one's happiness should endeavour to have them treated with proper medications. (pp. 68-71)

The Mentally Healthy

Those in whom the psychic element is in perfect tone, are possessed of memory, devotion, gratitude, wisdom, purity, great energy, skill, courage, prowess in battle, freedom from sorrow, firmness of tread, deep intelligence and character and are given to good pursuits. Their very characteristics describe their good qualities.

Examination of the Body build etc.

Those in whom all the elements are in perfect tone are very strong, endowed with very happy circumstances, able to bear troubles, self-confident in all enterprises, given to good pursuits, of firm and well knit bodies, firm in tread, of resonant mellow, deep and big voice, and are possessed of happiness, power, wealth, pleasure and honour. They are slow in aging and slow in being attacked by disease and are long lived.

Examination of the Psychic Make-up

As regards Psychic Element—the mind is called the psychic element. That is the controller of the body through its connection with the soul. It is of three kinds according to the variation in strength. It is high, moderate and low. Men are of high, moderate or low psychic powers.

Three Kinds of Psychic Qualities

Of them, those of high psychic quality are of the psychic nature as described in the perfect tone of psychic element. Though possessed of small bodies, and in spite of being affected by severe ailments of either exogenous or endogenous type, they look unaffected, owing to the high tone of their psychic quality.

Those of moderate psychic quality seek consolation by comparing themselves with others or get composed when consoled by others.

But those of low psychic quality, cannot be composed either by themselves or by others. Though possessed of big bodies they seem incapable of bearing even small ailments. When confronted with fear, sorrow, temptation, delusion or disgrace or made to listen to tales of wrath, awfulness, hate, horror, ugliness, or see sights of the flesh and blood of animals and men, they suffer depression of spirits or pallor or fainting or insanity or giddiness or falling, or even death. (pp. 348-350)

The Causes of Mental Diseases

The derangement of the understanding, will and memory, the onset

of adverse season and effect of past action and contact with unwholesome sense-objects—these should be known as the causes of suffering.

That is called derangement of understanding whereby the eternal and the non-eternal, good and evil, are mistaken, one for the other, for true understanding always perceives rightly.

In the event of the derangement of the will, the mind which is always reaching out for its objects, is incapable of being restrained from undesirable objects, for the will is the controller.

When, on account of the mind being clouded, with passion and delusion, the retention of true-knowledge is destroyed, that is called the derangement of memory.

Whatever act is done by one who is deranged of understanding, will or memory, is to be regarded as volitional transgression. It is the inducer of all pathological conditions.

Premature expulsion of excreta or the suppression of natural urges, indulgence in rash acts, over-indulgence in women, procrastination of treatment, wrongful undertaking of actions, disregard of modesty and custom, disrespect towards the venerable, indulgence in things which one knows to be harmful or highly intoxicating, moving at improper times and in improper places, friendship with evil doers, the abandoning of the good habits inculcated in the chapter on the regimentation of the senses, envy, pride, fear, anger, greed, folly, arrogance, delusion, or injurious acts emanating from these, or any act that is harmful to the body, or any similar act arising out of passion and delusion—all these, are said by the sages to be volitional transgressions causative of disease.

Misconception by the intellect, and misconduct are to be understood as volitional transgressions, because they come under the ken of the mind. (pp. 370-371)

III, Insanity

Diet that consists of articles that are incompatible, vitiated and unclean; disrespect towards the gods, teachers and the twice-born; mental shock resulting from excess of fear or joy; and faulty bodily activity—all these are the causative factors of insanity.

The humors in the body of the weak-minded, getting morbid by the above factors and in their turn, vitiating the brain, the seat of intelligence, become localized in the channels of the nervous system and soon derange the function of the mind.

Confusion of intellect, extreme fickleness of mind, agitation of the

eyes, unsteadiness, incoherence of speech, mental vacuity—these are the general symptoms of insanity.

Origin and Classification

Insanity which is characterised by such derangement of understanding mind and memory, is said to be of exogenous and endogenous origins. I shall describe individually the five-fold causation of insanity together with symptoms and the treatment.

The Vata, getting severely provoked by indulgence in dry, meagre or cold diet, or by excess of purificatory procedure or atrophy of body-element or by fasting and vitiating the brain, which is already overcome with worry etc., soon impairs the understanding and memory as well.

The following are the symptoms of insanity arising from provoked Vata: laughing, smiling, dancing, singing, speaking, bodily movements and weeping, all of which are out of place; hardness, leanness and dusky red coloration of the skin and the disease in its unabating phase at the close of digestion of food.

Intolerance, turbulence, nudity, intimidation, running about, heated condition, anger, craving for shady places and cooling foods and drinks are the symptoms of insanity due to Pitta.

In the person of sedentary habits, the Kapha, getting greatly increased in the vital organs as the result of over-feeding, combines with heat and impairs the intellect and memory, and confounding the mind causes insanity.

Slowness of speech and action, anorexia, fondness for women and solitude, somnolence, vomiting, dribbling of saliva, anabasis following meals, pallor of the nails etc., these are the symptoms of insanity due to Kapha.

Possession by the gods, sages, Gandharvas, Pisachas, Yakshas, Raksha and the manes, and the failure in the proper discharge of observances and vows in this life or the previous one—these are the causes of the insanity of the exogenous type.

The man who evinces super-human power of speech, valour, prowess and behaviour in respect of knowledge, science and strength, and whose fits of insanity are indefinite as regards time—such a one should be regarded as having the insanity born of spirit-possession. (pp. 697-699).

Of the five kinds of insanity, the four which arise from the morbidity of humors, develop most readily in men of the following description

viz., the faint hearted, those suffering from mental shock, the humor ridden, those who make use, in a manner forbidden by the dietetic rules, of improper dietary articles, which are unclean and ill-prepared; those who abuse the general rules of healthful living, as also those resorting to other kinds of wrongful bodily activity; those who are exceedingly wasted in body; those who are crazed with the severity of disease, or those whose minds have been impaired by the attacks of lust, anger, greed, excitement, fear, infatuation, fatigue, grief, anxiety, regret and the like and also those that are injured by trauma. In such persons the mind, having been impaired and the understanding unsettled, the exacerbated humor getting further provoked reaching the heart (the brain) and blocking the channels of sensory communication, brings about insanity.

Insanity is to be known as the unsettled condition of the mind, understanding, consciousness, perception, memory, inclination, character, behaviour and conduct.

These are its premonitory symptoms viz., feeling of voidness in the head, restlessness of the eyes, noises in the ears, hurried respiration, dribbling of the mouth, inappetance, anorexia, misdigestion, cardiac spasm, misplaced mental absorption, fatigue, infatuation and anxiety, constant horripilation, frequent pyrexia, intoxicated condition of the mind; pain in the upper half of the body; the appearance of the features presented in facial paralysis, and the frequent seeing in dreams of roving, moving, unstable and inauspicious forms, or of oneself sitting mounted on the wheel of the oil-press, or being churned as it were by whirlwinds, or the sinking of oneself in whirlpools of tinged waters and the retraction of the eye-balls. These are the premonitory symptoms of the insanity induced by the provocation of the morbid humors.

Immediately after these indications insanity manifests itself. The signs and symptoms of the different types of insanity are as follows: they are—constant rambling, meaningless jerking of the eyes, eyebrows, lips, shoulders, jaws, foreparts of the arms and feet and other body-parts; talking interminably and incoherently; the flowing of froth from the mouth, continuous and inopportune smiling, laughing, dancing, singing and playing on instruments; giving loud imitations of the sounds of the lute, flute, conch and cymbals of the left and the right hand, trying to ride on mounts not in vogue, adorning oneself with queer and un-ornamental objects; hankering after unobtainable viands, and actual contempt or extreme niggardliness for those in actual possession, emaciation and roughness of the body and swelling and red-

ness of the eyes; these are the symptoms of insanity of the 'vata' type.

Irritability, anger, and excitement in the wrong place; striking oneself or others with weapons, brick-bats, whips, sticks, and with fists; running about; craving for shade, cold, water and food; prolonged attacks of anguish; coppery, green, yellow and furious look of the eyes, these are the symptoms of the 'pitta' type of insanity.

Being rooted to one spot, silence, little disposition for movement, dribbling of saliva or nasal discharge, disinclination for food, love of solitude, offensiveness, aversion to cleanliness, constant somnolence, edema of the face; whiteness, fixity and covering of mucus-discharge of the eyes, these are the symptoms of the 'kapha' type of insanity.

That form of the insanity which manifests the symptoms of all the three morbid humors is to be known as the insanity of the tridiscordance type. The specialists declare that such insanity is incurable.

Of the other three which are curable, the following constitute the therapeutic measures: Oleation, sedation, emesis, purgation, corrective and unctuous enemata, eye-salves, nasal medications, besmearing, shock therapy by intimidating the patient with threat of death, chaining and confinement, frightening, inducing astonishment and forgetfulness, skilful regimen of diet according to indication and other suitable medications antagonistic to the nature of etiological factors.

That form of insanity, however, which presents causes, premonitory symptoms, suffering and homologation, other than those which arise from endogenous humoral discordance is said to be exogenous. Some would have it that such insanity owes its origin to reprehensible actions done in the former existence. The teacher Atreya Punarvasu, however, is of the opinion that in this case, too, the etiological factor is volitional transgression that a man, by disregarding the gods, seers, manes, gandharvas, seniors, elders, adepts, preceptors and worthies, perpetrates undesirable acts or begins similar reprehensible undertakings.

The following are the premonitory symptoms seen in a man who is heading towards the exogenous type of insanity, a liking for causing hurt to the gods, cows, Brahmanas, and the ascetics, irascibility, mischief mongering, apathy, the impairment of the vital essence, complexion, lustre, strength and body and in dreams being despised by the gods and others and being incited. Thereafter there is the appearance of insanity.

The following is the manner in which the madness-inducing agencies, when wishing to afflict any one with madness, operate.

These are the symptoms of the exogenous type of insanity, viz.,

superhuman strength, energy, capacity, prowess, grasp, retention, memory, understanding, speech and knowledge. The time of manifestation of this type of insanity is indeterminate. (pp. 267-270)

Therapeutic Measures

The stomach, the senses, the head and the alimentary tract being purified by emesis and other purificatory procedures, the mind becomes clear and the patient regains his memory and wits.

If even after purification, the disorganized behaviour persists strong nasal and eye medications, flagellation and giving shock to his mind, intellect and body are advised.

If the patient continues to behave in an irresponsible manner, then he should be made gentle by soft but strong bandages and put into a dark room free from metallic and wooden articles (lest he should harm himself with these).

Intimidation, terrorization, coaxing, exhilaration, pacification, frightening and astonishing—these being causative of forgetfulness serve to reclaim the mind to normality from its insane fixation.

Applications, massage, inunctions, inhalations and potions of ghee should be used for restoring him to his normal frame of mind, intellect, memory and intelligence.

On having fed him to repletion on ghee and flesh, the patient should be confined in a comfortable room free from draught. By this he becomes free from his derangement of intellect and memory and having regained his normal wits, gets rid of his disease.

The patient's well wishers may claim him with words of religious and moral import, or they may shock him out of his distemper by announcing the news of the loss of something he dearly loves or they may win him back to normality by showing him marvels.

Thus he may also be terrorised by means of snakes whose fangs have been removed or by trained lions and elephants, or by men dressed as bandits or foemen with weapons in their hands or men impersonating the king's officers may, having dragged him out securely bound, intimidate him with threats of immediate execution by order of the king.

It has been well said that the threat to life is more potent than fear of bodily injury, accordingly that measure may succeed in helping the disordered mind of the insane patient to regain its composure (when all the other measures have failed).

The man who has become unhinged in his mind as the result of losing something that he dearly loved, should be consoled by the

proffer of a substitute and by words of sympathy and comfort.

As regards the mental derangement resulting from an excess of desire, grief, delight, envy or greed, it should be allayed by bringing the influence of its opposite passion to bear on the prevailing one and neutralize it.

The man of strong mind, who abstains from flesh and alcohol, observes a wholesome diet and is always dutiful and pure, will never fall a victim to insanity, whether exogenous or endogenous.

Signs of Cure

The signs of a man who has fully recovered from insanity are: clarity of sense-faculties and sense perceptions as well as of the understanding, the spirit and the mind and the normal condition of the body-elements. (pp. 612-618)

IV. Epilepsy

Definition. The knowers of the medical science define epilepsy as a disease due to the derangement of the intellect and the mind, characterised by loss of memory, loss of consciousness and convulsive movement of the body.

In those persons in whom the humors have become excessive and deranged by addiction to unwholesome and unclean food, and the sattva quality has become obscured by passion and ignorance, the brain has become occluded with morbid humors and the mind oppressed with worry, passion, fright, anger, grief, anxiety etc., epilepsy makes its manifestation.

Varieties and Symptoms

Epilepsy is considered to be of four kinds: three of them being due to each of the humors separately and the fourth to the discordance of all three combined.

In an epileptic fit due to Vata there is visual aura of forms which are hard and of dusky-red or black color; the patient trembles, gnashes his teeth, throws out foams from the mouth.

In a fit of epilepsy due to Pitta, the patient's saliva, limbs, mouth and eyes have an icteric tinge, he sees the visual aura of yellow or red colour and is affected with thirst and heat and visualizes the whole world as being in flames.

In a fit of epilepsy due to Kapha, the saliva, limbs, mouth and eyes are white, the body is cold, horripilated and heavy; the patient sees

visual aura of white shapes and takes a long time to recover from the fit. If accompanied with all the symptoms in all their intensity, the epilepsy should be known as being produced by the tridiscordance of all the three humors. This type is incurable: so also is the epilepsy which occurs in debilitated persons or which is of long standing.

The provoked morbid humors precipitate an attack of epilepsy once every fortnight, every twelve days or every month, the paroxysm lasting for a brief period. (pp. 618-619)

Treatment

The victim of this disorder should first be subjected to oleation and sedation and then purified by means of emesis and purgation. When his strength has been rehabilitated, he should be nourished with foods and drinks that serve as brain tonics.

In addition, his friends, sympathizers and trusted mentors who can expound to him both his moral and material good, should instil into him understanding, resolution, memory and concentration.

The physician should bring about the restoration of the activity of the brain, nerves and mind, which have been occluded by the above factors, by first administering the drastic purificatory measures.

The physician should treat the Vata type of epilepsy mainly by means of enemata, the Pitta-type mainly by purgation, and the Kapha type mainly by emesis. (p. 622)

V. Intoxication

That which is the destroyer of sorrow, unhappiness, fear and distress, which is powerful, and which itself turns into and causes love, joy, speech and nourishment, and beatitude, that which has been praised as the joyful wine by the gods, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Rakshasas and Mortals, should be taken in the enjoined manner.

Merits of Right Mode of Drinking

Wine is prepared from various substances and possesses various qualities. It has various actions on the body. It is intoxicating in nature. Hence it should be viewed from the point of both its good as well as evil effects.

If a person takes it in right manner, in right dose, at right time and along with wholesome food, in keeping with his vitality and with a cheerful mind, to him wine is like ambrosia.

While to a person who drinks whatever kind comes in hand to him,

and whenever he gets an opportunity and whose body is dry due to constant exertion, that very wine acts as a poison.

The Action of Alcohol

Alcohol reaching the brain, disturbs all the ten qualities of the vital essence by its ten-fold nature of action and thus leads to the derangement of the mind.

They are—lightness, heat, acuteness, subtleness, acidity, diffusiveness, quickness, dryness, expansiveness and limpidness. These are described to be the ten qualities of alcohol.

While heaviness, coldness, softness, smoothness, denseness, sweetness, fixity, clearness, viscosity and unctuousness are laid down as the ten qualities of vital essence.

Thus alcohol by its characteristic actions, destroys the ten qualities of the vital essence. It acts as a protoplasmic poison. As a result, alcohol agitates the mind and its foundation, namely the heart, and quickly produces intoxication.

The heart is considered to be the seat of the circulatory channels of the body nutrient fluid, the Vata and other humors and of the mind, intellect and the senses, as also of the vital essence.

By excessive use of alcohol and the resulting impairment of the vital essence, the brain becomes disordered along with the body-elements situated there.

In the first stage of intoxication, the vital essence is not affected but the mind becomes stimulated. In the second stage, the vital essence is slightly affected and in the third stage, it is completely affected.

The Three Stages of Intoxication

Three stages of intoxication are observed in a person who drinks alcohol the first, the middle or the second and the last or the third. We shall describe the characteristics of each of them.

It produces exhilaration, delight, a finer discrimination of the qualities of food and drink, desire for music, song, jokes and stories. It does not impair the intellect or memory and causes no incapacity for sense-pleasures. It promotes sound sleep as well as happy awakening. This is the first and the happy stage of alcoholic effects.

Fitful recollection, fitful forgetfulness, frequent, indistinct, thick and laryngeal speech, indiscriminate talk, unsteady gait, impropriety in sitting, drinking, eating and conversation—these are to be known as the symptoms of the second stage of alcoholic effects.

After transcending the second stage and before reaching the last stage there is no impropriety which persons of the rajasik and tamasik nature will not commit.

Having reached the third stage of intoxication, he becomes paralysed like a felled tree, with his mind submerged in intoxication and stupor, and though alive he resembles a dead man.

He does not discriminate between or recognise the qualities of things or his friends. He does not possess even a sense of his own happiness for the very sake of which alcohol is drunk. (pp. 807-10)

SUSHRUTA SAMHITA*

I. Evolution of Matter and Mind

The latent (unmanifest) supreme nature (Prakriti) is the progenitor of all created things. She is self begotten and connotes the three fundamental or primary qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. She is embodied in the eight-fold categories of Avyakta (unmanifest), Mahan (intellection), Ahamkara (Egoism) and the five Tanmatras or elementals (Proper sensibles) and is the sole and primary factor in working out the evolution of the universe.

Out of the original (impregnated by the elemental units of consciousness or Purushas) Intellection or Mahan has been evolved, and out of Mahan egoism. This Mahan or intellection should be likewise considered as partaking of the three fundamental attributes (Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas) of the original nature. Ahamkara or egoism in its turn may be grouped under three subheads as the Tajasa, Rajasika and Tamasika.

All the aforesaid categories or elementals are devoid of consciousness. Similarly the modifications of the primal cause of Prakriti such as the Mahat etc., are all bereft of consciousness inasmuch as the cause itself, the Avyakta or the original nature is devoid of it. The Purusha or the self-conscious subjectivity enters into the primal cause (Mula-Prakriti) and its necessary effect (the evolved out phenomena) and makes them endowed with his own essence or self-consciousness. Though unconscious in themselves, they tend to contribute towards the making of the self-conscious self or the universal individual (the aggregate of limited or conditional selves) for the purpose of working out his

*Extracts from the translation by Kaviraj Kunjalal Bhishgaratna, the *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, Varanasi (Vol I first published in 1907, Vol II in 1911 and Vol III in 1916)

final liberation or emancipation i.e., attainment of the stage of pure consciousness or perfect knowledge. (Vol. II, pp. 113ff)

II. Specificity of Sense Organs

A man by a particular organ of his body perceives the same matter which forms the proper object of that organ inasmuch as the perceiving sense organ and the perceived sensible are produced by the same material cause. The matter which specifically forms the object of a particular sense organ, cannot be perceived by the other. We see a flower with the eyes and not with the nose. (p. 118)

III. Analysis of Taste Sensation

Taste is said to be water-originated principle. This water-originated flavour (Rasa), which becoming modified through its contact with the rest of the material elements, admits of being divided into six different kinds, such as sweet, acid, saline, pungent, bitter and astringent. These, in their turn, being combined with one another, give rise to sixty three different kinds.

According to certain authorities, there are only two kinds of tastes, owing to the two-fold (hot and cold) nature of the temperament of the world. Of these the tastes such as sweet, bitter and astringent are cold in their properties, while the pungent, acid and saline ones exercise fiery or heat-making quality.

Characteristics of tastes: A taste, which is pleasant, proves comfortable to, and contributes to the life-preservation of man, keeps his mouth moist, and increases the quantity of bodily Kapham, is called sweet (Madhura). A taste, which produces tooth-edge and increased salivation, and increases the relish for food, is called acid (Amla). A taste, which imparts a greater relish to food, produces salivation and softness of a part, is called saline (Lavana). A taste which produces a burning sensation at the tip of the tongue attended with a tingling of the part and headache and is instantaneously followed by a running at the nose (fluent coryza) is called pungent (Katuka). A taste, which gives rise to a sort of sucking sensation at the throat, removes the slimy character of the cavity of the mouth, gives rise to the appearance of goose flesh on the skin and increases the relish for food is called bitter (Tikta). A taste which brings about the dryness of the mouth, numbs the palate, obstructs the throat, and gives rise to a drawing, pressing sensation in the region of the heart is called astringent (Rashaya). (I, pp. 382ff)

IV. The Attributes of an Individual

Longing for pleasure, avoidance of pain, energetic undertaking of work, respiration, closing and opening of eyelids, sentiment, intellect, deliberation, discretion, memory, knowledge of art, perseverance, sensation and perception are the attributes of an organic individual. (p. 120)

V. Temperamental Types

The temperaments (Prakrti) of persons may be of seven different types, according as the deranged Doshas of the body are involved therein, either severally or in combination of two or of all the three together. The temperament (Prakrti) of a man is determined by the preponderance of the particular Doshas at the time of his generation (actual combination of the semen and ovum) and is marked by that preponderant Dosha.

Vataja Temperament. A man of Vatika temperament is wakeful, averse to bathing and cold contact, unshapely, thievish, vain, dishonest and fond of music; the soles of his feet and the palms of his hands are much fissured; has often a rough and grisly beard and moustache, finger nails and hairs; he is hot-tempered and is given to biting his finger nails and grinding his teeth (when asleep). Morally he is impulsive, unsteady in his friendship, ungrateful; his body is marked with a large number of prominent veins; he is incoherent in his habit and vacillating in his temper. He is a fast walker and dreams of scaling the skies in his sleep. His eyes are always moving. His mind is never steady. He makes few friends, is capable of accumulating very little money and talks incoherently.

Pittvaja Temperament: His limbs are loosely shaped and yellowish in colour. The finger nails, eyes, palate, tongue, lips, soles and palms of such a person are copper coloured. He looks ugly with wrinkles, baldness and grey hair; he eats much, is averse to warmth and irritable in temper, though he cools down very soon. He is a man of middling strength and lives up to middle age. He is intelligent and possesses a good retentive memory and loves to monopolise the conversation (by pulling down any speaker that may be present). He is vigorous and is simply irresistible in battle. He dreams in his sleep of such things as meteors, lightning flashes, fire. He is never overpowered with fear nor bends before a powerful antagonist; he protects the suppliant.

Kaphaja Temperament: The complexion of a man of Sleshma temperament resembles the colour of a blade of grass, or blue lotus. He is

comely in appearance, fond of sweet tastes, grateful, self-controlled, forbearing, unselfish and strong; he does not hastily form any opinion and is fast in his enmity. His eyes are white; his hair curly and raven black. He is prosperous in life. His voice resembles the rumblings of a rain-cloud or the roar of a lion. He dreams in his sleep of large lakes or pools decked with myriads of full blown lotus flowers and swans. His eyes are slightly red towards the corners, the limbs are proportionate and symmetrically developed with a cool effulgence radiating from them. He is possessed of the qualities of the Sattvika stamp, capable of sustaining pain and fatigue and respectful towards his superiors. He possesses faith in the Shastras and is unflinching and unchanging in his friendship; he suffers no vicissitudes of fortune, makes large gifts after long deliberation, is true to his word and always obedient to his preceptors.

A combination of two different temperaments should be called a double temperament or a Dvandvaja one; and one of all the three temperaments in a person should be stated as a Sannipatika one.

Sattvika Features. The features of a Brahma-kaya person are cleanliness of person and conduct, belief in the existence of God, a constant reader of the Vedas, reverence of elders and preceptors, hospitality and celebration of religious sacrifices.

Those of a Mahendra-kaya person are valour, command, constant discussion of the Shastras, maintenance of servants and dependents and magnanimity. The features of a Karuna-kaya person are a liking for exposure to cold, forbearance, and sweet speech. The features of a Kouvera-kaya person are arbitration of disputes, capacity of bearing hardships, earning and accumulation of wealth, and capacity of propagation of fertility. The features of a Gandharva-kaya person are love of garlands and perfumes, fondness of songs and music, and love making. The features of a Yamy-Sattva person are sense of duty, promptness, firmness of action, courage, memory, purity, and absence of anger, illusion, fear and malice. The features of a Rishi-Sattva man are divine contemplation, observance of vows, complete sexual abstinence, performance of Homas, celebration of religious sacrifices, knowledge, wisdom and cultivation of divine or spiritual science.

These seven types of men should be considered as belonging to Sattvika group (of sattvika mental temperament).

Rajasika Features. Asura-Sattva men are affluent in circumstances, dreadful, valorous, irascible, jealous of other men's excellence, gluttonous and fond of eating alone without sharing with anyone else. A

Sarpa-Sattva man is irritable, laborious, cowardly, angry, double-dealing and hasty in eating and sexual intercourse. A Sakuna Sattva man is gluttonous, intemperate in sexual matters, irritable and fickle. A Rakshasa Sattva man is solitary in his habits, fierce, jealous of others' excellence, externally pious, extremely vain and ignorant. The characteristics of a Paisacha Sattva man are eating food partaken of by another, irritability of temper, rashness, shamelessness, and covetousness of female possessions. Those of Preta-Sattva man are utter want of knowledge as regards duty, laziness, miserableness, envy, covetousness, niggardliness. These six belong to the Rajasika cast of mind.

Tamasika Features. The features of a Pasava-Sattva man are perverseness of intellect, parsimoniousness, frequent sexual dreams and incapacity of ascertaining or discerning anything. The features of Matsya-Sattva man are unsteadiness, stupidity, cowardice, fond of intermissive quarrel and oppression and a longing for water. The features of a Vanaspati-Sattva man are fondness of staying at the same place, constant eating and absence of truthfulness, piety, riches and enjoyment. Thus the three types of Tamasika temperaments have been described.

A physician should take in hand a patient with an eye towards these mental traits etc. A physician should coolly deliberate upon the different types of temperament described herein upon their characteristic features. (II, pp. 154-158)

VI. Handling of Children

A child should be so handled or lifted as not to cause any discomfort. A baby should not be scolded, nor suddenly roused up (from sleep) lest it might get awfully frightened. It should not be suddenly drawn up nor should be suddenly laid down. An attempt to seat it (before it has learnt to sit steadily) may lead to hunchback. Lovingly should a child be fondled and amused with toys and play-things. A child unruffled by any of the above ways becomes healthy, cheerful and intelligent as it grows older. An infant should be guarded against any exposure to the rains, the sun, or the glare of lightning. He should not be placed under a tree or a creeper, in low lands, and in lonely houses.

In the sixth month of its birth the child should be fed on light and wholesome boiled rice. (pp. 231-232)

VII. Effects of Suppressing Urges

A wise man valuing his life shall never repress any natural urging of his body, whether upward or downward, e.g., that of Vayu, etc., evacu-

ation of bowels, micturition, yawning, lacrimation, sneezing, eructation, vomiting and discharge of semen when it makes its appearance (udita) and urges a person to answer its call; (there should be no) repression of hunger, thirst, respiration and sleep.

A repressed urging for stool is followed by exhibition of such symptoms, as rumbling in the intestines, severe pain (in the abdomen), cutting pain in the anus. A repression of the desire of making water is followed by scanty emission of urine which is often given out by painful drops producing distension of the bladder and an excruciating pain in the urethra, anus, scrotum.

A repression of yawning leads to wry neck as well as troubles of the head due to the incarcerated local Vayu and violent diseases affecting the eyes, nose, ears, and the mouth. Tears born of any mental condition of grief or joy and voluntarily repressed without being given free vent to, give rise to severe distempers of the eyes, heaviness of the head and catarrh.

A repression of sneezing is followed by acute diseases of the head, eyes, nose and ears. The voluntary repression of any natural urging towards eructation give rise to diseases peculiar to the derangement of the bodily Vayu.

A repression of vomiting is followed by cutaneous affections due to the bodily Doshas which being vitiated, had interfered with the gastric digestion with reactionary acidity and produced the vomiting. Painful swelling of the bladder and of the scrotum, and about the anus as well as suppression of urine, formation of gravels in the bladder and involuntary emission of semen are the symptoms which manifest themselves in a case of repressed seminal discharge.

Ungratified hunger brings on drowsiness, aching pain in the limbs, disrelish for food, sense of exhaustion, and weakness of eye-sight. An ungratified thirst brings on dryness of the throat and mouth, dullness of hearing and pain in the heart. A suppression of breath in an exhausted person brings on cardiac troubles, fainting fits and an attack of Gulma. An unindulged sleep produces yawning, aching pain in the limbs and a sense of heaviness in the limbs as well as in the head and the eyes. It may also bring on drowsiness. (III, pp. 344-346)

VIII. Sleep

Sleep has its sway over all created beings. The kind of sleep which sets in when the sensation-carrying channels (Snayu) of the body are choked by Sleshma, which abounds in the quality of Tamas, is known

as Tamasi-nidra. It is this sleep which produces unconsciousness at the time of dissolution or death. A man of Tamasika temperament sleeps both in the day and night, one of the Rajasika temperament sleeps either in the day or in the night; while sleep never visits the eyelids of a man of Sattvika temperament before midnight. Persons with enfeebled kapham and aggravated Vayu, or suffering from bodily and mental troubles, get little sleep, and if at all; their sleep is much disturbed.

The heart is said to be the primary seat of consciousness (Chetana) in the animated beings. Sleep overcomes a man whenever the heart is enveloped in the illusive effects of tamas. Sleep is the offspring of tamas and it is the quality of Sattvam that brings on awakening. This is the fundamental law of nature. The self-conscious individuality ensconced in the material frame of man which is composed of the five material elements, recollects through the agency of the mind (Manah), which bounds in the quality of Rajas. Dreams are but the embodiments of these recollections. The Self, though he sleeps not himself, is said to be sleeping, whenever the sense organs are overpowered by the illusive energy of Tamas.

One should not sleep in the day, nor keep late hours. Having known both these acts to be injurious, the wise should observe moderation in sleep. A conformity to the preceding rule of conduct is rewarded with health, good humour, strength, healthful complexion, virility and beauty, a frame which is neither too fat nor too thin, and a long life. (II, 149ff)

IX. Dreams and Temperament

A dream should be regarded as ineffectual which is quite in conformity with the physical temperament of the dreamer (such as, one of scaling the heavens by a person of Vataja temperament; one of seeing a blazing fire, a flash of lightning, or a meteor-fall by a man of Pittaja temperament; and one of witnessing reservoirs of water, etc., by a man of Kaphaja temperament as well as one which has been forgotten or followed by another of an auspicious type or is the outcome of premeditated thought like one dreamt in the day time. (I, p. 281)

Dream Symbols

Now we shall describe the dreams, which are of auspicious nature. Member of the twice-born castes, gods, cows, bullocks, kings, one's

own living friends and relations, a blazing fire, a Brahmana, or a sheet of clear water seen in a dream by a healthy person predict a pecuniary gain in the near future, while such dreams occurring in a diseased person indicate a speedy recovery of the disease he has been suffering from. Similarly dreams of meat, fish, garlands of white flowers, clothes and fruit predict a gain or a speedy cure, as the case may be.

Dreams of ascending the terrace of a royal palace, of climbing a tree or a hill, or of riding an elephant predict similar results as above. A dream of one's sailing over a river, pool or sea of turbid water predicts a money gain or cure, according as one is healthy or diseased. A dream of having been bit or stung by a serpent, by leeches, or by a bee, indicates bliss or cure, according to one's good or bad health at the time. The man, who usually gets such auspicious dreams should be looked upon as a long-lived man, and may be unhesitatingly taken under medical treatment by a physician. (I, pp. 282-283)

X. Four Types of Diseases

(1) *Agantuka*—Diseases of extraneous origin like disease due to an extraneous blow or hurt.

(2) *Sharira*—Disease due to irregularities in food or drink or incidental to a deranged state of blood or bodily humors.

(3) *Manasa*—Mental, due to excessive anger, grief, fear, joy, despondency, envy, misery, pride, greed, lust, desire, malice etc.

(4) *Svabhavika*—Due to the natural derangements of the body like hunger, thirst, decrepitude, imbecility, sleep etc.

The mind and body are the seats of the above said distempers according as they are restricted to either of them or affect both of them in unison (I, pp. 10-11)

XI. Intoxication

Wine is heat-making in its potency, keen or sharp in its properties, subtle in its essence, acts as a soaker or cleanser of moisture and albuminous matter, is dry and instantaneous in its action, stimulating or exhilarating in its effect and is diffusive. It destroys cold and shivering by virtue of its heat-making potency. It suspends all cognitive process on account of its keenness or sharpness, enters into every limb and member of the body by reason of its subtlety destroys Kapha (phlegm) and semen, enrages or aggravates the bodily Vayu on account of its dryness and is instantaneous in its action. It is exhilarating and diffusive (coursing swiftly all through the body). Wine is acid in its taste, is

light and appetising, and produces fresh relish for food. Others assume the presence of all the tastes except the saline one in it.

Wine taken in combination with cooked meat and boiled rice, or any other articles of food profusely saturated with a Sneha (clarified butter etc.,) adds to the longevity, muscular strength and corpulency of a person (using it in moderate quantities) and to the exhilarated state of mind accompanied with beauty, fortitude, vigour and valour and these benefits one may derive from the proper use of wine. This fiery liquid in combination with the aggravated bodily fire (Kaya-Agni) produces the symptoms of intoxication and unconsciousness etc., (Mada) in a foolish person taking it without food or on an empty stomach and in an inordinate quantity.

Evil Effects of Drinking. Excessive drinking produces incidental nescience which gradually creeps into and clouds the sense-perceptions, destroying and giving publicity to the innermost thoughts (in the mind) of the intoxicated person.

Three Stages of Alcoholic Intoxication. There are three stages of intoxication. The first or preliminary stage (of intoxication) is marked by an exhilarated state of mind with increased valour, and conviviality as well as satisfaction and talkativeness, etc. The second or intermediate stage is indicated by incoherent speech, exhilaration and the performance of proper and improper acts. In the third or last stage the man lies down unconscious, bereft of all powers of action, of memory and of judging the ethical effects of his acts.

A man who is in the habit of taking fatty food or in whom Slesma predominates, or in whose constitution there is only a little of Pitta, is not so easily affected by the action of wine, which, however, proves distressing in a person of contrary nature. (II, pp. 289-290)

Temperament and Intoxication

A man of phlegmatic temperament (Kapha-Prakriti) can carry his wine well, and symptoms of intoxication usually appear late in him. A man of bilious temperament (Pitta-Prakriti) under such circumstances, gets easily intoxicated, while the man whose temperament is marked by a predominance of Vayu is often found to be tipsy after his first cup.

A man of Sattvika frame of mind exhibits under the influence of wine, a decided predilection for fine dress, jollity and acts of purity and compassion. He sings, or reads, or evinces a strong desire for female company. A man of a Rajasika frame of mind becomes extremely melancholy or pugnacious, indulges in despondent reveries, and evinces

suicidal tendencies; while wine in a subject of a Tamasika cast of mind exhibits the latent and innate vileness of his soul. Such a person generally sleeps when intoxicated, falsely boasts of his own excellence, and evinces a desire for women with whom connection is forbidden by both social and canonical laws. (I, pp. 464-465)

Chapter 16

Bharata's Natya Shastra

It is surmised that Bharata's Natya Shastra was written in 200 A.D. It is an encyclopedia dealing with various aspects of theatre and stage. The author tries to find out the process by which a play provides enjoyment to the spectators. He has tried to discover the psychological basis of the enjoyment.

The theory of 'Rasa' occupies an important position in Natya Shastra. According to Bharata there are eight enduring emotional states and thirty three transitory emotional states. The eight enduring emotional states, the sthayī bhavas, are: Love (rati), laughter (hasya), sorrow (shoka), anger (krodha), energy (utsaha), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsa) and astonishment (vismaya).

The thirty three transitory emotional states, vyabhichari bhavas, include discouragement, envy, anxiety, contentment, shame, joy, agitation, arrogance, despair, cruelty, fright etc. Bharata has also classified eight sattvika states or psychophysical states, namely, perspiration, paralysis, trembling, weeping, change of colour, horripilation, change of voice, and fainting, all of which help to portray the enduring emotional states according to the exigencies of the situation.

It is the durable emotional states that form the basis for the eight rasas corresponding to each enduring emotion, namely, srīngara (erotic), hasya (comic), karuna (pathetic), roudra (furious), vīra (heroic), bhayanaka (terrible), bibhatsa (odious) and adbhuta (marvellous). The group of thirty three transitory emotional states strengthen the effect of the durable psychological states in the evocation of the rasas.

The durable emotional states affect the human personality so profoundly that the individual who is witnessing the play forgets for the time being all other things in him and around him, that is, when he is under their influence he ignores his own internal states and the stimuli that impinge on him from the outside. In this manner the rasa experience brings in its wake a profound experience which has a purifying effect on his self.

The dramatic representation consisting of words and gestures stimu-

late particular enduring emotion in the spectator so that he forgets himself and he experiences and is completely immersed in the aesthetic enjoyment. It is this aesthetic enjoyment that is designated *rasa*.

The important point is that the actor on the stage does not express this *rasa* but he suggests it by his words, gestures and actions. These stimulate the appropriate emotion and the aesthetic experience in the spectator. Thus *rasa* is the vital principle of unity underlying a great play. Though *rasa* has something to do with the mental states and emotions, it is not identical with them. The principles of unity of action and consistency of character derive directly from the principle of *rasa*. Ordinary experiences, situations and emotions are so impersonalised and universalised by the genius of the dramatist and the actor that the appropriate *rasa* is evoked in the spectator and he is completely immersed in it. The great commentator Abhinavagupta of tenth century showed that the aesthetic experience of *rasa* has the same status as the basic values of truth (*satya*) and righteousness (*dharma*).

Thus Bharata approached the problem of aesthetic experience more than two thousand years ago from a purely behavioural standpoint. He looked upon *rasa* as an impersonal, disinterested, aesthetic joy which is roused in the spectator by the gestures, words and actions of the actors on the stage. He identified that the goal of all art is the evocation of *rasa*.

In life our moods and emotional states are transitory. They change as the situations change and as our attitudes to the situation change. Further, in life we are involved in our emotions. The dramatist takes these multiple and ever-fleeting moods, feelings and emotions, weaves them into a pattern around one of the enduring emotions and the actors are able to evoke in the spectator the appropriate *rasa* by the appropriate gestures, words and actions so that he is completely oblivious to his own inner feelings and the outer circumstances.

As Bharata puts it, "The durable psychological states (*sthayi bhava*) are eight in number. The transitory states (*vyabhicharinah*) are thirty three and *sattvika* states are eight in number. These are the three varieties of states. Hence we are to understand that there are forty-nine states capable of drawing out the *rasa* from the play. The *rasas* arise from them when they are imbued with the quality of universality (*samanya*).

Attention may be drawn to the careful way in which Bharata describes the behavioural features of all these forty-nine states

The Sentiments (Rasa)*

1-3. Explain how the Sentiments, enumerated by experts in dramatic art attain their special qualities. And why are the bhavas (psychological states or feelings) so called, and what do they make us feel?

15. The eight Sentiments (rasa) recognised in drama are as follows: Erotic (sringara), Comic (hasya), Pathetic (karuna), Furious (raudra), Heroic (vira), Terrible (bhayanaka), Odious (bibhatsa) and Marvellous (adbhuta).

17. The Durable Psychological States (sthayi bhava) are known to be the following: love, mirth, sorrow, anger, energy, terror, disgust and astonishment.

18-21. The thirty three Transitory States (vyabhichari bhava) are known to be the following: discouragement, weakness, apprehension, envy, intoxication, weariness, indolence, depression, anxiety, distraction, recollection, contentment, shame, inconstancy, joy, agitation, stupor, arrogance, despair, impatience, sleep, epilepsy, dreaming, awakening, indignation, dissimulation, cruelty, assurance, sickness, insanity, death, fright and deliberation.

22. Paralysis, Perspiration, Horripilation, Change of Voice, Trembling, Change of Colour, Weeping and Fainting are the eight Sattvika states.

I shall explain the Sentiments (rasa). No (poetic) meaning proceeds (from speech) without (any kind of) Sentiment. The sentiment is produced from a combination (samyoga) of determinants (vibhava), consequents (anubhava) and Transitory states (vyabhichari bhava). Is there any instance (parallel to it?) Yes, it is said that, as taste (rasa), results from a combination of various species, vegetables and other articles and as six tastes (rasa) are produced by articles such as, raw sugar or spices or vegetables, so the Durable States (sthayi bhava), when they come together with various other states (bhava) attain the quality of the Sentiment. Now one enquires, "What is the meaning of the word rasa?" It is said in reply to this (that rasa is so called) because it is capable of being tasted (asvadyate). How is rasa tasted? Just as well disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spices enjoy (asvadayanti) its tastes (rasa) and attain pleasure and satisfaction, so the cultured people taste the Durable States (sthayi bhava) while they see them represented by an expression of the various psychological states

*Extracts from the translation by Manmohan Ghosh, Manisha Granthalaya, Calcutta, 1967

with Words, Gestures and the Sattva and derive pleasure and satisfaction.

Now one enquires, "Do the Psychological States come out of the Sentiments (rasa) or the Sentiments come out of the Psychological States?" On this point, some are of opinion that they arise from their mutual contact. But this is not so. Why?

It is apparent that the Sentiments arise from the Psychological States and not the States from the Sentiments.

34-35. The Psychological States are so called by experts in drama for they make one to feel (bhavayanti) the sentiments in connection with various modes of dramatic representation.

36. There can be no Sentiment prior to the Psychological States and no States without the Sentiments (following it) and during the histrionic representation they are result from their interaction.

Sources of these (eight) Sentiments are the four (original) Sentiments e.g., Erotic, Furious, Heroic and Odious.

39. The Comic (Sentiment) arises from the Erotic, the Pathetic from the Furious, the Marvellous from the Heroic, and the terrible from the odious.

45. We shall now enumerate the Durable Psychological States in different Sentiments.

(1) *The Erotic Sentiment*. Of these, the Erotic (sringara) Sentiment proceeds from the durable state of love (rati) and it has as its basis a bright attire; for whatever in this world is white, pure, bright and beautiful is appreciated in terms of the durable state of love. For example one who is elegantly dressed is called a lovely person (sringarin). The Erotic Sentiment has been so named on account of its usually being associated with a bright and elegant attire. It owes its origin to men and women and relates to the fullness of youth. It has two bases: union (sambhoga) and separation (vipralambha).

Now it has been asked, "If the Erotic Sentiment has its origin in love, why does it (sometimes) manifest itself through pathetic conditions?" (In reply to this) it is said, "It has been mentioned before that the Erotic Sentiment has its basis in union as well as in separation. The Pathetic Sentiment relates to a condition of despair owing to the separation from dear ones, loss of wealth, death or captivity, while the Erotic Sentiment based on separation relates to a condition of retaining optimism arising out of yearning and anxiety. Hence the Pathetic Sentiment, and the Erotic Sentiment in separation differ from each other. And this is the reason why the Erotic Sentiment includes condi-

tions available in all other Sentiments.

(2) *The Comic Sentiment*. 48. Now the Comic (hasya) Sentiment has as its basis the durable state of laughter. This is created by Determinants such as showing unseemly dress or ornament, impudence, greediness, quarrel, defective limb, use of irrelevant words, mentioning of different faults, and similar other things. Transitory States in it are indolence, dissimulation, drowsiness, sleep, dreaming, insomnia, envy and the like. This (Sentiment) is of two kinds: self-centered and centered in others. When a person himself laughs it relates to the self-centred (Comic Sentiment), but when he makes others laugh it (the Comic Sentiment therein) is centred in others.

52. (The six varieties are): slight smile (smita), smile (hasita), gentle laughter (vihasita), laughter of ridicule (upahasita), vulgar laughter (apahasita) and excessive laughter (atihasita).

53. To persons of the superior type belong the slight smile (smita) and the smile (hasita), to those of the middling type the gentle laughter (vihasita) and the laughter of ridicule (upahasita) to those of the inferior type the vulgar laughter (apahasita) and the violent laughter (atihasita).

(3) *The Pathetic Sentiment (Karuna)*. Now the Pathetic (karuna) Sentiment arises from the durable psychological state of sorrow. It grows from Determinants such as separation from dear ones, loss of wealth, death, captivity, flight (from one's own place), (dangerous) accidents or any other misfortune. This is to be represented on the stage by means of Consequents such as shedding tears, lamentation, dryness of the mouth, change of colour, dropping limbs, being out of breath, loss of memory and the like. Transitory States connected with it are indifference, languor, anxiety, yearning, excitement, delusion, fainting, sadness, dejection, illness, inactivity, insanity, epilepsy, fear, indolence death, paralysis, tremor, change of colour, weeping, loss of voice and the like.

62. The Pathetic Sentiment arises from seeing the death of a beloved person, or from hearing something very unpleasant and those are its Determinants.

63. This is to be represented on the stage by Consequents like weeping loudly, fainting, lamenting and bewailing, exerting the body or striking it.

(4) *The Furious Sentiment (Raudra)*. Now the Furious (raudra) Sentiment has as its basis the durable psychological state of anger. It is caused by fights. This is created by Determinants such as anger, rape, abuse, insult, untrue allegation, threatening, revengefulness, jealousy

and the like. Its actions are beating, breaking, crushing, cutting, piercing, taking up arms, hurling of missiles, fighting, drawing of blood, and similar other deeds. This is to be represented on the stage by means of Consequents such as red eyes, knitting of eyebrows, defiance, biting of the lips, movement of the cheeks, pressing one hand with the other, and the like. Transitory states in it are presence of mind, determination, energy, indignation, restlessness, fury, perspiration, trembling, horripilation, choking voice and the like.

(5) *The Heroic Sentiment*. Now the Heroic Sentiment (vira) relates to the superior type of persons and has energy as its basis. This is created by Determinants such as presence of mind, perseverance, diplomacy, discipline, military strength, aggressiveness, reputation of might, influence and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as firmness, patience, heroism, charity, diplomacy, and the like. Transitory states in it are contentment, judgement, pride, agitation, energy, ferocity, indignation, remembrance, horripilation and the like.

(6) *The Terrible Sentiment*. Now the Terrible Sentiment (bhayanaka) has as its basis the durable psychological state of fear. This is created by Determinants like hideous noise, panic and anxiety, staying in an empty house or forest, sight of death or captivity of dear ones, or news of it, or discussion about it. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as trembling of the hands and the feet, horripilation, change of colour and loss of voice. Its Transitory states are paralysis, perspiration, choking voice, horripilation, trembling, loss of voice, change of colour, fear, stupefaction, dejection, agitation, restlessness, inactivity, fear, epilepsy and death and the like.

70. Terror is characterised by looseness of the limbs, the mouth and the eyes, paralysis of the thighs, looking around with uneasiness, dryness of the drooping mouth, palpitation of the heart and horripilation.

(7) *The Odious Sentiment*. The Odious (bibhatsa) Sentiment has as its basis the durable psychological state of disgust. It is created by Determinants like hearing of unpleasant, offensive, impure and harmful things or seeing them or discussing them. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as stopping the movement of all the limbs, narrowing down of the mouth, vomiting, spitting, shaking the limbs (in disgust) and the like. Transitory states in it are epilepsy, delusion, agitation, fainting, sickness, death and the like.

73. The Odious Sentiment arises in many ways from disgusting sight, tastes, smell, touch and sound which cause uneasiness.

74 This is to be represented on the stage by narrowing down the mouth and the eyes, covering the nose, bending down the head and walking imperceptibly.

(8) *The Marvellous Sentiment*. The Marvellous (adbhuta) Sentiment has as its basis the durable psychological state of astonishment. It is created by Determinants such as attainment of desired objects, entrance into a superior mansion, temple, audience hall, a seven storied place and (seeing) illusory and magical acts. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as wide opening of eyes, looking with fixed gaze, horripilation, tears (of joy), perspiration, joy, uttering words of approbation, making gifts, crying incessantly 'ha, ha, ha, ha', waving the end of dhoti or sari, and movement of fingers and the like. Transitory states in it are weeping, paralysis, perspiration, choking voice, horripilation, agitation, hurry, inactivity, death and the like.

75. The Marvellous Sentiment is that which arises from words, character, deed and personal beauty.

The Emotional and Other States

The bhavas (psychological states or feelings) are so called because through words, gestures and the representation of the sattva, they infuse the meaning of the play (into the spectators).

When the meanings presented by Determinants and Consequents are made to pervade (the heart of the spectators) they are called bhavas.

Vibhavas (Determinants) Explained

"Now why is the word 'vibhava' used?" (Answer) "The word 'vibhava' is used for the sake of clear knowledge. It is synonymous with karana, nimitta and hetu. As Words, Gestures and the Representation of the sattva are determined by this, it is called vibhava (Determinant). Vibhava (also) means the same thing as vijnata (clearly known).

Anubhavas (Consequents) Explained

"Now, why is the word 'anubhava' used?" Answer, "Because the Histrionic Representation by means of Words, Gestures and the Sattvas are made to be felt by spectators by this, it is called anubhava (consequent).

Now the durable psychological states (sthayi bhava) are eight in number. The transitory states (vyabhicharinah) are thirty three and the sattvika states are eight in number. These are the three varieties of the states. Hence we are to understand that there are forty nine states

capable of drawing out the Sentiment from the play. The Sentiments arise from them when they are imbued with the quality of universality (samanya).

The Durable Psychological States

(1) *Love*. Love (rati) which has pleasure as its basis is caused by Determinants like seasons, garlands, unguent, ornaments, dear ones, enjoyment of a superior residential house and absence of opposition (from anyone). It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as a smiling face, sweet words, motion of eyebrows, and glances and the like.

9. Love arises from the attainment of desired objects, because of its agreeableness. It is to be represented on the stage by sweet words accompanied by (suitable) gestures and movements of limbs.

(2) *Laughter*. Now laughter (hasya) is caused by Determinants such as mimicry of other's actions, incoherent talk, obtrusiveness, foolishness and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by means of smile and the like.

(3) *Sorrow*. Sorrow (shoka) is caused by Determinants such as death of the beloved one, loss of wealth, experience of sorrow due to anyone's murder or captivity, and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as shedding tears, lamentation, bewailing, change of colour, loss of voice, looseness of limbs, falling on the ground, crying, deep breathing, paralysis, insanity, death and the like. Weeping in this case is of three kinds: (weeping) of joy, (weeping) of affliction, and (weeping) due to jealousy.

11. Weeping in which the cheeks are blooming in joy, the body is pilating, there are words of remembrance and tears are not concealed is called weeping of joy.

12. Weeping in which there is a loud sound, copious shedding of tears, uneasiness of the body, want of steady movements and efforts, lamentation after falling on the ground and rolling on the earth is called weeping due to affliction.

13. Loud weeping of women in which the lips and the cheeks are throbbing and the head is shaking, the eyebrows and the glances are moving in anger, is called weeping due to jealousy.

14. Sorrow relates to women, persons of the inferior type and it has its origin in affliction (of any kind). With relation to it persons of the superior and middling types are distinguished by their patience and those of the inferior type by their weeping.

(4) *Anger*. Anger (krodha) is caused by Determinants such as insolence, abusive language, quarrel, altercation, opposing (persons or objects) and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as swollen nose, upturned eyes, bitten lips, throbbing cheeks and the like.

15. Anger is of five kinds, viz., anger caused by enemies, superior persons, lovers, servants and feigned anger.

16. One should show anger against resistance by the enemy with knitting of eyebrows, fierce look, bitten lips, hands clasping each other, and touching one's own head and breast.

17. One should show anger against control by superiors with slightly downcast eyes, wiping of slight perspiration and not expressing any violent movement.

18. One should show one's anger to the beloved woman by a very slight movement (of the body), by shedding tears, and knitting eyebrows and with sidelong glances, and throbbing lips.

19. Anger to one's servants should be represented on the stage by means of threat, rebuke, dilating the eyes and casting contemptuous looks of various kinds.

20. Anger which is artificially shown with a view to the realisation of an ulterior motive and which mostly betrays marks of effort is called feigned anger, and it relates to two sentiments.

(5) *Energy*. Energy (utsaha) relates to persons of the superior type. It is caused by Determinants such as absence of sadness, power, patience, heroism and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as steadiness, munificence, boldness of an undertaking, and the like.

21. Energy which has effort as its basis and which grows out of alertness and such other qualities, should be represented on the stage by acts of vigilance and the like.

(6) *Fear*. Fear (bhaya) relates to women and persons of the inferior type. It is caused by Determinants such as acts offending one's superiors and the king, roaming in a forest, seeing an elephant and a snake, staying in an empty house, rebuke (from one's superiors), a dark rainy night, hearing the hooting of owls and the cries of animals that go out at night and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as, trembling hands and feet, palpitation of the heart, paralysis, dryness of the mouth, licking the lips, perspiration, tremor, apprehension (of danger), seeking for safety, running away and the like.

22. Fear arises from an embarrassment due to offending one's supe-

nors and the king, seeing terrible objects and hearing awful things.

23. This is to be represented with tremor of the limbs, panic drying up of the mouth, hurried movement, widely opened eyes and such other gestures and actions.

24. Fear in men arising from terrifying objects should be represented on the stage by actors with slackened limbs and suspended movement of the eyes.

25. This (fear) should be represented on the stage with tremor of hands and feet, and palpitation of the heart, paralysis, licking the lips, drying up of the mouth, loosened limbs and sinking body (*visanna*).

(7) *Disgust*. Disgust (*jugupsa*) relates to women and persons of the inferior type. It is caused by Determinants such as hearing and seeing unpleasant things and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as contracting all the limbs, spitting, narrowing down of the mouth, heartache and the like.

(8) *Astonishment*. Astonishment is created by Determinants such as illusion, magic, extraordinary feats of men, great excellence in painting, art works in parchment and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by Consequents such as wide opening of the eyes, looking without winking of the eyes, (much) movement of the eyebrows, horripilation, moving of the head to and fro, the cry of "well done", "well, done" and the like.

The Transitory States

The Dominant States are to be known as described here. We shall now explain the Transitory States (*vyabhichari bhava*). It is questioned, "Why are these called *vyabhicharinah*?" (In answer) it is said that *vi* and *abhi* are prefixes and the root is *chara* meaning 'to go', 'to move'. Hence the word *vyabhicharinah* means 'those that move in relation to the Sentiments towards different kinds of objects.' That is, they carry the sentiments which are connected with words, gestures and the temperament. It is questioned, "How do they carry (the sentiment)?" In answer it is said, "It is a popular convention to say like this, just as people say. The sun carries this *nakshatra* (star) or that day. It does not, however, mean that these are carried on arms or shoulders. These transitory States (*vyabhichari bhava*) as mentioned in the Digest (*samgraha*) are thirtythree in number.

(21) *Sleeping* (*nidra*) is caused by determinants such as weakness, fatigue, intoxication, indolence, (too much) thinking, too much eating, (soporific) nature and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by

consequents such as heaviness of the face, rolling of the body, rolling of the eyes, yawning, massaging of the body, deep breathing, relaxed body, closing the eyes and the like.

71. Sleep comes to a man through weakness, fatigue, exertion, (too much) thinking, natural tendency (to sleep) and keeping awake throughout the night.

(23) *Dreaming* (supta) is caused by determinants such as interruption of sleep, enjoying objects of senses, infatuation (of any kind), spreading the bed on the ground, dragging the bed over the ground and like. The dreaming which occurs in sleep is to be represented by consequents such as deep breathing, dullness of the body, closing the eyes, stupefaction of all the senses, dreams and the like.

75. Dreaming occurs due to interruption of sleep, enjoying objects of senses and infatuation (of any kind). It is to be represented on the stage by closing the eyes, deep breathing, dreaming dreams and talking while asleep.

76. Dreaming is to be represented on the stage by deep breathing, imperfectly closing eyes, stupefaction of all senses and absence of all activity.

(24) *Awakening* (vibodha) is the break of sleep, and it is caused by determinants such as digestion of food, bad dreams, loud sound, sensitive touch and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by consequents such as yawning, rubbing the eyes, leaving the bed, and the like.

77. Awakening is caused by digestion of food, (loud) sound, (sensitive) touch and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by yawning, rubbing the face and the eyes, and the like.

(3) *Insanity* (unmada) is caused by determinants such as death of beloved persons, loss of wealth, accidental hurt, derangement of (the three humors), wind (vata), biles (pitta), phlegm (sleshma) and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by laughing, weeping, crying, talking, lying down, sitting, running, dancing, singing, and reciting (something) without any reason, smearing (the body) with ashes and dust, taking grass, Nirmalya, soiled cloth, rags, potsherd, earthen tray as decoration (of the body), many other senseless acts, and imitation of others.

84. Insanity occurs owing to death of beloved persons, loss of wealth, accidental hurt, wind (vata), bile (pitta), phlegm (kapha), derangement of the mind in various ways.

The Sattvika States

Sattva in this connection is (something) originating in mind. It is caused by the concentrated mind. Its nature (which includes) paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, tears, loss of colour and the like, cannot be mimicked by an absentminded man. The sattva is desired in a play for the purpose of imitating human nature. In theatrical practice, situations of happiness as well as misery should so purely accord with the sattva behind them that they may appear to be realistic (*yathasvarupa*).

How can sorrow which has weeping as its basis be represented on the stage by anyone who is not sorry? And how can happiness which has joy as its basis be represented on the stage by anyone who is not happy? Hence the sattva being desired (in acting) in connection with certain states the latter are called Sattvika. Tears and horripilation should respectively be shown by persons who are not (actually) sorry or happy.

94. The eight Sattvika States are as follows: Paralysis, Perspiration, Horripilation, Change of Voice, Trembling, Change of Colour, Weeping and Fainting.

(1) *Perspiration* (*sveda*) occurs as the result of anger, fear, joy, shame, sorrow, toil, sickness, heat, exercise, fatigue, summer and massage.

(2) *Paralysis* (*stambha*) occurs as being due to joy, fear, sickness, surprise, sadness, intoxication and anger.

(3) *Trembling* (*kampavepathu*) due to cold, fear, joy, anger, touch (of the beloved) and old age.

(4) *Weeping* (*ashru*) occurs as being due to joy, indignation, smoke, collyrium, yawning, fear, sorrow, looking with a steadfast gaze, cold and sickness.

(5) *Change of Colour* (*vaivarnya*) occurs as being due to cold, anger, fear, toil, sickness, fatigue and heat.

(6) *Horripilation* (*romance*) due to touch, fear, cold, joy, anger and sickness.

(7) *Change of Voice* (*svara sada*) occurs as being due to fear, joy, anger, fever, sickness and intoxication.

(8) *Fainting* (*pralaya*) due to too much toil, swoon, intoxication, sleep, injury, astonishment and the like

Chapter 17

Bhratrihari's Vakyapadiya

Bhratrihari who lived in fifth century A.D. developed his theory of sphota in his Vakyapadiya. Earlier Patanjali, the famous grammarian who lived in second century B.C. had outlined this theory in his Vyakarana Mahabhasya.

The word 'sphota' signifies 'bursting into view'. There is an element of suddenness involved in the process. It also indicates that the process is unanalysable into distinct aspects or stages. Finally, it occurs like a flash of lightning and constitutes the actualization of some potentiality: it is spontaneous.

The 'sphota' is put forward as a hypothesis to explain the process by which the meaning occurs to us when we hear a word (shabda).

Three factors are involved when we hear a word. First there is the presentational data; the ears receive certain acoustic patterns, the phonemes (varna); we get a series of discrete auditory sensations. Next there is the word (shabda) itself. Finally there is the meaning (artha). The auditory sensations generate the word. The problem is the relation between the word and its meaning. Does the word generate its meaning? According to Bhratrihari the word does not generate the meaning; the word itself is transformed (vivartate) into meaning; the relationship between the word and its meaning is not that of 'generator-generated' but that of 'signifier-signified'. The word and its meaning are in essence identical. While the word is generated by the auditory sensations, the meaning is a 'sphota'; it 'bursts out into view'. Thus sphota is an indispensable intervening factor. Sphota is a force which structures or orders the presentational data into an integrated pattern.

Thus 'sphota' is an internal, experiential event. While the work is manifested by sounds and the ear receives the sensations, it is apprehended by the mind; it is a conscious process. However, when we apprehend the meaning on hearing a word, we grasp a significant whole. The meaning 'bursts out' as it were. It is a spontaneous process. This is sphota. We apprehend the meaning as a whole. This process is not divisible into parts.

Bhratrihari gives two analogies to help us understand this process. Just as the fire that is latent comes out when there is a friction and lights up other objects, the meaning bursts out on hearing the word. The sphota is a latent tendency in the consciousness; it cannot manifest itself unless there is the presentational data by way of auditory sensations. But there is a confusion. Just as the sun's reflection in the water appears to move when the water moves while, in fact, there is no movement of the sun, similarly, the sphota is confused with the sound. The sound of the word and the meaning of the word, though distinct, are taken as being identical. It is true that sphota cannot occur when the sounds are not there; but the sound of the word itself is not the meaning of the word. The sound is physical but the meaning is psychological. The sound of the word can be analysed into its phonemes (varnas), but the meaning, the sphota, is not so divisible. When we hear the word, the meaning dawns in our minds. Thus the sphota is an intervening variable between the heard word and its meaning which is intellectual.

Suppose a word consists of three or four syllables which are heard in succession as the word is pronounced. At what stage is the sphota generated? The sphota theorists concede that the word as uttered and heard is analysable into parts but the meaning is not understood according to these parts. The apprehension of the meaning is not a summation of a series of perceptions. The phonemes and syllables do not separately convey bits of meaning which are put together so that the total meaning is constructed. From the point of view of meaning, the syllables are not independent entities conveying their own meanings, nor is the meaning of the word constructed out of the meanings of these parts. Apart from the word, the syllables are meaningless. The syllables are parts of the word but the meaning of the word does not arise out of them. Meaning is the function of the word as a whole and it has the characteristic feature of coming up as an integrated whole on hearing the sound composing the word.

The sphota theory of meaning is indeed a reaction against Sabara's theory which held that a word is nothing more than a combination of phonemes (varnas) and that the syllables are independent units. We apprehend a word as syllables. It is true that the syllables do not convey meanings, but when they combine they are capable of conveying the meaning. The later mīmamsakas continued the tradition of Sabara and stopped with the presentational data and questioned the justification of positing sphota. In the same way the Naiyayika logicians also denied the sphota theory since one perceives only the syllables and not the

sphota. They held that the word is a collection of syllables and the sentence a collection of words.

Thus, the controversy between the sphota theorists and the mimamsakas and Naiyayikas bears a strong resemblance to the controversy between the Gestaltists and the Associationists in the early decades of twentieth century. The sphota theorists like the Gestaltists recognize phenomenal wholes in cognition, and explain meaning in terms of organization. The sphota theory resembles greatly the 'insight' theory of the gestaltists.

[The extracts are from the translation by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Deccan College, Poona, 1965.]

1. *Vrtti*. In our cognitions we identify objects with their words and our cognitions are intertwined with the words; thus our cognitions are essentially of the nature of the word. All divisions such as the beginning, the substance and the end of things can be determined only through words.

The manifestation of the word which is in everybody as one with the spirit is for the purpose of communicating what is within.

13. *The expression of what one wants to say (the principle of the use of things) depends upon words.* (a) The basis for the expression of a meaning is that the speaker wants to communicate it, not whether it has an external existence as an object or not. Desire to communicate depends upon the existence of a suitable word. The speaker uses a separate suitable word for every meaning which he desires to communicate brings to the mind. It is like a person applying the right sense when he wants to cognise anything directly.

(c) Or one can say that the interconnection is the basis of verbal usage. As the meanings of words are closely connected with one another, even though they appear to be unconnected, verbal usage depends upon the sentence.

23. *The great sages. . . have declared words, meanings and their relations to one another to be eternal.* The very basis of the science of Grammar is that the word, the meaning and their mutual relations are eternal.

In the case of words like 'vrksha', distinct parts like 'v' are produced by special effort, but their distinction is difficult to grasp. But when a succession of the parts is gradually perceived, the verbal usage based on particular universals becomes possible.

Even though the universal of a word may not inhere in the word, when the mind is prepared by the successive impressions left by the

cognition of the previous phonemes of a word, the universal of the word, previously not cognised or indistinctly cognised, is perceived through the cognition of the last phoneme.

Even those who do not accept the existence of such a universal declare that there is one eternal word which is suggested by the many sounds of a word. Others still accept divisions in the form of phonemes within the word, some others hold that the word is one, whether it be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, but appears to have parts produced in a sequence. Others still hold that, due to the continuity of tradition, there is a constant usage and the speakers are not aware of the beginning of words, which are eternal because of uninterrupted usage.

The eternality of meanings is also accepted by some on the basis of the eternality of universals.

The relation between the word and meaning is also eternal since meaning cannot be assigned; (nor can it be assumed that it is) something not known before and made for the first time by some speaker for the benefit of some listener. Therefore the relation between the word and the meaning is beginningless and unbroken.

Or it may be stated that the relation between the word and the meaning is that of the illuminator and the illuminated, based upon convention, a kind of fitness, like that between the senses and their objects.

28. *Whether words be eternal or otherwise, their beginning is not known. As in the case of living beings, there is what is called continuity.*

44. *In the words which are expressive the learned discern two elements; one is the cause of the real word while, the other, is used to convey the meaning.*

45. *That there is an essential difference between them is the view of some followers of tradition. Others, on the other hand, think that they are one but appear to be different owing to difference in point of view.*

46. *Just as the fire which is within the churnsticks is the cause of the other fire (which is kindled), similarly, the word which is in the mind (of the speaker) becomes the cause of the different expressive words.*

47. *First conceived in the mind and applied to some meaning or other, the word is suggested by the sounds which are produced by the articulatory organs.*

49. *Just as a reflection, formed elsewhere (as in water) seems to have movement because of the movement of water, such is the relation between 'sphota' and 'nada'.*

The word ('sphota') takes on the property of the primary sound when it is looked upon as short, long or protracted and those of the secondary sound when it is looked upon as having quick, medium or slow speed.

50. *Just as, in knowledge, its own form and that of the known are cognised, in the same way, in verbal cognition, the form of the object and that of the word are cognised*

52. *Just as the unified image of an original figure is drawn on cloth (in three stages), so does one see the three stages in the case of the word also.*

When a painter wishes to paint a figure having parts like that of a man, he first sees it gradually in a sequence, then as the object of single cognition and then paints it on cloth or on a wall in a sequence. In the same way, the word in a verbal usage is first perceived in a sequence, then cognised as a unity with the sequence suppressed. This partless and sequenceless mental form is superimposed, i.e., identified with the previous appearance having sequence and seeming to be separate.

55. *Just as light has two powers, that of being revealed and that of being the revealer, similarly, all words have two distinct powers.*

. . . The word is cognised; (it also) illuminates the object to be cognised. . . .

57. *Therefore, when the own form of the word is not understood, one asks the speaker 'what did you say?'*

72. *There is no word over and above the phonemes nor is there any sentence over and above the phonemes and words*

73. *There are no phonemes in the word nor are there parts in the phoneme. There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence.*

. . . As it is the sentence, whether consisting of one word or of many words, which is used to express the meaning, there arises a perception of the word as means to the perception of the sentence. In regard to the sentence, there arise cognitions having sequence and having the form of phonemes and words, but they are not identified with the sentence. Therefore, phonemes and words have no separate existence from the sentence so defined, unbreakable, indivisible.

75. *Of the 'sphota' which has no temporal distinction and which appears to follow the duration of the sounds, distinctions in duration have been declared on the basis of distinctions in the manifesting sounds*

76. *According to the view that the word is eternal, the short, the long*

and the protracted being different in nature, distinctions in time belonging to the primary sound are attributed to the 'sphota'.

77. After the manifestation of the 'sphota', the secondary sounds cause the differences in speed of utterance, but the essence of the 'sphota' is not affected by them.

Just as light, as soon as it appears, becomes the cause of the perception of a jar etc., and if it continues, becomes the cause of the continued perception of it in the same way, the sound which continues after the manifestation of the word, caused the continuance of the cognition of the word by adding strength to the manifestation.

81. According to some, the sound is cognised as identical with the word ('sphota'); others think that the sound is not perceived at all, still others think it is perceived as a separate entity.

83. . . . through the previous cognition, unnameable, but favourable to the final clear cognition, the form of the word, manifested by the last sound, is perceived.

84. The word is grasped in the (final) cognition the seeds of which have been sown by the sounds including the final one and which has gradually attained maturity.

The sounds, while they manifest the word, leave impression-seeds* progressively clearer and conducive to the clear perception (of the word). Then, the final sound brings to the mind which has now attained maturity or a certain fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous cognitions, the form of the word as colored by itself, because, they, in a way, perfect the mind; they are called 'bhavana' because they give the form of consciousness and finally, they are called seeds ('bijani') because they are the causes of the later clear cognition.

88. Even though the sounds manifesting the phonemes, words and sentences are entirely different from one another, their powers appear confused.

. . . Even though the manifesting powers have separate effects, their essence, possessing some common features, is confused** due to some

*'Samskara', 'bhavana' and 'bija' stand for three aspects of the same thing The Vritti says that they are called 'samskaras'

**The Vritti explains why the partless phoneme, word and sentence appears to have parts . . . The sounds manifesting 'g' are identified with those manifesting 'g' in the word 'gauh' and in the sentence 'gamabhyaja' So the word which is indivisible appears to have parts and the sentence which is partless appears to have parts This is what is meant by "the powers seem to be confused" The appearance of parts in the partless is the result of this confusion

special effect. Hence there is the comprehension of the parts in the partless phonemes, of divisions in the form of phonemes in the word and of divisions in the form of words in the sentence.

89. *Just as, from a distance or in the dark, after having mistaken an object in the previous cognitions, one sees it correctly*

90. *In the same way, when the sentence is being manifested by the words which are the causes of its manifestation, there is at first a cognition in which parts figure.*

Even though the sentence is indivisible, the sounds produced by the efforts intended to manifest it, cause a knowledge consisting of the cognition of parts appearing as phonemes and words, because of resemblance in their parts which, in reality, are different

92. *Even if the words are accepted as having parts, the difference in parts is due to the sequence of sounds. And if they are partless, the appearance of parts (due to the sequence of a sounds) is the means for their cognition.*

According to those upholders of division who are of the opinion that the word 'gauh' is nothing more than the phonemes 'g' - 'au' - 'h' that there is no indivisible word-essence beyond them to be cognised,. . . If it is held that all parts are manifested at the same time, there would be no difference between 'vega' and 'gave' or 'tena' and 'nate' as far as audible side is concerned. If they are looked upon as two divisible words with two different meanings, this difficulty would not arise. ...

93. *Some have declared the universal manifested by the individuals to be the 'sphota' and what are called 'dhvanis' (sounds) to be individuals.*

It is universal of the word which is called the 'sphota'. . . the individual sounds which are produced and which make the unnameable 'sphota' nameable get the name of 'dhvani' (sounds).

97. *Just as there is an eternal fitness between the senses and the objects, in the same way, there is the relation of manifestor and manifested between particular sounds and the word ('sphota').*

(Though generally) What is to be manifested does not require a fixed manifestor, since all objects like jar are manifested by any kind of light, in the case of words, on the other hand, it is held that fixed sounds manifest them. . . Just as the colour which inheres in the sense of vision is the cause of the manifestation of external colour, not other qualities nor other senses, in the same way they (the sounds) become the causes of the manifestation of external objects.

101. *Therefore, due to the difference in time of the manifesting*

sounds, their own time and that of the duration of their cognition are attributed to the phoneme ('varna') word ('pada') and sentence ('vakya') which have no difference in time

102. *Others have declared that whatever is produced by the organs of articulations, through contacts and separations, is the 'sphota'; the sounds produced by this initial sound are the 'Dhvānis'.*

103. *Whether the sound in question is short or long, the time of the 'sphota' is invariable. The series of sounds which follows is susceptible of greater or lesser duration.*

Smallness and bigness are attributed to the word on the basis of the common feature consisting of covering a certain amount of space. Or it is due to worldly usage. Everywhere usage is the basis for determining the nature of objects. Determining the nature of objects on the basis of reason and tradition would be unreliable because it would result in different views. As both the sounds which are effects and those which are causes are produced and perish without distinction, there is not the slightest difference between a big and a small sound. . .

106. *Even after the organs have ceased to vibrate, other sounds are produced from the 'sphota' as one flame from another.*

Chapter 18

Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka

It has been noted above (Ch. 16) that Bharata enunciated the theory that the essential thing in drama is not the story or the character but the emotion which the dramatist and the actors communicate. He showed that aesthetic enjoyment, 'rasa', is based on a limited number of enduring emotions which he designated as sthayi bhavas. Later critics asserted that this emotional theory applied primarily to drama in which there is actual impersonation of characters by actors and helped in the direct communication of emotions, but that in poetry this communication is indirect as it is a pure verbal expression. So the early rhetoricians like Bhamaha (sixth century A.D.) said that rasa is communicated in poetry through various embellishments like style, figures etc.

It was Anandavardhana of ninth century A.D. who unified literary criticism by treating the problems of poetry and drama as fundamentally identical and restored the supreme place of emotion in aesthetic enjoyment.

It is true that words can convey only ideas and emotions cannot be evoked by mere mention of words. But poetry does convey emotions and feelings. It rouses the sentiments of love etc., in a responsive reader. According to Anandavardhana this is done neither by the primary sense of words nor by the secondary metaphorical shifts but by 'dhvani', suggestion. Anandavardhana expounded the theory that it is suggestion (dhvani, vyanjana) that is the chief means by which art achieves its highest communication. It is 'dhvani', which has to do with the overtones of words that renders the communication of ideas and figurative turns more charming than by straightforward statement. He gave us an illustration of the manner in which emotional response is evoked in the hearer by music though pure melody does not involve any verbal communication primary or secondary. Similarly the look in the beloved's eye has a profound emotional significance which cannot be explained except in terms of suggestion.

Anandavardhana showed that there are three types of meanings for words. There is the primary meaning of denotation of the word, next

there is the secondary meaning as a result of the use of simile and metaphor, and finally there is the suggested meaning. Words convey the conventional meaning by denotation with the help of the abhidha shakti. The aesthetic experience is conveyed by the dhvani, the *vyanjana shakti* (suggestive power).

Here also critics refused to acknowledge the need to ascribe to words this intangible quality of suggestion when there are such processes of verbal cognition like the speaker's intention, presumption and inference.

[The extracts are from the translation by K. Krishnamoorthy, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1974.]

1. *Though learned men of yore had declared time and again that the soul of poetry is suggestion, others affirmed its non-existence; some would regard it as something (logically) implied and some others speak of its essence as lying beyond the scope of words. We propose, therefore, to explain its nature and bring delight to the hearts of perceptive critics.*

In view of the prevalence of so many conflicting opinions, we propose to elucidate the nature of suggestion for the delight of perceptive critics. The nature of suggestion is at once the quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets and most beautiful, though it eluded detection by even the subtlest minds of the rhetoricians of the past.

2. *That meaning which wins the admiration of cultured critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The 'Expressed' and the 'implied' are regarded as its two aspects.*

3. *Of these, the Expressed is commonly known and it has been already set forth in various ways through figures such as the simile by other writers, hence it will not be discussed here at length*

4. *But the Implied aspect is quite different from this. In the words of master-poets, it shines out supreme and towers above the beauty of the well-known outer parts even as charm does in ladies*

The Implied aspect is entirely different from the Expressed aspect and it is found in the words of master-poets.

Charm in ladies is a simile in point. Just as charm in ladies exceeds the beauty of all the individual parts observed separately, and delights the eyes of the passionate onlooker in a most unique fashion like the veritable nectar of gods, so also does this Implied meaning. It will be shown in the sequel that this meaning embraces various divisions such as the bare idea, figures and sentiments etc., —all implied by the inner

power of the Expressed. In all these varieties, it will be seen to differ from the Expressed.

But the third class of the Implied, viz., Sentiments etc., (rasadī) is seen to shine out as a result of the latent power in the expressed. It never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is decidedly distinct from the expressed.

5. That meaning alone happens to be the quintessence of Poetry whose outward charm is secured by the combination of varied and uncommon expressed meanings, expressions and art of composition. That is why the sorrow of the First Poet on hearing the wail of the he-curlw afflicted with separation from its dead mate, transformed itself into a distich. Sorrow indeed is the abiding emotion which is at the basis of the Sentiment of Pathos. As already explained, it is only of the nature of the Implied. Though one can discern other subspecies of the Implied, they can all be understood by the synecdoche of sentiments (rasa) and emotions (bhava) since these happen to be the most important representatives of the rest.

7. It is not understood by a mere learning in Grammar and in Dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true significance of Poetry.

By a mere learning in rules of grammar and meanings recorded in lexicons, that meaning cannot be grasped, for it can be grasped only by those who have an insight into the true significance of poetry.

The fact is that the implied meaning remains beyond the understanding of persons who have had merely a gronding in the sciences of meanings and words if they are averse to aesthetic contemplation. . . even as the true appreciation of notes and tones of music will remain beyond the reach of even the knowers of the science of music.

8. That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve careful scrutiny of a master-poet.

The status of master-poets is achieved by them only by their proper usage of suggested meaning and suggestive expressions and not by a mere composition of conventional meanings and conventional words.

9. Just as a man interested in perceiving objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp since it is a means to realise his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the suggested meaning first evince interest in the conventional meaning

Even though a man may ultimately be interested only in the perception of objects, he will (first) direct his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp as it serves as a means to achieve his end. In fact,

without the flame of a lamp, there could be no perception possible. So also a man who is ultimately interested only in the suggested meaning will first direct his efforts towards conventional meaning.

10. *Just as the purport of a sentence is grasped only through the sense of individual words, the knowledge of that sense is got only through the medium of Expressed sense.*

11. *Though by its own power the word-import conveys the sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its purpose is served.*

12. *So also that Suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of cultured critics when they are indifferent towards the conventional meaning.*

13. *That kind of poetry, wherein either the (conventional) meaning or the (conventional) word renders itself or its meaning secondary (respectively) and suggests the Implied meaning, is designated by the learned as DHIVANI or 'Suggestive Poetry'.*

14. (a) *Suggestion does not bear identity with Indication because there is difference in nature between the two.*

Suggestion which has been explained above does not bear identity with Indication since the two have different natures. Suggestion is the unidirectional communication of a sense other than the Expressed sense by both the Expressed sense and the Expression while at the same time the sense Implied will be exclusively important. But Indication is merely metaphorical application.

15. *Only that word, which conveys a charm impossible of communication by any other expression and which is pregnant with suggestive force, becomes a fit instance for the title "Suggestive"*

17. *If one gives up the primary denotative (abhidha) power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through its indicative (lakshana) power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily).*

18. *The fact is that Indication is grounded on the primary denotative force of words. How can it ever be a definition of Suggestion whose sole support is suggestivity?*

Hence, suggestion is one thing and indication another.

19. (a) *At the most, it might serve as a pointer to one species of suggestion.*

Ch. III. 33. Let us take an instance where a word conveys another meaning after having conveyed its primary meaning earlier.

Here there are two functions of the word, viz., the denotation of the

primary meaning and the implication of the other sense. These two functions are different in their scope as well as in their nature.

The scope of the function of denotation in a word is confined to its primary sense; while the scope of the function of implication includes a sense other than the primary one. . . The apprehension of the expressed will be directly related to the word while the apprehension of the implied will be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense. . . Thus the difference in scope between the two functions is clear.

In the same way their difference in nature too is obvious. The function of denotation itself cannot be the same as the function of implication since we find suggestiveness of sentiments etc., (*rasadī*) even in sounds of music.

Since the scope and natures of the two functions are thus quite different, it is clear that the denotative function of words and implying function of words are quite different from each other. . . The meaning is conveyed only by way of suggestion and not by way of denotation.

The analogy of the word-import and sentence-import too does not quite apply to the expressed and suggested senses. . . when the suggested sense is apprehended, the expressed sense is not driven away to a distance since the apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the apprehension of the expressed. . . Just as the light of the lamp will not recede as soon as the perception of the pot is brought home to the observer, so also the expressed sense will continue to shine out even after the apprehension of the suggested sense has been achieved.

Objection. At this rate a sentence will have to possess two senses simultaneously. If so, its very nature as a sentence will be upset.

Answer. There is no fallacy. One of these senses is subordinate and the other principal. In some instances, the suggested will be principal and the expressed subordinate. In other instances the expressed itself will be principal and the suggested will be subordinate. The designation of 'suggestion' is to be given only when the suggested sense happens to be principal.

Denotation is based upon words only, while suggestiveness is based not only upon words but also upon senses since suggestiveness relates to words as well as senses.

It is true that Indication is also based upon both word and sense through metaphorical application and secondary sense. But suggestiveness differs from indication also both in respect of nature and of scope. It is well known that indication is the name given to a verbal function

which does not proceed principally. But suggestiveness is a verbal function which proceeds principally. Further, indication is practically denotation itself with this difference that it is a subordinate verbal function. On the other hand, suggestion has been proved to be quite different from denotation.

The scope of suggestiveness is three-fold, viz., (1) sentiments etc., (*rasadī*), (2) specific figures of speech, and (3) suggested ideas.

Though suggestiveness differs from both denotation and indication, it is based upon each of them. In suggestion with meant but further extending expressed sense, suggestiveness gets assistance from denotation; in suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, it gets assistance from indication.

Thus it is clear that the functions of words are three-fold: (1) denotation, (2) indication and (3) suggestiveness. And suggestion itself has two important categories, namely, (1) that with unmeant expressed sense and (2) that with meant but further-extending expressed sense Thus suggestiveness is a verbal power, over and above two other powers, viz., denotation and indication.

All human utterances primarily communicate the intention of the speaker. That intention is suggested but not denoted since the relation of denoter-denoted does not apply at all to the intention and the words.

(From another point of view) the scope of words is two-fold: (1) denotative and (2) inferable. Of these the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention. . . Words will have the state of inference only while implying the intention of the speaker; the meanings themselves which are signified by the words are due to the verbal power of denotation and not inference.

The nature of suggestiveness is not co-extensive with the nature of inference. Just as the denoted content of words is not identical with an inference, so also the suggested content is not identical with an inference.

Glossary of Terms

<i>abhida</i>	:denotation
<i>abhilasha</i>	:desire
<i>abhimana</i>	:self-appropriating function, referring all objects to self
<i>abhinivesa</i>	:clinging to life
<i>abhivyakti</i>	:manifestation
<i>abhyasa</i>	:constant practice
<i>achetana</i>	:non-conscious
<i>adbhuta</i>	:marvellous
<i>adharapratyaya</i>	:supporting belief
<i>adhibhoutika</i>	:pain caused by men, beasts and objects
<i>adhidaivika</i>	:pain caused by ghosts etc.
<i>adhyatmika</i>	:pain caused by one's bodily or mental events
<i>adhyavasaya</i>	:definite cognition
<i>ahamkara</i>	:egoism
<i>ahampratyaksha</i>	:self-consciousness
<i>ahimsa</i>	:non-violence
<i>akanksha</i>	:expectancy
<i>akhandapaksha</i>	:holistic standpoint
<i>akhyati</i>	:non-apprehension
<i>akriti</i>	:particular shape
<i>alamkara</i>	:figure of speech
<i>amarsha</i>	:resentment
<i>ana</i>	:respiration
<i>anandamaya kosa</i>	:the sheath of bliss
<i>anantarya</i>	:immediate sequence
<i>anga</i>	:part, limb
<i>anurvachanīyakhyati</i>	:apprehension of an undefinable object
<i>annamaya kosa</i>	:the physical sheath
<i>antahkarana</i>	:the internal organ, the mind
<i>antaratman</i>	:inner self, self-consciousness

<i>anubhaava</i>	:consequent emotional state
<i>anyathakhyati</i>	:apprehension of an object as a different one
<i>aparigraha</i>	:non-acceptance of gifts etc.
<i>apaurushaya</i>	:self-existent, not caused by man
<i>apavarga</i>	:liberation
<i>aprapyakari</i>	:apprehension of objects without sense coming into contact with objects as in vision and audition
<i>apravritti</i>	:inertia, inactivity
<i>artha</i>	:wealth, power
<i>arupachitta</i>	:formless mental process
<i>atman</i>	:self
<i>atmakhyati</i>	:subjective cognition projected into the external world
<i>atmanamviddhi</i>	:know thy self
<i>asana</i>	:posture in yoga system
<i>asatkhyati</i>	:apprehension of non-existing object
<i>asava</i>	:depravity
<i>ashtanga Yoga</i>	:eight limbs of yoga system
<i>asmita</i>	:egoism, ego-sense
<i>asrama</i>	:stage of life
<i>asrama dharma</i>	:duties concerning the stages of life
<i>asraya</i>	:supporter
<i>asrita</i>	:supported
<i>asteya</i>	:non-stealing
<i>asuya</i>	:jealousy
<i>asvadayanti</i>	:eating with relish
<i>avadhi</i>	:clairvoyance
<i>avagraha</i>	:apprehension of details
<i>avaya</i>	:ascertainment of the true nature of the object
<i>avidya</i>	:ignorance, false knowledge
<i>avidyasava</i>	:depravity based on ignorance
<i>avyavasayin</i>	:irresolute person
<i>bala</i>	:energy
<i>balam</i>	:strength
<i>bahiratman</i>	:identification of self with body
<i>bhakti</i>	:devotion

<i>bhaava</i>	:desire concealed in the mind
<i>bhava trishna</i>	:will-to-live
<i>bhaavana</i>	:stimulation
<i>bhaavaanga</i>	:stream of being
<i>bhavaasava</i>	:will-to-live
<i>bhaavendriya</i>	:psychical counterparts of sense-organs
<i>bhautika</i>	:physical, material
<i>bhaya</i>	:fear
<i>bhayanaka</i>	:terrible
<i>bhoga</i>	:worldly experience
<i>bhokta</i>	:experienter
<i>bhutadi</i>	:elements etc.
<i>bhutas</i>	:elements
<i>bibhatsa</i>	:odious
<i>Brahman</i>	:the Absolute
<i>brahmana</i>	:the priest, the scholar, the first varna
<i>brahmacharin</i>	:the student, the celibate
<i>brahmacharya</i>	:the stage of the student
<i>buddhi</i>	:intellect
<i>buddhindriya</i>	:the five organs of knowledge
<i>buddhi nasa</i>	:destruction of intelligence
<i>buddhi vrutti</i>	:mental function
<i>chanchalatva</i>	:fluctuating
<i>chetana</i>	:sentience, consciousness
<i>chetasika</i>	:mental properties
<i>chidrupa</i>	:form of consciousness
<i>chit</i>	:pure consciousness
<i>chitta</i>	:memory, mind
<i>chittasthairyā</i>	:mental stability
<i>chitta suddhi</i>	:purification of the mind
<i>chittavritti</i>	:modifications of the mind
<i>chittavritti nirodha</i>	:control of the modifications of mind
<i>chittavritti visesha</i>	:states of the mind
<i>dagdhabija</i>	:burnt seed
<i>darsana</i>	:simple apprehension
<i>dhanaushana</i>	:desire for wealth
<i>dharana</i>	:retention

<i>dharma</i>	:righteousness, duty
<i>dhvani</i>	:suggested meaning
<i>dhyana</i>	:meditation
<i>ditasava</i>	:holding wrong views
<i>dosha</i>	:fault
<i>dravyendriya</i>	:objective, physical sense organs
<i>dravya</i>	:substance
<i>droha</i>	:malevolence
<i>dvesha</i>	:aversion
<i>dukha</i>	:pain, sorrow
<i>ekagra</i>	:single-mindedness, concentration
<i>grihasta</i>	:householder
<i>grihasthasrama</i>	:stage of householder
<i>guna</i>	:quality
<i>gunasthanas</i>	:stages of development
<i>harsha</i>	:joy
<i>hasya</i>	:comic, humorous
<i>hridaya samveda</i>	:empathy
<i>iccha</i>	:wish, desire, volition
<i>iha</i>	:desire to know
<i>indriya</i>	:organs of sense
<i>irshya</i>	:envy
<i>ishta</i>	:desired object
<i>jagrat</i>	:waking state
<i>jati</i>	:class
<i>jiva</i>	:monad, individual
<i>jnana</i>	:knowledge of self
<i>kaivalya</i>	:isolation, emancipation, liberation
<i>kama</i>	:desire
<i>kama chitta</i>	:normal consciousness
<i>kamarupam</i>	form of desire
<i>kamasavas</i>	:depravity arising from desire, attachment, etc.
<i>kamatrishna</i>	:thirst for sensual pleasure

<i>kapha</i>	:phlegm (one of the three humours)
<i>kaphaja</i>	:arising from phlegm
<i>kapha prakriti</i>	:phlegmatic temperament
<i>karma</i>	:action
<i>karmasaya</i>	:storehouse of impressions arising from actions
<i>karmatva</i>	:concept of motion
<i>karmendriya</i>	:organs of action
<i>karta</i>	:agent
<i>karunya/karuna</i>	:compassion
<i>kevala jnana</i>	:perfect knowledge, omniscience
<i>khandapaksha</i>	:analytical approach to the study of meaning
<i>klesha</i>	:affliction
<i>kosa</i>	:sheath, covering
<i>krodha</i>	:anger
<i>kshatriya</i>	:warrior class; the second varna
<i>kshipta</i>	:restlessness of mind
<i>labdhi</i>	:manifestation of sense by partial destruction of covering
<i>lakshana</i>	:indication
<i>lakshana vyapara</i>	:secondary meanings giving rise to figures of speech
<i>linga</i>	:sign, mark
<i>lobha</i>	:greed
<i>maana</i>	:pride
<i>madyastha</i>	:indifferent, neutral
<i>mahat</i>	:the great, the intellect
<i>manahsuddhi</i>	:the purification of the mind
<i>manas</i>	:mind
<i>manana</i>	:reflection
<i>manodvara</i>	:threshold of consciousness
<i>manomaya kosa</i>	:the mental sheath
<i>maitri</i>	:friendliness
<i>matsara</i>	:jealousy
<i>maya</i>	:insincerity, illusion
<i>muthyajnana</i>	:false knowledge
<i>moha</i>	:delusion

<i>moksha</i>	: liberation, emancipation
<i>mudha</i>	: infatuated
<i>mudita</i>	: joy at the success of others
<i>nama</i>	: name
<i>nama-rupa</i>	: name and form
<i>numitta</i>	: cause
<i>numitta karta</i>	: causal agent
<i>nirjiva</i>	: lifeless, soulless
<i>nirodha</i>	: restrained, restricted
<i>nirvana</i>	: liberation, emancipation
<i>nirvikalpa</i>	: indeterminate
<i>nirvritti</i>	: renunciation
<i>nishkama karma</i>	: desireless action
<i>nishpatti</i>	: causation
<i>nissatva</i>	: substanceless
<i>niyama</i>	: observances
<i>panna (prajna)</i>	: wisdom
<i>pannatti</i>	: name, idea, concept
<i>panchayat</i>	: council of elders
<i>pancha klesha</i>	: fivefold afflictions
<i>papayonaijah</i>	: those born of sinful womb
<i>paralokaishana</i>	: desire for the other world
<i>paramatman</i>	: supreme, pure and perfect self
<i>parigraha</i>	: ownership
<i>parinama dukha</i>	: consequent pain
<i>putrarina</i>	: debt to parents, ancestors
<i>pitta</i>	: bile, one of the three humours
<i>pittaja</i>	: arising from bile
<i>pitta prakriti</i>	: bilious temperament
<i>prajnana</i>	: supra-intellectual
<i>prakasa</i>	: radiance
<i>prakriti</i>	: fundamental substance, physical world
<i>prakriti dhvani</i>	: normal speech utterance
<i>pramada</i>	: indifference
<i>pramoda</i>	: delight in emphasis on good aspects
<i>prana</i>	: life principle, vital principle
<i>pranamaya kosa</i>	: life sheath, covering

<i>pranaishana</i>	:desire to preserve life
<i>pranayama</i>	:control of breathing
<i>prapyakari</i>	:apprehension through contact of sense organs with objects
<i>prasada rupa</i>	:sensitive qualities of body
<i>prasamkhyana</i>	:liquidation by deep meditation
<i>prasiddhanta khyati</i>	:apprehension of an object established by knowledge
<i>prasupta</i>	:dormant impression
<i>pratyabhijna</i>	:recognition
<i>pratikula</i>	:counteractive
<i>pratityasumutpada</i>	:a series including past, present and future, the twelfefold concatenation of causes and effects
<i>pratyuhara</i>	:withdrawal of senses from the objects
<i>pratyaksha</i>	:sense perception
<i>pravritti</i>	:outward movement, active worldly life
<i>prayatna</i>	:effort
<i>purusha</i>	:self, the pure consciousness
<i>purushartha</i>	:the four principal objects of life
<i>raga</i>	:attachment
<i>ragadvesha</i>	:attachment and aversion
<i>rajasika</i>	:passionate, active
<i>rajo guna</i>	:quality of passion, activity
<i>rasa</i>	:aesthetic taste sentiment
<i>rasasvada</i>	:relish of aesthetic taste
<i>rasadi</i>	:aesthetic taste etc.
<i>raudra</i>	:fierce
<i>riti</i>	:style, figure of speech
<i>rudhi</i>	:convention
<i>rupa</i>	:form
<i>rupa chitta</i>	:sphere of forms
<i>sabda</i>	:word
<i>sadharanikarana</i>	:universalization of experience
<i>sadrishya</i>	:similarity
<i>samadhi</i>	:concentration

<i>samaya</i>	:equality
<i>samanya</i>	:genus
<i>samatva</i>	:equality, equanimity
<i>sambhoga</i>	.union
<i>sakala</i>	:perfect
<i>sakshin</i>	:witness
<i>samghata</i>	:an aggregate
<i>samjna (sanna)</i>	:perception
<i>samsara</i>	:recurring worldly experience
<i>samskara</i>	:latent impressions
<i>samskara dukha</i>	:pain arising from latent impressions
<i>samyag darsana</i>	:focussed insight
<i>samyogi</i>	:conjunct
<i>sanga</i>	.clinging
<i>sankalpa</i>	:will
<i>sanna (samjna)</i>	:perception
<i>sannyasa</i>	.asceticism
<i>sannayasasrama</i>	:stage of the ascetic
<i>santana</i>	:series
<i>santosha</i>	:satisfaction
<i>sattva</i>	:goodness
<i>sattvika bhaava</i>	:bodily changes
<i>sattva guna</i>	:quality of goodness
<i>savikalpa</i>	:differentiated perception
<i>sila</i>	:right discipline
<i>skandha</i>	:component part
<i>smriti</i>	:memory
<i>smritibhramsa</i>	:destruction of memory
<i>smriti pramoshā</i>	:obscuration of memory
<i>smriti samskarajanyam jnanam</i>	:cognition produced by past impressions
<i>sparsha</i>	:contact
<i>spriha</i>	.desire for acquisition
<i>sphota</i>	.breaking forth, bursting
<i>sringara</i>	.erotic
<i>sraddha</i>	:faith
<i>sthayibhava</i>	.enduring emotional state
<i>suddha chaitanya</i>	:pure consciousness
<i>sudra</i>	.worker, the fourth varna
<i>sukha</i>	.pleasure

<i>sukhanusayi ragah</i>	:attachment generated by pleasure
<i>sukshama rupa</i>	:subtle form
<i>sunrita</i>	:truthfulness
<i>sushupti</i>	:deep sleep
<i>sutra</i>	:short rule
<i>svapna</i>	:dream
<i>tamas</i>	:dullness, darkness, inertia
<i>tamoguna</i>	:quality of dullness, inertia
<i>tanmatras</i>	:the subtle basis of elements
<i>tanhajata</i>	:born of desire
<i>tanu</i>	:attenuated form of samskara
<i>tapadukha</i>	:pain arising from anxiety
<i>tattvamasi</i>	:“That thou art” - the great saying of Upanishads
<i>trigunatita</i>	:one who transcends the three qualities of goodness, passion and dullness
<i>trishna</i>	:craving
<i>turiya</i>	:the fourth state of consciousness beyond waking, dream and deep sleep
<i>udara</i>	:manifest form of impressions
<i>udvega</i>	:anxiety
<i>upadha</i>	:deception
<i>upayoga</i>	:conscious attention of the self directed to an object
<i>upeksha (upakka)</i>	:overlooking the faults in others
<i>utkarsha</i>	:sense of exaltation
<i>utsaha</i>	:energy, enthusiasm
<i>vairagya</i>	:detachment
<i>vaisya</i>	:producer of goods, trader, the third varna
<i>vanaprastha</i>	:hermit, the third stage of life
<i>varna dharma</i>	:duties regarding class system with four classes
<i>varnasrama dharma</i>	:duties regarding class and stages of life

<i>vasana</i>	·the latent tendency which influences
<i>vastumatra</i>	matter of fact
<i>vasyatamana</i>	the self-controlled person
<i>vata</i>	:wind, one of the three humours of the body
<i>vataja</i>	:temperament arising from excess of wind
<i>vedana</i>	.feeling
<i>vedana skandha</i>	:feeling component
<i>vibhaava</i>	:a state of body or mind
<i>vibhava trishna</i>	:thirst for wealth and power
<i>vichikitsa</i>	:doubt
<i>vicchinna</i>	.intercepted form of impression
<i>vidhimutta (vidhimukta)</i>	:the subconscious that is free from processes
<i>vijnana</i>	:understanding, intelligence
<i>vijnanamaya kosa</i>	:the sheath of intelligence
<i>vikala</i>	:non-sensuous imperfect perception
<i>vikshepa</i>	·distraction
<i>vikshipta</i>	:distracted state of mind
<i>vipralambha</i>	:separation of lovers
<i>vira</i>	:hero, warrior
<i>virodha</i>	:opposite
<i>viveka</i>	:discrimination, discernment
<i>vivekakhyati</i>	:non-discrimination
<i>viyoga</i>	:separation
<i>vruttis</i>	:operations, fluctuation
<i>vyabhichari bhaavas</i>	:transitory emotional states
<i>vyakti</i>	:the particular, the individual
<i>vyanjana</i>	:suggestion
<i>vyavasayatmika buddhi</i>	:cultivated mind, resolute mind
<i>yaga/yajna</i>	:sacrifice
<i>yatna</i>	:effort
<i>yama</i>	:restraint
<i>yoga</i>	:union, Patanjali's system
<i>yogi</i>	:follower of yoga system
<i>yogyata</i>	:ability, consistency

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